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GREAT-BRITAIN's TRUE SYSTEM:

Wherein is clearly shewn,

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|--|--|
| I. That an Increase of the PUBLIC DEBTS and TAXES must, in a few Years, prove the Ruin of the <i>Moried</i> , the <i>Trading</i> , and the <i>Landed Interests</i> . | III. That such a Design, however seemingly difficult, is very practicable: With a Sketch of various <i>Schemes</i> for that Purpose. |
| II. The Necessity of raising the SUPPLIES to carry on War, <i>within the Year</i> . | IV. An EXPEDIENT which will support the <i>public Credit</i> , in all Times of public Distress and Danger. |

To which is prefixed,

An Introduction, relative to the forming a NEW PLAN of BRITISH POLITICKS, with Respect to our FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and our Connections on the CONTINENT.

Humbly submitted to the Consideration of all the GREAT MEN, IN and OUT of Power.

By MALACHY POSTLETHWART, Esq;

L O N D O N:

Printed for A. MILLAR, in the *Strand*; J. WHISTON, and B. WHITE, and W. SANDBY, in *Fleet-street*.

M DCCCLVII.



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the public Deans

and I know myself, in a few hours, I have

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Politicks with Respect to Foreign Affairs

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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Considerations, shewing that the Connections between GREAT-BRITAIN and His Majesty's GERMAN DOMINIONS, have proved highly beneficial to each other, and may be rendered far more so.

GREAT-BRITAIN'S NEW SYSTEM, *with Relation to our DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, in a Series of Letters; shewing the Necessity and Practicability of raising the SUPPLIES within the Year, without running the Nation further in Debt, and thereby encreasing the public Taxes.*

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The Effect of a quick Circulation between
Manufacturers and Consumers further
which Principle depend the Ease and
to the Facility of Raising the Supplies within the



AN
HUMBLE ATTEMPT
TO FORM
A *new Plan* of BRITISH POLITICS,
IN REGARD TO
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

With Considerations, shewing that the Connections between GREAT BRITAIN and *His Majesty's* GERMAN DOMINIONS, may be conducive to render them highly beneficial to each other.

IF it should be resolved to raise the SUPPLIES *within the Year*, as has been humbly proposed in the Sequel of this Tract ; yet this should not prevent the Exertion of our utmost Efforts to bring the War to a Conclusion as soon as may be, by a safe, and
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an honourable Peace ; and that as lasting and durable, as the Nature of Things will admit of : Otherwise we shall only fight to negotiate, and negotiate to fight again as long as we are a State, every ten or twelve Years : which after all, will leave the Affairs of *Europe* as well as our own always in a precarious Situation, which may, at length, prove the Ruin of this Nation, notwithstanding our Ability and determined Resolution to raise the Supplies *within the Year*.

Experience having shewn that in all the Wars between *England* and *France*, since the Revolution, the Event has not proved beneficial to *England*, any way proportionate to the immense Profusion of Blood and Treasure she has expended ; it should seem that our past Systems of Policy, in Regard to our Foreign Affairs have not been duly concerted

certed to put it out of the Power of *France* to annoy us, or disturb the Tranquility of *Europe* in future.

Wherefore, there appears, at present, a Necessity for *England* to change her System in Regard to *France*, and adopt such other that bids fairer than our former, to enable her so to restrain that restless Potentate, that they may never more have it in their Power to kindle up the Flames of War against *England*.

We have the Experience of Three great Wars to convince us, that the strongest Confederacies which can be formed, *upon the Principles of the former*, are scarce a Match for *France*; and therefore they that, at present, are for trusting to the single Strength of *England*, in Opposition to a Force so much Superior, pay no Regard to past Experience. A Standing Army is in-
con-

consistent with the Preservation of our Constitution: The *French* King, on the contrary, is never without one: Therefore it is our Business to secure the Assistance of such as have always a standing Force ready to oppose his; to the End that by their Fleets at Sea, as well as their Armies on the Continent, they may in Conjunction with us, deter him from invading *England*; or, if he does, soon find him so much Work at Home, as may oblige him rather to think of defending his own Dominions, than invading those of his Neighbours.

In Order to secure to ourselves such a military Force upon the Continent, and the requisite additional Degree of Maritime Strength to act in Concert with *England* against *France* and her Allies; it is not proposed to purchase them in the expensive Manner that *England* hitherto has done, for we cannot afford so to do:

do: On the contrary, I humbly apprehend, that they may be obtained with very little Expence to this Nation, in Comparison to what it has cost on former Occasions; by the Negotiations of a wise, a united, and an upright Administration: Which, if it can be happily effected, by the Means of what I shall desire the Honour most humbly to submit, in *Manuscript*, to the Wisdom of the Administration, my Endeavours may deserve Attention.

The Strength of *France*, at present, both by Sea and Land is, by Virtue of her Commerce, greater than it ever was, in Comparison to That of her Neighbours: And such seems to be the Influence of this Court, that she appears, at present, likely to add to her Strength, by potent Alliances and very interesting Neutralities, while *England* may labor under inextricable Difficulties, if she cannot

form a more powerful Confederacy than she ever yet did.

In Times of War as well as Peace, the *French* are so circumstanced in their Trade, as to be able to undersell *Britain* in the general, in such Manufactures as interfere with those of the latter at Foreign Markets, at least from 15 to 30 *per Cent.* on an Average.

Though the *French* are, at present, from the wise Measures taken at the Beginning of the present Rupture by the Court of *England*, greatly disabled from carrying their Merchandize in their own Bottoms, to Foreign Markets; yet this, it is to be feared, will not diminish their *Exports*, if the *Dutch*, the *Hamburghers*, the other *Hanse-Towns*, the *Danes*, the *Swedes*, and the *Spaniards*, become their maritime Carriers, by Virtue of their Neutrality.

Those

Those trading Carriers have an extensive Correspondence with the mercantile Part of the *French* Nation. This cements such Friendships between them, that in Times of War, the same commercial Correspondence is continued, and enlarged by Neutral States, in Proportion as *France* is disabled by such Wars, from being her own *maritime Carriers*.

Neutral Carriers for *France*, will, in Times of War practise every Art to conceal *French* Property. Little is discovered, compared to what is secreted by the mercantile Arts.

The Merchandizes of that Nation, which can be purchased the cheapest, and will turn to the best Account to Neutrals at Foreign Markets, will be the most encouraged by such Neutrals, who will force the Sales everywhere. And, if such Merchandises interfere with those of *Great Britain*,

and her Plantations, such *Neutral-Dealings* will injure her Interests, in Proportion as they shall advance those of *France*.

There is little Occasion, in the present Case, for Neutrals to practise any hazardous Arts to cover *French* Property, seeing that is so much cheaper than *English*, and therefore, from what has been urged through the whole Course of this Tract, they are the more acceptable in the general at Foreign Markets. For such Neutral Trading States will purchase *French* Property in the Ports of *France* for their own Account, and gain more by carrying That to Foreign Markets than they can do by purchasing, or covering *British* Property : And when such *French* Property, by fair Purchase, becomes the Property of the Traders of Neutral States, it is not liable to Capture. Nor do Neutrals thus gain by the general Vent of *French* Merchandize only, but also by
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the Article of Freight: And, if by the Arts of Merchandizing, Neutrals transact the Business for *French* Account (which they can easily do and conceal) their Gains by Freight and high Commission for screening, make it more for the Interests of Neutrals to traffic in Times of War, in *French* than in *British* Merchandize, the latter being so much dearer than the former, as observed. Besides, *England*, at present, being their own Carriers more than *France*, it deprives Neutral States of those Advantages arising to them by Freight from *England*, which they receive from *France*; and therefore Neutrals, neither reaping those Benefits from *British* Freights, nor *British* Merchandizes, nor from high Commission for the screening of *British* Property, as they actually do, by trafficking in *French* Property; such Neutrals will encourage the *French* Trade

Trade more than the *British*: And therefore *England* cannot reap those Advantages by the above-mentioned Neutralities that *France* does *.

Thus while *England* may be gaining some temporary Advantages at Sea over the Enemy, her Commerce and Navigation may be insensibly ruined, and those of *France* proportionably advanced by Trading Neutrals. For, when foreign Markets, have been, in Times of War, accustomed to *French* Commodities, it will be no easy Matter for the *English* to regain such Trade; not altho' we have *Treaties of Commerce* subsisting with certain Nations; for Traders will easily evade such Treaties, while they can gain more by trafficking in *French* than in *British* Fabricks: And Foreign Courts will coun-

* This Point is more particularly demonstrated by *Figures*, in my *Manuscript*.

tenance rather than discourage such evasive Arts, as might be instanced if necessary.

If in Consequence hereof our *British Exports* decline, our *Imports* must in the like Degree, because the less we sell of our *own Commodities*, the less we shall be able to purchase of *Foreign*; and consequently the *Public Revenue* will dwindle as both do. This will damp the *Public Credit*, dispirit the whole *Trading Interest*, and ruin our Navigation.

But this will not prove the Case of *France*. Her Manufacturers and Artisans, and her whole Trading Interest, will, by the crafty Arts of Neutral Traders, have more Employment in Time of War than Peace. The Revenues of *France* will be kept in good Plight, and her public Credit upheld, maugre all the Injury that
Britain

Britain alone seems capable of doing them by Sea.

To engage the *Dutch* in a Neutrality, *France* has wisely applied to the darling Passion of that People : They have convinced them that it is more in her Power to promote the Interest of the Republic, than it is in that of *England* ; unless the Court of *England* shall think proper to change her System, and convince the *Dutch*, that she neither wants *Will* nor *Power*, to make it more for the Interest of *Holland* to act in Concert with her vigorously against *France*, than *France* can do to induce them to fall in with her Measures.

A Change in the System of *England*, from continental to meerly SEA-WARS, might prove a very eligible Change ; if we had guarded against destructive Trading-Neutralities, and against a Possibility of *England* as well as *British America* being made
the

the Seat of internal Wars. Had we effectually prevented the former, the latter would have been impracticable, because the Trade of *France* would soon have been so distressed (by wanting Neutral Powers to carry their Goods to Foreign Markets) that, in Conjunction with the wise Measures taken, in making Reprisals on the *French* Commerce without a Declaration of War, the Public Credit of *France*, would, by the Ruin of their Trade have been so struck at, that She could not have raised so easily the Royal Navy as she has done, nor have threatened *England* with Invasion, or obtained, as she has, those Advantages perhaps, in the *Mediterranean*.

To detach the *Dutch* and other maritime States from a Neutrality, and draw the whole Weight of their Power into the *British* Scale as *Principals* (not merely as *Auxiliaries*, or
Subsi-

Subsidiaries) is an Event greatly to be desired by *England*. Without which, it will be very difficult for *England* to defeat the Designs of *France*: But if she does, upon our past Principles of Policy, it can only prove a *temporary Defeat*, depending on a short-lived Peace, as has always been the Case from the Revolution to the present Time.

To bring about such an Event, there are Obstacles that may appear unsurmountable. Great are the Prejudices of the *Dutch* against the *English*, with Regard to Matters of Trade; and no less are the Prejudices of the *English* against the *Dutch* on various Accounts. Till these are radically removed on both Sides, *England* will never gain the *Dutch* over to act in Concert with her against *France*, with the full Weight of their Power, and that so zealously, as if
England

England and *Holland* were one and the same Nation: And till such an inseparable Union is cemented between these Maritime Powers, *France* will, at length, perhaps, be an overmatch for both.

To promote such an indissoluble Union, *England* must take the Lead. But even a grand Alliance (which the *Dutch* are never likely to be brought into again) founded on the Principles only of that in Queen *Anne's* Reign, would not now defeat the Designs of *France* and *Spain*, and others, who soon may act in Conjunction with her very likely, &c. For it would be easy to shew, that the Foundation which these Potentates have laid for the Encrease of their maritime Commerce, and their Naval Force, will daily encrease their Wealth and their Strength: and therefore such Kind of *British* Alliances, can only be productive, as they have hitherto been,

been, of the eternal Round of War, and a short-lived Peace: Which Policy must at length impoverish this Nation, destroy its Inhabitants, and subvert the Constitution.

If there is a *Ne plus ultra*, with Regard to the Encrease of the Public Debts and Taxes, as well as with Regard to the Reduction of Interest: if there is a *Ne plus ultra*, as well in Regard to the Profusion of Blood, and the Loss of our People by Wars, beyond which the Nation cannot, with Safety, go further Lengths: if fighting and negotiating, according to our former Politicks must inevitably bring us to such a *Ne plus ultra*, the Fate of this Nation must soon be determined; unless we, in Time, change our *old foreign System*, for a better, that will prevent those Calamities to our Country.

Some

Some look upon *Holland* as an impotent Ally. Though the States are not, at present, actually powerful by Land and Sea; yet they are potentially so. Their System, at present, is to conceal their Strength, and their Wealth, that their Conduct may give less Umbrage to *England*, whose System they think is diametrically opposite to their general Interest: And till they are otherwise convinced, it is to be feared, that their Interest will influence them to act rather like an Enemy, than a Friend to *Great-Britain*, however great a Regard many of the *wiser Dutch* may have to this Kingdom.

Holland never wants Plenty of Naval Stores, they making one capital Article, of their Commerce. They have many commodious Ship-Yards, where they can build 300 Trading Vessels a Year; and where their Ship-

Carpenters, if they have but two Month's Notice, will undertake to build, during an whole Year next following, a Man of War every Week fit to launch. This has been done at the Village of *Sardam*, at the Mouth of the River *Saren*, in *North Holland*, and in several other Places; and doubtless what has been done, may be again. Nor was the Trading Interest of *Holland* ever richer than at present; nor had the *Dutch* in general ever such a large Share of Wealth in the *British* Funds, as well as in those of other Nations.

The principal Part of the *Dutch* Trade, depending on maritime Carriage; which, from their peculiar penurious Way of Living, they perform cheaper than any other Nation, this does not, at present, as I have noticed, interfere with the *British* Commerce. On the contrary, it has extended

tended the same, by the *Dutch* carrying *British* Merchandizes to Foreign Markets cheaper than we can do ourselves ; for which we are proportionably obliged to them. If the *Dutch* were to lay this Branch of Carriage down To-morrow, little Share of it would devolve to *Great-Britain*, but to the *French*, the *Prussians*, the *Danes*, the *Swedes*, the *Hamburghers*, and the other *Hanse-Towns*, who sail much cheaper than we.

The Divisions between *England* and *Holland*, in Regard to Matters of Trade, first gave *France* the Opportunity to encrease her Naval Strength, to extend her Dominions in both the *Indies*, to drive the *English* out of the Trade of *Hudson's-Bay*, and of great Part of that of *Newfoundland*; to lay such high Duties on our respective Commodities as amounted to a Prohibition, and there-

by to encourage and force her own Subjects to establish our Manufactures in *France*, and by that Means to run away with a great Share of *ours*, as well as of the *Dutch* Trade to *Spain*, the *Levant*, and other Countries.

Too many seem to be insensible of the Advantages *England* derives from *Holland* in the Way of Trade. The *British* Commodities that have been sent to *Holland* are prodigious, whether we consider our Woollen Manufactures, the Product of our own Country, or our Plantation and *East-India* Goods, &c. But if the Commercial Connections of Interest between *Holland* and *France* encrease, and those between *England* and *Holland* decline, (as must be the Consequence of a *Dutch* Neutrality for any Time) our *British Exports* to *Holland* must decline, as will also the Benefits arising to us from their Maritime Carriage;

riage; while Advantages of this Kind to *France*, will encrease at the Expence of *England*.

Doctor *Davenant* in his second Report to the Commissioners of the Public Accounts, dated *December* 11, 1711, by a Medium of seven Years, has valued our Trade to *Holland* as follows: *viz.*

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Our Annual Exports at	1,937,934	7	11 $\frac{1}{4}$
Our Annual Imports at	579,832	1	2 $\frac{3}{4}$
Ballance of Trade in our Favour	1,358,102	6	8 $\frac{1}{2}$

Since the Peace of *Utrecht*, the Ballance of Trade with *Holland*, has encreased in our Favour.

The *Dutch*, by their large Stock in Trade, by their Interest of Money being lower than ours, and by their having little or no Duties upon the Goods imported into *Holland*, are, by such Policy, enabled to make their Country a general Magazine of Merchandize, and therewith to carry on

a general Traffick throughout the World. And, if the *Dutch* did not purchase great Quantities of our Produce and Manufactures, our Plantation and *East-India* Goods, we could not depend on any other such parsimonious People to introduce our Commodities so cheap into so many Parts of the World.

If *England* could be wise enough to make it for the Interest of the *Hollanders* to take off as much more of our Commodities as they have done, and less or none of those of *France*; it would proportionably encrease the Obligation of *England* to *Holland*: But *England* must make it for the Interest of the *Dutch* so to do, without Detriment to herself in any Respect. And this should seem to be practicable from the Consequences of what I shall have the Honour most humbly to submit to the Consideration of
those

those in Power, who will make such Use of it as it shall be found to merit.

Though there is little Difficulty in removing the Prejudices of the *English* against the *Dutch*; yet, we fear, it may not be so easy to eradicate those of the *Dutch* against the *English*.

It was not less for our own than the Sake of the *Dutch*, that we have spent so many Millions upon the Continent in the Three Great Wars: And if a considerable Part of the Money we spent there, had not reverted to *England* again by the *Dutch* Channel of Trade, our *Public Debts* would scarce have sat so easy upon us as they have done. The Injury we did the *Dutch* at the Treaty of *Utrecht*, is not obliterated by any notable Services we have since done them. We have, doubtless, a natural Right to cultivate our own Fisheries to the utmost.

most. It would have been happier for us, perhaps, if a Matter of this Delicacy had been conducted so as to have given no Umbrage to the *Dutch*, nor any Occasion to the *French* to make that Handle of it they have done to my Knowledge, at this Con-juncture, to divide *England* and *Holland*. Their Fisheries and carrying Trades are the great Dependance of the *Dutch*; and it is the Interest of *England* to be very tender and circumspect with the *Dutch*, upon those and many other Occasions, too little regarded by this Nation; especially so, when it is considered that most of the Wealth of *Holland* centers at last in *England*, as might be shewn, if needful. Upon the whole, from the present Measures of the *Dutch*, it appears that they look upon the *French* to be better Friends to their Trade and Navigation, by which alone they can subsist, than the *English*;

glisch: And as their Barrier is in a defenceless Condition, they could not, with Safety, as Things are circumstanced, have acted any other Part than what they have done. And till *England* shall alter her System, in Regard to the *Dutch*, as well as some other Potentates, the *Dutch* and other, even our natural Allies cannot be securely depended upon by the Court of *England*. *France* may have it in her Power to detach those Allies from our Interest, and leave us to fight our own Battles against a powerful Confederacy both by Land and Sea, (acting in Support of *French* Measures, either as Auxiliaries or Principals) and to carry on our Trade, under the great Disadvantage of a powerful united maritime Force, so well as that of Neutralities, as before shewn.

Apprehending that *France* is not so easily to be reduced, at present,
within

within due Bounds, by the mere hackney'd and tried *Arts of War* alone, as by the Power and Efficacy of some *New System of Policy* rightly applied at this Conjunction; I shall most humbly endeavour to lay before the Administration the Sketch of a Plan; which, from the Wisdom of His Majesty's Councils may, probably, be so modelled, as to answer the good Purposes thereby intended.

Our most *natural Allies* are allowed to be the *Dutch*, and the *Prussians*, and next to them are the *Russians*, the *Swedes*, and the *Danes*; and, sure, I may without Offence, add the *Hanoverians*: But to engage those States permanently in the *British Interests*; *England* should not act with them upon *unnatural Principles*: And those *Principles* seem to be unnatural that are bottom'd only upon temporary *Subsidiary Treaties*, or upon *Auxiliary* ones, or others whereon they hitherto have been; Experience

perience having evinced that such Treaties and such Motives are not Ties and Inducements sufficiently interesting to keep these Allies steady and zealous in the *British* Cause. They will, in Spite of all temporary pecuniary Advantages, or those which are calculated for a mere present Safety, prove, at length, lukewarm; they will prove not less neglectful in sending the stipulated Succours, than indifferent to fighting in our Cause, when we have the most Need of them: Some are daily liable to be soften'd, or corrupted in Favour of the common Enemy, and even to be absolutely detached from the *British* Alliance, and their Weight thrown into the opposite Scale; when the common Security requires their most inviolable Adherence to Treaties: This Experience has shewn. Nor do some States care how long the War lasts, while their Subsidies are paid.

It

It is no Wonder, therefore, that such Kind of Confederacies have always proved a Rope of Sand, and been productive only of Peace and War alternately about every Ten or a Dozen Years ; for Want, as is humbly conceived, of grounding *British* Confederacies upon other Principles : For, we humbly apprehend, that all our Confederacies are little to be depended upon, unless they fall in with our Measures as *Principals*, and make *our Cause their Cause, and we their Cause our own in Return.*

Though *England* has fought the Battles of other States unsubsidized and unpaid, to maintain the Ballance of Power ; (of which all *Europe* ought to have a grateful Sense) yet we cannot safely depend on others to fight our Battles effectually, though well paid and subsidized. This is too natural to most, especially to the inferior States ; for after the War is at an End, the Interest of such Confederates

rates ceasing, they have rather endeavoured to prevent than forward a Pacification.

I would not be understood, that all temporary subsidizing is wholly to be laid aside: Some Powers can occasionally be gratified in no other Shape, and their Necessities require it; and even those may, and ought to be rendered proportionably beneficial to our Expence. But the Powers of most Weight in the *British* Scale, must be engaged in her Interests, by Motives more permanently prevailing, than what have hitherto been the Case; or they cannot be securely relied on to act so vigorously in Concert with *England*, as to put it out of the Power of *France* to subvert the *British* Constitution.

Which brings me to consider by what natural Means, a Matter of this high Importance, can be happily effected, in all human Appearance.

Arduous

Arduous is the Task I have undertaken ; and in the Judgment of some, perhaps, presumptive, for any private Man, to be so hardy as to attempt it. Though I should not be happy enough to succeed in my zealous Intentions, to the Good-liking of my Superiors ; yet I humbly hope they will do me the Honour to think there is some Degree of Merit in the humble Attempt : And if they, in their great Wisdom, shall find what I have to submit deserving their Deliberation, it is not to be doubted, but they will perfect what a private Man can only presume to imperfectly delineate.

Various, will be the Conjectures in Relation to the Nature of this my *intended Plan*, with Regard to our *Foreign Affairs* ; but Conjecture will scarce hit upon the same : for I will crave Leave to aver, that it is a Matter that has never yet been tried in the
Light

Light wherein I have endeavoured to represent and apply it; and yet it has enough of the Sanction of Experience to manifest its Reasonableness and its Practicability: Whence it will appear, that it is not a mere speculative Chimera, that looks with a plausible Aspect upon Paper only.

The Basis of the Design, is not founded on the trite Scheme of a *Religious League*. If it was, there would be as little Merit as Novelty in it; nor could greater Things be expected from it than hitherto have been. Permit me further to declare, that it does not solely depend upon Wars and Bloodshed, or upon very expensive, and very hazardous Expeditions: On the contrary, it is contrived, I humbly apprehend, to contribute in its Consequences, to check that unnatural Spirit of slaughtering the human Species, according to the diabolical Arts
of

of War: In a Word, the whole of my humble Intention is calculated in the End for the Preservation, not for the Destruction of Mankind; and to convince all our Allied-States, when it is happily carried into Execution, how easy it is for a very few wise and good Men to be instrumental in tying the Hands of those Nations, who plume themselves in the Butchery of their Fellow-Creatures; and to make even those Enemies of Peace happier, as Nations, than they ever can be by Means of their darling Projects of Violence and Perfidy; wherein they affect to be superlative Masters.

Though I have thought proper to declare in the general what this political Plan *is not*; it will hardly be expected that I should thus publicly declare what it *really is*; unless my Intentions were to put it in the Power of our Enemies to traverse and defeat it.

This

This would not only be highly injurious to the Nation, but a flagrant Abuse of the Liberty of the Press: And, indeed, it is too common for the Enemy through this great Channel of Freedom, to be furnished with Artillery very detrimental to the Kingdom.

But, as the King's Ministers are, at present, unhappily divided among themselves, and no one knows when the Administration will be firmly settled, and when it is, how long it may continue so; private Persons must be at a Loss to know to whom they can make Application, with any Design of public Utility; lest, at such a Crisis, it should be totally disregarded, and not only be quite thrown away, but, perhaps, be made an Use of highly injurious to the Interest of the Nation. For that which will do
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the greatest Benefit, may be converted to the greatest Mischief.

It has, therefore, been the Advice of my Friends, to make my Intentions thus publickly known, by submitting this Affair in the general, to the Consideration of all the great Men, *In and Out* of Power; my Design being no Party-Concern, but a Matter calculated, as is humbly apprehended, for the immediate Honour and Interest of *Great-Britain*, at this critical Conjunction: Nor is any Time to be lost, in carrying the same into Execution, if it shall be judged rational and practicable, when submitted to the Judgment of those, whom his Majesty shall please to appoint for its Examination. But if it should not be kept secretly and sacredly within the Breast of those with whom it shall be intrusted, and carried into immediate Execution, if approv'd, the
 Enemy

Enemy may find Means to defeat it, and thereby the good Intentions of the Proposer be frustrated, and the Nation deprived of that Emolument, which may probably arise from it.

That the Tenour of my Plan in Relation to our Foreign Affairs, may be judged of so far as I dare presume to go ; I shall observe, that it is divided into four Parts: In the first of which I have endeavoured to shew, as I have, indeed, in these Papers, that if *England* pursues the present War, upon the same Principles as she has done others since the Revolution ; such Measures do not appear likely to extricate the Nation from the Difficulties under which she, at present, seems to labour, but to plunge her into still greater and greater.

The second Part discovers, upon what general Principles of Policy, I humbly apprehend, a new System

may be formed, that seems to bid fairer, in all human Appearance, than our former, to reduce *France*, and whatever Allies she may engage in her Interests, within the Bounds of Impotency, necessary to disable her from disturbing the Tranquillity of this Kingdom in future for many Years, if not for ever.

The Third Part contains the Delineation of a Scheme to answer the great End hereby humbly proposed and intended.

The Fourth Part is an Attempt to obviate Objections that may be urged against it.

The Writer of these Papers is the last Person who would presume to think, that any of his poor Productions can be consummate, and incapable of being rendered far more complete. If the general Idea of his humble Intentions, is grounded on the

Prin-

Principles of sound Policy ; and has enough of the Sanction of Experience to prove it not an aerial impracticable Scheme ; wise Statesmen will easily model the Matter suitably to the Circumstances of public Affairs, and as easily find Ways and Means to negotiate that with Success which shall appear rational.

But if the Design should be judged too extensive in the whole ; some material Part or Parts of it may probably be found to deserve immediate Attention, and may lay the Ground work of the whole Superstructure intended to be thereon erected. Nor is this Plan a mere temporary Expedient to serve only the Turn of the Day ; no ; the Doctrine of Expedients is sufficiently exploded. On the contrary, my humble Attempt is no less than to form the Out-lines of such a System of *British* Policy, as, if steadily

ly pursued, in Regard to our Foreign Affairs, under every Administration, and at length brought to its ultimate Perfection in the executive Part, may tend to establish the present Constitution of this Kingdom, and that of some other Nations, upon such a Rock, that it will never more be in the Power of *France*, and all the Allies she can engage in her Cause hereafter, to shake them, or even put the People into a Pannic. And if, our domestic Affairs also, shall be so conducted as to coincide with the System of our Foreign Concerns, and particularly, in Regard to the *Public Revenue*: if the *Supplies* to carry on the War shall be raised *within the Year*, as I have done myself the Honour to submit to the public Consideration; it is humbly conceived, that the Commerce, and the Public Credit of this Kingdom can never more be injured.

And

And I trust that from this public Declaration of my Intentions, proper Notice will be taken of them; either by the chief People in, or out of Power; for all Persons are indifferent to me; it is their Measures which I regard; and those whose Conduct appears to me to be the best calculated to promote the true Interest and Honour of the Nation, and will accept of my best Services, are the Persons to whom I would tender them, and to none else; having Nothing to do with the Intrigues and Finesses of Parties of any Kind, nor any personal Disgust and Indignation towards any Man either in, or out of Power.

If those Persons into whose Hands I may be induced to put the Manuscripts proposed, do not make that national and honourable Use of them, I could wish; the Blame must lie at their Door, not mine. Nor is it any

Reflection on the ablest Statesmen, to receive Information and Intelligence from all Persons; but it is neither *wise* or *safe* for Men in Power to reject them when offer'd, though a proper Recompence should be expected, according to the Merit of the Service intended. As my Province and Employment is Study, it will hardly be expected, that I should altogether neglect myself, through Zeal to serve my Country. My Labours shall ever be devoted to the public Interest and Happiness, as they shall appear to me: And I am willing to hope, that no wise Man will think it amiss, if a private Person endeavours to make his own Interest consist with that of the Public. Men of large independent Fortunes may, and ought to serve their Country and Mankind in general, from other than lucrative Motives: There are those who cannot

cannot be expected so to do without some prudential Regard to their Interest: But every Man ought to make his particular Interest no Way incompatible with the general; and where that is the Case, the Public are ever ready to bestow Remunerations adequate to the Service.

However singular this open-hearted Declaration may appear, I am not without my Reasons for it. The Writer of these Papers has for many Years given public Testimony of his Zeal and Ambition to serve these Kingdoms to the utmost of his small Talents and Application: To that End, he has sacrificed his whole Life. Nor has he been wanting, when Occasions have offered, to give ample Proofs of his Desire to be useful to the Nation in a *private Capacity*; where public Communication might have been as imprudent as it would be in Regard to his present Intentions.

But

But as his Recompence hitherto has proved no Way adequate to the *private* Services, when they come to be made known; he thinks it Time to stop; it not being reasonable to expect, that a Person who in some Measure, subsists by his Studies, should go farther Lengths, but upon *secure and certain Terms and Conditions* of being suitably rewarded, as well for what private Service he has already done, as for what he has farther proposed to do, by this Publication. And if any public Regard should be paid to his zealous Endeavours to evince the Necessity and Practicability of raising the *Supplies within the Year*; and in Consequence thereof, Something of this Kind should take Effect, he is willing to hope, that there are public-spirited People in the Kingdom, who will take Care that he should not pass entirely disregarded upon that Account also. Altho' this

this Matter has been often talked of, and some ingenious Gentlemen have very worthily distinguished themselves upon this Occasion; yet I believe the Public will do me the Justice to allow that this Matter was never before put in the Light it is done in these Papers.

The last Year I was desired, by a Personage of the first Distinction, to put the Sketch of a Plan, and some short Reasons whereon it was founded, for raising the Supplies *within the Year*, into his Hands, which I had only transiently intimated in Conversation: this I did in Manuscript: But as it might then have been too late in the Year to think of an Affair of that Nature; I have reconsidered the Subject, as being more necessary, perhaps, this Year, and endeavoured to shew how far the Matter in general, may, from Variety of Topicks, be defencible. For if

once

once the Nation is convinced of its Reasonableness and Necessity, the consummate Wisdom of a *British* Parliament, will not be at any Loss to think of the proper Ways and Means to carry such their Resolution into Execution.

Before I conclude, I would beg Leave to observe in the Behalf of others ; that a Government which is sparing and niggardly in the Distribution of due Rewards and Encouragements to those who may prove the happy Instruments of laying useful Designs before Princes and Men in Power ; can never expect to be well served or supported : For Nothing can more effectually tend to destroy and extirpate all honest Industry, and all useful Arts, Studies, and Ingenuity ; and thus drive Numbers of the King's best Subjects out of the Nation, to the great Emolument
and

and Glory of other States and Empires, and to the Ruin and Destruction of our own.

That this is not the Case in *France*, I have amply shewn in my Dictionary of Commerce: And to such Policy we may ascribe the Prowess and Splendor of this neighbouring Kingdom; such Methods proving the silent, but the more effectual Arts of Conquest. By proper Encouragements, *France* drains the whole World, as it were, of the most capable, and most useful Persons, and becomes the grand Emporium, where Men, who excell in every Thing, are to be met with. A *Richlieu*, a *Mazarine*, a *Louvois*, and a *Colbert*, let none go unrewarded, who had any Talents to serve the State. *Colbert* used to declare, that he thought his Time well spent in perusing a hundred Proposals for advancing the Wealth, the Commerce, and

and the Glory of *France*, though but one of them deserved to be encouraged.

Though it is not with a very good Grace that a Person can speak of himself; yet as there are, at present, very peculiar Motives which induce to it; and such too, wherein I aver, that the Interest of the Public, is far more concerned than my own; I am willing to hope I shall not be unhappy enough to incur any Kind of Censure upon such an Occasion: Well satisfied I am, that I shall not from the candid and ingenuous Part of Mankind.

Amongst various of my humble Endeavours to serve this Kingdom, I shall desire Permission at present, to mention two only. The one is an Attempt to establish a MERCANTILE COLLEGE, which was never done before; the Plan whereof may be seen
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at large, in my universal Dictionary of Commerce, under the Article MERCANTILE COLLEGE.

In the first Part of this intended Institution, I have endeavoured to shew the Necessity of such an Establishment in *Great Britain*. In the second Part, I have laid down a *Plan* of Instruction for training up the *British Merchant*, with every desirèable Benefit and Advantage requisite to form him for his honourable Profession; and how the said *Plan* should be carried into *Execution*, by those who may think proper to attempt it. In the third Part is shewn the Usefulness and Dignity of Merchants to trading Nations in general; and their high Importance to the *British Empire* in particular, at present. This I have done with a View to raise in our *British Youth* in general, the warmest Desires to cultivate the *practical*

Etical Arts of Merchandizing, as well for the Interest of themselves, as of their Country.

Herein, also, I have, in a particular Manner, endeavoured to inspire the younger Branches of our Families of the first Distinction, with a Love of the commercial Arts; and to convince them, that there is not less Wealth, nor less Glory to be acquired by Trade, than by any of the learned Professions, or even by Arms. Whence I have taken Occasion to shew, that if ever *Britons* will attain to the Mastery of Trade, and support the *commercial Dominion*, they must do it by their superior Skill and Address in the practical Arts, as well as in the political Knowledge of Commerce; and that more depends upon these than upon the *Sword*. “ Un-
 “ less this be done, says the learned
 “ *Bishop Sprat*, they will in Vain be
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“ victorious: At the End of their
 “ Wars they will cool again; and
 “ lose all the Fruits of their Valour.
 “ The Arts of Peace, and their Im-
 “ provements, must proceed in equal
 “ Steps with the Success of their
 “ Arms; or else their Blood will be
 “ shed in Vain: they will soon return
 “ to the same Poverty, and Want of
 “ Trade, which they strove to avoid.”

In this new intended *Mercantile In-*
stitution, I have given some Intima-
 tion, in what Respect that Design
 might prove useful, even to the elder
 Branches of our most noble Fami-
 lies.

Although I may not live to see this
 Affair carried into Execution, yet
 some public spirited Persons may arise,
 who probably will one Day set the
 same on Foot. Since I have put my
 Hand to the Plough upon these Sub-
 jects, I have had the Satisfaction to
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observe not only many more useful Performances published upon this Subject than before, but many beneficial Designs encouraged in the Nation, that have a Tendency to the Promotion of the Trade and Commerce of this Kingdom, and to raise a general Spirit for these Studies. Amongst the rest, there is one in particular which ought to be taken Notice of: I mean *That* of the Prize-Donations bestowed by a most noble and honourable Lord * to encourage the Studies of Commerce even at the University of *Cambridge*; and may not this prove the happy Prelude to the Establishment of a COMMERCIAL and MERCANTILE COLLEGE, at our most learned and illustrious Seminaries?

How unspeakably interesting, and how honourable to these Kingdoms

* The Right Honourable Lord *Townshend*.

such Institutions would prove, I have endeavoured to shew, not only in the Design before-mention'd, but occasionally throughout the Universal Dictionary; which was the next public Work I engaged in, after that of the *New Mercantile Institution*.

Herein likewise is open'd to the public View, a very capacious Field of *Commercial Knowledge*; such a one, as may be said with great Truth, and I hope without the Imputation of Immodesty, never appeared before, in this, or in any other Country, upon a Plan so universal and extensive.

Throughout this Undertaking, I have endeavoured to make the national Interests my sole Guide; no other Motives whatever have had the least Influence to divert or bias me to deviate from that Principle. Nor have I been less tenacious in taking every

natural Occasion that offered, to encourage and inculcate a Spirit of Loyalty and Affection towards the present Establishment in his Majesty's most Royal and August House. As the Subject of Trade is what the People in general are more sensibly interested in, than any other next to that of Liberty; those who have manifested themselves to be their avowed and real Friends therein, can hardly be suspected to mislead them in their other political Interests. However inviolably I may have adhered to the constitutional Prerogatives of the Crown; I have shewed no less Attachment to the Rights, the Liberties, the Prosperity and Felicity of the People: And whenever Men in Power have, according to my humble Judgment, disregarded the true Interest, either of their Sovereign, or of his Subjects, I have endeavoured to point it out; but

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I hope with such Decency, Candor and Moderation, that no honest and impartial Man can be disgusted with my Conduct. Men in Power will bear Reasoning, where it is done with due Respect and Decency, as well as with a becoming Zeal for the public Welfare; and they may be induced by such Behaviour towards them, generously to rectify a *faux Pas*, when they are convinced of it; but we rarely find, that the severest Raillery, or most poignant Satyr, and personal Acrimony, have any other Tendency, than to make Men in Authority the more obstinate and pertinacious in their Misconduct. Whence it is, that tho' we esteem the Liberty of the Press, as the great Palladium of all our Liberties; yet certain it is, that it may be so licentiously abused, as to become quite useless, when we stand the most in Need of its Aid to preserve us.

It may be said, it is humbly hoped, without any Charge of Vanity or Self-sufficiency, that the Plan of my Dictionary is not only far more comprehensive than that of Monsieur *Savary* in *French*, but is essentially different in Point of Matter, as well as the Manner of its Execution in general; and may with Truth be deemed an original Work of its Kind in this Kingdom.

If Regard is to be paid to the Testimony of Numbers of the wise and impartial, I have been happy enough, according to their candid Sentiments, to be considered as one, whose Labors have not been of the least public Utility. Certain it is, that my humble Endeavours have not proved the least conducive to raise such a Spirit for the Studies of Commerce in the Nation, even amongst the young Nobility and Gentry, as
never

never took Place before: And what happy Consequences may we not expect from the Prevalence of this laudable Passion? So favourable an Opinion some are pleased to do me the Honor to entertain of my Labors, that a noble Person was pleased to say, that I had laid a more secure Foundation to check, and even destroy the Power of *France*, than could perhaps, ever be effectually done by our Fleets and our Armies alone. However polite and complimentary this might be said, certain it is, that unless our commercial Politicks shall keep an equal prosperous Pace with those of our Arms, our Blood and our Treasure will be spent to little Purpose.

The public Encouragement Mons. *Savary* met with in *France*, to induce him to engage in the compiling of his *Dictionary of Commerce*, was very engaging, and sufficient to influence

him to the Undertaking. He had the joint Aid and Assistance of a great Number of Persons to accumulate Matter for that Work : Not only Merchants of the first Eminence, but Personages of various conspicuous Ranks in the State, distinguished for their superior Knowledge in Trade, chearfully united to help him : All the public Offices of the Kingdom, the Royal Council of Commerce, and even the first Ministers of State themselves contributed to his commercial Fund for the Benefit of *France* : And the Author was not only honoured with the peculiar Encouragement and Patronage of all the great Men in Power, but he was liberally rewarded by them, and enjoyed a lucrative and honourable Post to his Death. This was the Treatment that the Author of the *French Universal Dictionary of Commerce* met with. I do not chuse, by Way of Contrast, to

to make any Declaration, at present, what Treatment the Author of the *English Universal Dictionary of Commerce* has hitherto met with; reserving that perhaps, for an humble Appeal to the Public, previously to the farther Tender of my best Services to them. To which Reservation I am the more readily induced from the public-spirited Declaration of some Persons of Distinction, who have spontaneously done me the Honour to declare, that they will use their good Offices that some public Notice may be taken of the disinterested Zeal, and indefatigable Industry, that has been shewn throughout that Undertaking: and it is well known, that I several Times hazarded my life in the Prosecution of that Work.

Was I to say, that I am indifferent in Regard to such a Testimony of public Approbation, I should say
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an Untruth : I wish it, not only as an honorary and undeserved Recompense to myself, but as an Earnest of Encouragement to others, not to be dismayed to engage in Enterprizes the most arduous ; to conduct them upon Principles purely national, and no Way stained by Party Prepossession, Rancour, and Malignancy.

Every Man of Candour and Impartiality will grant, that the Person who in a *private Capacity* importantly serves his King and Country, is no less entitled to a Reward suitable to the Service done, than he who does the same in a *public* one. The speculative Person may be as useful to the State as the active ; and when a Person takes upon him the contemplative Recluse, rather than the bustling Life, either from Choice, or Tenderness of Constitution, or from other Motives that induce him to think that he may
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be more serviceable in the one Capacity, than he could be in the other; it is a Sign that he has made the best Choice, in Regard to the public Service; and if such Service has been accepted, no Man will say but he has just Pretensions to be paid for it. I would not ascribe a Neglect of this to other Causes than to those unhappy Divisions and Distractions that have subsisted amongst our Rulers. These Things every true Friend to his Country must lament; and private Persons as well as the Public, will suffer thereby. Nor can any one, at present, judge to whom he can apply, in Relation to any public Service that may be intended, unless now to Majesty itself; and this creates private Pique and Resentment from Persons in Authority.

At the present Conjunction, it is the Duty of every Man to throw in
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his Mite in the public Service: And I have waited many Months to know to whom in Power, I could properly communicate my Intentions; which, might, in all human Appearance, have saved the Nation a very great Expence, in Consideration of a reasonable Reward. But to lose more Time, would be to lose the whole of my Labours, and the Public all the Benefit and Advantage thereby humbly and zealously proposed. As Things are therefore circumstanced, I was at a Loss to act otherwise than I have done.

What Degree of Merit my past private Services may be judged to have, there are Persons of the first Distinction, who well know; and who have done me the Honour to express their Concern, that Men in Power should be so circumstanced, as to prevent due Attention being given to them. If the
Public

Public could be made sensible thereof (which cannot be done at present, without Injury to the Nation) those Persons also well know, what the *public Voice* might be expected to declare in their Favour. Nor are some Persons of Honour unapprized of the private Advantages that I might have made in all Probability, from *another Quarter*, if not restrained by an over-ruling Passion for the Interest and Glory of these Kingdoms.

But I am willing to trust, that when the Administration shall be happily settled, and happily united, in the Service and Glory of their Country, due Regard will be had to these Things.

Had the Writer of these Papers given no *public* or *private* Testimony of his Turn to Studies, that have proved useful to the State, it might be unreasonable; it might have been
justly

justly thought presumptive in such a one, to expect to make Terms for his future intended Services: But as the Case is otherwise, he humbly hopes, that some People will be candid and ingenuous enough to think, that he has a Right to be treated upon a Footing Something different to that of an upstart, idle Schemist or Projector, who has never given Proof of any Talents that might deserve the public Regard and Attention.

Nature having given me but a very tender and weak Constitution; I have studiously declined and avoided as much as I well could, every Degree of the public Life, as being inconsistent with, and indeed destructive of that small State of Health which I have several Years enjoyed: And it will be easily believed, that the Studies I have been engaged in has not mended it. I therefore, considered in what Capacity

capacity I might prove any Way useful to Society; and accordingly betook myself to the studious Life; experiencing that to be more consonant to my Preservation, than that of the active and public one, as it left me at Liberty to live in a Way agreeable to myself, and not conformable to that of others.

In this my retired and contemplative State, I am willing to think, that I have made such unprejudiced and disinterested Observations upon Men and Things, that may not only prove of peculiar Utility to these Kingdoms, and especially with Respect to the present Situation and Circumstances of public Affairs, but to Mankind in general; having made some Discoveries from my philosophical Speculations into Nature, that may one Day not a little surprize the learned World; and many of them tend importantly to such Improvements in
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the *active Life*, as will greatly benefit and advantage Society in general.

Having thus devoted my whole Life to the public Service, it is humbly hoped, that I shall not have Reason to charge my Country with Ingratitude, or great Men with Want of Duty to their Sovereign, in laying my past, and my further intended Services candidly and justly before Him; that others may not be rather induced to disserve the King and Kingdom, than study to benefit either. And if this shall not be done, let who will be in Power, I must desire to be excused, if I do myself the Honour to present a *Memorial* into His Majesty's own Royal Hand, and trust solely to His gracious Liberality: This I would by all Means rather desire to avoid, it not being my Intention to displease any Person in Power at present, or whoever shall come into Power; the

the Officers of the Crown being the proper Persons to have Access to Majesty, on Occasions that concern the public Interests. And confident I am, that if my honest Zeal in the King's and in the Kingdoms Service, is faithfully represented to our gracious Sovereign, I shall not go unrewarded; knowing some extraordinary Instances of his Majesty's Royal Liberality, upon Occasions of far less Moment to the Dignity of his Crown, and the Honour of his Kingdoms,

CONSIDERATIONS, *showing how the Connections between GREAT-BRITAIN and His Majesty's GERMAN DOMINIONS, have been conducive to render them highly beneficial to each other; and by what Measures they may be rendered more so. Also Remarks on the Consequences that may attend the present happy Union of the Houses of Brunswick and Brandenburg.*

THAT Britons may have a true Idea of the grand System of *France*, with Respect to the Encrease of their Commerce, their maritime Power, and their Dominions, from the Time of the Commencement of the Reign of *Lewis XIV.* to the present Time, under every Administration since; we cannot better give the Representation thereof, than from describing the Secrets of the Cabinet Council

• Council of *France*, as they became unluckily divulged before the Year 1680; and by comparing the Conduct of that Crown since, with the Discovery then made, we shall find that to be the Master-key to all their Misteries of State, let their Pretensions be e'er so contrary. We were first obliged with this Anecdote by a Writer of Authority, intitled *Britannia Languens*, or a Discourse of Trade, published in the Year 1680.

This judicious Writer mentions a Treatise, written by a Gentleman bred under Mons. *Colbert*, which he gave to the King in *Manuscript*, and which coming afterwards to be printed, about the Year 1664, the Gentleman fell into Disgrace, was sent to the *Bastile*, and afterwards banished for suffering this Affair to become public. From this *French* System, I shall quote such Parts as are the most

essential to my present Purpose---
 “ The State, says this *French* Patriot,
 “ is no farther powerful, than in
 “ its public Treasure. The Founda-
 “ tion of the Wealth of a State con-
 “ sists in the Multitude of its Sub-
 “ jects; for it is they that till the
 “ ground; that produce Manufac-
 “ tures; that manage Trade; that
 “ go to War; that people Colonies;
 “ and, in a Word, that bring in
 “ Money.

“ There cannot be too great a
 “ Number of Husbandmen in *France*,
 “ * by Reason of the Fertility of the
 “ Country to produce Corn, which
 “ may be transported, and therefore
 “ we ought to make great Stores of
 “ it, and have it, as much as may
 “ be, in Readiness.

* The *French* have wonderfully encouraged Agriculture since *Colbert's* Time.

“ Handicraft’s-men and Artificers
 “ are no less useful; for, besides that
 “ Manufactories do keep Men at
 “ Work, they are the Cause that the
 “ Silk, Wool, Skins, Flax, Timber, and
 “ other Productions that are raising
 “ in *France*, are made Use of; which
 “ being wrought up into Wares, not
 “ made in foreign Parts, the Country
 “ People find a Vent for them. And
 “ we may go farther into the making
 “ of more valuable Manufactures, as
 “ we now do of Hats for *Spain*;
 “ and Stuffs for all *Europe*; a Mat-
 “ ter of great Consequence: for this
 “ quickens Trade, and makes Money
 “ pass to and fro, which promotes
 “ the Public; and therefore every
 “ one’s private Advantage *.

* To what an extraordinary Degree *France* has ad-
 vanced in their manufactural and mechanical Arts, I
 have shewn throughout this Tract, as also what a
 broad-bottom’d Foundation they have laid for that *com-
 mercial Dominion*, which will give them that general
 Empire over *Europe*, that their grand System aims at;
 unless they are prevented at this Juncture.

“ There must be *Merchants* † also,
 “ for, without their Industry, our
 “ Commodities might be locked up
 “ in Warehouses. All Things con-
 “ spire to give *France* Hopes of Suc-
 “ cess; the Work, however, is such
 “ as must be *leisurely* carried on, and
 “ perfected by *Degrees*; so great a
 “ *Design* continually alarming *Europe*,
 “ *Asia*, *Africa*, and *America*, Friends
 “ and Foes, the Precipitation of it
 “ would be its Ruin.

“ The King may keep 100 Gallies
 “ and 100 Ships in the *Mediterra-*
 “ *nean*, and 200 Sail upon the Ocean:
 “ The more Vessels he shall have,

† What peculiar Encouragement and Honours, this Nation has given to the Merchants since this Time, I have represented; and if Merchandizing to a certain Degree was, in a proper Manner, made the Road to Honour and Nobility in this Kingdom, it might be attended with no little Benefit to the State.

“ the more able he must be to reco-
 “ ver the Expence of them : The Sea
 “ will yield Maintenance for the Sea,
 “ by *Commerce or War* : There is
 “ Timber in *France* ; there is Cor-
 “ dage ; there are Sails ; there is Iron
 “ and Brass, &c.

“ When Things have taken their
 “ Courses, Seamen will be had in
 “ Time, and the Profit that will en-
 “ crease, will afford Store, and bring
 “ them in from all Parts of the
 “ World †. The Fleets of the *North* ;
 “ yea, though *Holland and England*
 “ should unite against *France*, they

† A few Years after this grand Scheme of *Trade* and
maritime Power had been formed in *France*, they spared
 no Pains to raise a flourishing Navy. This Navy was
 as splendid and magnificent, as it was formidable.
 It actually consisted of 115, of the First, Second, Third,
 Fourth, and Fifth Rates ; of 24 small Frigates, 8 Fire-
 Ships, 10 *Barcalongas*, and 22 Pinks ; making in all,
 179 Ships, consisting of 7080 Pieces of Cannon, 1028
 Major-Officers, 7955 Marine-Officers, 20,618 Ma-
 rines, 10,904 Soldiers, the whole Crew being 39,477
 (the 1028 Major-Officers not included.)

“ could not avoid their *Ruin in the*
 “ *End*; for, how could the one, or
 “ the other make good their Com-
 “ merce, (which is all they have to
 “ trust to) if they were forced to keep
 “ great *Armadas* to continue it?

“ The Point of *Britain* is the Gate
 “ to enter into, and go out of the
 “ Channel; 50 Ships of War at *Brest*
 “ would keep those Gates shut, and
 “ they would not open them but by
 “ the King of *France's* Command.
 “ Thus there would require no War
 “ to be almost for all those Things,
 “ nor his Majesty's Forces hazarded:
 “ it will be sufficient to give *his Or-*
 “ *ders to Foreigners*; nor will it be
 “ difficult to cut them out Work in
 “ their own Countries, and, by that
 “ Means, stay their Arms at Home,
 “ and make them spend their Strength
 “ there §. “ His

§ Are not the Seeds of Dissention so effectually sowed
 in *Holland*, in Favour of *France*, that they have of late
 Years

“ His Majesty’s Power being thus
 “ strongly settled in each Sea, it will
 “ be easy to secure the Commerce of
 “ *France*, and even to draw *Mer-*
 “ *chants* thither from all Parts; I say
 “ *secure*, for till this be done, it will
 “ always be uncertain and dangerous.
 “ It must studiously be prevented,
 “ that Commerce introduce not into
 “ the State, Superfluity, Excess, and
 “ Luxury; which are often followed
 “ with Ambition, Avarice, and a dan-
 “ gerous Corruption of Manners. *

“ It were to be wished, that the
 “ King did add to the Kingdom of

Years influenced the *Dutch* to what Measures they have pleased? And have not Rebellions also been cherished in these Kingdoms; and have we not been threatened with the most alarming Invasions, and may we not be soon so again? For this we find, is an essential Part of the *French* grand System.

* *France* does not only, at present, supply themselves with all those *Woollen Manufactures*, and other Manufactures, which they formerly took from *England*, and other Countries, and exclude the *Luxuries* of other Nations from their own Dominions, but they supply all the World more or less, with their own Superfluities; which are the greatest Luxuries to those Countries and produce the most dangerous Corruption of Manners.

“ *France*

“ *France*, all the *LOW-COUNTRIES* * to
 “ the *Rhine*, which would make him
 “ Master of the *North Seas*.

“ It would be convenient that he
 “ had *Strasburgh* †, to keep all *Ger-*
 “ *many* quiet.

“ He had need to have *Franche*
 “ *Comte* ‡, to lay a Restraint upon the
 “ *Switzers*. “ *Milan*

* Had they not this in their Power in the last War; and how far are they off this their darling Point at present, unless the *Dutch* shall be effectually roused to exert their whole Strength in Concert with their *Britannic and Prussian Majesties*, to prevent this Catastrophe to the whole Protestant Interest?

† *Strasburg* was a City of *Germany*, before this Scheme was hatched, in the middle of the *Upper-Rhine*, and the Capital of *Alsace*, and a free *Imperial City*, and *Sovereign State*, till it was treacherously surprized by the *French* in the Year 1682, in Consequence of this System. It had then a great and flourishing Trade, and the *PROTESTANT RELIGION* was established there; but they have ever since been obliged to submit to Popery and Tyranny. The *French* have improved Nothing but the *Fortifications*, which are very formidable; and as long as they are possessed of this Capital, which, in a Manner commands *ALSACE*, and gives the *French* an easy Passage into *SWABIA*, the *GERMANS* will never be at Rest long. Was it not therefore, a wise Proposition in his *Prussian Majesty* to offer lately to act in Concert with the House of *Austria*, to recover *Alsace* from *France*, for the Benefit of the Empire, if that Court had declined *French Measures*?

‡ *Franche Comte*, or the County of *Burgundy*, was Part of the Duchy of *Burgundy*, and subject to the *French Branch*

“ § *Milan* is necessary in Respect of
 “ *Italy*.

“ *Genoa* || would make the King
 “ of *France* Master of the *Mediterra-*
 “ *nean Sea*.

Branch of the House of *Austria* before this Scheme, but taken from them by *Lewis XIV.* and confirm'd to *France* by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, Anno 1678. It is now a Principality of *France*, is bounded by *Lorrain* on the North (which is also now annex'd to *France*) by *Alsace* and *Switzerland* on the East, by *La Brasse* and *Bugry* on the South, and by the Duchy of *Burgundy*, and Part of *Champagne* on the West. Thus have *France* added to their Strength on this Side !

§ *Milan* abounding with Corn, Wine, and delicate Fruits, well watered with Lakes and Rivers, and intermixed with great Numbers of fine Towns and Villages, and subject to the House of *Austria*, would be no disagreeable Morfel to *France* ; especially as it might, consistent with their System in *Italy*, tend to awe the *Piedmontese* and other Neighbours, who should dare to disobey them.

|| In Order to perpetrate this *French* System, *Lewis XIV.* ordered the City to beat about their Ears—When the *Spaniards* possessed *Milan* and *Naples*, this Republic was obliged to be governed by *Spanish* Councils ; and when the *Austrians* possessed these Countries, they have influenced their Affairs, which frequently draws on them the Resentment of other Powers, particularly of the *French*, who have not only bombarded their Towns, but obstructed their Foreign Trade ; and the formidable Fleets of this Republic, which formerly gained so many Victories over the *Greeks*, the *Venetians*, *Turks*, *Spaniards*, &c. and settled so many Colonies in *Asia*, and the *Euxine Sea*, are now dwindled, and chiefly by the Power and Policy of *France*, to a few paultry Gallies : and
 when,

“ *Sicily* * might easily make an
 “ Infurrection.

“ *Portugal* † is a perpetual Instru-
 “ ment for weakening *Spain*. The
 “ *Venetians* and People of *Italy* are
 “ wise; to reduce them to our In-
 “ tentions, we must work by down-
 “ right Force. The Pope will ever

when, the *Genoese* would have encreased them, the
 FRENCH have commanded them to forbear them at their Peril.
 And till GREAT BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES shall be
 able to command *France* to forbear encreasing her naval
 Power, they, it is to be feared, will enjoy no lasting Tran-
 quillity. If *France* become Masters of this Republic,
 and its Island of *Corfica*, (for both which they seem at
 present, to stand a pretty good Chance,) what hinders,
 but with the Possession of *Minorca*, they may become
 Masters of the *Mediterranean Seas*?

* This Island is called the Grainary of *Rome*—It lies
 very convenient for the whole *Turkey* and *Levant Trades*,
 and his Majesty has opened a Trade thither, which
 they never had before to signify. This would, doubt-
 less, be very agreeable to *France*, but it may occasional-
 ly answer their Purpose to make Infurrection only, as
 the Scheme proposes, to weaken its Possessor, according
 to the Views of *France*. But as the King of *Naples* and
Sicily is likely to follow the Dictates of *Spain*, we are
 likely soon to see a Change in the System of *Italy*, per-
 haps, that may forbode no great Interest or Glory to
Great-Britain, unless timely prevented.

† May not *Portugal* prove instrumental to strengthen
Spain too? What is the Meaning of the magnificent
 Embassy lately said to be sent from *Portugal* to *France*?

“ respect

“ respect *France*, because of the County
“ of *Avignon* †.

“ *HOLLAND* will keep themselves to
“ our *Alliances* as much as possibly
“ they may: They are rich; it is ex-
“ pedient the King did *interpose* in
“ their *Affairs*, and that some *DIVI-*
“ *SIONS* were sown among them ‡.

“ The *Switzers* are mercenary, who
“ will always serve the King for his
“ Money §.

“ The King of *Denmark* || is a
“ Prince whose State is but small.

† Here *France* suffers an Inquisition to pleasure the Pontiff.

‡ The *French* having gained the Ascendancy in *Holland* at present; is it not proper Time that *Great-Britain* should *some how* interpose in their Affairs likewise, to draw them from their Attachment to *France*? Or,—

§ The *French* are seldom without many Thousands of these Troops in their Pay: And to induce them to enter into the Service, they indulge them with extraordinary Privileges and Immunities.

|| The Face of *Denmark* is changed since this System took Place; and being blessed with a wise Prince on the Throne, who is daily advancing the trading Interest of his People, and has 50,000 good Troops at her Command, that State, I hope, through the Wisdom of his Britannic Majesty's Council, will soon be made instrumental, to thwart these Parts of the great *French* Scheme which remain unexecuted.

“ The

“ The SWEDES * will not break off
 “ from the Interests of *France*.

“ We ought to consider all the In-
 “ struments, which for our *Money* †,
 “ we may make Use of to divert the
 “ Forces of *England* and *Holland*,
 “ when his Majesty makes any Enter-
 “ prize which pleases them not.

* The *French*, perhaps, are too sanguine to imagine that they shall always be able to purchase the Friendship of *Sweden*. The present Prince is wise and good, and knows the true Interest of his Kingdoms, as well as Numbers of wise, brave, and incorrupt *Swedes*; who, however they may temporize occasionally, will hardly desert the *Protestant Cause*, when they find it in imminent Danger. It is not long since the *French* flattered themselves, that his *Prussian* Majesty was not to be detached from their Interest.

† Engaging *Subsidies*, and *Money* otherwise properly applied, may, and certainly will, do mighty Things towards the Completion of this great Design; and, very probably, the sagacious Application of *Louisdores*, has proved a bewitching Charm to many Princes to become the Dupes of this enterprizing Court. It is Pity, but such should become eternal and ignominious Slaves themselves, who will fall in with Schemes to enslave all *Christendom*. But if the wise States of *Holland* can, by the happy Influence of their *Britannic* and *Prussian* Majesties, be brought to desert every Connection with *France*, and exert their utmost Strength by Sea and Land, in Concert with those *Antigallican* Princes, we shall have it in our Power to break all the Measures of *France*, and her Popish Allies and Confederates.

“ The

“ The Friendship of *Turkey* * is
 “ very good for *France*.

“ Lastly, the *French Patriot* speaks
 “ of *England*, when the foregoing
 “ Points should be carried by *France*,
 “ as easy to be conquered, and that
 a War with *France* would ruin Her,
 “ and that no Peace should be made
 “ with *England*, but upon Condi-
 “ tions of the greatest Advantage to
 “ *France* †. “ The

* This is because she can play the *Turks* against the House of *Austria*, or against the *Muscovites*, when it suits her System. But we have an able and faithful *British* Minister there, as well as a *Dutch* one; nor is *Prussia* and *Sweden* without their Influence at the Port; which may soon disappoint the *French* Schemes there.

† However omnipotent we *Britons* may presume to think ourselves, it is certain, that since *France* has gain'd so many essential Points of her darling Scheme, we have Reason enough to be alarmed, and now to make Use of the utmost Stretch of *British* Policy to defeat this mighty Enterprize. Before the grand Stroke of reducing this Kingdom to a State of Vassalage to *France*, was to be struck, it was no bad Policy in that Nation, first to make a tolerable Trial of our real Strength, and effectually to feel the Pulse of those who pretended inviolable Attachment to the *French* Interest. And, may we not reasonably enough suppose, the Rebellions that have been excited, since the present happy Establishment took Place, have been faint *Miniature Essays* only, tending to try the *Experiment in Grand*, at the proper Time: And the sanguine *French* Zealots say, *aut nunc,*
aut

“ The League with *Holland* *
 “ should be renewed, and they put
 “ into

aut nunquam. It certainly behoves us never to forget the Consternation that a very trifling Body of Rebels put this Nation into; and from that *French* Trial, they judge what 20, or 30,000 good Troops would do, if they could once land them in this Island: And if they sacrificed such a Body, or double the Number, it will not much hurt them; and how it might affect *England* I do not chuse to disturb my Imagination with. But an Evil of this Kind ought to be guarded against, by every Measure in our Power: And if a *Militia* should be disapproved by the Wisdom of Parliament, I would beg Leave to start a Suggestion that just now occurs to me: What might be thought of a well regulated MARINE ESTABLISHMENT, round certain Parts of the Sea Coasts? Such a well trained Body being capable of acting in a double Capacity; in that of Sailors suddenly to man a Fleet, to prevent the Enemy's landing; or if they did land, to be bred to *Huszar* it, in Conjunction with a Body of regular Troops, as soon as they could join them, might answer good Purposes, as well in Time of Peace as War. People near the Sea Coasts, taking rather to the Sea than military Service, may, perhaps, be found fitter in the general, for the Marine-Exercises than the mere Militia. As this is a Point beside my present Purpose, I would only beg Leave to ask another Question: Whether such an Establishment properly regulated, might not always afford a Supply of Seamen, necessary to man a Fleet without the disagreeable Practice of *Pressing* for the Service? I wish somebody more capable, and more at Leisure, would consider this Point for the public Service.

* To this End, has not *Holland* been many Years made to BELIEVE ONLY, that they should have all the Trade, while *France* has been gaining it themselves, under that Pretext? Has not this once *High and Mighty* Republic been so long amused and cajoled by this artful

“ into a BELIEF, that *France* should
 “ give them all the Trade still, be-
 “ cause they have the Knowledge of
 “ it, and are proper for it; but that
 “ the *French* (as it is to be suggested)
 “ have no Inclination that Way, and
 “ neither can be forced: They must
 “ be told they are come to the happy
 “ Time for advancing their Affairs,
 “ and ruining *their Competitors* [the
 “ *English*] in the Sovereignty of the
 “ Northern Seas.

Thus have I given a concise Account of the *French* GRAND SYSTEM;

ful Court, as to reduce them to great Distress and Poverty. Let the Eyes of the States of *Holland*, as well as those of *Great-Britain*, be at length opened. May they not both easily discern, that this deep laid Scheme has been actually carried into Execution? Can any Thing more effectually accomplish this masterly *French Plan*, than distracting both *England* and *Holland*, in their domestic Concerns, as well as dividing them in Friendship and Alliance as Nations? As these are some of the chief Arts of Conquest practiced by *France*, ought not both Nations heartily to unite to defeat their Success, when they appear so barefaced and notorious? And if these States shall be happy enough to unite vigorously at this critical Time, they will find no great Difficulty to ruin the Power of *France* for ever.

and we find it is no visionary Chimera: we have seen, on the contrary, that it has had real Existence, and the *Completion* of the whole seems to be *now* aimed at, all the preparatory Steps taken thereto, having been hitherto successfully conducted. For since the same has been adopted, the new Conquests and Acquisitions that *France* has made to her Dominions are from Facts as follow: *viz.* (1.) Those of ALSACE and LORRAINE, on the Side of GERMANY; (2.) Those of ARTOIS, the CAMBRESIS, Part of FLANDERS, HAINAULT, and LUXEMBURG, on the Side of the NETHERLANDS; (3.) The defenceless Condition of the BARRIER TOWNS; (4.) ROUSILLON, formerly a Part of CATALONIA, on the Side of SPAIN; (5.) The weakening of GENOA, and obtaining a Footing in CORSICA, likewise the Possession of the important Island of MINORCA; (6.) The mighty Things they have done, and
are

are still attempting in NORTH AMERICA; (7.) Their settling the NEUTRAL ISLANDS; (8.) Their Encroachment on the *British* Rights and Privileges of Trade in AFRICA, on the GUM COAST, from *Cape Blanco*, to the River *Sierraleone*; (9.) The great Encrease of their Power in the EAST-INDIES.

If to these Considerations, respecting the Encrease of the *French* Dominions in all the four Quarters of the World, since the hatching the above-described System; we add the incredible Encrease of their *Commerce* in all Parts of the Globe, and likewise of their Fisheries, their mercantile Shipping, and their naval Power; together with the sure Foundation they have laid for a farther Augmentation of them all, the PROTESTANT INTEREST, never had so great Cause to dread the Success of the *French* Arms and

f 2

Ma-

Machinations as they have at present.

And who will take upon him to say, that they are certain that *Spain* will not join *France* at this Juncture? However favourable an Opinion some may be pleased to entertain of the Friendship of that Court towards *Great-Britain*, I cannot help declaring, that I greatly distrust them. Though we have done every Thing for that Nation that they have desired for these Thirty Years past, What have they done equivalent to it? The Affair that was one of the principal Causes of the last War is not yet regulated: I mean our Right of Trade to and from the Bays of *Campeachy* and *Honduras* for Logwood.

Though we have given up the Renewal of the late *Asiento*, to prevent all Cause of Umbrage on our Part, as if we thereby encouraged an illicit Commerce; yet they permit the *French* to

to supply them considerably with Negroes, without any formal *Assiento*, being entered into for that Purpose; and they countenance and encourage, as I have shewn in this Treatise, those our Rivals in the direct Trade from the *French* to the *Spanish* Colonies in *America*, while they are excessively vigilant to prevent the like on our Part. Do they not also promote and encourage the *French* Trade from *Old Spain* to *New*, in Preference to the *British*; and does not that Commerce of *France* encrease, and ours decline? Though the *Spanish Imports* into *France* bear no Comparison to those into *Great-Britain*; and our *Exports* to *Spain* daily diminish, yet we still flatter ourselves with the mighty Advantages we gain by the *Spanish* Trade beyond those of *France*. As *Spain* is establishing Manufactures of her own, and have commenced a new System of an *active* instead of a mere *passive* Trade,

our Commerce with them must necessarily grow worse and worse, unless we can at present defeat the Schemes of *France*. Though we have settled two *Spanish Monarchs* in *Italy* to pleasure this Court, yet they are eternally harping upon the old Affair of *Gibraltar*; and we may reasonably enough expect, that it will not be long before they act in Concert with *France* to wrest it out of our Hands; especially so, since the great preparatory Stroke is struck in Regard to *Minorca*: And if we lose *Gibraltar*, as we have done *Minorca*, by Virtue of an Alliance between *France* and *Spain*; will not the dependent *Spanish* Princes throw their Weight into the united Enemy's Scale; and what then will the King of *Sardinia* be able to do alone, when our Fleets shall not be admitted to enter the *Mediterranean*? What must become of our *Italian* and *Levant* Trades? However distant these

Events

Events may seem to be in the Opinion of some; yet, as they are not unlikely soon to come to pass, in the Opinion of others, should we not be upon our utmost Guard to prevent them?

However doubtful these Things may be, we have no Occasion to doubt but the House of *Austria* is now our declared Enemy; and that they have declared, even so early, they will, in Concert with *France*, invade these Kingdoms from the *Netherlands*. And who can doubt, but they will if they can? Have we not Accounts already from *Marseilles*, that the *Spaniards* have already made large *Remittances* to the Court of *Vienna*? If this proves true, can we longer doubt of the Junction of these three great Catholic Powers? *France* did not join *Spain* in the last War, till the critical Point of Time: And may we not expect, that this will prove the Case of *Spain*, in Regard to *France* now?

f 4

When

When *Spain* and the Emperor united in the Year 1725, was not the whole Protestant Interest justly alarmed? The Misunderstandings then between *France* and *Spain*, prevented the Junction of the latter with the former; but there are no such Reasons that subsist at present.

In the last War the *Dutch* beheld undisturbed *France* possess their *Barrier*, which they once thought could not be purchased too dearly as a Security against her. They beheld that same Power conquer the fair Country between that *Barrier* and their own Frontier. They suffered the choicest of their Troops to be taken from them, while their Behaviour at Home was so cool and unconcerned, as if they were disinterested in the Event; or if interested, as if it was a Matter agreed on. Assistance, indeed, they lent us, who struggled our utmost to save

save them; but such Assistance as could give us no Cause to think that their Intention was to break with *France*; nor so big with Mischief, as to induce *France* to break with them. Is not this the State to which *France* had, according to their Grand System, long schemed to bring this High and Mighty Republic? And may we not look upon this as the Forerunner of the Conquest of the United Provinces? I will not dwell longer on the Conduct of the *Dutch* in the last War. This the Triumphs of *France*, the Groans of *Flanders*, the Disgrace of *Britain* sufficiently proclaimed.

However incapable the *Russians* may be of maintaining an Army out of their own Territories; can we suppose they will as little Want the Aid of the *French* and *Spanish* Purse as the *Austrians*? His *Prussian* Majesty, on many Accounts, is the Object of
Mus-

Muscovite Enmity : And if the Protestant Cause, is to have no Assistance from the *Dutch*, from whom can we expect it at this critical Time but from the *Prussian* and *Hanoverian* Monarchs? Is not the present Quarrel wholly *British*? If the Court of *England* judged that a *Russian* Alliance only would not so effectually answer her End as a *Prussian* one joined therewith ; and if, in Consequence thereof, and of the united Mediations of the Courts of *Versailles*, *Vienna*, *Petersburgh*, and *Saxony*, his *Prussian* Majesty was doomed a Sacrifice, is it no less our Duty than our Interest, to render him instrumental to revenge the *British* Cause? Can we suppose, that the Electorate of *Hanover* also, was not to be made a Sacrifice as well as the Dominions of *Prussia*? Could any Measures have more effectually answered the Views of *France* towards

wards *Great-Britain*? If *Hanover* belonged to a Prince independent of the Crown of *Great-Britain*, has not the Electorate a Right to the effectual Protection of *Great-Britain*, whenever it shall be threatened with Destruction, from a Cause purely *British*? Has not *Hanover*, as a Protestant Ally, been instrumental, in Conjunction with others, to defeat the Designs of the Popish Interest? Whoever will say otherwise, deserves to be contemned rather than reasoned with. But it is not my Intention to dwell upon what is so obvious and so trite: My Intention is to consider his *Britannic Majesty's* Dominions in other Lights than have been common; and yet may, perhaps, be found not less obvious, or less deserving Attention.

To which End, it may be necessary to give a short Description of those Dominions, because speaking in generals will not answer my Purpose.

The

The Extent of the particular Dominions of His *Britannic* Majesty in *Germany* is as follows:

	Miles long.	Miles br.
The Principality of <i>Grubenhagen</i>	40 - - - - -	40
The Duchy of <i>Hanover</i> , or <i>Calenberg</i>	40 - - - - -	12
The Duchy of <i>Lunenbourg</i>	80 - - - - -	50
The Duchy of <i>Saxe Lawenburgh</i>	30 - - - - -	15
The Duchy of <i>Bremen</i> including <i>Verden</i>	60 - - - - -	40
The County of <i>Hoya</i>	30 - - - - -	15
The County of <i>Diepholt</i>	30 - - - - -	10
	310	182

The Principality of *Grubenhagen*, is intersected in two Parts by the Bishopric of *Hildesheim*; that on the East is bounded on the North by the Duchy of *Wolfenbutle*; on the West by *Hildesheim*; on the East by *Hart's Forest*; and on the South by *Eisfield*. The West Part is also bounded on the North by *Wolfenbutle*; on the South by *Oberwalt*; and both on the East and West by *Hildesheim*. Both Parts

Parts abound with Woods of Fir and Pine; but most of its Treasures are subterraneous, especially in the East Part, where are most of the Mines of Silver, Copper, Iron, and Lead, besides numerous other valuable Minerals.

The East Part is generally inhabited by Miners. The chief Places are.

Ardreburgh, famous for its rich Mines of Iron.

Eymbeck, the Capital of *Grubenhausen*: It stands in a fine Corn Country, and carries on a considerable Trade in Malt Liquor.

Gottengen, of Note for an University.

Hanover-Duchy, is very fruitful, and abounds with fine Meadows and Fields, affords Sheep and Wool for Exportation, breeds excellent Horses, and affords Salt and Tobacco more than sufficient for Home Consumption.

The

The chief Town of this Duchy is that of

Hanover, the Metropolis, and the Seat of the present Elector is pleasantly situated, in a sandy Soil, on the River *Leine*. Here are four *Trading Fairs* a Year, much frequented by Foreigners from several Parts of *Germany*. It was once a free *Imperial City*, and a *Hanse-Town*, when it had a *flourishing Commerce*. And why may it not have the like again?

Brunswick-Lunenburgh Duchy, in which *Zell* is comprehended, has the Dominions of *Brandenburgh* and *Mecklenburgh* on the East; the County of *Hoye*, with the Duchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*, on the West; the Territories of *Lubec* and *Hamburg*, and the Duchy of *Saxe-Lawenberg*, on the North; the Duchy of *Brunswick*, the Bishoprick of *Hildesheim*, and the Duchy of *Calenberg*, on the South.

This

This Duchy abounds with Woods and Forests, consisting of good *Fir*, *Oak*, and *Elm*, which they export to the *Hamburgers* and the *Dutch*, together with great Quantities of wild Swine, and all Sorts of Deer, and other Venison: Of which there is such Plenty, that the neighbouring Princes and Nobility have an annual Assembly here for Hunting. A great Part of it consists of Heath, yet here they make a great Profit by their Honey and Bees-Wax. Their Lakes, Pools, and Rivers, abound with good Fish, and breed great Numbers of Pheasants, and other wild Fowl.

Zell lies on a sandy Plain, near the Conflux of the River *Aller* and *Fuhse*, 24 Miles North of *Hanover*, 32 North East from *Brunswick*, 35 South of *Lunenburgh*, and 47 South of *Harburgh*. Though there is a great deal of Heath between the Town and *Hanover*,

never, yet the Country is well cultivated, and there is a Trade from hence to *Bremen*, by the River *Aller*.

Walstrade, on the River *Bohme*, is a considerable Town, with a good Trade in Honey, Wax, Wool, and Malt-Liquor. It stands in a pleasant Valley, encompassed with Woods and Mountains.

Harburg, lies on the River *Lotze*, near its Influx into the *Elbe*, almost over-against *Hamburgh*. It has great Privileges, is populous, and enjoys a pretty good *Trade*, having near as convenient a Situation for it as *Hamburgh* itself, with a tolerable Harbour, which has been much improved, since it has fell into the Hands of a Power able to protect it from the Insults that *Hamburgh* is liable to from its Neighbours. The Islands between this and *Hamburgh*, are all of them very agreeable, being surrounded with Dykes, and
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by that Means being recovered out of the *Elbe*, and made firm. Their Appearance is much like Meadows in *Holland*, and they bring the Proprietors a good Revenue.

Lunenburgh, which gives Name to the Duchy, and is its Metropolis; stands on the River *Elmenaw*, which is navigable here, and falls into the *Elbe* 13 Miles below the Town. Its chief Commerce is in *Salt*, made from Springs that rise within the Walls: The Water is greenish, but a small Mixture of Lead purifies it; and makes it preferable to that of all other Salt Springs. The Salt is esteemed the best in *Germany* for Colour and Taste, and, therefore, large Quantities of it are exported; and it makes no inconsiderable Branch of the Elector's Revenue.

Darmesberg, stands in the most eastern Part of the Duchy, on the
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River

River *Jetze*, about six Miles from its Influx into the *Elbe*, and 33 South-East from *Lunenburgh*. It is the chief Town of the rich and fruitful Country of that Name.

Sneckburgh, which belongs to this County, is a large Trading Town, at the Conflux of the *Elbe*, and *Weckt*, or *Besse*, 65 Miles South-east of *Lunenburgh*.

Saxe-Lawenburgh Duchy, is the farthest Province to the North-East of the King of *Great-Britain's* Dominions, and lies on the North and South Banks of the *Elbe*, between *Holstein* on the West and North, *Mecklenburgh* on the East, and *Lunenburgh* on the South. It abounds in Pasture and good Cattle, is well supplied with Wood and Water, and has some populous Trading Towns on the *Elbe*, besides its Capital.

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Lawenburgh Town is well situated for Trade, which is most engrossed by *Hamburg*.

The *Duchy of Bremen* has the *Wefer* on the West, the *Elbe*, and Part of *Lawenburgh* on the East, the *German Sea* on the North, and Part of *Verden*, and *Oldenburgh*, on the South. Between *Bremen* and *Stade* is a *Morass*, but drainable; the Parts towards the River is very pleasant, and abound with Fields, Meadows and Orchards. The Situation of the Country between two such navigable Rivers, has turned the Inhabitants in general to Trade.

Stade, the second Town in the *Duchy* next to *Bremen*, has a good Trade, and Air, situate in a fruitful Country, on the River *Zwinga*, or *Schwingle*, which falls into the *Elbe* two Miles below it, 27 Miles West of *Hamburg*, and 44 North of *Bremen*. This, besides its having been a free

Imperial City, and one of the *Hanse-Towns*, was formerly endowed with great Privileges, with a Right of *Toll* for Ships passing up the *Elbe*; but became so poor by *Hamburghers* outstripping it, that it was forced to sell its Trading Stock to that City, and put itself under the Protection of the Archbishop of *Bremen*, it having been formerly the Capital of a Marquisate of its own Name; which was annexed to that See by its Marquis, in the 13th Century. After its above-mention'd Decay, our *English* Merchants, upon some Disgust taken at *Hamburgh*, removed hither; which greatly revived the Trade, so that it again became rich and populous, and is in a very good Condition at present, though the *English* returned to *Hamburgh*. Here is a large commodious Haven, that will admit larger Ships than *Hamburgh*: And, as it stands
fairer

fairer for Trade than *Bremen*, and 30 Miles nearer to the Sea, its Trade may be greatly advanced.

Brunhusen, at the Mouth of the *Schwing*, has a Fort where the King of *England*, as Elector of *Hanover*, has a considerable Toll; all Ships, except the *Hamburghers*, that come up the *Elbe* out of the Sea, being obliged to stop here, and give an Account of their Lading; for which, when they come to *Hamburgh*, they must pay a certain Duty to a Comptroller, placed there by the Government of *Hanover*: And an *English* Man of War of 24 Guns rides at Anchor on the *Elbe*, at the Entrance into the *Schwing*, in Order to oblige them to bring to; which Vessel is of great Service to the *English* Trade and Navigation carried on in these Parts, for preventing clandestine Practices of other Countries, and preserving the Rights

and Freedom of the *British* Commerce.

Bremen, the Capital of the Duchy, is a great, populous, and flourishing Trading Town, a free Imperial City, and the third in Rank among the *Hans*. It had several Privileges granted it by the Emperor *Wencellaus*; one of which was, that no Goods were allowed to go down the River, and pass this City, without being first landed here. The Inhabitants have the Privilege also of Fishing from the Bridge of *Hoy*, down to the Sea; as likewise the River *Hunte*, *Ochtum*, *Wemme*, and *Seesum*, which flow into the *Wefer*. The City is well supplied with Fish, both from its Rivers and the Sea, and they have every Month several Sorts in Season. Among others, they catch great Quantities of Salmon and Lampreys, the former of which being dried and smoaked,

smoked, and the latter pickled, are in great Esteem throughout all *Germany*. *Charles V.* gave them the Right of Coinage. The River *Weser*, navigable about 30 Miles from the Sea, runs through it; but the River is not deeply navigable farther than *Fagesack*, six Miles below the Town, where is a Custom-House, and where all Ships, which come out of the Sea, or are outward-bound, load and unload.

Bremen has a considerable Trade to *England* with *Westphalia* Linens. But since *England*, *Scotland* and *Ireland*, have so greatly encreased in the Linen Manufacture, there are less of those imported. Here is a great Consumption of the *English* Woollen Manufactures, which they receive, not only directly from *England*, but by the Way of *Hamburg* and *Holland*, and disperse them again through the whole Circle of *Westphalia*. From

hence likewise are sent Ships to *France*, *Spain*, *Portugal* and *Italy*, and a good Number to *Davis's-Streights*. It has also no inconsiderable Inland Trade, more particularly to the great Trading Fairs and Marts in *Germany*; to which it sends large Quantities of *British* Manufactures, our Plantation Produce, as Sugars, &c. and of our *East India* Goods. Its Beer being very much esteemed in *Germany*, is exported in large Quantities. Its other Commodities are, Minerals, Timber, Corn, Cattle, and Leather; in dressing of which and Cloth, they are very expert; so that both are sent hither for that Purpose from other Countries. *Its Duties upon Importation and Exportation are very low*; which proves no little Encouragement to its Trade, and gives it an Advantage, even over the *Dutch*, in the Countries between this City and their *United*
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Provinces, It is, in a Word, justly esteemed, the next Port to *Hamburg* in the whole Empire of *Germany*: And, in Time of War, fits out Ships of Force, to convey their Merchantmen. They generally send 25 or 30 Ships a Year to the Whale-Fishery in *Greenland*; and their Harponiers being esteemed the most expert in all the Country, are frequently hired, both by the *Dutch* and the *English*. In fine, it cannot but be a very flourishing City; after having enjoyed a perfect Neutrality during all Wars, for more than 50 Years past, between the *Northern* and other Powers of *Europe*. And here is a Council of Trade highly useful to their commercial Interests.

Verden, or *Ferden*, a Principality, lies between the *Wefer* on the West, and *Lunenburgh* on the East, and between *Bremen* on the North, and the
County

County of *Hoye* on the South. The Country is reckoned 18 Miles from North to South, and 22 from South-West to North-East.

The City of *Verden* is a pretty large Town, divided into the old and new, and was an Imperial City, strong and populous. 'Tis 26 Miles South-East of *Bremen*, 41 South of *Stade*, above 50 South-West of *Hamburgh*, and 55 from *Lunenburgh*. It lies on the River *Aller*, by which Merchandize are brought to it from *Bremen*.

Rotenberg, is a small Town within this Principality, stands on the River *Wein*, It has become populous, and is a Place of tolerable Trade.

His *Britannic* Majesty's *German* Dominions in *Westphalia*, are as follow: *viz.*

Hoye-County. It has *Bremen* on the North, *Minden* on the South, *Lunenburgh*

nenburgh on the East, and *Diepholt* on the West. Its chief Town is *Hoye*, stands on the East Side of the *Wefer*, 25 Miles South-East of *Bremen*, 36 North East of *Minden*, and *Diepholt*, and 40 North-West of *Zell*. 'Tis a small but well fortified Town of some Trade.

Nyenburg, on the East Bank of the *Wefer*, 10 Miles South of *Hoye*. Its Territory abounds with all Sorts of Grain, Fruit, Pasture and Cattle. Here is a considerable Commerce between the two Cities of *Westphalia* and *Lower Saxony*, consisting of Corn, Wool, Flax, Honey, Wax, and Cattle.

Diepholt-County, lies South of *Delmenbost*, between *Hoye* on the East, and the Bishoprick of *Osnaburgh* on the West; and its Capital of the same Name stands 27 Miles West of *Hoye*, 35 West of the *Wefer*, and 40 South of *Oldenburgh*, on the River *Hunte*.

Osnaburgh Bishopric, is situate in the Center of the Circle, between the *Wefer* and the *Elbe*. Here are Manufactures of Linen, and a good Breed of Cattle, particularly Hogs; wherewith they make the best *West-phalia* Hams*.

The Reason for descending so minutely to the Particulars before enumerated is, in Order to give the Reader an Idea, that the King of *England's* Dominions in *Germany*, are not disadvantageously situated for Trade and Commerce; and that they have been greatly instrumental to promote and advance the Trade and Commerce of *Great-Britain*, however meanly, and even contemptuously some People have mistakenly judged of *HANOVER*, and our Sovereign's other Territories on the *Continent*: And it is Something ex-

* This Bishoprick falls alternately into Catholic and Protestant Hands.

traordinary, methinks, that the beneficial Connection between GREAT-BRITAIN and HANOVER, &c. considered in this LIGHT, should not have been taken due public Notice of before; because it might have had a happy Tendency to have removed those Prejudices that too many may have entertained against these Dominions.

Before I enter upon this Matter, it may be requisite to apprize the Reader, (that he may not be prepossessed against what may be said) that my Intention hereby, is not to justify any past expensive Measures in sending *British Troops* Abroad, to fight for any Allies upon the *Continent*: On the contrary, I judge with others, there can be no Manner of Doubt, that *Great-Britain* never maintained such an Army upon the *Continent*, but at three Times the Expence, at which, she might have hired an equal Body of auxilliary Troops: And it has been
before

before sufficiently signified, that no such expensive Measures are proposed to be pursued by the new foreign System intended to be humbly submitted in *Manuscript*. All that is hereby principally intended, is to shew, how far it concerns the Interest of *England*, as a Trading Nation, to support and protect *Hanover*, and his Majesty's other *German* Territories, upon the Supposition that the King of *Great-Britain* was not the Electoral Prince of *Hanover*, &c.

From the Particulars given, it is obvious, that our Sovereign, by Virtue of his *German* Dominions, is become as it were, Master of the Rivers *Aller*, as well as the *Weser* and the *Elbe*; and those are of such Importance to the Trade of *Great-Britain*, that, according to the *Custom-House* Books in the Year 1713, the Value of 688,737 *l.* of our Produce and Manufactures, was

was carried through them to several Parts of *Germany*, in the Articles only of our Cloth, Gloves, Leather, Tobacco and Sugar.

But since the Year 1713, *Bremen* and *Verden* have been annexed to his *Britannic Majesty's German* Dominions, and this has not a little added to the Advantages of our Trade. The *Swedes* continued their Masters till 1712, when *Bremen* and *Verden* were conquered by the King of *Denmark*. This Prince mortgaged them to the late Elector of *Hanover*, who, in 1715, had 250,000 *l.* granted him by the Parliament of *England*, to enable him, together with his prior Mortgage, to make an absolute Purchase thereof. There was an Opposition, indeed, made to it in both Houses, and a Clamour raised against this Measure without Doors: But, however convenient these Territories might be for
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the Elector of *Hanover*, whose Family was possessed of *Bremen* once before, and to whose Dominions it lay contiguous, the *British* Legislature wisely judged it might prove of dangerous Consequence to the Crown, and the Commerce of *Great-Britain*, that any foreign Prince, especially a maritime Power, should hold the *Key*, which the King of *Denmark* then had of the *Weser* and the *Elbe*.

On casting an Eye over the Maps of this Part of the Empire, we shall perceive that, whilst his *Danish* Majesty was in Possession of the Duchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*, he was Master of the Sea-Coast, from *Denmark* almost to the *Seven Provinces*. The *Elbe* also runs for above 500 Miles through *Bohemia*, *Saxony*, *Brandenburgh*, and the rest of *Germany*; and the *Weser* passes for above 250 Miles, through *Hessia*, *Westphalia*,
Olden-

Oldenburgh, and some other Countries of the Empire; and the vast Importance of these Rivers to the *British* Trade, will be confessed by every one, who considers that all our Woollen, and other *English* Manufactures, and our Plantation Produce, are by these Streams conveyed to a prodigious Number of Markets, and are to be met with at all the great Trading Fairs in the Empire of *Germany*; a Trade too estimable to have lain at the Mercy of any foreign Power, either to lock it up from us, or to lay what Impositions they please thereon, as might have been the Case, if his *Britannic* Majesty had not got *Bremen* and *Verden* out of the Hands of the King of *Denmark*. In the Year 1720, the Crown of *Sweden* also consented in Form to the Dismemberment of this Duchy from its other Dominions,

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and confirmed them to the House of *Brunswick*.

By the Elector of *Hanover* being Master of the *Elbe*, the Security of the *British* Commerce to *Hamburg* may be said to depend upon that Electoral Prince. It may not be improper, therefore, to give a brief Account of our Trade to *Hamburg*.

The chief Merchandize which it exports to *Great-Britain*, is the Linen of several Parts of *Germany*, but since that Manufacture with us has arrived to the Height it is in *Great-Britain*, our Imports of *German* Linens have declined. We import from thence likewise, Tin Plates, Wire, Iron, Brass and Steel, which come chiefly from *Upper Saxony*; also Clap-Boards, Pipe and Hoghead Staves, Wainscot-Boards, and some Oak Plank, and other Timber, with
Kid

Kid Skins from *Brandenburgh*. Of the numerous Articles which they import, the chief are the Woollen Manufactures of *England*. The Value of which sent from *Yorkshire* only, and generally shipped at *Hull*, have been computed to amount to considerably above 100,000 *l* yearly; and the single Article of Stockings sent from thence, comes to above 20,000 *l*. per *Ann*. In short, all the *English* Merchandizes vended from *Hamburgh*, have been reckoned by a moderate Computation at above 600,000 *l*. per *Ann*.

What renders this Trade so beneficial is, that the *English* Merchants in particular, having extraordinary Privileges granted them from this City, make a great Figure here, different from those of all other Nations: They appear as a Body with peculiar Jurisdictions and Powers among them-

selves; and as they are called in *London* by the *Hamburgh-Company*, so they are distinguished at *Hamburgh* by the *English Hans* or Society. The *English* are not only pretty numerous here, this being the Staple of the *British* Trade for this Part of the World, but carry on from hence a more extensive foreign Commerce, than that of all other Nations together settled here. They had a particular Grant from the City by Treaty, of the same Privilege to import *Herrings*, as is allowed to the *Dutch*. The *Hamburghers*, particularly the *British* Factory, drive a great Trade to *Russia*, and *Livonia*; and, for the Goods which they send to the North Part of the *Empire* and *Poland*, they have Returns, not only in *Linen*, *Yarn*, and fine *Flax*, but in *Honey*, *Wax*, *Anniseed*, *Lindseed*, *Drugs*, &c. all which come by the Navigation of

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 There have very lately arrived here several British
 Merchants from *Hamburgh* with considerable Estates, and
 this is generally the Case.

the *Oder* and the *Spree*, and thence into the *Elbe*, in the Marquasite of *Brandenburgh*; and therefore the *Danes* cannot interrupt this Trade, or easily obtain any Part of it, nor hinder the great Vent of *English* Manufactures back into all the before-mentioned Countries; which is one capital Branch of the whole *Hamburgh* Trade, and has greatly enriched the *English* Nation; and the Estates acquired by the whole *British* Factory, center at length, in this Kingdom*. The Number of Vessels of any considerable Burthen belonging to the City, is computed at 400, of which above 30 of the principal are employed in the Trade to and from *London*. They have about 60 Sail engaged in the *Greenland* Trade, many that navigate the *Baltic*, and some that trade to *Portugal*, *Spain*, *France*, and the *Mediterranean*, &c. and

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* There have very lately arrived here several *British* Merchants from *Hamburgh* with considerable Estates, and this is generally the Case.

all this Trade is chiefly for *British* Account. The *British* Factory is governed, as it were, by their own Laws and Regulations. *Hamburg* is a *Hanse-Town*, not of less Importance than most trading Places in *Europe*. This Place may be considered, with Respect to *Germany* in particular, and in some Degree, to the other Places before-mentioned, what *Amsterdam* is to *Europe*; a general Magazine of the Merchandizes of the Trading World, and this Nation reaps by far the greatest Benefit by it.

The Neighbourhood of *Altena* has, indeed, in some Measure, hurt the Trade of *Hamburgers*, having the Advantage of Situation little inferior to it, but it has no Fortifications; nor is the *Danish* Sovereignty near so great a Security of its Commerce, as its being not only an *Hanse Town*, but as it may always be protected by the Elector of *Hanover*; for although the *Danes* have *Gluckstadt* upon the *Elbe*,
which

which might obstruct their Trade, the Elector of *Hanover* has also *Stade* below the City, from whence they could intercept the *Hamburg* Trade; and by the Means likewise of *Brunsbusen* at the Mouth of the *Schwing*, and of *Lawenburgh* on the *Elbe*, above the City of *Hamburg*, the Court of *Hanover* have it in their Power to stop all their Navigation upwards.

How much the *Hamburgers* are in the Power of the Elector of *Hanover*, will farther appear from observing, that *Stade* has been formerly endowed with great Privileges; with a Right of Toll for Ships passing up the *Elbe*; and had a very considerable Trade, till *Hamburg* out stripped it. And why might not, if needful, the Ministry of *Hanover* revive the Commerce of *Stade* again? Is here not a very spacious, and commodious Haven,

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that

that will admit of larger Ships than *Hamburgh* will? May not this Port be rendered highly beneficial to the Commerce of *Hanover*, and thereby become no less interesting to that of *Great-Britain*? Moreover, Is not the Elector of *Hanover* possessed of another Port, very little inferior to *Hamburgh*? Is not the Port of *Harburgh*, on the River *Lotze*, near its Influx into the *Elbe*, almost opposite to *Hamburgh*? Does it not enjoy great Privileges, and near as convenient a Situation for Trade as *Hamburgh* itself? It is populous; and has it not a pretty good Trade already? And has not this Port been greatly improved since it came into the Hands of a Prince able to protect it from the Insults that *Hamburgh* has been long liable to by its Neighbours? Might not *Stade* and *Harburgh* be made Ports to outrival *Hamburgh* in a great Mea-

Measure? Certainly they may. But they are, at present, not only very useful to *Hamburg*, with Regard to the *English* Trade carried on there, but directly to *Germany* by the *Elbe*; and they may be rendered far more so than they are. The Islands between this Part and *Hamburg* are all of them very agreeable, being surrounded with Dykes, and being recovered out of the *Elbe*, and made firm, they are inhabitable for Traffic, and bring in no inconsiderable Revenue to their Proprietors.

We have seen that such is the Situation of his Majesty's *German* Dominions, and so great are the Advantages arising thereby to the Trade of *Great-Britain*, that it is Something strange, methinks, People should disregard those interesting Connections between *Great-Britain* and his Majesty's *German* Dominions. I will not presume at present

present to say, what the Ballance of Trade in Favour of *England*, by Means of the whole of his Majesty's Electoral Territories, may be, taking into Consideration, the whole *British* Trade dependent on *Hamburgh*, which is at the Mercy of the Elector of *Hanover*, who can remove it whenever he pleases: I will not say, how much the Ballance of Trade may be to the Advantage of *England*, by Virtue of the *Elbe*, the *Weser*, and the *Alter*; but this, I hope, may be allowed to be said, that if the whole was computed from the Year 1715, when the Possession of *Bremen* and *Verden* was annexed to the Dominions of the Elector of *Hanover*, it would amount to so many *Millions Sterling*, as would not a little surprize those, who have been so mistakenly prejudiced against *Hanover*. And why are not those his Majesty's *German* Domi-

Dominions capable of becoming a maritime Power? Had *Holland* originally any such Foundation for it as they have? As *Holland* was stolen out of the Sea; so according to Sir *William Temple*, the Sea may one Day have its own again. But the King of *England's German* Dominions are not so precariously situated in that Respect, nor liable to those immense Dyke-Expences. And why may not there be an *Hanover East-India* Company established at *Stade*, or at *Bremen*, as well as an *Embden* one, or a *Danish*, or a *Swedish* one? Though *Bremen* is an Imperial City, and as a maritime State, sails under a Flag of their own; yet, as it belongs to the Elector of *Hanover*, why should not its Navigation be protected under the Banner of the *Hanoverian* Flag, to distinguish that Electorate as a maritime Power? If once the Ministry of *Han-*

Hanover should turn their Thoughts to render this State as commercial and maritime as it may become, this Electorate would soon show itself not inconsiderable, even by Sea. And if God shall please to spare my Life, I will endeavour to form a Plan for that Purpose. Though some Quantity of our *English* Manufactures does not go directly up the *Weser* and the *Elbe* from *England*, but by Way of *Hamburg* and *Holland*; yet the Course of this Trade might be easily changed, when a mercantile Correspondence, and Courses of Exchange, should be properly settled by the *Hanover* Ministry: But I shall say no more upon this Head, at present.

His *Prussian* Majesty wisely aims at the Establishment of a maritime Power: And if both *Hanover* and *Prussia* become such, it would prove of no little Service to the Protestant Cause, nor any Way disadvantageous
to

to the Commerce of *Great-Britain*, as might be shewn, if I had Time for it. What I would chiefly observe at present, is, that since the *Dutch* are not likely upon the *Old System* to enter into our Measures with such Vigor and Alacrity, by Sea and Land, as seem necessary for our mutual Interests; *Great-Britain* must raise herself such other Allies as she can depend upon to supply their Place: And who are more natural Allies to *Great-Britain* than the Elector of *Hanover* and the King of *Prussia*? If the maritime Strength of those Potentates were not less respectable than their military, we might be the more indifferent about the *Dutch*. But may not this Union of *England*, *Hanover*, and *Prussia*, induce the *Dutch* at length, to fall in with such Measures as may restrain the House of *Bourbon* and *Austria*, from doing irrecoverable Mischief to the maritime Powers,

Powers, and to the whole Protestant Interest? May not an happy and well adapted Alliance at present, between *Great-Britain, Holland, Hanover* and *Prussia*, influence the *Swede* and the *Dane* to come into our Views? And may not such a well-timed Union bring the *Russians* again into the System of the *British* Court? Upon such a weighty Conjunction of Power, shall we not be able so to distress the Commerce of *Russia*, as to induce them to listen to reasonable Terms? The Courts of *Prussia* and *Petersburgh*, may not be irreconcilable when the *Dutch* shall heartily join their *Britannic* and *Prussian* Majesty's, and the Elector of *Hanover*.

If the Electorate of *Hanover* was in the Hands of any other Prince; suppose even any Protestant Prince, might not such Prince deprive *England* of all the Benefits of Commerce, which we

we now receive by the *Elbe*, the *We-*
ser, and the *Aller*; and by the Means
 of *Hamburg*?

Should *England* be deprived of all
 the Benefits and Advantages which we
 receive in Point of Trade, through
 the Protection of the Elector of *Hano-*
ver, we should very sensibly feel the
 Want of them. If these Dominions are
 so very indifferent to us, let us sup-
 pose them in the Hands of a Popish
 Prince: Let us suppose them even in
 the Hands of *France*, can we flatter
 ourselves that we should be suffered
 to have any Communication with the
Elbe and the *Wefer*? Would not a
French Factory be soon established at
Hamburg instead of a *British* one?
 Would not *Bremen* and *Verden* soon be-
 come instrumental, not only to extend
 the Trade of *France* to all Parts con-
 tiguous, but wherever else they can
 carry it on? And would not all the
 Benefits

Benefits of this Commerce be thrown into the *French* Scale, and taken out of the *British*? What then would become of the River *Embs*, and of the Trade of his *Prussian* Majesty's Dominions? As the Monarchs of *Hanover* and *Prussia* are now happily united; as their Territories are so contiguous, and as they are the great Support of the Protestant Cause, may not their commercial Interests be made to coincide in a Manner not less advantageous to *Great-Britain*, than of each other? Would not the contrary of all this be the Case if *Hanover* was in *French*, or any other Popish Hands?

As I would by no Means overrate the Value of his Majesty's *German* Dominions, with Respect to their commercial Connections with *England*; so neither is it just to undervalue them. Nor will those, who are desirous to come at the Truth, depreciate the
Benefits

Benefits and Advantages that those Dominions have received from *England*.

'Tis in the Mouth of many, what mighty Things *England* has done for *Hanover*, what great Advantage his Majesty's *German* Dominions have received from this Kingdom, and what an immense Expence the Nation has been at to support *Hanover*! and in short, how *Germanized* we have been since the present Family has been settled on the Throne of these Realms! I would be the last Person, who should under-value the good Offices of my Country to any other State: But in this, as well as in other Cases, I would by no Means deviate from the Truth knowingly. I hope, therefore, I may, without Offence to the Lover of Truth, pray Leave to ask, What extraordinary Things has *England* done for his Majesty's *German*

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Domi-

Dominions, that have not virtually proved to the Benefit of *Great-Britain*?

Such are our commercial Connections with the *Continent*, that, if we will support our Trade, we must support our Customers when they need our Protection, otherwise they and their Trade must fall into the Hands of those who will protect them, or subdue them, and annex their Territories to those of the Conqueror. We have in Part, seen how our Trade is connected with the *Continent*; and in Consequence thereof, with divers other Parts of the World, by Virtue of his Majesty's Electoral Dominions. And I have, in the former Part of this Work shewn, how much greater our trading Connections with the whole *European* Continent are, by Virtue of the Commerce of the *Dutch*. This I shall not repeat. However indifferent some
may

may think of our trading Connections with the *Dutch*, yet they have been so beneficial, when considered in their full Extent, as justly to entitle the *Dutch* to the Protection they have ever received from us upon that Account only; without taking into Consideration their Assistance in the Preservation of our Religion and Liberties. And if our trading Interests are likewise so advantageously connected with his Majesty's *German* Dominions, as has been observed; what has *England* done for the Support of *Hanover* and *Holland*, which our Interest as a trading Nation, should not induce us to? If the *United Provinces*, and his Majesty's *German* Dominions, had fell into the Hands of the Popish Powers, would not the whole *British* Commerce derived from these Connections, have been swallowed up by that Interest also? Would not the Loss

of *Holland* and *Hanover*, have proved an infinitely greater Loss to *England*, than that of any supposed Expence she has been at to preserve their Independency? If we could have supported those Powers at less Expence to ourselves than we have done, that has been the Fault of certain Administrations. But have not those Powers contributed their Quota of Expence to their own Support at the same Time? And has not such proportionable Contributions tended to the Support of *Great-Britain* also? How then are these Powers more obliged to *England*, than *England* to them? If the Advantages, which we have derived from our Trade with this Part of the *Continent*, had not returned us a very considerable Proportion of the Money we have expended there, we should not have been able to have supported the Burthen. However large our Expence,
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as well as that of our Allies, has been upon the *Continent* in Times of War, we do not find that it has greatly enriched the *Continent*; and therefore there seems Reason to believe, that no inconsiderable Part of our Expence, has, by the Channels of Trade reverted to *Great-Britain* again.

We have seen how much our Trade with *Germany* and the *North*, depends upon *Holland* and his Majesty's *German* Dominions; and does not a great Part of our Plantation Trade depend hereon likewise? Does not the Preservation of the Trade of *Great-Britain* over all *Europe*, greatly depend on those capital Branches? Trade has many secret Springs and Operations, which, however distant they may appear, have, all of them, a Connection and Dependency on each other, and every Turn, which Commerce might take to our Disadvantage in the

North, would soon operate to our Prejudice in the South.

However greatly the Advantages that *Hanover* has received by *England*, may have been magnified by some; and however it may become the Tongues of the common Herd to hollow out, *The immense Sums of English Money said to have been spent upon, and even carried away to Hanover*; yet this Spirit of talking very illy becomes Persons of another Stamp, who ought to know better. Whoever is acquainted with his Majesty's Civil List, and the inevitable Expence to which he has been put, well knows how small a Proportion of it comes to the Royal Hand, at his Majesty's sole Disposal; and that instead of *English Money* being sent to *Hanover*, I am convinced the Fact is quite otherwise, and this is well known to some. If his Majesty's Household is supported in *England*, have we not
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the Benefit of his Royal Residence; and that of his Council? And by his Majesty's general Abode here, can we suppose that the Interest of his *German* Dominions has not been thereby neglected, to serve that of *Great-Britain*? The Royal House of *Hanover* has no Competitor to their Electoral Dominions. Can any sensible Man expect, that a Prince would absolutely neglect, or wholly abandon certain patrimonial Territories, whose Right is indisputable, and never called in Question, for the Sake of those, though much greater, which others make Pretensions to, and have often endeavoured to wrest out of his Royal Hands? While the Right in these *German* Dominions is indivisibly maintained in his Majesty's Family, and this Nation shall be blessed with a Prince upon the Throne of his august and illustrious House, have we not

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seen

seen what Advantages we may continue to reap, as well in Relation to our Trade, as to the Preservation of our Religion and Liberties? With Respect to the latter Points, enough has been unanswerable urged by others.

Nothing is more common, than for many to lament our Want of Allies, and that we are left alone to fight our own Battles; and yet in the same Breath those very Persons shall assert, that we should have no Connections with the *Continent*, from whence alone we can expect any Allies, when we have Occasion for them. When People embrace mistaken Principles, what Inconsistencies do they not fall into? If *Allies* are necessary for us, why is not *Hanover* a proper Ally? Instead of lamenting that we have such an Ally as the Elector of *Hanover*, would it not be happy for *England*, as well as *Holland* too, if the former could

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as securely depend on the Alliance of the latter, as we can upon that of *Hanover*? If the *Dutch* were happy enough to have as secure a Barrier on the Side of the *Austrian Netherlands*, as they have in the Elector of *Hanover*, and the King of *Prussia*, on the other Side of their Provinces, would not the States of *Holland* have Reason to rejoice? Instead of bemoaning our *Hanover* Ally, as a Burden, would it not be as happy for *England* as *Holland*, if the *Dutch* had another *Hanover* to protect their present defenceless Barrier against the common Enemy? Would not this put it out of the Power of an ungrateful Court to threaten *England* with an Invasion from the *Netherlands*, in Concert with *France*? Instead of complaining for Want of Allies to fight in Earnest with us and for us, why do not these Complainants point out how the Court of

of *England*, may effectually gain over the *Dutch* and others to our Alliance? To obtain which, we can hardly suppose that *England* has left any Thing undone, that has fallen within her Knowledge. Have we not experienced that even a *Granville*, a *Chesterfield*, and a *Stairs*, have not been able to prevail with the *United Provinces* to come heartily and vigorously into our Measures against *France*? Instead of railing at the Obstinacy of the *Dutch*, or the Ineffectuality of our Negotiations with them, would it not prove more interesting to the Nation, to shew how the *Dutch* and some other Powers, might be brought into the *British* System, to reduce the Power of *France* within due Bounds? Would not this answer a far better Purpose to our Country than depreciating *Hanover*, which appears to be an Ally of great Importance to our Interests?

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Every true Friend to his Country justly laments the Loss of *Minorca*, and so doubtless he will still more so that of *Gibraltar*. And why? Is it not because our *Italian*, our *Turkey*, and our whole *Levant* Trades depend on their Preservation? And because they are importantly useful in Time of War with *France* and *Spain*, to enable us the better to annoy the Enemy, and obstruct their Navigation? Is the Preservation of *Holland* and *Hanover* of less Concernment to *Great-Britain* than those Places, as well in Relation to our Commerce, as the Annoyance of the Enemy, in Time of War? If we are, by the Event of War, losing of valuable Possessions in one Part of the World, that have promoted our Trade, should not this put us the more on our Guard, not to lose those Allies on whom our Security and our Commerce in other Channels greatly depend? Or, from whom

whom we can receive any Degree of Assistance in Time of Need?

When we seriously consider the System of *France*, as before given in Epitome; when we ruminate on the Success they have had in accomplishing a very great Part of that deep-laid System, and what Measures they are now taking to bring their whole Scheme of Power to that Issue they have so long aimed at: When we maturely weigh their Strength by Land, and reflect on the Addition it must receive from the Union of the House of *Austria*: when we behold their Attempts at *Dunkirk*, and what we may soon expect at *Ostend*, and elsewhere: when we consider their determined Resolution to raise a maritime Strength, no Way inferior to that of *Great-Britain*, is not the *Fulness of Time* come to rouse us effectually to prevent the impending Evil?

Have we not seen, that the Councils of *France*, since the Time of *Richlieu*,

Richlieu, have been governed by the *Grand System*; which under all Ministers has been tenaciously and inviolably adhered to? We have seen what that System is, and too sensibly felt the Effects of it. To such a Maturity is their Scheme at present brought for Execution, that there is Nothing to obstruct its Conclusion, but the Conduct of the *Dutch*. To awe them into their Measures effectually, may not *France*, by Virtue of their Alliance with the House of *Austria*, soon become Masters of all the Barrier-Towns? That the *Dutch* may not be a Moment longer cajoled, *England* has Need of the most consummate Statesmen, and the ablest Negotiators: Nor should the chief People in Power be less conspicuous for their unblemished Integrity, than for their Knowledge and Judgment in public Business; for it is Integrity and Honour only

only that will give Weight to the most profound Councils, at such critical Conjunctions. The utmost Stretch of human Policy will have little Influence with foreign States, when they have Reason to suspect the Uprightness of our Intentions towards them, and that they are only calculated to answer a present Turn to serve ourselves, and not those Allies, whose Power we have Occasion for.

The present Union of the Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*, it is to be hoped, will rouse and spirit up the *Dutch*, if they have a due Regard to the Preservation of their Religion and Liberties, and indeed of those of all Christendom. But if the *Protestant* Interest should zealously unite, should they not think of Something more than merely to check *France* and her Allies from over-running them at present? If they go no greater Lengths than they have heretofore done, what
other

other End can this be expected to answer than to obtain a breathing-time of Peace for Ten or Twelve Years? For so great is the Power of *France*, at present, by Sea as well as by Land, and so firmly are they determined upon the Encrease of the former to a Pitch at least equal to that of *Great Britain*: As *Spain* also pursues the same Scheme of Policy, in Regard to the Augmentation of their maritime Force; and as *Spain* and her natural Allies, are bent upon the general Extension of an *active* Commerce, instead of that *passive* one for which they have been so long reproached: Since these things look with a formidable Aspect towards the Protestant Cause, it is to be desired that such a Union of Interests will be made by the latter, as may not only give a short-lived Check to the Power of the Houses of *Bourbon* and *Austria*, but reduce them so low,

low, as to disable them for ever after, if possible, from having any Chance to extirpate the Protestant Interest from the Face of the Earth. And since a great Protestant Prince is raised up, no less famed for Wisdom than Heroism; and who is now happily united in Council with the wisest and best of Protestant Princes, it is to be hoped that they will bring all the Protestant Potentates into such a League, as may prove productive of a *Protestant Emperor*. Why not? Does not Protestantism abound in *Germany*? Cannot these Potentates draw those Subjects into their Asylum, and put Arms into their Hands? Will not this also greatly distress the Trade of the Catholick Powers in the Empire, and throw them into Confusion? Have they not converted a Protestant Prince to Popery? Why should not Endeavours be used to proselyte some Popish one

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to embrace the opposite Cause? Unless Something more is done than whatever has been since the Revolution by *Great Britain*, and her natural Allies in the present War, what Reason have we to expect a Peace of any Duration? The Popish Interest is great, and magnifies daily, beyond that of Protestantism. Is not there greater Reason, therefore, to stop its Progress, before it becomes quite invincible? How this may be accomplished must be left to the Wisdom of their *Britannic* and *Prussian* Majestys: and one great End of my Labours having been devoted to a Consideration of this Kind; I hope what I shall have humbly to submit will meet with a candid and generous Reception. In Order to prepare the Way hereto, is the Motive to my drawing up this Treatise. For, Can any thing have greater Weight with the *Dutch*, or any other Allies

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that may be necessary to defeat the Designs of *France* and her Confederacies, than to convince them, that we are able and resolute to raise the *Supplies within the Year*, requisite to carry on the War with Wisdom and Vigor ; and that we are not under the Necessity of running the Nation a Shilling more in Debt for that Purpose ? When, by our public Oeconomy, we shall convince our desired Friends as well as our Enemies, that we shall be capable of making *Three Million per Annum*, go as far, as heretofore, perhaps, we made *Four or Five Millions* ; will not our natural Allies, especially the parsimonious *Dutch*, be at once charmed and influenced by the Wisdom of our Councils, while our Enemies may stand aghast, and think it fruitless to oppose us ? When this *Domestic System* shall prevail with the Court of *London* ; when her *Foreign System*

System also shall coincide therewith, what may we not hope for? Where is the *Senator*, who can with any Sort of Weight, or Dignity, fly in the Face of such Measures? Although, the general Voice of the People may not always eccho to the Voice of sound Reason and Policy; yet the People can never be deceived, when they feel and experience, that *three Million of Money* is, by good Management, made to go as far as *four or five Millions* used to do. They cannot be imposed on in a *Fact* that shall prove so palpable and notorious. And who without Doors will not give Weight and Sanction to the wise and upright Measures of such an Administration within, be the Persons in Authority whomsoever they may?

The People know as well the wisest Statesmen, that the Events of War both by Land and Sea are precarious;

and they will ever make candid Allowances, when they are convinced from *Facts*, that wise, frugal and upright Measures have been invariably pursued: Nor will they scruple to raise the SUPPLIES *within the Year*, when they discern the Reason of the Measure, and the Rectitude of their Application. If an Administration shall not always prove so fortunate and successful in dealing with the Enemy as could be wished; yet a wise Ministry, faithful to the Interest and Honour of the King and his Kingdoms, will still be chearfully supported; till Things shall be brought to a prosperous and honourable Issue. A wise, a united, and a faithful Ministry, well informed in the State of our domestic as well as foreign Concerns; a Ministry consisting of Persons well accomplished for their respective Departments, and who act in Harmony for the public Interest and Glory, will
never

never be grudged the Emolument and Honour to which their Merit shall entitle them. Nor will such an Administration have Occasion to practice any of the expensive Arts of Influence. On the contrary, who can, with a good Grace, oppose, or traduce such a Ministry? Whoever does, will they not be sure to meet with the Contempt and Indignation they justly deserve? We may venture to foretell, without the prophetic Spirit, that Oppositions *within Doors*, founded on such Principles, will not only prove unavailing, but bring such a Discredit and Ignominy upon their Abettors, as will destroy all their Weight and Influence within and without Doors, and both Abroad as well as at Home: Such pretended Patriots will render themselves incapable of ever serving the Crown hereafter, because they can never be trusted, either by the Sovereign or the People: So that there
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will be no less Danger in opposing *right* than in espousing *wrong* Measures.

Should any Administration, therefore, be dismayed from attempting right Measures, when their Opponents must fall a Sacrifice to the public Resentment? Let but Men in Power be resolute to do their Duty by their King and Country, and they may despise all Opposition. And certainly it is easier to do Right than Wrong, if Persons in Authority will take proper Measures to be duely and faithfully informed in what they cannot come at without, by those whose Interest it is not to deceive them.

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it is not to deceive them.

GRANT



GREAT BRITAIN'S NEW SYSTEM.

L E T T E R I.

*Of raising the SUPPLIES, by encreasing the
PUBLIC DEBTS, considered.*

'TILL the People are thoroughly convinced of the injurious and fatal Consequences that must, at length, inevitably attend the Encrease of the *Public Debts* of this Kingdom, and of the Encrease of new and additional Taxes in consequence thereof; it is quite fruitless to attempt to suggest other Methods of raising the Money requisite to prosecute the present War, than such as have hitherto been practised on the like Occasions.

Let it be supposed that, according to the usual Methods of *Borrowing* and *Funding*, the Public Debts, during the present War, should encrease to no greater degree than they did

in the last War; which was about 30 Millions: And let it be supposed, according to past Experience, that, in ten or twelve Years after a Peace, we should be plunged into a fresh War; which might encrease the Debts of the Nation 30 Millions more; and that afterwards we should have another Breathing-time of ten or twelve Years; and that, according to custom a third War should ensue, no less expensive than each of the former two; these three Wars will swell the national Debts to the amount of 170 Millions, and that in little more than fifty Years. For if we are to take past Experience for our Guide, we have no reason to believe that any more of the Debts will be paid, during the Intervals of Peace, than have hitherto been: Nay, the whole of the Sinking Fund, by such an encreased Debt, becoming absolutely anticipated, together with numbers of additional oppressive Taxes, we have less reason to expect any of the old Debts to be discharged, as we go on contracting of new.

If then the Nation becomes loaded with such an encreased Debt, and the Rate of Interest paid to the public Creditors should continue to be 3 *per Cent*, the Annuity requisite for Interest-money will be 5,100,000. To discharge which, our encreased Taxes upon Trade will not be less than 1,700,000 *l. per annum*, supposing that the Sinking Fund should be capable of contributing a Million to the beforementioned Annuity of 5,100,000.

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The Proprietors of the Funds having, at present, no other way of gaining a Subsistence by the Improvement of their Money, but by lending it to the Government, they must take what Interest they are pleased to give them; and the great monied Corporations, as long as their *Credit* subsists, are enabled to carry the Diminution of Interest, and the Value of Money, to what degree they please, since they are at no Charge but a little Paper to effect it; and by these means they may facilitate the encreasing our Debts, instead of promoting our Wealth and Riches; and I believe every considering Man dreads the Consequence of it.

Let it be supposed then, that when the public Debt came to the enormous Height of 170 Millions, that some People should take it into their Heads to reduce the Interest to 2 *per Cent*, the Annuity to be then paid to the public Creditors would only be 3,400,000, they being, by such Act of Reduction, for ever stripped only of 1,700,000 *per Annum*. This would, for certain, discover a superlative Regard and Tendernefs towards that part of the public Creditors who are Widows and Orphans, and helpless and superannuated: but this would be palliated, as it always has been, from the specious Pretence of throwing this into the *Sinking Fund*, and applying such Saving to the lessening of the principal Debt: but this Pretence will never more be swallowed, unless the public Creditors are infatuated, and the Nation will

suffer the public Debts to be encreased without end. For, to keep to our Touchstone of past Experience, what end can we expect that this farther Reduction of Interest would answer, but to facilitate the farther Augmentation of the Debt to such an additional principal Sum, as 1,700,000 *per Annum*, at 2 *per Cent*, should pay Interest for; which would be no less than 85 Millions of Money more? And thus the Reduction to 2 *per Cent* would prove instrumental to encrease the Burthen of our national Debts to the round Sum of 255 MILLIONS; which, at 2 *per Cent*, would saddle the Nation with a perpetual Annuity of 5,100,000 for the Payment of Interest-money only, without any hopes of ever seeing the Principal discharged. And such is the Language of Parliament, that Taxes appropriated to the Payment of Interest, are never to be taken off till the Principal is paid; and thus our Commerce and Navigation may be clogged for ever with Taxes to the Amount of Five Millions One Hundred Thousand Pounds *per Annum*: And to this happy State and Condition may the Nation be brought at last, upon the old System of running in Debt, without any Hopes of our Redemption, unless other Measures are taken. Nor is this at so great a distance of Time; for all this may come to pass within fifty Years after the Time before-mentioned.

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And here I will beg leave to pause a Moment, and make two Observations that may deserve no less Attention than what has been said; and indeed they will shew how ill our Affairs have heretofore been managed. The First is, That although the Public should have had a Right to the Sinking Fund, (which is a very doubtful Point) and the Parliament should, from such Motive, think they had a Right to apply the same to the current Service; yet it must be observed, that the Sinking Fund, meant and intended by Parliament, was that Sinking Fund which was thought originally, by most, to have been inviolably applied to the Payment of part of the public Debts, contracted before the Year 1716: And if the Public have a Right to a certain Proportion of the Sinking Fund that was intended to be applied to the Payment of Debts before 1716; another Proportion of the Sinking Fund is to be applied to the Payment of Debts incurred since 1716: And should not this be carefully distinguished by the Parliament? For here seems to have been an opening to have sav'd a considerable part of the Sinking Fund from being applied to the current Service; because if one part only is to be applied to the current Service, which was design'd to have been applied to the Payment of the Debts incurred before 1716, the Debts incurred since that time have a Right to be paid by the Sinking Fund, that has taken place since

such subsequent Debts have been contracted, And if so, the Sinking Fund must, for this purpose, be properly distinguished into two parts: And if the Public have a Right to that part of the Sinking Fund, which was to pay the Debts before 1716, the Public have no Right, by virtue of the same Act, to that part of the Sinking Fund which belongs to the Payment of Debts contracted since 1716: No; the subsequent public Creditors have a Right to the subsequent Sinking Fund: So that although the Creditors before 1716 should be obliged to be perpetual Annuitants, the subsequent Creditors have a Right to demand the Money out of the subsequent Sinking Fund; and the Debts of the one may be said to be irredeemable, and those of the other redeemable, there being a Fund established for that purpose, and which will soon be considerably encreased by the Reduction of Interest that will take place. And it is to be hoped, that when that Reduction does takes place, the *New Creditors* will claim the other part of the Sinking Fund, and not suffer the same ever to be applied to the current Service, as the other part of it has been, that belonged to the *Old Creditors*. Nor will those that shall become future Creditors, have any Title to the new Creditors Sinking Fund.

Does not this shew the Necessity, that when any Creditors lend their Money to the Government, upon the Security of certain
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specific Funds, they should take care that it should be explicitly inserted in the Act of Parliament, that the whole Produce of such Funds, to the Amount of their Interest, is their Property; and that if they consent hereafter to the Reduction of their Interest, the Surplus shall be at their Option, either to take the same in part of their Principal, or not. And in such Case, it would be in the Power of the public Creditors to determine whether such Saving should be instrumental to pay Interest-money for future Debts, or not; and this might, and would prove something of a check against the Encrease of the public Debts; and might be attended with other good Consequences to the monied Interest, whose Power and Influence in the State will grow less and less, as the public Debts shall increase, and their Interest be more and more reduced.

Another Observation I would here make is, with respect to the Practice of Parliament, in relation to their making good the Deficiencies of all Funds that may fall short of the Sums for which they were primarily given. When peculiar Funds are appropriated to pay Interest for the public Loans; and those peculiar Funds, so appropriated, are found deficient to answer the purpose for which they were given; it is consistent with the Equity of Parliament to make good such Deficiency. If this was not the Practice of Parliament, the Interest-money of the public

Creditors would be uncertain and precarious, and no one would lend their Money to the Government upon an uncertainty of Interest, however contented they might be in regard to the time when they should receive their Principal.

But what I would chiefly notice is, that those Deficiencies are made good without due Enquiry into the Cause thereof; which, methinks, should be previously necessary. For, if those Funds are constantly greatly deficient, in answering the Sums for which they were given, this will not only bring a Discredit upon those who proposed and abetted them, but should occasion an Enquiry into the Cause why such Funds should be deficient at one time, which were wont perhaps to be otherwise. If such Funds depend upon the prosperous State of our Trade, their Deficiency proves its Declension; and before that is supplied, it would become the Wisdom of Parliament to scrutinize how it comes to pass that our Trade should decline in such certain Branches; and before such Money-deficiency was made good, the Deficiencies in our Trade should be provided against; otherwise the like or greater Deficiencies in those Funds may happen the succeeding Year.

And although, for the Support of the public Credit, the Annuity payable to the public Creditors should be made good; yet it does not follow that any other Deficiency
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of the Sinking Fund need, except those that are also anticipated to pay Interest-money: But why those Deficiencies belonging to the unappropriated part of the Sinking Fund, should be made good, is not so clear; since making them good, and keeping up the Sinking Fund, does not seem to have answered any other end hitherto than what has been observed.

But before those Sinking Fund Deficiencies are made good in the gross, might it not be useful also for the Parliament, previously, to consider their Power? If the Sinking Fund has been abused; if in their Judgment that Fund has been misapplied, and otherwise appropriated, than was originally intended; does it not become the Wisdom of the Nation, before such Deficiencies are made good, to consider whether they have it not in their Power to make good those Deficiencies or not? If they are not bound by former Acts, to make good such Deficiencies, but upon condition that such part of the Sinking Fund belongs to the public Creditors, since 1716, and not to the Public; have they not still a justifiable Right not to supply the unappropriated Deficiencies of that Fund, unless they are to be sacredly applied as primarily intended by Parliament? And might not a just Occasion be from hence taken to think, at a proper time, of the Redemption of that Fund, which was once looked

looked upon as the sacred Treasure that was to redeem the Nation from all its Debts? Or, if that Fund is never to be redeemed, should not the Parliament seriously think of putting a Stop to its future Encrease; and establish some other Fund that shall not only be christened, but prove a *Debt-paying Fund*, or a *Tax-redeeming Fund*? For if all the Savings of the Nation are to be swallowed up by the Sinking Fund, and this shall be made no other use of than it hitherto has been; we shall never be capable of lessening the more burthensome of our Taxes, if we should never lessen the principal Money Debt.

However wise and just the Reasons were for the first Institution of this Fund; yet certain it is, that it has been abused in many Respects, and may prove the Destruction, instead of the Salvation of the Kingdom, as shall be more fully considered hereafter. In the interim I shall only observe; that when this Fund was applied to the current Service, instead of the Payment of the public Debts, there was one essential Disadvantage the Nation sustained, that was not attended to, even by those who opposed the Misapplication of this Fund: Which was, that by the Application of that Fund to the current Service, instead of the Payment of the public Debts, the Nation lost thereby the Benefit and Advantage arising from Compound-Interest, when the public Occasions might have been supplied by the means of Simple-Interest only.

Some

Some People take it for granted, that it is better for the Nation that the public Creditors remain perpetual Annuitants, than ever to be paid their Principal. By the Reduction of their Interest, indeed, their Principal becomes of less and less Value, and therefore they may be said to have the less to lose. The reducing of Interest from 6 to 3 *per Cent.* is, in effect, reducing one half of the national Debt with a Sponge; and he that possessed 100 *l.* Stock formerly, was as rich as he that now possesses 200 *l.* Stock: And if the Interest should be reduced to 2 *per Cent.* 300 *l.* Stock then will be of no greater Value than 100 *l.* Stock was at 6 *per Cent.* In this manner has the Public Credit of Old *England* been tampered with; and yet, instead of mending our Affairs, we seem to think only of encreasing the Evil, by running further and further into Debt.

But if the public Creditors are never to expect their Principal Money again, it is to be hoped, that their Annuity will be effectually and sacredly secured to them. Let us consider then, upon what Foundation this Security depends: And this Security can depend upon nothing but that of our Trade and Navigation. For, in proportion as those shall decline, the Security for the Interest-money of the public Creditors must be weakened; the Parliament being incapable of making good the Deficiencies of the appropriated Funds, if our Trade itself becomes deficient,

deficient, and is incapable of supplying the Treasury that must supply those Deficiencies.

That this must be the Case seems obvious, if we continue to encrease our public Debts ; for, as these encrease, the public Taxes on our Trade must likewise, in some degree of proportion : And no one will scarce undertake to prove, that the more and more our Trade is loaded and incumbered with Taxes, the more it will prosper. If then, the direct contrary must, and will be the inevitable Consequence of encreasing our Taxes of any kind (for let them be laid wherever they may, they will, at length, all terminate on our Trade) by loading our Trade therewith, more and more ; do we not give our great Rivals and Enemies still further and further Opportunity of supplanting us in every Branch of foreign Commerce we enjoy ? And will not, at length, that Source of Wealth be dried up, from whence the Public Creditors derive their very Annuity ? In consequence thereof, will not the Payment of their Interest become precarious, as well as that of their Principal ?

Should it be said, that if Wars occasion the encrease of our Taxes, they will also encrease those of *France*, and other Nations, in something of the like degree ; and therefore we shall still continue upon an Equality with them in point of Trade. This is fallacious. They have already got the start of
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us in the Prices of their Merchandise, and can and do considerably undersel us, more or less, at all the foreign Markets in the World: And no one will believe, that the further Encrease of Taxes on our Trade is the way to overtake them. If the continued Encrease of our Taxes, still more and more, heighten the Price of our Produce and Manufactures, and foreign Purchasers do not encrease in their Wealth, as we shall do in such our Prices, they cannot afford to buy our Commodities; but they will daily encrease in the Purchase of those of our Rivals; because they may be capable of buying others, though not ours. Such is the System of *France* in particular, with regard to their Commerce and Navigation, that they will always be, as they have long been, able to undersel us in our capital Species of Fabricks: And what greatly contributes to this is, a disadvantageous Inequality that we are never likely to prevent: Which is, the Superiority in their Number of People; for while they have three People to our one, their Price of Labour, from that cause only, will be at least one-third lower than ours: And, if to this Consideration, we add their other natural and political Advantages, they cannot avoid gaining the Dominion in Trade; and this will give them the like in the Purse and the Sword, unless we are resolute rather to reduce, than enhance our Debts and Taxes.

Nor

Not can the Expence of the Nation, by the usual way of raising the Supplies, in times of War, be judged of from the additional Interest-money only paid to new Creditors; for the Denomination of the Rate of Interest, said to be given for the public Loans, is not the whole Expence we are at on those Occasions: This must be judged of, according to what the Public does really pay for such Loans. The Interest may be called 3 *per Cent.* yet, by a kind of Management very practicable, and not unusual in Contracts with *monied Societies*, the Public may at least pay at the Rate of 5 *per Cent.* or more.

There is another sort of Management sometimes practised with *monied Societies*, by giving them some *Bargain*, which may be *more valuable* to them, and *more detrimental* to the Public, than *really* and *openly*, to give five, six, or even ten *per Cent.* only in *Appearance*.

Every one knows how our Contracts for naval and military Stores, in times of War, are managed; and that our Navy and Victualling-Bills carry an Interest at 5 *per Cent.*: and although the Interest does not commence for the first six Months, yet This is, and has constantly been allowed in the Prices, which is the same as if it did commence.

If the accumulated Expence of all private Jobs, by running in Debt in times of War, could be accurately computed, it would

would amount to a great Sum: And if to this we were to add the Losses of the Bulk of the Public Creditors by the nefarious Arts of Stockjobbers, and the Losses sustained by our Trade in general at such times, it would magnify the Account, perhaps, beyond the Pitch of Credibility. By these means the Grievances of the Nation are multiplied, and the Increase of the Public Debts accelerated.

Apprehensions of the Danger that may attend the Encrease of the Debts of the Nation, from the Encrease of our Taxes, seem to make little Impression upon some People. "There was a time (say they) when we
 "owed no Debt, and yet this Country was
 "never richer, nor had it more Trade than
 "at present." To which it has been replied, That such who think in this Strain, should recollect the State of this Nation 60 or 70 Years before King *William's* Wars, with respect to our Trade, Shipping, Wealth, and Manufactures; and let them compare it with our Situation when that War broke out, and then let them give a Reason why we have not encreased in the same proportion since that Period. Trade was then in its Infancy; our Colonies were scarce established; those Times had all the Expence of them, and we all the Profit; *Ireland* was then but little better than our Settlements in *America* are now; we had no Union with *Scotland*, and *Portugal* afforded but little Money: Each of these has opened a new
 Source

Source of Wealth to us ; and, with such Advantages, ought we not to have throve in the same proportion we did in the former Period ? Had it not been for the public Debt, there can be no doubt but our Improvements, for the last sixty Years, must have surpassed those of the sixty Years preceding.

While we go on encreasing our Debts, instead of discharging them, it is true that temporary Artifices may be practised to keep up and advance the Price of Stocks ; which will be more a proof of our public Folly, than of the Stability of the public Credit ; for, if the People did not depend more on the first than the last, a redeemable Annuity could never rise above Par.

Some People tell us too, that paying off our Debts is annihilating so much Property. On the contrary, it is purchasing at Par, for the national Benefit, what is supposed to be worth much more ; and the Subject is not annihilated, but only transferred to the Public from a private man, who might have employed it to the public Detriment.

When the Art of Funding was first introduced, the common Talk of Mankind was, that the People of *England* must be undone. Some tell us, that the Event has proved the Vanity of that Apprehension. The Prediction has been verified, perhaps, in the strict Sense. All that was then meant by the Assertion, we may suppose was, that the then
Land-

Land-Possessors, and their Posterity, must be undone, and their Inheritance given away from them, and become the Property of the Chiefs of the Money-mongers. It could never be their Meaning, that the Land would run away, or cease to be occupied by some body. Since our Debts have taken Place, not near one Tenth of the Land of *England* is possessed by the Posterity or Heirs of those who possessed it at the Revolution: And if the Extermination (as it may be justly enough termed) is not universal, it is only, because there were a few over-grown Estates, such as the *Devonshire, Bedford, Curzon, &c.* which have been Proof against the Waste of Luxury and Taxes.

Suppose the *Turks* were to over-run *England*, it might certainly be affirmed with Propriety, that, if we did not drive them out, *England* must be undone; and yet, if they should prevail, the Land would still remain, would still be occupied and cultivated, and possibly the Trade of *England* would receive some Advantages from the Favour of other *Mahometan* Nations, who are Customers for our woollen and other Manufactures: And it is more than probable, that a greater Proportion of the Property of the Country would remain in the Possession of the original Inhabitants Sixty Years after such a Conquest, than is now to be found amongst the Posterity of those to whom it belonged at the Revolution. As the Public Debts still subsist,

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and must daily encrease, unless we resolve to raise the Supplies without running farther in Debt, the present Possessors of Lands must not expect a more durable Establishment; for they assuredly must and will part with their Estates to public Money-dealers, Usurers and Stockjobbers, who will grow immensely rich at their Expence, and that of the other Classes of the Nation.

However little apprehensive the Public Creditors may be of the Danger arising from their encouraging the Augmentation of the National Debts; yet it may be nevertheless certain. For, when the Nation becomes absolutely overwhelmed with the enormous Burthen, and Stockholders, are possessed of so large a Share of the Wealth of the Kingdom, that we can no longer sustain the Weight of the Taxes necessary to pay Interest for such Debts, much less ever to think of paying the Principal-Money; they may, and perhaps will be induced to get rid of the Debts all at once.

We have something similar to this in our History, which ought to alarm us. In a like Extremity, when the Clergy had engrossed too large a Share of the Land Property of the Country, HENRY VIII. was obliged for the Relief of the People, to seize on their Temporalities; and had the Approbation of all true Friends to his Country. Nor was the Grievance so intolerable at that Time as it is likely to be hereafter by encreasing our Money-Debts; because the Clergy contented themselves with Possessions in Land, without

without pretending to a Share in the National Industry.

As to the Violation of Laws and the public Faith, it will be in vain to urge these in Cases of Desperation. The first of all Principles is Self-preservation; nor could the Ties of Law and public Faith be stronger in Favour of Stockholders, and Jobbers now, than of the Clergy at the Reformation. With respect to public Credit, we should have no more Occasion for it; since the People, relieved from so heavy a Burthen, would, on any Emergency, by submitting to the former Taxes, be better able to raise Money within the Year, than can now be brought in by Anticipating. And the greatest Advantage of abolishing the Debt would, in the public Opinion, be, that it would secure us against running in Debt for the future.

It may be said, in Objection to the Nations coming to Extremities of this Kind, that it would be dangerous to drive so powerful, and so rich a Body of People, as the Possessors of so many Millions, to despair. True, it is, they would be powerful, and their Cry loud, because they were possessed of so many Millions: but, when they shall be stripped of that, as would then be the Case, they would be as inconsiderable, and as little listened to, as any other Set of Beggars. No one will say, it would be wise or just in a Prince to act this Part; but Necessity may, at length, compel a Nation to come to such Extremities: And this is a very

melancholy Situation for the public Creditors to consider themselves in: and especially, when the Encrease of the Public Debts, will bring them nearer and nearer to so calamitous a State and Condition.

At however great a Distance these Evils may be conceived by some; yet that of the further Reduction of their Interest to *2 per Cent.* may be nearer at hand than they are aware of; and then a Person with 10,000 *l.* Stock will not be capable of living so well, as a common industrious Tradesman, who began with a single Thousand Pound only.

The more the Nation runs in Debt, the more Money will be locked up in the Funds, and the less will there be employed in Trade; which must necessarily cramp and stagnate the same, for want of a due Proportion of this circulating Property to preserve the whole Commercial Machine in Motion. And if, as the public Debts increase, our Trading Capital decreases, must not this so prejudice the whole national Trade, as gradually to disable the Government from paying even Interest-Money to the public Creditors? For, if we have no Money left to carry on our Trade, we cannot carry it on without. Some Proportion, perhaps, may be preserved for a Time, by the Means of the long Credit that is given and taken in Trade amongst ourselves, and that we unwarily give to foreign Countries: But Foreigners neither do, nor will give us such long Credit as we do them; and if this detrimental

detrimental Custom continues, as we shall have less and less Money in Trade, this Practice, in Conjunction with the Encrease of our Taxes, will contribute to the total Ruin of our Trade: For the farther we deviate in our trafficable Negotiations, from ready-Money Agreements, the higher will be the Price of our Commodities advanced, the less Vent shall we have for them abroad, and the more must our foreign Trade decline: And all the mysterious and superlative Arts of Funding, and Stock-jobbing will not be able to save these Kingdoms from Destruction.

It is the Encrease of our Trade, our foreign Trade and Commerce that must ever prove the grand Preservative of this Kingdom, from that Ruin wherewith it is threatened. But while Men's Heads are busied with the Arts of Money - Jobbing between the Exchange and the Exchequer, they will be drawn off from the solid Arts of honourable Traffic; which alone can prove nationally and permanently lucrative. But if we convert our Traders into Stock-jobbers, who is to carry on the Commerce of the Kingdom? Can any thing be more destructive of the Race of our most skilful and most opulent Merchants than such Policy?

As Commerce is what renders every Country rich and consequently powerful; so the Merchant in this View, may be said to be the most useful Member of the Society in which he lives. It is he, who renders the

Product and Manufactures of our own Country valuable, and brings, besides, a Balance in Money, those of the most distant Countries, for our Use. He runs the Hazard of Seas and Storms, and sails to every Quarter of the World for his Country's Good, depending on nothing but his own Skill and Industry for the Advancement of his Family and Estate. Under whatever Government he lives, the Merchant may be truly said to be an independent Man. He must always be an Enemy to *arbitrary Power*, and his *Industry* will set him above the Temptation of Corruption. It is Liberty which makes Trade lastingly flourish, and a flourishing Trade makes such a Fluctuation of Property, especially amongst the Commonalty, that it is the great Means of preserving Liberty ; and thus they mutually depend on each other.

What a Pleasure is it to see the bustling mercantile Scene, and the perpetual Hurry of Business to be observed in our great trading Cities ? The Channel filled with Ships ; the Quays crowded with infinite Numbers of People, like so many busy Bees about their Hives ? Who can help wishing them Prosperity ? Who does not grieve to consider the many Clogs, which Necessity hath obliged us to lay upon Trade already ; and whose Grief must not be encreased, when he considers, that an Encrease of public Debts must encrease our commercial Grievancies ?

But

But when our Traders shall be converted into mere domestic Money-Shufflers, most of the current Coin of the Kingdom will be turned out of the Channels of Trade, and the Heads of its Merchants and Traders off their proper Business. Funding and Jobbing too often enrich the worst Men, and ruin the Innocent. It taints Men's Morals, and defaces all the Principles of Virtue and fair Dealing, and introduces Combination and Fraud in all Sorts of Traffic. It hath changed honest Commerce into bubbling; our Traders into Projectors; Industry into Tricking; and Applause is earned when the Pillory is deserved. It hath created the Mischiefs which daily threaten us, and which give Reason for standing or occasional Troops. It hath overwhelmed the Nation with Debts and Burthens, under which it is at present almost ready to sink; and it hath not only hindered those Debts from being paid off, but will daily contribute to enhance them; for while there is more to be got by Jobbing, than by discharging our Debts, all Arts will be used to encrease the new Debts, not to redeem the Old.

There is nothing left to be done, but for all honest Men to join Heads, Hearts, and Hands, to find Means, not only to prevent the Encrease of the public Debt, but to think, even in time of War, of laying the Foundation, gradually to lessen our public Burthens; to search every Measure, whereby we can save the public Treasure; and to do all in

our Power to raise the Supplies within the Year, without imposing further Taxes, as well as to think of every thing that may advance Trade, and the public Wealth, without sacrificing the Nation to any Jobs, or private Views; which Conduct alone will enable us to support our public Credit with Honour and Glory, and enable us hereafter to pay off what we owe, and to become once more a free, rich, happy and flourishing People.

L E T T E R II.

A short Enquiry how far Great Britain may be capable of raising some considerable part, if not the whole of the Supplies within the Year, necessary to carry on the War with Vigor.

TO make a right Judgment of this Matter, it may be previously necessary to enquire, where all the Money raised by the Parliament to carry on the War, may actually center and circulate; for that Proportion which is spent in the Kingdom, will not impoverish the Nation, so as to disable her from raising some considerable Part, at least, if not the Whole of the Supplies within the Year.

The following Particulars we shall lay down as Principles whereon to ground what shall be urged in the Sequel.

I. That

I. That whatever Money is raised for the Support of the Royal Navy centers and circulates amongst ourselves ; excepting that small Proportion thereof, which is expended out of the Nation for that Part of our naval Stores we take from foreign Countries ; which in its Consequences is not detrimental, it tending to cement a constant Intercourse of Friendship and Commerce with such States, whose Aid, in time of War, we stand in Need of : and in particular with *Russia* ; with which Potentate we have a more beneficial Treaty of Commerce subsisting than any other Nation has, and our Trade with that great Empire may be rendered more and more lucrative, by maintaining a proper Intercourse of Traffic therewith.

II. That all our domestic military Expence centers and circulates within the Nation.

III. That the interest Money we pay as an Annuity to the public Creditors all centers and circulates amongst ourselves ; excepting that Proportion thereof which we pay to Foreigners ; and this cannot, perhaps, be so disadvantageous to the Nation in its Consequences as some have been pleased to think, for the following Reasons.

1. Because while the *Dutch*, who are our principal foreign Creditors, continue to have any considerable Share of Property in our Funds, they will be ready, in order to save that, to assist us with more on the most dangerous Emergencies.

2. Because

2. Because their being Stock-Proprietors, the Commission our Remitters gain by negotiating these Money-Transactions for their Account, contributes in that Proportion to lessen the Expence of Interest-money, which we pay them.

3. Because the Money, which the *Dutch* Merchants have in our Funds promote and facilitate a more beneficial Intercourse of Trade and Navigation with the States than we could reasonably expect to have, if they had no Money in our Funds ; or if their moneyed-Property lie wholly in the *French*, or other foreign Funds ; for daily Experience proves, that this administers such a Conveniency in the way of Traffic, as naturally tends to encourage the same between the two States.

4. Because by these, and such-like Transactions, such currency of Commerce has been carried on between *England* and *Holland*, as hath, ever since the Peace of *Utrecht*, proved greatly to the Advantage of the former, the Balance being considerably in her favour.

5. Because, a considerable Proportion of the trafficable Gains made by the *Dutch*, does at length center in *England*, many of the richest *Dutch*, *Christian*, and *Jew* Families, intermarrying with the *English*, *Christians*, and resident *Jews* ; whereby they and their Families settle in this Nation, and promote still a greater degree of Trade and Navigation between the two States ; which has by these, and such like Causes, and commercial Negotiations,

gociations, contributed to preserve the general Ballance of Trade so long with the *Dutch* in the Favour of *England*.

In Consequence of which, the *United Provinces* may be looked upon, in the Light of a *British Factory*, subservient to the Advancement and Prosperity of the Interests of the Trade of *Great-Britain*; and may be rendered far more so, perhaps, than they have hitherto ever been.

IV. That the Money expended in the *Collection* of the *Public Revenue*, centers and circulates amongst ourselves, as well as does the Whole of His Majesty's Civil-List, except the Appointments that our Ambassadors and other Ministers abroad spend out of the Kingdom; and this is replaced by what is expended here by foreign Ministers.

Whence it should seem that, in Effect, the Bulk of the Money we raise, centers and circulates within ourselves; except such Proportion thereof as may be expended out of the Kingdom in Subsidies, &c. if that never returns here again, in any Shape to make us a Compensation for such Disbursements.

If these Principles upon Examination shall be found true; it will follow, that this Nation cannot be so distressed for Money, but she may raise a considerable Proportion, if not the Whole of the Supplies within the Year, without running the Nation in Debt, as has been done in the usual Manner. For,

Supposing

Supposing the encreased Expence in Time of War should amount, we will say, to Four Millions more or less annually : if this Sum be raised amongst ourselves within the Year, and returned to the People again within that Year, to the naval and military Contractors, &c. why should not the Nation be capable of raising the Sum required within the Year ? If the Contractors to supply the Navy and Army should be certain of having their Money within the Year, they would not only chearfully give Credit to the Government for that Year, but could afford to serve them much cheaper, than they can do, when the Government runs in Debt for the same ; whereby not only the Time of Payment of the Principal is scarce ever expected, but the Interest-money rendered precarious, perhaps, by the Event of War. The Difference being very great between a Certainty of Payment of the Principal within the Year, and the Certainty of the Principal being paid we know not when ; and the Interest thereof rendered we know not how uncertain : The Difference between these, will certainly make a wide Difference in Point of the Expence to the Nation in the Purchase of all Government Stores and Necessaries.

If the Government by purchasing on Condition of certain Payment within the Year only, should save but 10 *per Cent.* Profit upon Four Millions, would not 400,000 *l.*, *per Ann.* be well worth saving ? But perhaps, upon such

a Contract, the Government might save considerably more, than $\frac{1}{10}$ Part of the Four Millions required to be raised the succeeding Year. If to this we add the Saving of 3 *per Cent.* Interest only upon the Raising of the Four Millions in the usual Way of running in Debt, &c., this will make an additional annual Saving of 120,000*l.* more; the Total whereof would make a Saving towards the next Year's Supplies, of considerably more than 520,000*l.*; which would be more than $\frac{1}{7}$ Part and $\frac{2}{3}$, of the Four Millions to be raised for the succeeding Year.

And how far the preventing an Encrease of Taxes upon our Trade annually for a Term of Years, (till the Four Millions of Principal-Money borrowed, shall be repaid) may be considered as an Advantage to our general Commerce and Navigation, will appear if we reflect how greatly our Trade is, at present, incumbered with Taxes; and how greatly it thereby suffers, by empowering our Rivals to undersel us, in Time of Peace, and enabling neutral Powers, by the same Means, to ruin our Trade in Time of War.

If we go on from Year to Year thus running in Debt, and thereby encreasing Taxes on our Trade; our Trade must inevitably decline as these Incumbrances shall encrease; whereby we must, at length, be deprived of those Resources of Wealth, which will enable us to raise the Supplies at any Rate hereafter.

When

When the Supplies shall be raised within the Year, and the sooner Contractors with the Government shall be paid *within that Year*, with less Difficulty will the Supplies be raised, not only for that, but for the succeeding Year; because the sooner the Money raised returns into the Channel of public Circulation, the better will the People be enabled, from Year to Year, to raise the Money required; for the quick and regular Circulation of the Money again into the public Hands, gives such an Acceleration and Rapidity to the whole Currency of our Traffic, that People will be as little sensible, perhaps, of raising the whole Supply of *Principal Money* amongst ourselves within the Year, as they will be of raising the *Interest Money* for such Supplies only by new created Taxes.

When the Nation runs in Debt for the Supplies, nothing but the *Interest - Money* of such Principal Debts, returns into the Channel of Circulation, till such Debt is redeemed. This is taking so much *Principal Trading-Stock*, out of the People's Hands, which might be employed (if our Trade is left unincumbered with additional Taxes from Year to Year) to the national Advantage both in our foreign and domestic Traffic, instead of locking the same up in Stocks, as a dead Capital for the Sake of a *domestic Interest Money* only: Whereas, if the *Principal Money*, without the Payment of Interest, was raised upon the People, within the Year,
and

and repaid to them within the same Period of Time, such Principal Money would continue as a Live Trading Capital Stock, constantly in the Commercial Channel of Circulation; for when Persons were certain of the Returns of their *Principal Money*, and others had no Interest-money to receive for the same, nor any Advantage but what could be made in the Way of domestic or foreign Traffic, they would not only employ such Principal Money in Trading with the Government in naval and military Stores, &c. at Home, but many would extend their Credit in foreign Trade abroad; when they were certain of the regular Returns of their Principal Money from the Government, to answer all Demands upon them within a limited Time: for hereby they would know what Credit to take at home, and what they could afford to give abroad: So that the dead Stock now lent to the Government upon no Certainty of Payment, would become a Live Trading Stock, inducing to new Commercial Enterprises; which would encrease the general Treasure and maritime Force of the whole *British Empire*.

It is the Quickness of the Circulation of Money in a Trading Nation, that is the Soul of Trade, and is a Species of Policy that may be rendered the *Steady Support* of the Public Credit of this Kingdom in Time of War, and of the greatest Danger; provided this *Circulation* is duly *accelerated* and maintained
between

between the Government and the People, in raising the Supplies *within the Year*.

The Government and the People may be considered in the Light of Dealers and Traders with each other ; the Government, as the Purchasers of Naval and Military Stores, &c. the People as the Sellers thereof. The quicker Paymaster the Government is to the People, the better able, and the more ready will the People be, to raise all Supplies necessary within the Year.

Such annual Supplies should be raised in a way the most easy, the most equal, and the most agreeable to the People. Let it be supposed that the Four Millions extra, more or less, should be raised within the Year, instead of running that Sum in Debt ; and that the said Sum is levied in such a Manner as it may be raised *monthly* ; and that Payment shall be made to all Contractors with the Government, every *four Months*, or *quarterly*. This would furnish the Government with Money to purchase all they wanted, at a *Ready Money* Price, as it were (Three Month's Credit being reckoned as good, when Creditors are certain of their Money in that Time). This will enable the Government to buy all Stores from 30 to 60 *per Cent.* cheaper than they could do when the Time of Payment is left uncertain ; and yet the Contractors may gain at least by the Government ten *per Cent. per Annum* ; on the Four Millions laid out with them. But if the Money is paid them *quarterly*,

terly, it will prove such an Easement in their other commercial-Concerns as to be far more beneficial to them. Such like Conduct in the Government will be acceptable to all with whom they have Dealings, and the Public, we may presume, will chearfully submit to such reasonable Taxation as may empower the Government to pay them so quickly and so punctually: especially as all Traders in general will know that this Money is laid out for the Security of what Trade the Nation already has, and for its further Increase and Prosperity. The Trading Interest will chearfully credit the Government with any Sum they shall want payable within the Year, when they are sure to gain no more than Ten *per Cent. per Annum* by it; though when their Returns are made quarterly, this will greatly augment their commercial Profits.

These Measures will also accelerate the general Circulation of Money amongst the People, and encrease their Gains in general, which accumulated Gains of many being brought to Market in the Funds, will contribute to keep up the Price of the Stocks; for no Trader of Consideration will keep large Sums in his Coffers, when an easy Opportunity of some Advantage offers, if it be only for a Month or two.

Another End that may be answered by these Measures is, that, if by any Invasion, or other alarming Disadvantage arising from the Event of War, the public Creditors should

be struck with a Pannic, and the Funds should fall greatly, so that every one would be for realising his Stocks into current Cash: Should this be the Case, the Government would, by raising the Supplies, in the Manner proposed, be enabled to prevent any continued *Run* upon the *Public Stocks*, For having the *New-Fund-Money* come in *Monthly*, and that repaid to Contractors every *Three Months*, or *Four Months*, the Government will always have at least a *Million* in their Hands of the *New-Fund-Money* only.

The Use proposed to be made of which occasionally is to uphold the Price of Stocks on any sudden Surprise. To Instance: when the Stocks shall have fallen on such an Occasion any thing extraordinarily, let the Government purchase Half a Million or more at the lowest Rate. This will as suddenly raise the Price of Stocks as it might have fallen; for when the Government were found capable of purchasing its own Debts, this would be looked upon a Kind of Payment of such Debt, even in Times of Danger: Thus, by raising the Stocks, Buyers would soon come in to take them off the Government's Hands, at the advanced Price; and thereby the Nation would gain those Advantages that others only have too long done to, the Detriment of the Kingdom, and the public Credit.

Measures of this Kind properly conducted should seem to have such an happy Effect
upon

upon the public Credit on any alarming Occasion, as to prevent detrimental Consequences, after such an Experiment, to the public Creditors, by keeping the Price of the Funds steady; for when the Nation were convinced, that the Government was able and ready to purchase the public Stocks as fast as the Creditors should sell out, and reap the Advantage of their Fear and Apprehension, they would be upon their Guard, and not to be taken in again, when they had once lost 20 or 30 *per Cent.* or more, perhaps, by the precipitate Sale of their Funds.

If the Sellers of Stocks on such like Alarms, should call for more ready Money than the Exchequer should be provided with, the Government in Times of impending Danger taking Bank-Notes in Payment for the Revenue, and converting the same into current Cash; together with such an Association for the Circulation of Bank-Notes being made as was done in the late Rebellion; will enable the Bank to supply the Exchequer with what Hard-money they may stand in need off on those Emergencies; For, upon such a State of the public Credit, the Bank by a proper Agreement with the Exchequer will not be intimidated from supporting the Credit of the Exchequer, and the Exchequer will in Return be enabled to uphold the Credit of the Bank; and that not only as a Bank, but as a Body of public Creditors, by pre-

venting any disadvantageous Run upon the Stocks in general.

But the public Credit cannot be thus upheld and preserved in Times of the greatest Danger, without the Supplies are raised within the Year: for encreasing the public Debts by so many Millions a Year as we have done in Times of War, and thereby encreasing the Property, and the Number of Stockholders in the like Degree, will occasion Runs upon the Stock, in Time of imminent Danger, to be in Proportion to the encreased Number of Stockholders: and this may prove so great, upon some alarming Events of War, that it may not be in the Power of the Government, by any Measures they can take, to prevent very destructive Consequences to the national Creditors in general; if they should be able to save the public Credit from absolute Ruin.

Another Advantage that should seem to attend the Raising of the Supplies, as proposed, would be the throwing, in Effect, an additional Quantity of Live-Stock into the commercial Channel of Circulation; which would enable the Trading-Interest, by virtue thereof, to deal for much shorter Credit, and more for ready-Money in their Negotiations than they can do at present; for there will be a wide Difference in Circulation between the whole Principal-money extraordinarily raised, reverting into the Channel of Trade every *Three Months*, and the Interest-money only for such Sums as should

should be borrowed, tho' the Interest-money be paid *half yearly*. For although the raising the Supplies within the Year cannot be said to add to the national Hard-money ; yet its bringing more out of private Hands, than our running in Debt, and paying Taxes only for such Debts does : Such Measures may be said to add to the Quantity of circulating-Money of the Nation, though it may not add to the national Quantity. And such Addition to the circulating Money, will, by its Employment in Trade, gradually add to the national Quantity ; which cannot be done, while private People keep more Money by them than their Occasions require.

And if Ready-money Dealings, or Dealing for short Credit should take place between the Government and the Public ; such reiterated Practice might be made naturally instrumental to introduce the like Practice into all our trafficable Dealings in general : And if this should prove the happy Consequence of such Policy, it will, as well on this Occasion, as on many others, be productive of lowering the Price of our Manufactures, and thereby putting it less in the Power of our Rivals to supplant us in our foreign Commerce : and this would most certainly contribute to the solid Encrease of the national Money.

As Ready-money or short Credit Dealings between the Government and the Public should seem to have a Tendency to introduce the like Custom into private Dealings in

Trade ; and such a Custom is likely to lower the Price of our Manufactures to foreign Nations, and thereby enrich the Kingdom ; it is a Matter that may deserve our further Attention. For, as the due Support of the Public Credit may prove conducive to shorten the Time of private Credit ; so this Benefit to private Credit, will, in Return, add to the better Support of the public Credit ; whereby they will afford a reciprocal Aid to each other : and therefore it will not be judged repugnant to our Subject, if I say a Word, en passant, upon private Credit, as having a Connection with that of the public.

Nothing is more apparent, than that of the original, natural and genuine Way of commercial Dealings must have been either by Barter, or to buy and sell for ready Money ; and that the Selling large Quantities of Goods on Trust has been superinduced through ill Custom ; which, with us, by long Usage, is become so habitual, that we scarce attend to the Danger and Inconveniencies, or endeavour to reform them. To give a short View of this Matter, we may observe an Instance how it was introduced, and how rectified in a foreign Country.

The usual Way of vending Goods formerly in *Spain* for the Expence of the Country, was by the Traders of the inland Cities, who came to the Sea Ports, and purchased with their ready Money, from the Factors of the
several

several Nations, residing there ; but they never thought of requiring Credit, till the Factors, being overstocked with Goods, would persuade them to take larger Quantities than they wanted, and pay for them the next Journey : Thus, by Degrees, they run into a trusting Trade, which continued for some Years ; and the Inland Traders, being hereby also enabled to give Credit to the Under-dealers, became more and more behind in their Pay ; and being pressed by their Factors, most of them, who had lived creditably before, while they traded upon their own Stocks, came to be ruined by adventuring upon long Credit ; the Factors disobliged their Principals, in contracting great Losses by bad Debts, whereby many of them lost their Business : new Factors were then sent over, and positive Orders given by their Principals, to sell none of their Goods but for ready Money : Thus the Trade was reduced to its original State, and so it long continued, and all Parties prospered, while it did so.

If we look at home, we shall find this Mischief radicated in the whole Course of our Trade, to a Degree beyond Comparison in any other Country, the greater Part of our Inland Traders, who deal for very great Sums, continuing to manage their Business in this Way ; and, though many of them, who act with extraordinary Prudence and Circumspection obtain considerable Estates ;

yet, if they account the Slowness of their Returns, together with the Losses which accrue by the bad Debts of such whom they trust again, they might, perhaps, have made far greater Improvements, if this Way of trusting and being trusted had never been introduced into their Traffic—Whence it comes to pass, that the Number of Bankrupts in *England* is greater than in any other trading Country.

As the Injury to our Trade by this Kind of Dealing is manifest, nor an easy Task to shew wherein it is at all helpful, it seems to be merely a Vice in Trade ; which, if it could be removed, the Trade of the Nation would certainly become more flourishing in general, and more beneficial to the individuals, therein interested.

If any should imagine, that this great Credit contributes to the promoting of Trade, this will appear groundless, when it is considered, that it adds nothing to the Consumption of Commodities ; there remaining no less Occasion for Consumption, if this Excess of Credit were lessened ; the only Effect thereof being, that it enables People to overstock themselves with Goods, which lays a dead Weight on the whole Trading Stock of the Nation ; and cramps the Merchant in his Commerce by the tedious Length of the Returns.

When Tradesmen shall receive less Credit from the Merchant, the former will give less
Credit

Credit in their Sales with a good Grace ; and so will continue to hold a Share in Trade proportionable to their real Stock, which is as much as any prudent Man should aim at : nor can it be doubted, but under such a Regulation, more Tradesmen would prosper than under the present misgoverned Excess of Credit.

That there is a Possibility of reforming this ill Custom, in respect of the Buyers, is apparent, from the Practice of the *East-India-Company*, who make the Trader pay for the Goods bought, before he receive them ; yet we see this is no Obstruction to the Currency of vending their Commodities through the Nation. As a Multitude of Sellers, indeed, cannot be brought to an universal Concert in their Business, like those who trade upon a Joint - Stock ; on their Part it will be a Work of more Difficulty and Time, but that should be no Discouragement to the reform.

The ill Effects of large Credit in Trade will further appear from considering, that Goods purchased by Merchants for Exportation on long Credit, with Intent to discharge the Debt by the Return of the same Commodities, has an injurious Influence upon Trade several Ways, It tends to force Trade and glut the foreign Markets with greater Quantities of Merchandize than is ordinarily required ; whereby the Price of the Commodities comes to be greatly abated, to the Prejudice

judice, not only of the Trader, but also of the Trade of the Nation in general.

When the Price of Goods is lowered by such means, the Manufacturers make them worse in Quality, that they may be sold at lower Prices ; and that, by degrees, brings them into disesteem, stagnates the Sale, and transfers the Trade to other Countries ; who supply the same Markets with better Commodities, because they do not over-stock them, nor trade for such long Credit.

He that buys Goods for time, must consequently pay the dearer for them, and must, as observed, force a Sale abroad, that he may have the Returns in time, to answer his Credit at home ; and, if by the falling the Markets, the Money-dealer gets little or nothing, he must sell for Loss : And if he makes his Returns by Merchandizes, his Necessities compel him to sell his Importations immediately, for the raising of present Money ; which oftentimes tends to Loss also : So that the way of Traffic by long Credit, is not only highly detrimental to Trade in general, but such Traders generally undo themselves, and involve others in their Ruin.

In short, the injurious Consequences of giving and taking long Credit in Trade, are too numerous to be here represented. But if a general Alteration was made in relation to this Matter, all degrees of People would find their Account in it ; Money will become more plenty in Circulation ; Rents be
better

better paid ; and improvident People be forced to Frugality ; which is the first Principle conducive to national as well as private Riches.

As the trafficking in Trade in general for ready Money, or short Credit, will enable us to send our Merchandizes to foreign Markets cheaper than we can do by reason of the large Credit given and taken amongst ourselves ; and will prove the best Support to the universal Credit of our Traders : So the like Practice used by the Government in all their Dealings with Traders, will prove, in time of War, the best Support of the public Credit : All the good Consequences that our Trade, and Traders in general, would receive by such an Alteration in our domestic System, would also attend the Government by transacting all their Affairs for ready Money, or at so short a Credit, as has been humbly suggested ; which is near equivalent to that of ready-money.

But it will never be possible for the Government to fall into a Practice so highly beneficial to the Nation, unless the Money for the Supplies is raised within the Year : And if this is done, the Returns of such Supplies being made quarterly, as observed, into the Channel of Circulation, the raising thereof within the Year, will scarce be felt by the Public ; and especially so, when all other Taxes are thereby prevented that would have been absolutely necessary to pay Interest for the

the same Sums, provided they had been borrowed. This Advantage, added to the various others before enumerated, would induce the Public chearfully to acquiese in these Measures, when they should experience the happy Effects of them : And those of the public Creditors, who were not mere Stock-traffickers, and others who had no View to make other kinds of lucrative Jobs, by the public Wants and Distresses, could have no Reason to object against such a System of domestic Oeconomy ; since such Conduct might enable the Government to uphold the public Credit, by means of the Exchequer Expedient before intimated, in a better manner than they have yet ever been able to do since the Revolution. And if we could make but a pretty accurate Computation of what the Nation will save by preventing every Species of Jobs, which our running in Debt makes us liable to ; it would amount to a large Sum in a few Years. Nor could any Measures, perhaps, tend more effectually than those to raise the Glory of our royal Navy to the most desirable Degree : For by such Policy the Consequences hereafter mentioned would necessarily follow.

When the Government purchased for ready Money, due Care would be taken that the Provision of our Seamen should be good and plentiful ; and that there should be no Connivance at Frauds, to the Prejudice of our Sailors : They would also be kept sweet and
clean

clean, carefully looked after when sick, and in all other respects used with that Humanity and Tenderneſs, which they deſerve.

Hereby we ſhould be able to pay them duly when they came home, that they might have ſome comfortable Enjoyment of themſelves, with their Wives and Children, Relations and Friends: By which means the Money we pay them may circulate amongſt ourſelves. — Their ſhort Allowance and Prize-money alſo would then be duly paid, at the time with their Wages, and their Plunder be timely ſhared amongſt them.

The Quarters of the ſick and wounded would be punctually diſcharged; and we ſhould the better afford to provide for them ſkilful Doctors and Surgeons on board or a-ſhore, and furniſh them with good Medicines, for the Preſervation of the Health and Lives of our maritime Protectors, on whom we rely for our chief Security.

In ſuch caſe, there would be always Money ready at the Pay-office to ſatisfy the Executors of thoſe who die in the Service, or thoſe who have lawful Powers to receive the Pay of ſuch as have been turned over into other Ships, before the Ships, they belonged to, were paid off. And an End alſo would be put to that miſchievous Practice of Calls and Recalls, in attending upon which, many have ſpent the greateſt part of their Pay, before they had received it.

THESE

These Measures would encourage our Seamen to enter into the Service joyfully, and save the Nation many Thousands a Year, that are now spent by Press-gangs, Press-Ketches, and in Provisions and Wages to keep Men on board Ships, that are laid up, during the Winter, to prevent their running away from the Service of their Country.

Were these Practices happily introduced, we should have no Complaints for want of Seamen ; this would induce more to enter chearfully, than we should need, by drawing them all out of foreign Service ; which now too much abounds with *British* Sailors to fight against, instead of for their own Country. For these are the unhappy Consequences of suffering our Sailors to labour under those Difficulties and Discouragements before particularized.

A ready-money Government will be capable of encouraging our Seamen with pecuniary Rewards in all respects : They might apply Bounties to promote and stimulate a Bravery on board our Privateers ; which might contribute to the maritime Glory of the Nation ; and if the Commanders of those private Ships of War, were rewarded according to their Conduct and Magnanimity, with a Command in the royal Navy, in the room of our dastardly Captains and Admirals, it would prove an eternal Ignominy to those Officers who eat the King's Bread, to be out-done, by the Master of a Privateer.—This
would

would create an Emulation amongst the Commanders of the King's Ships, as well as amongst those in our private Ships of War, not to be outdone by those in the Merchant's Service ; and it would animate the latter to eclipse the Conduct of the one, as well as emulate that of each other. And when our Sailors had experienced that Merit was sure to meet with Rewards in Money or Honours, and that even Seniority in the King's Service was superseded, without other Qualifications ; what a Spirit would this raise in the Nation for the *British* Sea Service in general ?

The Reputation and Glory that would arise to the Kingdom from our Capacity to raise the Supplies within the Year, would contribute in its Consequences to save the Nation Millions ; for when our Enemies experienced this Opulency of the State, and the unshaken Basis upon which the public Credit should then stand, they would begin to think it fruitless to prosecute a War against a Kingdom that could never be impoverished : And this must appear to them to be the case, when we were in a Condition to raise the Supplies within the Year, and even from Month to Month, and pay our naval and military Expences every Three Months.

By such-like Conduct we shall put a Stop to new Funding and Taxing ; and will not this put a Stop to numerous other Evils ? For new Taxes create new Officers, and new Powers to the Crown, new Expence in the Collection

Collection of the Revenue, new Incumbrances to ruin our Traffic, new private Jobs to be carried, new public Debts, new Difficulties to public Credit, new Schemes of Oppression to raise Money, new Insults from every Power in *Europe*, new Conquests of the Enemy, new foreign Alliances to distract and bully us, new Scenes of Corruption and Mismanagement in our naval and military Affairs, new domestic Intrigues and Cabal, to fleece and impoverish the Kingdom ; and at length to introduce a new Constitution : And when our ready-monied Policy puts a Stop to this Torrent of Evils, we may reasonably expect every Blessing ; and that all desirable Success will attend our Arms and our Commerce.

The great Bane of our Trade is the high Price of our Commodities. And must not Augmentation of our Debts and Taxes still enhance their Price ? And must not this, at length, prove the Ruin of our whole Commerce ? In order to ease our Trade, and to prevent its total Destruction, must we not, at any Rate, get rid of our Debts and Taxes ? Since the more we run in Debt the less able shall we be to pay them, can we get rid of them, without the absolute Ruin of all the public Creditors ? And what a Scene of Confusion and Horror must this produce in the Kingdom ?

The more our national Debts encrease, the more will the Spirit of Stock and Lottery-gaming

gaming advance and propagate : and this will rise to such a superlative Pitch, that we shall not be able to avoid having the same iniquitous Farces acted over again, as those of the *Mississippi* and *South Sea* Years ; for however sensibly Numbers of good Families both in *England* and *France* may have Reason to remember those memorable *Æra*, there are too many fresh-Men ripe to be decoyed again by the same State-Tricks ; nor is any thing more common than to hear of the young and unexperienced Fry, being taken in, by the Rogueries, that their Ancestors, if living would be Proof against.

As I was ever an Enemy to private, so I have an invincible Antipathy to public Gaming, because I well remember those Stock-Confusion Periods. These fatal Times made an inconceivable Change in the private Property : And if a public Debt of little more than Fifty Millions was productive of such a Catastrophe, what may not one of double or treble that Sum produce ? If the public Creditors have any Regard for the lasting Interest, and the Credit and Honour of their Families, they will be unanimous to prevent the Causes of such future calamitous Events to their Posterity ; for so sure as the national Debts encrease to the Degree they have hitherto done, so certain will the same Scenes, or worse be acted over again, to the unspeakable Injury, if not the Ruin of Stockholders in general.

In Comparison to the Number of Stockholders, there are very few, who are deeply informed of the Mysteries of this Sort of Traffic; but those few who are, will have it in their Power to strip the Rest, and leave only a little fairey Treasure in the Hands of the Ignorant, while they possess themselves of the permanent and substantial. As the levelling Principle is destructive of all true Merit and Industry, so is that of too great an inequality of Treasure amongst the People; yet this the Multiplication of Stocks will necessarily occasion; and those who may think themselves secure in amassing a large Family-Property by these Arts, may live to find it vanish, and their Property too soon experience its Annihilation; if a Stop is not put in Time to the Encrease of the public Incumbrances.

There is nothing can be more injurious, and in the end more ruinous to a Trading-State than for the People to possess this Stock-bubbling Itch, of shifting one and the same Quantity of Property only from Hand to Hand amongst themselves, without encreasing at all the solid Treasure of the Nation. The Price of all Things in the Year 1720 grew to such an exorbitant Height, by these deceitful Arts that there was little or no Profit to be got by carrying our Goods to foreign Countries; our general Commerce was stagnated, and was, as it were, at an End, the Root of all private as well as public Credit being struck at: The general Property became

became monopolised by a few, who drew it out of the national Traffic, and aggrandized themselves with immense Landed Property, at the Expence of the old Nobility and Gentry : and this must and will again come to be the Case of the new, if the Causes that lead to the like public Ferment, and public Plunder are not removed instead of augmented.

There can be no other Way imagined to render a Nation wealthy, and potent, than for the State to contrive that its Members partake of the Riches of the Nation, by such skilful and industrious Arts of Acquisition only, as shall encrease the general Treasures, at the same Time that they distribute a Proportion to every one suitable to his real Usefulness to the Community. But do not these domestic Arts of Stock-bubbling put a Stop to the Exertion of those Talents ? While there remain uncultivated Lands, and Numbers of distressed Poor ; while our Commerce and Manufactures do not continually afford new Occasions of drawing Wealth into the State ; while Gold and Silver are not encreased, from the Effects of Trade, it must proceed from Men's Heads being otherwise turned ; and it is the Duty of a wise and just Administration to turn them into the right Channel for the common Interest of the Nation.

The public Debt occasions an Annuity to be drawn out of the Profit and

Consumption of every Individual. Before such Debt took Place, every body possessed their whole Gains. There was no *Exchange Alley*: those who frequent it had no Existence; and, had there been no Opportunity of exercising their Genius that Way, their Necessities would have pointed out such Ways of Life as might have been of Use to the Public, which they now prey upon. The ready Money which circulates in the Alley, and is there tossed backwards and forwards, was, and without our Debts, would again be employed not only in the Ready-money Circulation of our whole Trade, but would thereby greatly extend and advance it, and prove the Means of drawing in the Wealth of other Countries. Our public Debts put it out of our Power to Traffic for ready Money, and disable us from working our Goods cheap enough to gain much by them at foreign Markets.

If the present public Debt instead of being encreased, was paid off, the Profits of the Manufacturers, Tradesmen and Merchants, &c. would be all their own. They would be exempted from paying at least 100 *per Cent.* out of their joint Gain. This would be equal in every Respect to a Bounty to that Amount on all our Productions and Fabricks: with that Advantage we should be able to undersell our Neighbours; Our People would of Course multiply; Our Poor would find ample Employ-

Employment; even the aged and infirm might then earn enough to live upon; new Arts and new Manufactures would be introduced, and the old ones brought to greater Perfection: Our most barren Lands would be cultivated, and the Produce of the whole be more than sufficient to supply the Demands of our People.

The Stock dealers, when paid off, would find Employment for their Money in fair Trade and Manufactures, and would experience that turn to far better and more lasting Account to themselves and Families than preying on the Vitals of their Country. Rents would rise, and the Country Gentleman be able to provide handsomely for his younger Children. We should be able to restore Morality among the People; and the immense Encrease of Trade would furnish Employment for every industrious Man. Our Colonies would share in the Benefits; and many Causes of Jealousy between their Mother Country and them might then be effectually removed. We should become formidable to our Neighbours; for besides the Encrease of our naval Power to what Degree we pleased, in Time of War, we shall be able to raise much more Money within the Year than we have ever done by Anticipation: And this we are capable of doing now, even with the Burthen of our present Debts, by Means of the quick Circulation of the an-

nual Supplies amongst the People again, as has been submitted.

And how far a Scheme for raising the Supplies within the Year, as proposed, may be made instrumental, after the End of a War, to lessen the public Debts, shall be hereafter considered: which may still prove a further Motive to induce us to think seriously of it.

LETTER

L E T T E R III.

Of raising the Supplies monthly, and paying all Contractors with the Government quarterly; and of the Effects thereof in the general Circulation of our Commerce.

FROM what has been urged in the former Part of this Volume, we have endeavoured to show, that the Practicability of raising the Supplies within the Year, depends (1) on the raising them monthly, (2) In a Manner the least expensive that can be done; and (3) from the Quickness of the Sums raised circulating again amongst the People.

If it should be imagined that the Whole of the Supplies requisite in Times of War, could not be some how raised within the Year in the Manner proposed; ought this to obstruct our Attempt to raise some Proportion thereof within that Period? If it should be thought too much to raise the whole, does it follow from thence, that we may not be able to raise one half Part of them within that Time, or some other considerable Proportion? If we experienced the Practicability of raising one half only, we might the next Year be induced to go further Lengths.

As the Raising the whole, or any Part therefore depends upon the Celerity of Circulation ; it may be useful to consider what Quantity of real Money may be necessary to carry on the Circulation and commercial Barter of a State ; and this has been judged to be nearly one third Part of the annual Rents of the Land Proprietors of such a State.

By an exact Land Tax, the Rents of the Lands of *England* may be known ; and consequently, if the preceding Position be true, the Knowledge of the actual Sum of Money requisite in Circulation may be attained.

If the real Rental of the Lands of *England* should be double to the computed one, as it is thought to be ; yet we cannot want the aforesaid Proportion of circulating Cash, that being scarce ever computed at less than three Quarters of the Value of the real Rental of the Land.

How the foregoing Position may be deduced, will be judged from what follows.

Let us consider the Proprietor of a Landed Estate, as keeping the same in his own Hands, and employing all Sorts of Labourers, Servants, Mechanics and Overseers, &c.

Let it be supposed, also, that several of these Overseers and Tradesmen, &c. to whom the Landlord usually gave an Allowance in Commodities, have, by their Oeconomy exchanged them for Silver, at such a Price as
has

has been determined by the Market-Alterations ; And that the Inhabitants are willing to take Silver as a Pledge for any Commodities they may barter with each other ; and do reciprocally take and give the same in Payment, finding it so generally in Request, that they may have what Commodities they want for it again, with little Variation in the Price.

Let us further suppose a fixed Quantity of this Money circulating on this Estate, as 2000 Ounces of Silver ; and that the same for the Conveniency of Payments is subdivided into several small Pieces, according to the current Coin of the State.

If the Proprietor, to avoid the Trouble of keeping his Estate in his own Hands, letts it out in Parcels, to several of his own Overseers, Labourers, Tradesmen, &c. on the ordinary Foot that Lands are lett in *England* ; and those supply, as they can, the Inhabitants, and himself and Family — And suppose the Quantity of Money at which he letts his Estate to be 1000 Ounces of Silver *per Annum*.

It is the general Opinion in *England*, that a Farmer makes three Rents ; *viz.* the one he pays to the Land-proprietor ; another is appropriated to the Expence of his Farm, and the Wages of Servants, &c. and the third subsists himself and Family. This Opinion being founded on Experience, shews, that, of a Farm of 300 Acres, of equal Goodness

ness, the Produce of 100 Acres sold at Market is sufficient to pay the principal Rent to the Landlord, or Proprietor.

In this Oeconomy the Tradesmen buy of the Farmers, &c. their Materials, the Clothier buys Wool of the Farmer; the Tanner, Hides; the Baker, Wheat; the Butcher, Oxen, Sheep, &c. the Land-proprietor, for the Use of his Family, purchases what he wants of all these, who are supposed to have each of them a Proportion of the 2000 Ounces of Silver, wherewith they commence Business— And, as the Land-proprietor is paid 1000 Ounces of Silver by his Farmers once a Year, he pays the said Quantity of Money to them for the Requisites with which they supply him; whereby they are reimbursed the Sums they had advanced in their Undertakings, and find a Maintenance for themselves and Families.

The Actors in regard to the second Rent, viz. the Tradesmen, Smiths and Carpenters, &c. so far as they are assistant to the Farmer, and the Labourers, Servant, &c. belonging to the Farmer; pay and receive of the Farmer, and of one another mutually, 1000 Ounces *per Annum*, according to the Supposition.

The Farmers, who are the Actors in regard to the third Rent, and have a Part of the Produce of the Estate free, supposing they lay up nothing, create also for Expenses for the Education of their Children, or
for

for the better Conveniency of living, a Circulation of 1000 Ounces of Silver *per Annum*: These Things supposed, it seems to require 3000 Ounces of Silver to carry on the Circulation of the three Rents, provided the Payments are made once a Year only.

But, as it frequently happens that the Farmer pays the Labourers in Villages with Corn and Commodities for their Work, and that such Part of the Land as maintains the Farmer's Horses, requires no Circulation or Barter in Money; nor does the Subsistence of the Farmer's Servants and Family require but very little Money, since they often kill their own Meat, and brew their own Drink, and bake their own Bread: and since no more Money seems requisite than for what the Undertakers and Tradesmen do; and there is little of that required in Villages, except for Clothing, Carpenter's Work, Smith's Work, Shoemakers, and the like: Whereas all the Land Proprietors Expence in his Family, (since as supposed he has no Land in his own Hands) is supplied by the Undertakers. From which Considerations it should seem, that the Circulation of the two last Rents does not require near so much Money as the single Rent of the Proprietor; which is the principal Source and Cause of the Circulation of Money.

Yet, we will suppose, that the Circulation of the two last Rents together, are equal to that of the first Rent.

So

So that, if the Produce of all the Land and Labour on the Estate in Question, is equal to 3000 Ounces of Silver, the Exchange and Barter of the said Produce amongst the Actors of the three Rents, will require but 2000 Ounces of Silver to carry on the Circulation of the Whole, and make all the Payments once *a Year*.

But, if the Land-proprietor stipulates the Payment of his Rents with the Farmer once in *six Months*; and if all the Payments, made by the several Actors concerned in the three Rents, are also made once in *six Months*; 1000 Ounces of Silvers in two Payments, will answer the End of 2000 Ounces in one Payment.

And, if all the Payments are made *quarterly*, 500 Ounces will answer the whole Circulation; and it often happens, that the Farmer pays but a Quarter's Rent to the Land-Proprietor at a Time; and, indeed, it is observable in the Country, that there is seldom more Money in Villages than what will answer to the Quarter's Rent.

Moreover, as the different Kinds of the Products of the Land seem to answer and correspond to the four Seasons of the Year; it seems natural to judge, that the Wheels of Money-Circulation and Barter of Commodities, are set a going four Times in a Year, and in many Counties the Rents are stipulated to be paid *quarterly*, perhaps, on that Account.

It follows from hence, that the quicker the Circulation is made in a State, the less Quantity of hard Money will perform the Offices of Circulation in such a State.

If we suppose this Land-Proprietor, and several others, to live together in the common center of their Lands, where they form a City, and draw thither most of the Undertakers and Tradesmen, who supply their Families, and one another : In such case, as almost every thing is carried on and supplied in a City by Undertakers, so the greatest part of all the Barters requires Money ; but then, on this Supposition, the Circulation of Money is very quick, all the Undertakers in Business and Tradesmen commonly paying their Workmen and Journeymen once a Week, and several Families paying their Expences daily, or weekly at Market.

These small Parcels of Money, which go and come so frequently and quick in several Rivulets of Barter, are gathered together again in Lumps, by the Undertakers ; as Bakers, Butchers, Brewers, &c. and paid to the Farmer, from whom all Commodities are bought ; and then are again repaid quarterly to the Land-Proprietors, out of whose Hands they are again dispersed into the ordinary Rivulets of Barter. Payments being thus made, the Land-proprietor seems to be the principal Object, whereby to judge of the Quantity of Money requisite in Circulation, there being no great Sum necessary, as we have

have seen, for the Circulation of the other two Rents. Cities are estimated to contain half the Inhabitants of a State, and to make more than one half the Consumption of the Produce of the Land.

Although the Detail of the Circulation of Money in a State may seem to be indefinite ; yet it appears, from what has been said, that it is not incomprehensible ; and till some body has the Curiosity to examine more minutely into such Detail, and shall fall upon better criteria to judge thereof than what have been suggested ; we may modestly give our Opinion of the Matter in general ; that the real Cash or Quantity of Money, necessary to carry on the Circulation and barter in any State, is nearly one third Part of all the annual Rents of the Land-Proprietors of the said State.

Whether Money be scarce or plenty in a State, this Proportion will not change ; because, if it be scarce, the Proprietor of Land will lett or sell his Land for less Money ; and if it be plenty, he will lett or sell it for more ; and this will always hold good in the Long-run. But certain it is, that if the Circulation of Money be slower or quicker in a State, the Proportion of Money required in Circulation consequently will be more or less.

According to this Supposition, if 2000 Ounces of Silver served to carry on all the Circulation on the Estate we considered, the Land-proprietors Rents ought to have been 6000 Ounces, and the Three Rents equal

equal in Value to 18,000 Ounces; and consequently the hard Money, which carries on the Circulation and Barter in a State, may be esteemed equal in Value to the ninth Part of the *annual Product* of the Lands of the said Estate.

Sir *Wm. Petty*, in a Manuscript written in the Year 1685, supposes frequently, that the circulating Money in a State is equal to the tenth Part of the *annual Product* of the Land; and, though he assigns no Reasons any-where for such a Conjecture, it looks to me, as if his great Experience and Sagacity had led him into that Proportion.

As his Supposition does not differ greatly from what has been suggested, we might come in to his Notion, provided it would lead us into any useful Knowledge: Whereas in fixing a Proportion between the circulating Money in a State, and the *Rents of the Land-Proprietors*, whereof the Sum may be known by an accurate Land-Tax, the Knowledge of the actual Sum of Money requisite in Circulation, we find, may be obtained upon rational Principles.

It is easy to conceive, that foreign Trade requires no great additional Sum of hard Money to carry on its Circulation in a State, when the Balance of Trade is equal. In this Case, the Goods and Commodities exported, pay the Value of those that are imported: When the Land-Proprietors consume the foreign Commodities, they pay the Undertakers of
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the foreign Trade what they had advanced for them ; and these pay the same Value to the Undertakers of the exported Goods, which compensate for those imported : And this is all paid out of the first landed Rent ; and, where the Actors concerned in the two other Rents, consume foreign Commodities, the Money necessary for the Circulation of the said Rents also, is sufficient to answer the current Payments.

All the Influence foreign Trade seems to have upon the Circulation of Money in a State, is, that it sometimes retards it, and makes it pass through the Hands of more Undertakers, Brokers and Actors, than it otherwise would do.

If the Proprietors of Land at *Paris* wear *Genoa* Velvets to the Value of 10,000 Ounces of Silver, and their Velvets are compensated by 10,000 Ounces Value in Silver in *French* Cloth ; the Proprietors out of the Rents pay the Velvet-merchants, as Undertakers, 10,000 Ounces ; they pay this Sum to the *Genoa*-Banker or Remitter ; he pays the same to the Cloth-workers, who sends Cloth to *Genoa* in Bills of Exchange. But, if the Land-Proprietors at *Paris* wore Cloth instead of the Velvets, they would pay directly the 10,000 Ounces to the Cloth-merchant ; and so that Money would not pass through so many Hands, as in the other case it would : And it is in this Sense only, that foreign Trade should

should seem to affect the Circulation of Money.

To corroborate the Train of reasoning here pursued, it may be further considered, that all Barters which are made by Evaluation in a trading State, require no ready-money for the Circulation of their Traffic. If the Woollen-draper sells the Baker 100 Ounces of Silver value in Cloth, and the Baker supplies the Woollen-draper with the like Value in Bread, both at the current Price, these Dealings are carried on without the Medium of Money—And the more such Kind of bartering-Negotiations take Place in a State, the less ready Money is requisite to uphold the commercial Circulation. If the Woollen-draper supplies the Wine-merchant with the Cloth necessary for the Consumption of his Family at the Market Price ; and the Wine-merchant also supplies, at the Market Rate, the Woollen-draper with the Wine his Family consumes : If they give mutual Credit to each other, when they come to settle their Accounts at the Year's end ; all the Money required to carry on these Dealings will be no more than the Sum which pays the Difference.

From what has been said, it may rationally be inferred, that Punctuality, Integrity, and Confidence in Dealings in a commercial State, augment those Kinds of trafficable Barters by Evaluation ; and, in consequence thereof, make *Money* go farther in Circulation : And

Experience tells us, that when either the private or the public Credit is injured, the general Circulation in such a Nation is clogged, and Money, in consequence thereof, grows scarcer.

The Bank of *England* as well as the private Bankers of this Kingdom, are a great Aid and Assistance to the general Circulation; especially when in the way of Traffic or otherwise, it may not be so convenient or so safe to circulate Specie upon every Occasion? They are more particularly useful by preventing great Sums from being kept in private Hands motionless; which contributes to accelerate the general Circulation of all Negotiations. These Considerations seem to confirm, that by Means of the Quantity of hard Money in the Nation, according to the lowest Estimate that has ever been made thereof of late Years; together with the conjunctive Aid of such a degree of solid Paper-Credit, that this Nation may always command, while the Public Credit shall be established upon the Foundation that is hereby humbly aimed at; we need not be under any Apprehension but we may be able to raise the Supplies within the Year, without the Risque of being disappointed in the Attempt.

There never was a greater Spirit of Resentment and Indignation raised in this Nation than at present against the common Enemy; and therefore we can scarce ever expect a more favourable Occasion to try the Experiment

ment proposed. Nor can we have reason to apprehend any Hazard or Danger that can attend such a Trial : For, if any Funds proposed for the Purpose should be deficient, can we suppose that the Nation would not chearfully make good any Deficiency that might happen, when they were convinced that this was not only a Scheme of national Parsimony and Oeconomy, but of national Honour and Glory ? Nor could any thing prove more so, at this critical Conjunction of our Affairs. It would be more to the real Interest and Honour of the Kingdom to raise Three or Four Millions within the Year, than to be able to borrow double the Sum ; because the one would demonstrate to the whole World, that such were our Resources of Treasure, that we can never be compelled to make a dishonourable Peace ; and the other would only shew, that so desperate were our Circumstances, that we would borrow on, till we should not be able to borrow more ; and that we were as indifferent to the Payment of the Interest as of the Principal. And the deeper and deeper the Nation is plunged into Debt, must not the very Interest-money grow more and more precarious ? When once the public Creditors take an Alarm of this Kind, the Power of borrowing will cease : And is there not far more national Risque and Hazard run, by pursuing such a System than by attempting to reverse it without suffering public Affairs to

come to such an Extremity? The imminent Danger lies in the Continuance of the Scheme of encreasing the public Debts, and perpetuating the Encrease of national Taxes, not in timely stopping the Encrease of both.

The Money to be raised for the annual Supplies in the general Manner proposed cannot be said to be drawn faster out of the Hands of the People than it will return to them again in the Channels of Circulation; and that not only by the Navy and Army, &c. but by an advanced general Balance of our Commerce; for no Measures could more effectually contribute to that, than demonstrating to all *Europe*, the Extent of the national Purse, and thereby displaying the Length of the *British* Sword. Such real Weight would this give us with every Potentate of Christendom that all would court our Friendship, from a Dread of our Power: And then would be the Time to turn our Thoughts to the planning of commercial Treaties, and making such Alliances, as would still more and more encrease the particular Balances of our Trade, and thereby proportionally augment the general Ballance in our Favour, even in Time of War. And would not this Addition to our Prosperity, still the better enable the Nation to continue to raise the Supplies within the Year, when they experienced such wise Measures to be attended with Consequences so beneficial as well as so honourable to the whole *British* Empire?

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When the Scheme of running the Nation farther and farther in Debt, was once laid aside, the moneyed-Interest would begin in Earnest to turn their Thoughts upon the Pursuits of honourable Traffic, and bring up their Families accordingly; which would gradually obliterate all future Expectation of gain by trading only between the Exchange and the Exchequer,

The national Debts first drew out of private Hands, most of the Money which should, and otherwise would have been lent to our skilful and industrious Merchants and Tradesmen: this made it difficult for such to borrow any Money upon personal Security, and this Difficulty soon made it unsafe to lend any upon such Security; which of Course destroyed all private Credit; thereby greatly injured our Commerce in general, and for Want of Money introduced the disadvantageous Custom of dealing upon large Credit, as before observed, in the Course of these Letters.

But our ceasing to encrease the public Debts, will sensibly convince the public Creditors, of the Ability of the Nation gradually to lessen those we have already contracted; and this would gradually prepare them to think of other Ways of employing their Money than keeping it wholly in the Stocks: which will prove as prejudicial to their Progeny in the End, as to the Kingdom in general; for this will only encourage their Families in a

disgraceful Indolence, Supineness and wanton Extravagance, that ends in Ruin : whereas, the present Stockholders becoming alarmed, in Regard to the Situation of their Debts, and bringing up their Children to Commerce and Employments useful to the State ; they will cease to be drones in the Hive of Industry, and by that Means preserve their Fortunes and Families from Calamity and Dishonour.

It is, therefore, for the Interest of the Posterity of our Stockholders themselves, that our public Debts should rather be diminished than encreased ; and to a Degree, that none but such who are Widows and Orphans, and other distressed and superannuated People, who were incapable of carrying on any Business or Employment beneficial to the Community, should be Proprietors : and if any of the public Creditors should become perpetual Annuitants in this Kingdom, such only should seem to have an exclusive Right to it ; and this may, perhaps, be the best Reason that can be assigned for the Continuance of any Proportion of the public Debts.

Nor can those, who are Advocates for the System of augmenting the Public Debts, be true Friends to the public Creditors, let their Pretensions be as they may ; for we have Reason to believe, from what has been before urged, that the more those Debts are encreased, the more their Interest-money is schemed to be reduced, and the more that

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is reduced, the less secure will their Interest-money be ; and I hope I may be allowed to say, that those, who have hatched Designs which strike at the very Root of the Property, of our whole moneyed-Interest, are their superlative Enemies instead of their best Friends.

If the public Creditors do not view their Concerns in this Light, we may fear it is for Want of duly considering their own Interest ; for that consists in discouraging new public Loans and new Taxes, because such will lessen the Value of the old. But it is not for the Interest of a few to declare they can see this : though it is for the Interest of Ninety-nine out of the Hundred of the national Creditors to discern it, unless they will suffer their whole moneyed-Property to be swallowed up by a very few, to the absolute Ruin and Destruction of all the Rest.

Long, too long have the public Creditors been amused, that they are a great and fundamental Support of the present most august and illustrious Family upon the Throne of these Realms ; and therefore it is to be feared, that it has been insinuated where it ought not, the more the Nation is involved in Debts, the more secure will the present Establishment be rendered : whereas the very contrary of this appears to my plain Understanding ; for certain it is that the Encrease of the public Debts and Taxes create Clamours, Discontent and Heartburnings amongst the People ; which, at

length, terminate in a Spirit of Disloyalty ; and those who are, by Principle, disaffected to the present Government, take Advantage of those Discontents, and leave no Arts unpractised to spread their Disaffection as universally as possible. Nor is there any thing that gives the Enemies of our happy Establishment greater Uneasiness than Measures that tend to the Diminution of our public Incumbrances, and the Benefit of the public Credit.

LETTER

L E T T E R IV.

Further Considerations on the Nature of public Credit, which seem to confirm what has been urged.

EVERY one will discern the Application of the preceding Principles, to the Point they are intended to confirm ; and therefore in this Letter, we shall still further pursue the general Consideration of the Nature and Foundation of the public Credit; from whence likewise will be deducible Consequences, that appear still farther to corroborate the Necessity of introducing the Measures proposed.

The Credit of the State, proceeds in general from the same Sources as that of private Men and Companies ; that is to say, the real Securities of the State itself, and the personal Securities of those that govern it.

It would be a gross Mistake to value those Securities by the general Capital of a Nation, as is done with regard to particular Securities. Those Calculations carried to Extremes, as they have been by some Writers, are fit only to amuse idle Imaginations, and may be productive of pernicious Principles in a Nation,

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The real Securities of a State are the Sum of Tributes it is able to raise from the People without hurting Agriculture or Trade ; for otherwise, the Abuse of the Imposts would be destructive of it, and Confusion would be near at hand.

If the Imposts are sufficient to pay off the Interest of the Debts contracted ; to defray all current Expences both at Home and Abroad ; to discharge yearly a considerable Part of the Debts : In short, if besides the present Tributes, there still remain behind Resources sufficient to answer any extraordinary new Demand before all old Scores are cleared, one may safely say, there is a real Security.

To determine the exact Degree of that Security, it would be necessary to know the Nature of the Demands or Wants that may happen, how near or how remote they are, and how long they are likely to last : After which, they should be compared in all their Circumstances with the Resources that probably would arise from the Payment of the Debts that may be begun to be discharged, the general Credit and Affluence of the Nation.

If the Security be not clear in the Eyes of all, the Credit of the State may be supported by Management, till the very Instant of a great Call or Want. But then that Want will not be satisfied, or if it is, it will be by destructive and ruinous Means. All Confidence, with regard to former Engagements,

ments, will cease; it will likewise cease between Man and Man, according to the Principles we have before laid down. The Consequence of that Disorder will be a great Stagnation of the Circulation of Commodities: Let us see what will be the Effects.

Capitals in Lands will diminish with their Produce; common Misfortunes unite those only whose Hopes are common; wherefore it is to be presumed, that Capitals in Money and valuable Effects will be secured in other Countries, or carefully concealed: Industry, affrighted and unemployed, will seek a Shelter with her Capital in other Asylums. What will then become of all the Projects founded on the Immensity of a national Capital?

The personal Securities of those who govern may be exactly valued; for the Degrees of Usefulness which the State reaps from its Credit, the Skill, Prudence, and OEconomy of its Ministers, lead to Exactitude in small Things as well as in great. This last Point operates so strongly on the Opinion of Men, as to be able on emergent Occasions to supply the Place of real Securities; nay, so as that without it, real Securities have not their Effect. It is of such Importance, that Operations in themselves contrary to the Principles of Credit, have been seen to suspend the total Fall of that Credit, when undertaken with Views of Exactitude. I do not, however, mean to launch

launch out in Praise of those Operations, always dangerous when not attended with full Success; and which, being reserved for Times of Calamity, are always wrong where there is a Possibility of avoiding them. They are like pulling down Part of a great Building to save the rest from the Flames: But it requires a vast Superiority of Views to resolve upon such Sacrifices, and to know how to get the better of the Opinion of Mankind. Those forced Situations are a necessary Consequence of the Abuse of public Credit.

After having explained the Motives of public Confidence in the State, and pointed out its natural Bounds, it is necessary to enquire into the Effect of public Debts in themselves.

Besides the Difference of which we have taken Notice in the Manner of valuing the real Securities of a State, and those of private Men, there are farther material Differences between those Credits.

When private Men contract a Debt, they have two Advantages: In the first Place, it is in their own Power to retrench their Expences until they have paid it; and 2dly, they may make more of the Money borrowed, than the Interests they are obliged to pay for it.

A State encreases its annual Expence by contracting Debts, without being able to retrench the Expences necessary towards its
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Support ; because it is always in a forced Situation with regard to its foreign Safety. A State never borrows but to spend ; therefore it cannot reap from the Debts it contracts, any Advantages whereby the real Securities it offers to its Creditors can be encreased. At least it very seldom happens so ; nor can those chance Occasions be included in what is called *public* or *national Debts*. Neither ought we to confound with them, those momentary Loans which are made with a View of prolonging Times of Payment, and of facilitating them. That kind of Oeconomy belongs to the Class of personal Securities, and encreases the Motives of public Confidence. But let us by the way observe, that those Operations are never so quick, so cheap, nor stand so much in need of intermediate Credits, as when the Revenues are known to be clear.

The question therefore, here relates to Alienations only.

In that Case a Body politic being able to make no other than a chargeable Use of its Credit, whilst that of private Men is of general Use to them, it is easy to establish a new Difference between them. It consists in this, that the Use which the State makes of its Credit may be detrimental to the Subject's Credit ; whereas the multiplied Credit of the Subjects, if not carried too great Lengths in Point of Time, can never be otherwise than useful to the Credit of the State.

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The Use which the State makes of its Credit, may hurt the Subject several Ways.

First, By the Load of Charges it accumulates or perpetuates : Whence it is reasonable to conclude, that all Alienation of the public Revenues is a greater Burden to the People, than an Increase of Imposts only temporary.

Secondly, Ways of subsisting without Work, and in Reality at the Expence of the rest of the Community, are introduced by the means of public Loans. The Consequence is, that the Culture of the Lands is neglected ; Money goes out of Trade, which dwindles, and at last falls, and with it perish Manufactories, Navigation, Agriculture, the Facility of collecting the public Revenues ; and in short, those Revenues themselves by Degrees. If, however, the Decline of Commerce be suspended by local Circumstances, or a Number of uncommon Facilities concurring, the Progress of the Disorder will be slow, but still it will be felt by Degrees.

Thirdly, From there being less Trade and more Wants in the State, it follows ; that the Number of Borrowers will be greater than that of Lenders. The Interest of Money will therefore keep up higher than is consistent with the Plenty of it ; and that Inconvenience becomes a new Obstacle to the Increase of Commerce and Agriculture.

Fourthly, The high Interest of Money induces Foreigners to remit their's, in order to become

become Creditors of the State. I shall not dwell on the puerile Prejudice of those who call the Acquisition of that Money an Advantage: unless where the commercial Interest of States are mutually connected. The Rivals of a Nation unconnected in their Trading-Interests, have not a more certain Way to ruin it's Commerce and enrich themselves, than by being concerned in it's public Debts.

Fifthly, Public Debts are attended with extraordinary Means or Imposts, whereby immense Fortunes are made very soon and without Risk. Other Ways of gaining are, on the contrary, slow and uncertain: for which Reason Men and Money will fly from other Professions. The Circulation of such Commodities as are of most general Use, is interrupted by that Disproportion, and is not compensated by the Encrease of the Luxury of a few.

Sixthly, To let those public Debts become Money, is adding a voluntary Abuse to a necessary one. The Effect of those multiplied Representations of Specie, will be the same as that of an Encrease of it's Mass: Commodities will be represented by a greater Quantity of Metals, which will lessen the Sale of them abroad. We have seen, in Fits of Confidence, before the Secret of those Representations was known, the Use of them give such Life to general Credit that the Rate of Interest has reduced itself naturally: that Reduction made some Amends for the
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Inconvenience of the too great Rise of the Price of Things relatively to other Nations who paid a higher Interest. It would be unwise to expect it now; and all forced Reductions are contrary to the Principles of public Credit.

It cannot be too often repeated, that a great Mass of Metals is in itself indifferent to a State, considered abstractedly from other States. It is the Circulation of it's Commodities, either at home or abroad, that constitutes the People's Happiness; And that Circulation requires a proportional Distribution of the general Mass of Money in all the Provinces, by which Commodities are furnished.

If the Circulating-paper, looked upon as Money, is spread over a State, where some inward Defect occasions a very unequal Distribution of Riches, the common People will not be more at their Ease, notwithstanding the great Multiplicity of Money-representations but the contrary; for Commodities will be dearer, and work for Foreigners less common. By continuing to add to that Mass of Signs, there will be by Starts a forced Circulation, which will prevent the Rise of Interest: for it is probable at least, that if the Mass of the Metals themselves, or of their Representations, was not to increase in a State where they are unequally distributed, the Interest of Money would rise again in Places where the Circulation should be least.

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If Reductions of Interest have been seen in Countries where Paper-money has been multiplied without ceasing, nothing ought to be inferred from thence contrary to these Principles, because those Reductions were not then quite voluntary; they can be considered only as the Effect of the Reflections made by the Proprietors of that Paper-money on the Nation's Inabilities.

Banks are a Branch of Credit, when considered as being destined only to discount the Obligations of Merchants whether Notes or Bills of Exchange, and to facilitate their Credit.

The Object of those Establishments sufficiently indicates their Usefulness in all Countries, where the Circulation of Commodities is interrupted by the Want of Credit.

If the circulating Signs are doubled, and the Quantity of Commodities be encreased but half, the Prices will raise a quarter Part.

To calculate what ought to be in a Country the Degree of the Multiplication of Commodities in Proportion to that of the Signs, it would be necessary to know the Extent of the Lands, their Fruitfulness, the Manner in which they are cultivated, the Improvements they are susceptible of, the Populousness, Number of Men employed, and Number unemployed, the Industry and general Manners and Customs of the Inhabitants, their natural, artificial and political Means and Ad-

vantages of Circulation at home and abroad ; the Price of such foreign Commodities as compete with them : and the Taste and Abilities of the Consumers. So complicated a Calculation may be thought impossible ; But the greater the sudden Augmentations of the Signs shall be, the less it is probable their Commodities should multiply in any reasonable Proportion with them.

If the Price of Commodities rises, it may, with equal Truth be said, that by the greater Multiplication of Signs than of Commodities, and the Activity of the new Circulation, there will then be fewer Borrowers than Lenders ; wherefore Money will lose of its Price.

That Fall will consequently be in composite Proportion to the Number of Lenders and Borrowers.

It eases Commodities of a Part of the Charges Merchants are at to sell them. The Charges so lessened are, the Interest of the Merchants Disbursements, the Valuation of the Risks they run, and the Price of their Labor ; the two last are always governed by the Rate of the first, and are generally valued at double of it. From these three first Diminutions result farther, a greater Cheapness of Navigation, and a less Valuation of the Dangers of the Sea.

Altho' those Savings are considerable, they do not lessen intrinsically the first Value of the national Commodities ; it is plain they
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lessen it only relatively to other Nations, rival Sellers of the same Commodities, who keep up the Interest of their Money higher, in Proportion to the Mass they possess. If those Nations should lower their Interest in the same Proportion, it would be the first Value of the Commodities, Things being equal in other Respects, that would determine the Superiority.

Tho' the Consequences drawn seem very clear, yet it may not be amiss to take a second cursory View of them.

We have seen the Bank give fresh Life to the Circulation of Commodities and restore general Credit by the actual Multiplication of Signs: whence result a double Cause of Encrease of the Price of all Things, the one natural and salutary, the other forced and dangerous.

The Inconvenience of the latter is partly corrected, with Regard to the Competition of other Nations, by the Diminution of the Interest of Money.

From what we have said it may therefore be concluded, that where-ever Circulation and Credit enjoy a certain Degree of Celerity and Activity, Banks are useless and even dangerous. In Regard to the Circulation of Money, it may be observed that it's Principles are necessarily the Principles of Credit itself, which is only the Image of it: the same Methods preserve and animate them. They consist, *First*, In the proper Execution of good Laws

to prevent the Abuse of Trust or Confidence. *Secondly*, In the Scarcity of the several Interests, by which the State is connected with private Persons, either as Subjects or as Creditors. *Thirdly*, By using every Method natural, artificial and political, proper to favour Industry and foreign Trade; which implies a Finance subordinate to Trade.

If any one of these Rules be neglected, no Bank, no human Power will be able to establish an entire and mutual Confidence among Men: that Confidence depends on Opinion, or in other Words, on Persuasion or Conviction.

If these Rules are followed throughout, a general Credit will certainly be the Consequence.

The Encrease of Prices on the Revival of Credit, will be only in Proportion to the actual Mass of Money, and the Quantity of foreign Consumptions. The Encrease of Prices by the continual Introduction of a new Quantity of Metals, and the Rivalship of Merchants by the Extension of Commerce, tend to diminish Profits: that Diminution of Profits, and the Encrease of general Ease and Opulence, will make the Interest of Money fall, as in the supposed Case of a Bank: but the Reduction of that Interest will be much more advantageous in the present Case than in the other, because the first Value of Commodities will not be encreased so much.

In order to conceive this Difference, it is necessary to remember three Principles already often repeated, and especially when we have been speaking of the Circulation of Money.

The People's Ease depends on the Quickness and Activity of the Circulation of Commodities : That Circulation is more or less quick and active, according to the *proportional Distribution* of the Mass, whatever it be of Metals or Signs, which we may call Money, and not according to the proportional Distribution of a large Mass of Metals or Signs, or Money : The Diminution of the Interest of Money is always in composite Proportion to the Number of Lenders and Borrowers.

So that the proportional Distribution of an unequal Mass of Signs being equal, the Case of the People will be relatively the same ; there will be relatively the same Proportion between the Number of Borrowers and of Lenders, and the Interest of Money will likewise be the same.

But the first Value of Commodities will be in Proportion to the reciprocal Inequality of the Mass of Signs.

Notwithstanding the Inconveniencies of a Bank, if the State be in one of those dreadful Crisis, never to be forgot, in which it cannot exert itself ; it is plain that such an Establishment affords the speediest and most effectual Resource, if kept within proper Bounds.

The Measure of those Bounds will be the Portion of Activity necessary to the State in Order to restore public Confidence by Degrees: A Bank may likewise be useful in small Countries, whose Wants are greater than their Superfluities, or who possess Commodities the only one's of their Kind.

Hitherto we have spoken only of solid Banks, that is to say, of those whose Obligations or Notes are balanced by a mercantile Pledge. Those States which have considered them only as a Means of facilitating Expences, have enjoyed their Prosperity no longer than till their Credit has been attacked in its fundamental Points. At all Times, and in all Countries, the Ruin of such a Credit bears down with it for a long while that of the Body Politic: But even before Things came to that Extremity, infinite Confusion will have arisen at Home, as we have before shewn speaking of national or public Debts.

Every one, who has attended to what has been said in the former Letters, will easily discern how far these Principles tend to establish the System we would introduce; and therefore we shall leave every one to make the Application.

L E T T E R

L E T T E R V.

*The Opinion that some Foreigners * entertain of the national Debts, and the public Credit of this Kingdom.*

'T IS impossible that Riches, (says a learned Foreigner, whose Principles I shall frequently cite, and adopt where I think them just) either real or artificial, should encrease to a prodigious Degree, in a State, without Manufactures encreasing in the same Proportion. The low Interest of Money may make some Amends for this Over-rate.

'Tis an evident Maxim, that whatever Nation has Money at the cheaper Interest, all other Things, considered on a Par, will ruin all other Countries in Competitorship. Therefore, *England* has reduced the Interest of the public Creditors to $3 \frac{1}{2}$ per Cent. till the Year 1757, and after that to 3 per Cent,

To have a right Notion of the Effects of this Operation, it must be observed, that the

* Le Negotiant Anglois, ou Traduction Libre du Livre intitulé : *The British Merchant*. See the preliminary Discourse thereto affixed. Although this ingenious Writer makes some Mistakes with Regard to the specific State of our Affairs ; yet there are many Things that may well deserve our Notice.

Merchant's Profit in Commerce is regulated by the Value of his Money placed out at Interest in the public Stocks; and this Profit is commonly estimated at twice as much upon Account of the Risk, their Labor and Attention. Let us compare the Consequence of this Method of Computation upon an Undertaking of 30,000*l.* carried on in Trade in *England* in the Year 1690, when the Interest of Money was at 6 *per Cent.* and upon another of the same Sum carried on in the Year 1757, when the Interest shall be reduced to 3 *per Cent.*

In 1690 a Merchant, by a Computation of the Expence of 1800*l.* a Year upon the Sum imagined for the Interest, which that Sum would have produced him on the Spot, and that the Profits of Trade might be equal to his Risks, he was obliged to deduct the clear Sum of 1800*l.* over and above; that is to say, this Money was to bring him upon the whole the Sum of 3600*l.* that he might be induced to employ the said Stock in Trade.

When the Interest of Money is at 3 *per Cent.* the Gain of the Merchant, or of Trade, will be in its Proportion at 3 *per Cent.* which in the whole will be 6 *per Cent.* or the Sum of 1800*l.* on 30,000*l.* trading Capital. Whence it is plain, that, according to this Value of 30,000*l.* an *English* Merchant may make more of 1800*l.* than he could in the Year 1690, supposing Commodities at the same Price; and that if they are
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only encreased by this Sum, the Foreigner will not pay dearer for them.

'Tis as apparent also, that, if in the Year 1690, an *English* Merchant only gained 3000*l.* by 30,000*l.* that is to say, 10 *per Cent.* his Hazards were not so well compensated as they will be in the Year 1757, by gaining on 1800*l.* In short, that in 1757, 1500*l.* upon 30,000*l.* will be an handsome Profit, whereas in 1690, there would have been a real Loss.

After having shewn the Effect of this Operation, it is proper to trace it back to the Beginning, in order to know the Circumstances of the Application.

A Nation, which has no Mines, and makes no Conquests, cannot certainly encrease the Mass of its Money but by foreign Commerce.

In Proportion as this new Money is quickly circulated, the Commodities whereof such Money is the Representative, not bearing so great a Proportion therewith as before, they are imperceptibly represented by a Share of Money.

But the letting out of this Money does not diminish of itself, because it is found in a greater Quantity than before; for if the Nation was to put a Stop all at once to its foreign Commerce, it is certain, that the new Mass or Stock of Money would be distributed in the same Proportion as the old. There would still remain more Borrowers than Lenders.

Lenders. The Interest of Money would be kept up from that Time. Their Poor, who should not be employed in the Consumption of Commodities at home, would be in a worse Situation than before; for Provisions would be dearer, and they would no longer be in a Way to procure them by Labor.

The continual Encrease of foreign Commodities is alone sufficient to force the moneyed Men to lower the Rate of Interest themselves. In Proportion as a greater Number of Men grow rich, and continue to enrich themselves by their Labor, the Number of Borrowers decreases, while that of the Lenders encreases. On the other Hand, the more Merchants there are, the less are their Profits, and they are accustomed to receive the less Interest for their Money. 'Tis a general Rule, that the natural low Rate of Interest denotes a large Commerce, as a natural high Interest does a small one.

The Body Politic is in a very prosperous State if such a Reduction of Interest is thus made of its own Accord, as was the very Case in *Holland*, as soon as the *India* Trade, Fishery, and the Navigation had thrown that immense Wealth into its Lap, which it now enjoys.

But 'tis proper to observe, that in *Holland* they are all Traders; that they all live frugally; that they had no Way of improving their Money to better Advantage, than by Com-

Commerce ; and, in short, that it had few Competitors in that Course.

These Remarks are of Importance, and will serve to prove what an Influence the Notion of Circumstances has upon the Application of Principles.

We will now consider in what a Situation *England* was when it made the last Reduction of Interest, and what were its Motives for it.

The Industry of all the Nations of *Europe* is animated at once ; consequently, there's a very great Rivalship. The Wealth of *Great Britain*, in whatsoever it consists, being multiplied to a much higher Degree, than elsewhere, the Price of Commodities could not but encrease there in a greater Proportion ; consequently, the very Hazard ran by their Exportation left but small Profit to its Merchants. On the other Hand, the Necessities of this Government both public and private being great, the large Demand for Money drew with it a higher Rate of Interest, than the Profit of the Trade, setting all Risks out of the Question. 'Twas, therefore, necessary that a Part of the Capital should be taken out of the Commerce : But one of its Branches lost in a Year, is not recovered sometimes in Centuries ; besides, the People lost the Means of Employment, and of Consumption, *in Proportion as the Capitals were drawn out of Trade.*

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In this critical Situation, *England* could not hope that the Reduction of Interest should operate of itself; and a Reduction by Compulsion must necessarily hurt the Credit of the Government.

But it prefer'd the Preservation of its Commerce, which alone is capable of furnishing it with solid Measures for supporting its Credit. Yet it must be confessed, that there would be no better Way of making an Advantage of the Disorder; for this Reduction, tho' forced in the main, has preserv'd all the Appearances of Liberty. The Influence of the Government over the Companies, each of which depends on it by some particular Interest or other, obtained their Consent: At the same Time their remaining Credit secured it the necessary Sums for proposing a Reimbursement to the Creditors, who would not subscribe to the Reduction.

This was undoubtedly a bold Step, and the Necessity there was of lessening the Charges of the Government, touched People at least as much as the Necessity of favouring Commerce. Many Annuities remained unsubscrib'd, and the landed Estates sunk greatly in Value. These common Effects of the Loss of the public Credit, could not well avoid being foreseen. Commerce being so closely connected with it, that the latter must needs suffer by the Shocks given to the former; but such is the Nature of it, that it sooner or later recovers the Equilibrium.

brium. The Reduction gives speedy Hopes of it, and never is a Government in a better Posture, than when the trading Funds come to regain the second Rank in the public Confidence. The Basis 'tis always founded on, is the Produce of the Lands to which it gives a Value in Proportion to the Briskness with which 'tis carry'd on, since, by incessantly multiplying the Riches, the Capital of the Nation, and the Mass of its Money, unavoidably encrease; but in Case of Necessity, a great Quantity of it must flow back again into the public Funds. If then the Operation of the Government has been well conducted, the Wisdom of the Nation cannot but be commended; which being too clear sighted not to comprehend all the Misfortunes with which it was threaten'd, has, from this Knowledge, drawn Arguments for putting Bounds to its Alarms.

To have made the public Credit desperate all on a sudden, would have been the Ruin of every Thing; therefore every one submitted to the Yoke of Necessity, and at this Time (1753) none of the public Actions are under Par.

In Order to form a perfect Judgment, by what Operation the Interest of Money in *England* was reduced from 4 *per Cent.* to $3\frac{1}{2}$, till 1757, and after that Date to 3 *per Cent.* 'tis necessary to consider its Consequences, with Regard to the home Consumption, and then with Regard to the public Revenues.

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The Author then proceeds to shew, how the Reduction of Interest must affect the general Consumption of the native Commodities: Which being too tedious to mention minutely; and he having, indeed, committed some Mistakes, in Regard to the specific State of our Affairs; I shall abridge the Matter, and lay before the *English* Reader, only what seems more essentially to concern his Country's Interest.

But it is very probable, continues he, that the Product of the Land, as well as the necessary Consumptions, will be the last to be sensible of the Diminution of the general Expence of the People; and always in a weaker Proportion. On the contrary, while foreign Commerce encreases, as we shall see presently, the People who are the grand Consumers of the Necessaries of the first and second Degree, 'tis probable, that the Produce of the Land will rise in Value: A great Part of this Diminution of the Consumption of the Annuitants, will therefore fall upon foreign Luxury; and the Government to determine the Effect of this Operation with the more Certainty, again opposes it with the strongest Barriers.

The other Part would really affect the Employment of the People, if this Inaction was not redressed and even prevented by the Briskness of Foreign Commerce.

Such an Operation gives it a considerable and sudden Increase, 1. Because the Nation
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being better enabled to sustain the Competition of other People, or to obtain the Preference over them, the Opportunities of a lucrative Commerce must necessarily be the more frequent. 2. Because as often as Commerce, allowing for all Hazards, offers a more considerable Profit than other Ways of employing Money, a great Plenty of it must needs flow back in its several Channels; and if any of those Channels run over, it will find out new Ways of Circulation, and the Means of employing the People encrease incessantly.

Such is the chief Aim of any Government whatsoever, and this is the chief Operation of a *British* Trade with Foreigners. The Value of Exports begins to be paid to the various Classes of the Manufacturers, Workmen, Day Labourers in the Field, and the Owners of Land.

If we value the Total of the Exports from *England* before the Reduction of the Interest of Money, at about 12 *Millions Sterling*, * and the Encrease of the Exports only at *Half a Million*, it will be manifest, that this Augmentation of the Foreign Commerce will make Amends for the Diminution in the Consumption of the Creditors by the Employment of the People.

* This is an extraordinary Supposition, but we give it in the Author's Sense; nor does it affect his Argument.

Was the Balance of Trade of ever so little Advantage to *England* before the Reduction, it is probable that it will be at least augmented by all the Value of the new Exportation; which will circulate in the Proportion we have established for calculating the Loss occasioned by their Absence; consequently the public and particular Revenues will be augmented, the Government and the Landed Estates will be eased, and all the Alteration will consist in the different Classes of those who shall pay the Workmen their Wages.

If Things in *England* do not take this Course, or if there was a Stagnation in Commerce, it will be a Proof that the public Credit has received some Shock; because, tho' the Reduction, had all the Appearances of being voluntarily, every one saw in the mean Time but too clearly that in Fact the Proposal of a Reimbursement was impracticable, Therefore the Government has wisely distributed the Effect of the Reduction: it is to be supposed *That* in 1757, which is declared to be from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 *per Cent.* will be insensible.

By these Remarks it may be judged, that when the Reductions operate of themselves by the Plenty of Money, and the Strength of the public Credit, the Government absolutely suffers no Alteration by it; for it is a Transpiration that is mild, natural and salutary to the Body Politic. If by the Nature of Circumstances it becomes necessary to aid
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and terminate this Transpiration, it is plain that there cannot be too much Precaution used in preserving the Qualities to it which it ought to have. In fine, *England* seems to give the only Example, perhaps, of this Circumstance.

I have treated, says this Gentleman, the more largely of this Operation because its Particulars prove that Foreign Commerce is the main Spring of a Government, when it can be had with Ease ; that every other Interest is subordinate to it, because that alone repairs in a Moment the Losses which the Labor of the People or the public Revenues may sustain : in a Word, that no Class of People except of such as have neither Land nor Industry falls to decay if foreign Commerce flourishes ; because the Profit of its Balance is indispensably attended by a continual Encrease of the home Consumption.

The Riches of a Body Politic ought to be compared to the Wealth of private Persons. That which remains after Payment of Debts is true Property. A large Credit, as long as it subsists, does but give a great Power to lay out Money : It depends on the Opinion of Men and of the Debtors Resources : consequently it has Bounds of itself as well as all human Things ; and it has foreign Limits, which it is as hard to calculate as the Caprices of the Multitude.

The Necessity of the *English* Government obliged it to have recourse to Loans in the War of

1688, in Proportion as the Expence exceeded the Revenues. The Credit which the Money-lenders give, being always usurious, in Order for the punctual Payment thereof, it was thought adviseable to engage the public Revenues to such as were inclined to be the Creditors of the Government.

In 1698 Doctor *Davenant* computed the general Expence of the People at 43 *Millions Sterling*; in which were reckoned 15 *Millions* of the current Cash; The public Debts amounted to 17 *Millions*, the Revenues to 5 *Millions*, and every Year the Government was enabled to pay Two and a Half to its Creditors. The Gain of the annual Balance of Trade was valued at about 13 *Millions Sterling*.

Every Thing seemed in a fair Way to come into Order again. The Resources were evident; the imaginary Capital was almost in Proportion with the real Capital; and from that Time the Security seemed to be perfect, by taking just Measures for easing the Government. *Davenant* had proved with what Ease this might be done, apprising the Nation at the same Time, *That the public Debts, were like those Cancer-Worms, whose secret Ravages in a Body at length absorb its Substance.*

England forgot such wise Maxims; and refused to enjoy this Comfort, of which the Peace gave her a Prospect, and engaged in the War of 1702, the Expences whereof accumulated the public Debts. Its own Money,

ney, and that which was brought to it by Commerce went abroad in some Measure: The Nation had Recourse to that of Foreigners to whom it became tributary for the whole Amount of the Interest.

In 1710 rose the *South-Sea-Company*, whose Credit advanced in Proportion to the Hopes that were formed of having a Settlement granted it in *South-America*; which was to furnish them with all the Riches of the *Spanish Colonies*. As long as this Credit, or the Opinion which supported it, subsisted, the Government received great Assistance thereby; but it was in a very languishing State, when it was revived in 1713, by the Peace of *Utrecht*. The Scheme was then formed for enabling this Company to pay off all the Debts of the Nation; and it was shewn what an Advantage was made of the general Confidence of the Public for lessening the Interests of Money in a Manner, which was really voluntary. This Confidence was natural; for the Profits which the Nation had Reason to expect from the *Asiento Treaty*, the Care and Punctuality of the Government in supporting its Engagements, the considerable Savings it made in the Article of Interest, the Promise of employing it to the Repayment of the Capital Debt, all together justifies the Eagerness that was then demonstrated. The Obligations of the Government, and of the Company attached to its Fortune, gave Men so favourable an Opinion of the

Capital, that it served for all the Occasions of Society like Specie itself,

But whether this Nation in other Respects, so apt to attend to the Dictates of Reason, is fond of giving the Preference to refined Ideas, and such as are far above the Sphere of common Capacity; or whether it was owing to the Intoxication that commonly attends the external Appearances of great Prosperity, it carried the Delusion so far as to think that the Debts of a Government were of Benefit and Advantage to it.

For we find in the *British Merchant*, that in 1714, even before the complete Re-establishment of Credit, the People's Expence amounted to 50 *Millions Sterl.*; which was 7 *Millions* more than in 1698. From hence it is inferred, that a greater Number of People was employed; yet the Mass of Money was not encreased, of which there could be no Manner of Doubt; consequently they were persuaded that the Multiplication of the public Debts, when they became Signs or Representations of Money having produced these Effects, it was of public Advantage.

They pretended, that it is no more than the right Hand lending to the Left; and the Riches of the Nation would be trebled, consequently its general Consumptions would have been greater: In fine, those of the Government would encrease in Proportion, for real Riches are the Sinews of Government, the Pledge of their Superiority: and if artificial Riches
produce

produce the Effects of it, to what a Degree of Power will not *Great Britain* arrive?

But one single Remark defeats the whole, and the Person whom it escapes must submit to the Delusion.

The Effect of a great Quantity of Money existing in a State must be properly distinguished from the Effect of the Encrease of that Quantity.

The Plenty or Scarcity of Money is indifferent in a Country abstractedly from its Political Concerns with its Neighbours: Sir *William Petty* and Mr. *Davenant* have thus calculated the Quantity of Money necessary for Circulation

Half of the Revenue of the	L.
Lands in 1698 -	5,000,000
A Quarter of the Revenue of	
1,300,000 Houses, in <i>ditto</i>	5,000,000
One Week's Expence of the	
People, <i>ditto</i>	760,230
One Fourth of the Value of	
the Exportations, <i>ditto</i>	1,500,000
Mr. <i>Davenant</i> adds to it One	
Fourth of the Value of Ma-	
nufacturers - -	1,000,000
	9,269,230

If instead of fifteen Millions in Specie, which were in *England* in 1698, there had been only seven Millions and one half, and at the same Time Provisions had been at less

than half of the Value, 'tis plain, that instead of 9,269,230 *l.* deem'd necessary for Circulation, there would have been wanting but 4,634,615 *l.* without any Prejudice to Industry and Commerce. The People would have been as much employed, and the relative Plenty of Money, would have been in the same Degree in the State, and amongst its Members.

For let us suppose a Kingdom which has no foreign Relation, if all the Parts and different Classes of its People, lend one another mutual Assistance, it will be happy, tho' it has little Money.

If it has a great Quantity of Money, the Productions of Art and Nature will be represented by a greater Quantity of Specie; but the Labor will still be the same, consequently the People will not be a Jot the happier.

'Tis not, therefore, in the Quantity of the circulating Cash, that the interior Strength of a Body Politic consists, but in the Circulation of Commodities.

Yet the actual Increase of the Mass of Metals is, on the contrary, of very great Importance to it. In Order to open a clear View of the Effects thereof, we will suppose, that some of the Counties in the Nation were all on a sudden enrich'd with a great Quantity of Money, by the Discovery of a Mine; while several of the other Counties had but little in Proportion; it will happen, that

that the Price of Provisions being enhanced in the Counties that are rich in Metal, the Commodities of the poor Counties will find their Way into them, by Reason of their Cheapness; so that from one Neighbour to another, this Money will spread insensibly into all the Counties, because the Industry of each will be animated to have a Share of it.

From such an Instance it cannot be inferred, that the Quantity of this new Cash has augmented Labor of itself, because twenty Millions wou'd, upon this Supposition, have the same Energy as forty. It only proves, that any actual Augmentation whatsoever of Money in a State, *quickens the Circulation* of Commodities from one Neighbour to another; because all Things have a Tendency towards settling in an Equilibrium.

But that the State may continue in a flourishing Condition, this Augmentation must be continual; for if there be no Succession in the Change of Industry, there will be no Motion: as soon as the new Mass shall be distributed, in Proportion with the old, Commodities will be dearer, but the Circulation will not be the brisker.

The Nations, therefore, which are not possessed of any Mines of Gold or Silver, can only support a Motive to Industry, by procuring itself every Year a new Quantity of Money, by the Balance of Trade; or by

continually multiplying the Paper that passes current for Specie.

This last is the most ready Expedient, and would for a long Time have all the Effect desired in a Nation, whose Expences should be all at Home; we say, for a long Time, for it would happen at the Long-run, that such artificial Wealth continually accumulated would become of no Value: Nay, it would soon prove fatal to a Nation that holds Correspondencies with the neighbouring States. The more such Correspondencies oblige to Expences Abroad, the more certain will be its Ruin, because real Wealth will go abroad to defray them.

The Abundance of artificial Wealth will operate at Home as much as an Abundance of Metal for the same Sum; we mean, it will enhance the Rate of Provisions, &c.

If it be successive, all Things will have a prosperous Appearance, because the Circulation of Commodities and Money will be the brisker. If withal 'tis immense, the Luxury and Expence of the People will be the same.

Thus the foreign Commodities of Luxury will be consum'd with the more Ease, and will carry away the Remainder of the real Wealth; whilst the Commodities of the Country, being raised to an extravagant Price, will go off Abroad with great Difficulty, when they are rivalled by those of other People.

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The Diminution of the Interest of Money will be a Remedy in some Degree; but if the Necessity of diminishing the Expences of a Government, appears to be the Motive of it, the Splendor of the *artificial Wealth* is eclipsed, and vanishes. This Prosperity, in Appearance, exists no longer after its secret Spring is once known. The general Credit may still be buoy'd up by Hopes, and by the personal Interest of every Member of the Society to support it; but the Confidence is destroy'd; and, tho' 'tis supported for the present, 'tis mistrusted for the future.

From all that has been said, 'tis evident, that *artificial Wealth* of every Kind is dangerous, if it exceeds the Quantity of the real Wealth; the Government is incessantly threaten'd with the Loss of its Credit, in the Moment when it has need of it; and when the artificial Wealth is a true Representation of the real, it hurts foreign Commerce from that Time to the Increase of the real Wealth, and of Industry.

If 'tis a true Saying, that Money performs the same Functions in a Body politic, as the Blood does in the human Body, the Superabundance of the one, must be as dangerous as that of the other. The Science of Physic, teaches to maintain an Equilibrium among the Fluids; and the Skill of the Politician consists in establishing a Balance between

tween the different Employments of the People.

The Grand Point of the Circulation of Money is, that every Part of a Nation be sensible of its Ease, in a sufficient Proportion, that all the Poor may be employed. For this End, there need no other Representations of Specie, than those of Commerce. When Money is at a low Rate, the Offices for discounting the Hazard, of which it is not so great in Fact as in Appearance, would succeed better than all Kinds of Paper Circulation.

Money is not scarce in any Place where every Commodity continually represents it in a Degree approaching to the general Proportion. If the Plenty of Money in the inland Counties far exceeds this Point sufficient for Circulation, there is a Hazard of losing its Commerce abroad, and then those Provinces will soon be exhausted. The Sea Ports are the Arteries of the Body politic, the capital City is its Heart, and the Plenty of Coin can never hurt it, if its Motions are regular and quick in the Circulation of beneficial Commerce.

All these Debts of the Government have the same Currency with the Public as Specie, and represent a Value more considerable than their Capitals.

Moreover, there is a Circulation of particular Bills of the great Companies, the Value of which is known to be very considerable; but the

the total Amount is a great Mystery. There are also the Bills of the Bank of *Edinburgh*, of the two Banks of *Glasgow*, that of *Aberdeen*, and of Exchequer Bills.

The Custom at *London* is to keep no Money at home but just enough to defray the little constant Demands, the rest being deposited in the Bank, and great Part in the Hands of Bankers; because they are more convenient than the Bank. They receive foreign Specie; and, if it be required, make Payments the next Moment in *English* Coin; and their Bills pass as ready Money.

According to the most common Opinion the Valuation of the whole amounts to a Capital of 400 Millions Sterling; and it must be owned, that if all the Paper-Property really represented the Specie, the *English* Nation would be the richest that ever existed.

Those who compute the Value of the circulating Species at the highest, suppose it in the whole to be 15 Millions Sterling, and one or two Millions in foreign Specie; there are many more, who compute it to be much less, and some say, it is but 12 Millions.

We will suppose it to be 16 Millions; and that one or two Nations be rich enough to amass that Sum in Effects that may be demanded upon the Spot in Money: what would be the Value of 384 other Millions in Paper-credit? They would absolutely be of
no

no Value in such a Confusion. Even though we should suppose there was in this Kingdom to the Value of 39 or 40 Millions Sterling, in Works of Gold and Silver, Diamonds, and other precious Moveables, 'tis certain, that the Nation would not be a whit the richer; for the Proprietors of such Effects would secrete them the very Moment that there was a Failure of Public Credit. The Commodities would fall from 2 *per Cent.* to one at least, 'till such Time as the Necessity of Foreigners gave them a greater Value, and the *English* would be the poorest People in the World.

I am perswaded, that with a Credit of less than eight Millions Sterling, some of these Disorders would happen. But this Supposition will never take Place; and the Resources of the public Credit will be kept up in Respect of the public Revenues.

It does not appear, therefore, that the Government can extinguish the Debts as the Revenues now stand. If the Duties on the Consumption of Goods are augmented, the Workmen will raise the Price of their Labor, by which, Commerce will be a Sufferer; and if the Burden be laid on the Manufactures, it will be their Destruction. There are, moreover, Taxes on every Thing that is capable of being taxed; as may be imagined by examining on what Funds the Interest of the public Debts are settled.

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If the Government taxes the Annuitants, its Credit will necessarily fall, because it has already felt some Shocks at the Time of the Reduction of Interest in 1749 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent. 'till 1757; and from thence for the future to 3 per Cent.

In this Situation *England* is, nevertheless, not without its Resources. Its Commerce still subsists, and it has had the Skill to preserve it by the Reductions of Interest. We observed, that in 1698 the Nation expended forty-three Millions, and that the Revenues of the Government amounted to five, three of which went into the Expence.—Now, those Revenues amount to near eight Millions upon the same Articles; and are scarce sufficient to defray the Expence, though the Heads or Articles of it are only augmented by about two Millions for the Interest of the new public Debts: from whence it may be inferr'd, that Commodities in general are augmented in the Kingdom by a little more than two Thirds.

On the other Hand, *Great Britain* being indebted to Foreigners a large Proportion of her public Debt is charged with a considerable Revenue for the Interest thereof, besides the common Loss by of Exchange, which is thereby sustained; the Nation has more need than ever of cultivating its Commerce, to augment and preserve its real Wealth.

Thus far goes our *French* Author; whose Sense, I believe, I have not misrepresented.

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Although the Reductions of Interest may have contributed to induce our Traders to pursue the national Commerce for smaller Gains, than when the Interest of Money was higher; yet this has not enabled us to obstruct that Rivalship we have met with in Trade from Foreigners. If, indeed, in Proportion as the Interest became reduced, we could have lessened our Taxes on Trade, we might, by the Means of these conjunctive Aids, have stopped, in a great Measure, that Competitorship, which has, and daily does prove so detrimental to this Kingdom. Were we to reduce the Interest of Money to 2 *per Cent.*, upon our former Principles; it would not prevent other Nations from supplanting us; for although their Interest of Money is now higher than ours; yet that has not proved the Means of our gaining the Trade out of their Hands. Further Reductions may oblige us to Trade for less Profit; and this may lessen the Quality of our Fabricks, but these Measures, if we may ground our Judgment on Experience, will never prove effectual to put us on an Equality with our Rivals: And we see that Foreigners look upon our late Reductions to proceed from Compulsion, not from those natural Causes which of themselves reduce the Interest of Money.

The great End to be aimed at, by any Kind of Regulation in our Finances, is That of the substantial Support of the public Credit, and of the Advancement of Trade and Com-

Commerce in Consequence thereof. Tampering with the Funds to answer other temporary Purposes, has not only been a political Amusement, but proved the Means of encreasing our public Debts, and enhancing, instead of lessening, our Taxes : Whereas certain it is, the original Pretence of Reductions of Interest, was, in Order to reduce the public Debts, and in Consequence thereof to reduce our Taxes ; and till we do this, we must lose the commercial Dominion in Time of Peace, however victorious we may be in Time of War.

LETTER

L E T T E R VI.

How the Public Revenue might have been constituted to have prevented the Encrease of the PUBLIC DEBTS, and TAXES ; with a further Comparison between the old and the new proposed System, to raise the Supplies.

AFTER two such bloody and expensive Wars, as those were of King *William*, and Queen *Anne*, it was full Time to think of effectual Ways and Means to lessen those heavy national Debts and Incumbrance we had thereby incurred, and to cultivate the Arts of Peace and Traffic, which alone could put our Affairs in a flourishing Condition.

To this End, the Expedient of reducing the Interest of the public Creditors, in Order to establish a Fund to discharge the principal Debt, was thought of. But the Reduction of Interest could not take Place, till the long and short Annuities upon Lives, &c. were brought into a State of Redemption : to do which, it cost the Nation above Three Millions.

Accordingly, the Interest was reduced from 6 to 5, and afterwards from 5 to 4 *per Cent.*; and these Savings, together with the Encrease of the Duties of those Funds, whose Surplusses

pluses constituted the Sinking Fund, amounted in the Year 1727 to no less than 1,200,000. The whole of the national Debt being then about 50 Millions, might have been absolutely discharged, from the inviolable Application of the said Fund, by the Year 1752: and from the expected efficacious Operation of this Fund, the Public in the Year 1727 were amused with the Hopes of one Day seeing the Nation out of Debt, and the Taxes reduced wherewith our Trade was incumbered.

But instead of the public Debts being lessened, by the Means of this Fund, they have encreased above One Half more, and are likely to encrease without End; If all Savings by the Reduction of Interest, and every other Improvement of the Revenue, shall be applied only to pay Interest for additional Debts; and to that End be consolidated without Distinction, into a General Fund for that Purpose.

If, in order to raise the Supplies we are to do it by Annuities upon Lives, this is returning again to the old System, and gradually contracting irredeemable Debts again; and must not this perpetuate the Taxes appropriated to pay such Annuities, till they become annihilated. If Annuities should be now thought the best Way of raising the Supplies, why did not our former Annuities all continue, till they were gradually sunk? Though the present

present Rate of Interest will make some Difference to the Nation ; yet these will prove but retrograde Measures, and is still borrowing, and incumbering our Trade with fresh Taxes ; and therefore cannot be so eligible as raising the Supplies within the Year.

Had the Sinking Fund been sacredly applied to the Payment of the Old Debts contracted before the Year 1716 ; and instead of contracting additional Debts since ; had we raised the Supplies within the Year, may we not reasonably presume that the public Credit, and general State of this Nation would have been in a Condition far superior to what they at present are ?

Although the public Creditors, when they experienced, that the Nation was capable of discharging its Debts, should struggle hard, who should be paid last ; ought this to have obstructed the Payment at all ? The Payment might have been so equalised among the great Companies, according to the Proportion of Debt due to them, that none could have had Reason to complain : But if any ought to have had the Preference in being last paid, they ought to have been Widows and Orphans, and the infirm and superannuated : but all other ought to be upon an Equality, because they are to be presumed capable of employing their Money in some Branch of Business, as well beneficial to the State as to themselves.

Had

Had Policy of this Kind taken Place, it would necessarily have thrown greater Quantities of Money into the commercial Circulation ; and the Custom of dealing for ready Money, or very short Credit, would have been restored, as the public Debts became to be gradually converted into a Live-Trading-Stock : Thus there would have been more Cash than Paper in Circulation, our Commerce encreased, and that Money kept at home that is now sunk and annihilated abroad. And, as has been observed in the preceding Letter, this Quickness in the Circulation of Money, considered as a Medium in all our Negotiations, would naturally have reduced the Price of our Commodities ; and would, in Effect, have answered the End of taking off a Proportion of our Taxes upon Trade ; which could not be done, if the Sinking Fund had been made to operate with its whole Power and Efficacy, by giving the Nation the Benefit, in the Payment of its Debts of that Compound-Interest, which it would have afforded.

And, if a general Cheapness in our Commodities had proved the certain Consequence of the gradual Payment of the Debts before 1716, and of our Ready-money and Short-Credit-Dealings; would not this have greatly contributed to the Advancement of our foreign Commerce in general ? Must not this have proportionally obstructed that Career of Competition in our Trade, that has proved so unspeakably detrimental and injurious to it ; which is likely to prove its absolute Ruin,

if Measures effectually efficacious are not some how speedily taken by the Nation : And if such are, the World would afford Trade and Navigation sufficient to employ all the Millions we could possibly have to throw into Trade, as fast as the Debt should have been so discharged : And this I may one Day endeavour to shew.

While the public Debts had been in this Course of Payment, and Ready-money and Short-credit in all our Concerns had been brought into Vogue, and become the fashionable Custom of the Nation ; the beneficial Change and Alteration in the whole State of the private Credit, would have greatly contributed to promote and facilitate the like Ready-money, and short-Credit-Dealings between the Government and all those who had any Transactions with them ; and would have the better enabled the People to raise whatever Supplies were wanted in the last War within the Year. If also the Government had raised those Supplies *monthly*, and paid their Contractors *quarterly*, as has been before shewn ; the Government Dealings thus cooperating with the public and commercial Transactions, by acting upon the Principles of Ready-money and Short-credit : in how prosperous a State and Condition would this Nation have now been ? Might not such like Measures have prevented the last War with *Spain*, as well as the present one with *France* ? For when those Potentates beheld the good Plight

Plight to which our Finances were brought ; when they experienced that our national System, and our Power were bottomed upon so wise, and so stable a Foundation, they would not have dared to provoke, maltreat, and insult us, as both these Nations have long done in their Turns.

Nor do these Measures appear to be incompatible with each other : they, on the contrary, should seem to be mutually aiding and assisting in carrying one another into Execution. For, if the Payment of the Debt, had thrown a Plenty of Money into all the great Channels, and even into every Rivulet of Circulation ; and if the Spirit of Trade and Commerce had been wisely cherished and encouraged, in the Manner it ought to have been done, that Addition of circulating-Money would have daily added to the general Balance of our Trade ; and these together would have enabled the People to have the more easily and readily raised the Supplies within the Year : Thus the Nation would not only have prevented an additional Debt of 30 Millions we incurred in the last War, but, by pursuing steddily and inviolably these Measures, from the Year 1727 to the present Time, would have brought the Nation absolutely out of Debt, or at least have discharged all its old Debts incurred before 1716—This is what might have been done ; and this is what we must think of some time or other, or be at length quite undone.

Although we are not in a Condition to think of lessening the public Debts, at this Juncture ; yet it well becomes the Nation to think of the best Measures to prevent the Encrease of them : And, indeed, such will prove the Consequence of raising the Supplies with the Year, that the very Scheme, which may be formed, (be its specific Nature what it will, if it is equally and justly contrived) for that salutary Purpose, may be partly applied after there is no farther Occasion for it, to the Establishment of a *General-Debt-Paying-Fund*; which will reduce the public Debts to whatever Degree the Nation pleases : And if the Nation is to continue burthened with any perpetual Annuitants, we have before pointed out the only proper Objects amongst our own Subjects that are entitled to such an Indulgence : And perhaps, a Debt of 20 Millions at 3 *per Cent.* might not prove any detrimental Incumbrance to our Trade ; but if we experienced it was, that also should be discharged, the better to promote, animate and encourage to the utmost that Rivalship between our own Traders and those of foreign States, as will prevent that Ruin and Destruction to our Trade, wherewith it is threatened : Nor can any thing effectually do this but being able to send our Commodities to foreign Markets as cheap as our Competitors do theirs.

Unless we have a View to answer this essential End in all our Schemes and Projects relating

relating to the public Revenue, they can have no Merit. The Funds of this Nation have been sufficiently tampered with already; which, it is to be hoped, will put us on our Guard not to be longer amused and cajoled with pitiful Expedients; which have tended only to encrease our Evils, and eternize the Load of Taxes on our Commerce and Navigation.

Nor is the present Constitution of the public Revenue so well founded as could be wished to preserve the Liberties of the People, or the Rights and Privileges of Parliament. For under the Colour and Pretext of securing the Interest of the Annuitants, the Taxes paid for that Purpose have first been made temporary, and afterwards perpetual; and so likewise are those Taxes which are appropriated to the Civil-List. This gives a perpetuated hereditary Revenue to the Crown; and the more this Perpetuation of Taxes encreases, the more will the Crown become independent of the Parliament, as well as of the People; for when there shall be no Supplies required to be raised annually, there will be no Necessity for the assembling of Parliament; and when the Necessity ceases, will not the Meeting of Parliament depend wholly upon the Will of the Sovereign? Whereas, on the other Hand, the less the Taxes are encreased, and perpetuated, and the greater Proportion of the Revenue shall be reserved to be raised annually, the more Necessity will then be for the an-

nual Meeting of Parliaments to raise such ; the more dependent will the Crown be upon the Parliament and the People, and the less capable of injuring their Rights and Liberties, and subverting the Constitution.

Upon the several Reductions of Interest taking place, the Savings made thereby have been passed to the Sinking-Fund ; and while this Fund remained unappropriated, the Money was in the Power of the Crown ; and when that Fund was applied to the current Service ; that Precedent has paved the Way to leave the Whole of that Fund at the Mercy of the Crown. When the Reduction of Interest to *3 per Cent.* takes place, this will add more to the Augmentation of that Fund ; and when the Whole becomes appropriated and perpetuated, this will prove a further Stride to a perpetual-hereditary-Crown-Revenue.

And the greater the national Debts shall grow, the greater Evils may proceed from this Sinking Fund. We have seen that in about 50 Years we are liable, according to the Old System, to encrease the public Debts to the Sum of 170 Millions. If when the Debt is advanced to such an exorbitant Height, the Parliament should be prevailed on to reduce the Interest of the Whole to *2 per Cent.*, under some specious Pretence ; this will add 1,700,000 more to that all-grasping-Fund.

Should this come to be the Case, if we should be unhappy enough to have a Prince upon the Throne, who might take it into his Head,

Head, that he could govern better without than with Parliaments; will he not than have it in his Power to do so? For this great additional Revenue added to the other hereditary Revenues, and those also of the Land and Malt Taxes, what could hinder such a Prince from acting without Parliaments? But if he did condescend to permit the Assembling of Parliament, might he not chuse whether he would give the Royal Assent to diminish any Part of the Revenues? On the contrary, by the Means of a large Civil List Revenue, added to the great Sinking Fund, and the other perpetuated Revenues, might he not have Influence enough to obtain the Perpetuation of a Land and Malt-Tax; and what then could hinder his becoming despotic?

The Danger attending an intailed hereditary Crown Revenue, is greater than some may imagine. It is a prevailing Temptation, even to well-disposed Princes, to shake off their Dependency on a *British* Parliament; especially so, if a Prince has experienc'd, or been taught by his Ministers, that P—ts are liable to be refractory, and therefore it is necessary that the Crown should be possessed of such a perpetuated hereditary Revenue as may obtain the desired Ascendancy: When this comes to be the Case, and it should cost a Prince ——— Thousands a Year to maintain such Ascendancy; a Prince so circumstanced may say, can I not as well save such a Sum, and lay Parliaments wholly aside, since they have bestow'd

bestowed a very liberal Revenue on me and my Heirs, and perpetuated the Funds for its Support? In this manner Princes may come to reason; and a bad Prince may make a bad Use of such his Power: Whereby, may not a large hereditary Revenue one Day prove destructive of the very Being of Parliaments that granted it?

But if on the contrary, the whole, or the far greatest Part of the public Revenue was voted only from Year to Year, the Existence of Parliaments would not be rendered so precarious; nor a bad Prince have it in his Power to invade their Rights and Privilege, but by the direct Means of Force and Violence. We well know that the *Spanish* Cortes lost all their Weight and Authority, by granting too much Money to the Crown; and the Consent of this Assembly became, at length, a Matter of Form only, to justify all the Incroachments and Oppressions of the Crown, and rendered *Castile* little better than a Province to *Flanders*. In a Word, a standing-perpetuated-Revenue, is not less dangerous to the Liberties of the Parliament and of the People, than a standing-perpetuated-Army. Nor will a bad Prince who has such a large standing Revenue, ever want standing Troops to perpetuate the despotic Power of himself and his Successors.

An ambitious Prince, fond of arbitrary Power, who should be thus backed with Money, and a military Force, would have,

have, we may naturally suppose, no great Scruple of Conscience, to strip the public Creditors of the remaining 2 *per Cent.* on their Capital of 170 Millions, and send them a grazing; which would throw but an additional Revenue of 3,400,000 *l. per Annum* more into the royal Coffers: So that such a Prince would then amply be provided for War, as well as Peace, and never more stand in Need of Parliaments.

Here then is a short Cut to the Destruction of all that is dear and valuable to *Britons*; whereby the Hundreds of Millions, and the immense Profusion of Blood expended since the Revolution, in the Behalf and Preservation of our Liberties, will be entirely thrown away, and the End thereof absolutely defeated. Such is the particular Constitution of the public Revenue of this Kingdom, that it seems calculated, when it is considered in this Light, only to destroy our happy Constitution, and introduce that Slavery, which our wisest and best of Men, have so zealously struggled to prevent.

Notwithstanding the Sinking Fund, as observed, so early as the Year 1727, produced no less than 1,200,000 *l.* yet, even during the Length of pacific Years, with which the Reigns of our Sovereigns *George I.* and *George II.* were long favour'd; the current Service has yearly absorbed that Fund; and every Reign, so far

far from diminishing the national Debts, has added to them.

Altho' by the Reduction of Interest that will take Place in the Year 1757, this Fund should be encreased to above two Millions; yet, according to the old System, this will only afford new Means to pay Interest for new Debts. The more the Sinking Fund shall encrease, either by the Reductions of Interest, or by the Affluence of the Funds therewith incorporable, the more will the Means extend of augmenting the public Debts, by the borrowing of new Sums upon the Sinking Fund: And the more those Debts shall encrease, the nearer will approach the inevitable Moment of the deplorable catastrophe of the national Creditors.

In this Manner, all that seems to have been intended by lessening of Interest, has been only to provide *new Funds* for such *new Debts*, as the past ill Management of public Affairs required. Thus a Fund of three Millions, which, at the Rate of 6 *per Cent. per Ann.* was heretofore sufficient to answer the Interest of a public Debt of *fifty Millions*, at the Rate of 5 *per Cent. per Ann.* has been sufficient to answer to the Interest of a Debt of *sixty Millions*; and at the Rate of 4 *per Cent. per Ann.* to answer a Debt of *seventy-five Millions*; and at the Rate of 3 *per Cent. per Ann.* to answer a Debt of a *hundred Millions*. So that this Sinking Fund, or rather intended sacred Fund of Redemption, together

gether with our other perpetuated Taxes, have proved a prevailing Temptation and Inducement to plunge the Nation farther and farther into Debt ; which must end, either in the Ruin of the Nation, or that of the public Creditors ; unless the old System shall be absolutely laid aside, and some other adopted, that will prevent these superlative Calamities.

These Things have been long foreseen and foretold ; and yet so unaccountably infatuated has the Nation hitherto been, that we have taken no Warning. Mr. *Archibald Hutchinson*, late Member of Parliament for *Hasting* in *Sussex*, had Penetration enough to discern these fatal Consequences in his Time ; nor did he want Resolution to declare his Sentiments upon this Occasion ; and even to lay them at the Foot of the Throne. For we find him thus address himself to his late Majesty, even so early as *January* the 14, 1714, in the following Manner.

May it please your Majesty !

“ The State of the Nation, with Relation to the public Debts and Funds, is a Subject of great Importance to your Majesty, and your People, and in the very first Rank of Things, which claims a Share in your Royal Majesty’s Thoughts.

“ From the Revolution to this Time, the public Debts have been continually increasing, and now amount to upwards of
“ forty-

“ forty-five Millions ; the Funds appropri-
 “ ted for Payment of the same do little, if
 “ any thing, exceed the yearly Interest ; and
 “ thereby there is a Necessity, even in Time
 “ of Peace, of providing yearly for the
 “ Fleet, Guards and Garrisons, by a Tax
 “ on Land and Malt ; the Revenues former-
 “ ly applicable to those Purposes, being in
 “ Mortgage for the aforesaid Debt.

“ Had the Nation at first raised, *within*
 “ *the Year*, those Sums which they after-
 “ wards did, the Expence of the last two
 “ Wars had been annually discharged ; no
 “ Debt had ever been contracted ; all the
 “ grievous new Impositions might now
 “ cease ; nor had there been any further
 “ Need either of Land or Malt-Tax, the
 “ Revenue only existing at the Revolution,
 “ being fully sufficient for all the Services of
 “ the Government in a Time of Peace.

“ These, and many other, had been the
 “ happy Effects of such a Management, and
 “ as less fatal has the contrary Conduct been ;
 “ for we run in Debt to subsist, even in a
 “ Time of Peace, and by any future War,
 “ must become entirely a Bankrupt : And,
 “ to prevent this, it seems absolutely neces-
 “ sary to raise for the future, *within the*
 “ *Year*, the Supplies which are wanted in
 “ it, and to repair, with all possible Dis-
 “ patch, the Misfortunes which are brought
 “ upon us by the unhappy Expedient of

“ mort-

“ mortgaging, which has been so much re-
 “ sorted to for these last twenty Years.

“ In the last Parliament, I expressed my-
 “ self fully on this important Subject, and
 “ do most humbly beg Leave to lay before
 “ your Majesty, the Thoughts I have had
 “ thereon. I am sensible that in this, and
 “ all other weighty Affairs, your Majesty
 “ will have the more proper Intimations
 “ from those who have so justly the Honour
 “ to serve your Majesty in the chief Parts of
 “ the Administration: But, although the
 “ great and rich, out of the abundance of
 “ their Knowledge and Experience, will
 “ bring into your Treasury, Presents worthy
 “ of themselves, and such as supersede the
 “ Need of any other; yet I persuade my-
 “ self, from your Majesty’s Goodness, that
 “ this poor Mite of mine, being offered
 “ with a Heart full of Loyalty, will also
 “ meet with your Majesty’s gracious Ac-
 “ ceptance.

“ May the Accomplishment of this great
 “ Work lay a solid Foundation for the future
 “ Glories of your Majesty’s Reign; a Foun-
 “ dation, and the only one, on which the
 “ Wealth and Honour of the Nation can be
 “ firmly built and raised to the highest Pin-
 “ nacle of Perfection, and whereby your
 “ Majesty will be enabled to give Laws to
 “ *Europe*, and to make such a Figure there-
 “ in, as no *British* Monarch ever did.

“ These,

“ These, great Sir, are the most passionate
 “ Wishes of my Soul, having the Welfare of
 “ my Country nearly at Heart, and being,
 “ as am obliged to be, by the strongest Ties
 “ of Duty, Gratitude, and Inclination,

“ *May it please YOUR MAJESTY,*

“ YOUR MAJESTY’S

“ *Most loyal, most obedient,*

“ *and most devoted*

“ *Subject and Servant,*

“ ARCHIBALD HUTCHESON.

Before I dismiss the Point, in Relation to the Sinking Fund in general, and what else has been said ; it may not be amiss, in order to give a short View of this important Matter, to reduce the Substance of what has been urged to the few following Queries.

I. Whether the popular Plea for the Reduction of the Interest of the public Creditors from six to five *per Cent.*, and from five to four *per Cent.* was not with a declared Intent, that their Savings might constitute a Sinking-fund ; which Fund, it was pretended, should be set apart, and most sacredly and inviolably applied to the Payment of the public Debts incurred before the Year 1716 ? And whether this was not, ’till the Sinking Fund became otherwise applied, the obvious and well-known Meaning of those Acts of Parliament, which primarily established that Fund ? And whether this was not the plain Sense and Spirit of all the Debates within doors and without,

without, which, at first, related to this Fund?

II. Whether, in Consequence of the Establishment of this Fund, the Security of the Payment of the public Debts, being thereby provided for, did not prove, for a Time, the great Support of the public Credit of the Kingdom? And Whether that Fund was not looked upon and applauded as a profound Master-piece in our *British* Politics?

III. Whether the inviolable Appropriation of this Fund to the original Purpose for which it seems to have been intended by Parliament, would not, from what has been observed, have put the national Debts in a certain Way of Redemption? And Whether, if we should not have been found capable of raising the whole Supplies necessary within the Year, to have served the public Exigencies, to have carried on the last War, it would not have proved more interesting to the Nation, that we had rather contracted some Proportion of *new Debts*, while the *old* were discharging by the Operation of the Sinking-Fund, than to have alienated that Fund of Redemption as has been done? And Whether the Nation would not, by discharging the Debts as intended, have received the Benefit and Advantage of *compound Interest*, while it might have raised such further necessary Money at a *simple Interest* Rate only, upon new Funds?

IV. Whether, if a Million only of this Fund, as it has encreased from Time to
K
Time,

Time, had been inviolably applied to the Payment of the national Debt contracted before 1716; and such other Part thereof applied to the taking off occasionally the most burdensome of our Taxes upon Trade, would not have been preferable to what has been done? And Whether such like Measures might not have proved the Means of contracting *new Debts* amongst *ourselves only* if they had been necessary, and discharging all those due to *Foreigners*? And Whether, by Virtue of the before-mentioned Application of the Sinking Fund, we might not have had it in our Power to have laid such *new Taxes*, for the requisite *new Loans*, as would have proved far more equal throughout the whole Kingdom, and far less burdensome to our Trade and Navigation, than the *old Taxes* have been? And Whether such new Taxes might not have been laid either by one moderate and equal Tax upon Houses, and by a Tax of one Shilling in the Pound only, in Time of Peace, and more in Time of War, laid upon all the Lands of *England*, according to an exact Survey to have been taken thereof; and both these Taxes to have been granted by Parliament only from Year to Year, as they should have thought meet?

V. Whether, if such like Steps had not been thought more eligible than alienating the Sinking Fund, the Nation was not in a Capacity to have raised all the Money required within the Year? And
Whether

Whether this latter Method would not, from what has been observed in the Course of these Letters, have preserved the *Sinking Fund* to have been sacredly appropriated to the Payment of the Debts incurred before the Year 1716? And Whether this System might not have prevented the last War; or, at least, have prevented the Debts incurred by that War, as well as have put us in a Condition to have made a more honourable and lasting Peace than we did? And Whether these Measures would not have brought our Affairs into such a State, as to have enabled us to have dealt with the present Enemies in a Way far more to our Advantage and Honour, than we shall be able to do, by tenaciously adhering to the *Old System*?

VI. Whether the past Reductions of Interest have not tended to the Encrease, rather than the Discharge of the national Debts? And Whether any future Reductions may not continue to have the same Effects, unless we change the System?

VII. Whether the Alienation and Anticipation of the Sinking Fund to other Purposes than seem to have been originally intended by Parliament, has not proved very detrimental to our Trade and the public Credit: they contributing to entail such Taxes on our Commerce and Navigation, that we are never likely to get rid off; unless the Sinking Fund is redeemed, which was to have been the infallible Redemption of the Nation; or some other established, that may, at a proper Time,

Time, effectually answer the wise Intention of the Legislature ?

VIII. Whether the Encrease of Taxes in our State, do not all some-how ultimately terminate upon our Trade and Commerce ? And Whether it does not become the Wisdom of the Nation, to advance and encourage its Commerce and Navigation to the utmost, in Order to encrease its solid Treasures, arising from the general Ballance, instead of encreasing those of nominal Paper, and lessening its Value as we encrease its Quantity ?

IX. Whether the Nation by persisting in following the old System of borrowing, and encreasing the public Debts and Taxes to supply the Exigencies of the War, may not, in the End, tend to reduce the Interest to two *per Cent.* ? And Whether, in Proportion as the public Debts shall more and more encrease, the Property of the *monied-Interest* will not become of less and less Value ; and at length either become gradually worth *Nothing*, or be absolutely annihilated from the great Distresses and Poverty of the Nation ?

X. Whether it is not for the Interest of the public Creditors, and their Posterity, to discourage to the utmost of their Power, instead of promote, the further Encrease of the public Debts and Taxes ; and to use all their Weight and Influence to effect it, in Conjunction with an Administration that is determined to raise the Supplies within the Year ?

XI.

XI. Whether the present Constitution of the public Revenue, and the Methods that have been many Years taken to convert our temporary Taxes into perpetual ones, has not a Tendency to annex a perpetual Revenue to the Crown? And Whether the Reduction of Interest, as the national Debts shall be encreased, and the Augmentation of the Sinking Fund proportionably in Consequence thereof, together with an Addition of perpetuated Taxes to answer the Interest of new Debts; may not prove the gradual Step towards the entailing such an hereditary Revenue upon the Crown, as may at length render Parliaments useless, our Princes despotic, and *Britons*, Slaves to arbitrary Power?

XII. Whether raising the Supplies within the Year will not vest more Power in the Parliament; occasion their uninterrupted assembling, and render them more independent of the Crown, than the raising of the Interest Money by new perpetuated Taxes, for such Sums as may be borrowed? And Whether, if it shall not be judged prudential to attempt to raise the *whole* Supplies requisite for the Year, within the twelve Months, it is not eligible to make the Trial, what *Proportion* of the Supplies we shall be able to raise, without any Inconvenience, within that Time? And Whether a Trial thus once made, may not prove a preliminary Touchstone, whereby to judge of the Ability of the Nation in the succeeding Years?

XIII. Whether, if some one general Tax, either upon Houses or otherwise, be laid as equal, as easy, and as equitable as possible, and as little expensive in the Collection as may be ; and this Tax be levied *monthly*, the Government will not be capable of judging in two or three Months of its nett Produce ? And Whether, if the Government should stand in Need of the Money for a *Month* or *two Month's* Produce of such Tax, before the same can be levied, and the Trial made of its exact Produce, they would not easily raise it at the Rate of 3 *per Cent. per Annum*, for that *Month* or two, or the like ?

XIV. Whether, as the nett Produce of such a general Tax might and would be known within the Time of two or three Month's Collection at furthest, and it should be found, within so short a Time, to be greatly deficient in producing the principal Sum for which it was given ; it will be too late in the Session to supply that Deficiency, either by borrowing the Remainder, or by adding to such Taxation ?

XV. As the Practicability of raising the Supplies within the Year will depend upon the Return and Circulation of the Money *quarterly* into the Hands of the People again: Quere ; will it not be necessary to prevent the Miscarriage of the Scheme, that it should be enacted in the Act made for such Purpose, not only that those who may immediately contract with the Government for naval and
military

military Stores, and all other the Requisites; shall be paid their Money *quarterly*, but that those Contractors, in Order to quicken and accelerate the general Circulation of the Money into the public Hands in all the Channels and Rivulets of Circulation; shall, upon the Receipt of their Money from the Government quarterly, pay every Person or Persons whatsoever, with whom they shall have had any Dealings which concerned the Affairs of the Government within — Days, after such Receipt of their Money from the Government, under the Penalty of — and being excluded from the Service of the Government for ever afterwards?

XVI. Lest the Credit taken of others by the chief Contractors with the Government should be abused; and the great and essential Ends of the quick Return and Circulation of the Money into all Hands that it concerned, should, by any under-hand-Dealings be retarded: Quere; Whether it would not be consistent with this Scheme of Oeconomy, for the Government to become Purchasers as much as possible of all their Wants, at the first-Hand, that they might be provided with the best Commodities at the cheapest Rates, and make their Payments themselves to those first-Hand-Dealers, at the *Three Month's* End?

XVII. And to the End that the Service of the Government might not be monopolized by a few over-grown opulent Contractors,

and their Dependants, and thereby the Money laid out by the Government, and the Gains made by the Public, might not be engrossed wholly by a few Contractors and their Coadjutors ; which might render the Design impracticable and abortive, by drawing the Government-Money and the Gains made by dealing with them, into such narrow and contracted Channels, as would retard its universal quarterly Circulation again among all Classes of People as is intended ; And in Consequence thereof would disable the Nation from raising the Supplies within the Year, however capable and willing they might be so to do, if the Nation was put upon as near an Equality in laying out the Government-money as could be done : Quere ; Whether, in Order to spread the Money so laid out by the Government, as equally as possible throughout the Kingdom, it might not be contained in the Act, that, in Proportion to the Sums of Money that shall be raised in the respective Counties, a due Proportion of the same shall be laid out and expended by the Government in such Counties, according to the Situation and the Abilities of such County to supply the Government with what they stand in Need of ? And Whether, altho' certain Counties, by Reason of their Situation, or other Circumstances, shall not be capable of supplying the Wants of the Government quite so cheaply as some other Counties ; such Counties, notwithstanding the

the Disadvantage under which they may labor, should not have a due Proportion of the Government Money laid out and expended amongst them? And Whether such like Measures would not the better enable every County to raise the Supplies within the Year, when they were certain of having such a Proportion of the public Money laid out with them, and to circulate amongst them again within the three Months?

XVIII. As Measures of this Kind might be contrived to circulate the Gains made by the Government as equally amongst the several Counties, as they could admit of, according to the Money raised in such Counties: Quere; Whether this would not have a Tendency to distribute a due Share of the national Wealth over the whole Kingdom in general, and thereby prevent the Impracticability and Miscarriage of the Scheme? And Whether such Policy might not contribute to raise a useful Spirit of Emulation between some of our Counties to vye with each other, which should serve the Government with the best Stores of every Kind? And Whether, as the Government's Time of Payment would be certain, it could be attended with any Detriment to the Nation, or Inconvenience, or Disadvantage to the Counties; If a certain stipulated Profit could be agreed to be allowed to the Sellers on the various Commodities wherewith they should be able to supply the Government?

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The Service of the Government by the Way of *Borrowing* and *Funding*, it is certain, has occasioned an unequal Distribution of Property amongst the People, which may at length, become so excessive, as that excessive Wealth in one Class of the State, may cause an excessive Poverty in others. As there is nothing but the Land, or Trade, that can produce in the State a Value that did not before exist in it, all excessive Fortunes, which do not proceed from those Spring-heads, cannot but be formed at the Expence of the Trader, or the Land-improver : which must be a Sort of Imposition on those two Classes, prejudicial to Cultivation, Industry, and the general Traffic.

Besides the excessive Proportion of overgrown Fortunes, obtained by trading with the Government, it is, in its Nature, little favourable to the Consumption of Provisions and Merchandize. The Head of a Family of Twenty Thousand Pounds a Year will not consume so much Wine, as twenty Families of a Thousand a Year each. The Dissipation and Waste in such an House of the Necessaries of Life, will not balance the Deficiency of Consumption by the Mechanics, and Peasants, deprived of the Means of it.

If a Number of enormous Fortunes by such Dealings should start up, and not be distributed in due Proportion, over all the Parts of the Kingdom, the Effect of them will be yet more pernicious. There will necessarily
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result from it a misordered Distribution of Subjects. The Inhabitants will be drawn from all Parts of the Kingdom towards that Spot, in which the Wealth of the State is concentrated, and the Evil will grow boundless, if these Men quit those Professions, that are of the first Necessity, to take up Trades which produce Nothing to the State, or which have only for their Object a ruinous Consumption : and such are all those, which are maintained by an excessive Luxury.

A considerable Portion of the Riches of the State, as well as of the Subjects, permanently fixed in one Spot, cannot diffuse its Influence but to a certain Distance. The neighbouring Lands, and such as could send their Produce to that Market, might feel the Benefit of it, respectively in Proportion to their Distance. The same may be said of the Manufactures necessary to the Demands of Life, or of Luxury. The Lands and the Manufactures, which want the Convenience of Carriage thither, have been neglected, or deserted, for Want of a sufficient Consumption on the Spot, or at proper Distances.

The Distribution of Property is ill-regulated, when we see the Land-Owners, occupying, in Town, sumptuous Palaces, whilst their Family-Seats, their Farms, their Villages are going to Ruin ; instead of having profitable Manufactures established in them. When the Produce of the Counties has no Demand, or Consumption, because the Proprietors live

no longer on their Estates, nor take care to promote some Trade and Business amongst them, they then rack their Tenants, wherewith to live in Town. And when this comes to be the Case, the Landed-interest of this Kingdom must dwindle and decline: But if additional Agriculture and Manufactures are proportionably encouraged, in the several Counties for the Service of the Government, as well in Times of Peace as War; this will give a new Face to many of them, and tend greatly to advance the Interest of Lands in general: All the Country-Gentlemen in the Kingdom will be the better for such Conduct, and that Gain, which now falls into few Hands, will be distributed over all the Nation. Besides, when all Counties find they can serve the Government in some Degree, they will insensibly obtain a Share in the Service of the Merchant; and thus a more equal Distribution of Commerce and Property will take Place all over the Kingdom, and the better enable it to raise whatever Supplies we stand in Need of within the Year; without being sensible of their Weight, when the Returns are so speedily made amongst them, as has been proposed to be done in these Papers.

Certain it is, that *London* has grown, and still continues to grow, out of Compass, at the Expence of, and to the sensible Diminution of the other Towns and Boroughs; and indeed at the Expence of the Class of
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Labourers and Workmen ; and some capital Towns do the like in their respective Counties.

Whence we may be convinced, that all Operations, which tend to encrease the Growth of *London*, at the Expence of other Parts of the Kingdom, are injurious to the State ; because the Affluence and Multitude of Men employed in *London*, in their Trades and Manufactories, enhance the Price of Provisions, and of Labor of every Kind ; by which the Trade and Manufactories herein established, and even the adjacent Agriculture themselves, suffer.

So many Poor whom the Public maintains, so many superfluous Inhabitants of Towns, if they were allured from thence into the Counties, by the Means of Manufactories established there, which can be carried on cheaper than in *London* ; and if, by that Means, the more of uncultivated Lands could become employed and occupied ; this would produce two great and apparent Advantages : the disburthening of *London*, and other great Cities and Towns of their Poor, and transplanting them where they might prove of more Benefit and Advantage to the Kingdom, by drawing new Riches into the Counties where they should inhabit and be employed, at a cheaper Rate than they can be in *London*, and other great Towns and Cities : And these Subjects so distributed and employed, will prove far more interesting to the Cities of *London*, and
other

other capital Cities, by supplying new Trades at cheaper Rates, than they can be, by containing resident Inhabitants in those Cities. Thus we see, that many national Benefits may be derived from raising the Supplies within the Year, while none but Evils can attend the contrary Conduct.

LETTER

L E T T E R VII.

How the raising the Supplies within the Year may be conducive to lower the Price of our Manufactures, and the better enable us to maintain a Competition in Trade with our Rivals.

Whatever Mediums of Proof may any way contribute to establish the Reasonableness and Necessity of what I have undertaken to support; I have a Right to apply to my Purpose, although some of the Sentiments may be derived from others: But if the Application of them has been to answer other Views, and not those, which I endeavour to maintain, the Subject may be said to be new handled, if the Principles whereon it is grounded, are as old as Truth itself. Besides, by surveying a Subject in Variety of Lights, we shall the better discern its Beauties; many of which may be otherwise obumbrated and eclipsed. If in every Point of View the Object still appears more and more engaging, we shall have the more Pleasure in admiring it.

Wherever they have the Use of Money, the Value of Lands, Houses, Provisions, and all Commodities follow the real or imaginary

ginary Plenty of it. We may regard Labor as a Commodity, which every Man will purchase as cheap as he can; and therefore the poorer Sort, whose Commodity it is, are obliged continually to under-sell each other, if there is not full Employment for the whole. They who sell cheapest must live; and they who must sell only to live, being unfortunately in all Countries the greater Number, they will, therefore, fix the Price of the Commodity. The Price of a Day's Labor will be at lowest a Day's Subsistence. Where Food and Cloathing, the Necessaries for a Day, are purchased for a little, there Wages will be low, or Labor Cheap.

The Price of a Day's Necessaries depends on the apparent Plenty of Money. If the capital Stock of any Nation is invariable, or admits of no visible Encrease, the apparent Plenty of Money will be ever the same, and the Prices of Provisions, Cloathing, and all Things continue for Ages unaltered. This is the Case wherever Commerce adds Nothing to the Stock, and is observable all over the boundless *manufacturing* Countries of the East. As they are populous beyond Belief, and have no Mines or Commerce, the Quantity of Specie in Proportion to the People, is always the same, and that very small. Little of it, therefore, is given for Provisions; the Produce of the Lands yields little; Rents are low; Houses are built for little, and sold
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and rented for little; and Money, being a most valuable Commodity, brings in an exorbitant yearly Hire or Interest. If there is any Difference here in the Price of Labor, it is ever highest in the most populous Parts, where the Demand for it is the greatest.

In *commercial* States, or those which carry on an active as well as a passive foreign Trade, the Case is reversed. Here the *national Stock* receives a regular and constant Encrease, equal to the yearly Balance of Trade; the Price of Lands, Houses, Provisions, and Labor consequently, are in continual Advance. Rents of Lands are high, and Money being, after every Encrease, less and less rare and valuable, brings in a Rent still lower and lower.

Besides this *real* Encrease in the *Capital*, there is an imaginary one much greater, by the Use of public and private Credit, and the Necessity of *Banks*. Inland Trading and *manufactory* States, require little or no Credit, but wherever there is a foreign active as well as a passive *Commerce* carried on, this cannot be well avoided; tho', as has been shewn before, the less the private Credit is given and taken in a commercial State, and the more Dealings are carried on for ready Money, the less will become the Price of Commodities and of Labor.

In *Holland*, every Branch of Credit, public and private, is in Extreme. By a Note of the Bank, any Man may convert his
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House, Land or Goods into Money, and send them to Sea, or to War. Thus the whole Purchase, or Fee Simple of that Nation, is ever in Currency, as well as their real Cash.

Through this the ideal Plenty of Wealth is so great, that it has been a Question whether there is actually Gold and Silver in the whole World to discount their Bills and Notes in general. Notwithstanding which, the Effect on the Prices of Commodities, Lands, Houses and Labor, is the same as if the whole Sum was really in the *Stadthouse*, or all the Soil of the Country under their Feet, solid Gold.

The Direction of this national Stock centers in few Hands, and is kept continually in Sight, no Money being ever dormant, or out of Circulation. According to this apparent Plenty, together with the real Encrease arising from Commerce, the Price of Lands, Houses, Provisions and Labor, daily advances.

The Case of Colonies is particularly full to the Purpose. These are wholly *commercial*, yet all their Trade is, or should be, with the Parent-state. Here the Product of the Soil and Labor is sent, and hence the Returns made, but not in Money. The Vender receives other Commodities, Provisions, or Manufactures, which the Labourer must take as his Pay. This being inconvenient, there becomes a Necessity of *commercial*

cial Credit ; a private Ticket must be created to answer the Ends of Money : Thence arises a Power subject to be abused by inordinate Men ; and sometimes through this *supposititious* Coin, the imaginary Plenty of Money has swelled to such an Excess, that Wages, and all other Commodities, have grown to an incredible Price. Here likewise, as in other Countries, every Man, not in Slavery, works a Day to earn a Day's Provision, which, through the above-mentioned Abuse, and the Distance from which his Provisions often come to him, arises to a great Sum.

This is the true State of Wages in the Extreme of *Inland* Trade and *Commerce*. In Proportion as Kingdoms approach nearer to one or other of these, Wages will be low or high, and in that Proportion only. No Laws can raise the Prices of any Commodity or of Labor, in a mere *manufactory* State, or prevent the Advance in a *commercial* one.

It is not wonderful, therefore, that in the *Mogul's* Empire the Rate of Wages should be so very low, that they could afford to undersell us here, in our own inland Markets, if our Laws did not prohibit their Goods ; though their Manufactures would come to us charged with a Voyage of twenty thousand Leagues, a prodigious Land Carriage, and great Duties both in the *Indies*, and at unloading.

In *China* they give not quite *Two-pence* a Day; in *Jamaica* five Shillings, in *Barbadoes* from seven to nine: The Commerce of *France* is computed to their inland Trade as one to twelve, ours as one to six; that of *Holland* exceeds their inland Trade. The Price of Labor is proportionably different; *France* gives from five pence to eight pence a Day, in those Busineses where we give from one Shilling to eighteen Pence and upwards, and *Holland* from one Shilling and eighteen Pence to two Shillings.

In each of these Places, Wages continue advancing with the Encrease of Coinage. In *Spain*, the Price of Labor is low, Money is a dear Commodity, Land cheap: In *Genoa*, and the commercial States of *Italy*, all fluctuate with the public *Credit* and *Commerce*.

In order to ascertain the Price of Labor from the Principles of Nature, let us suppose the Proprietor of an Estate in Land keeps it in his own Hands, he will employ Slaves, Vassals, or Servants to work for him. If he employs Slaves in great Numbers, he must have Overseers to keep them at Work, and as many Labourers and Tradesmen as are necessary to procure him all the Conveniences and Superfluities he shall require.

In this Oeconomy he must allow those Slaves not only a necessary Maintenance, but their Children likewise. He must allow the Overseers of the Slaves Advantages and Rewards proportionate to the Authority he gives them.

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Therefore the Labor of a Slave is worth at least the Quantity of Land which serves to maintain him, and about double the Quantity of Land which serves to breed up a Child, till he is of Age for Labor; for half the Children who are born, die before seventeen; so that two Children must be reared up on an Average to have one fit for Labor; and even then their Lives can be calculated but from ten to twelve Years.

'Tis true, the one half of the Children, who die before seventeen, die faster in the first than in the following Years: But as the Time the Mother loses in producing and attending them, seems to make up for this Computation, and the Females being more chargeable and less profitable than the Males, when they grow to Maturity; it seems reasonable to think, that the Labor of the meanest Slave is equal to double the Produce of Land, that is required to maintain him.

When the Proprietor maintains Slaves on his Land, if he has more of them than his Labor requires, he sells the superfluous Hands, as he does his Cattle: In which Case, their Value or Price ought to answer, *cæteris paribus*, to the Quantity of Land employed to breed up two Slaves to Maturity.

But if the Proprietor employs in his Service, free Servants or Vassals instead of Slaves, he may probably maintain them upon a better Foot than Slaves, according to the

Usage or Custom of the Place he lives in : Yet in this Case also, the Labor of a Day's Work ought to correspond to about double the Quantity of Land that is employed to maintain him. If he be married, the Surplus goes to the breeding up of his Children, his Wife being supposed just able to maintain herself by her Labor : But if he be a Batchelor, he will probably employ his Surplus to live more at his Ease : For Example, the married Labourer will live upon Bread and Cheefe, Roots, &c. eat Meat seldom, avoid strong Drinks, change Cloaths and Linen rarely ; whereas the unmarried Labourer will eat and drink better, wear better Apparel, and consequently (if we suppose their Wages equal) he will consume the Produce of more Land for the Maintenance of his own Person than the married Man, if he saves nothing.

For the better Understanding of what is meant, it is to be observed, that a poor Labourer may maintain himself at the lowest Computation upon the Produce of an Acre and an half of Land ; whereas, if he allows himself constantly Wine, Beer, Meat, and other Conveniencies, he may, without Gluttony or Excess, consume the Produce of 4 to 10 Acres of Land of ordinary Goodness, according to the different Ways of Living.

Whence may be inferred, that the Labor of a working Man corresponds to more or less Land in different Countries, according to the different Customs of Living used in such Coun-

Countries; and that if the Labor of a Peasant in *France*, be worth the Produce of Three Acres, that of an *English* Country-man, who drinks Beer, wears woollen Cloth, eats Meat pretty often, and consequently consumes the Produce of more Land, is worth in *England* from 6 to 8 Acres.

From what has been said, the Par and Equation of Land and Labor may be determined by the Quantity of Land, the Produce whereof is given for Wages to the Man who labours; and that the Labor of a Man, who earns the Produce of Three Acres, may be said to be equal to such Produce; if a Man, who earns the Produce of 6 Acres, is equal to such Produce, &c. And it seems, that the same Proportion allotted for Labor differs in several Parts of the World, according to their respective Ways of Living.

That in *China*, the Labor of a Peasant may be equal to Half an Acre of Land, since a Quarter of an Acre may probably maintain him after the *Chinese* Manner: That among the *Iroquois* in *America*, the Labor of a Vassal or Slave, may be equal to 20 or 100 Acres, since the Maintenance of a Man, may require half the Quantity, in Regard they subsist mostly on wild Beasts, which they hunt; and that the Beasts which one Man consumes in a Year, must have many Acres of Pasture to feed them; especially since People there do not clear the Lands of the Wood, and are un-

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acquainted with the Methods of making them produce as much Grass as they might.

The Females commonly consume the Produce of less Land than the Males, or in other Words, spend less; their Infancy is not only a dead Expence, but, even when they are grown up, they seldom earn more than what barely maintains them. Therefore it should seem, that the Labor of a Peasant ought to exceed twice the Quantity of Land necessary to maintain him, with Regard to the female Children, that are to be bred up in a State: But as most of the Day-Labourers do not marry, till they have saved something, such as are frugal, are by that Means, enabled to breed up several Children.

So that if it be allowed reasonable, that the Labor of a Peasant, is equal to twice the Product of the Land that serves to maintain him, the Mechanic or Manufacturer, who earns more, may be said to follow the same Proportion.

If we consider to what Quantity of Land an Hundred Bushels of Wheat correspond in Value, we must not only take in the Number of Acres, which produced it, but also the Double of the Number of Acres necessary to maintain the Men, whose Work and Labor produce it, in that Form, for the Time they were at Work about it: And if the said Wheat has been brought from afar, we must also take in the Land necessary to maintain the

the Men and Beasts employed in the Carriage.

Thus to consider the intrinsic Value of any Thing, we must consider the Land and the Labor that enters into its Production ; and since we may pretty nearly determine the Par of Land and Labor, we may look upon Land alone to be the principal Measure of all Values.

But as Money is the Medium, which finds out the Proportion of all Values, it is also the best Medium to fix the Proportion of Land and Labor, with Respect to all Goods and Commodities. If a Workman earns Half an Ounce of Silver *per Diem*, and another earns an Ounce, it may be judged the latter has twice the Quantity of Land to spend, since he earns twice the Quantity of Money.

This Notion of the Par of Land and Labor, Sir *William Petty* looked upon to be the most important Consideration in political Oeconomics, as appears by a M. S. of his written in the Year 1685 ; but the Method he took for enquiring into it, seems very trifling and ill grounded.

Further to corroborate what has been said, we may observe, that we suppose, no Acre of Land produces more Wheat or feeds more Sheep than another Acre ; the Work of one Man is dearer than that of another according to the Occurrences, as we have already explained.

If two Acres of Land are of equal Goodness, the Wheat or Wool of one is of equal Value

Value to that of the other, if the Work be equal that is employed about them.

Let us suppose the Wool produced by one Acre to be made into a coarse Suit of Cloath, and the Wool of the other to be made into a Suit of fine Cloth, containing the same Quantity of Wool with the coarse Cloth.

As the fine Suit of Cloth requires more and dearer Work, it will cost more than the coarse Suit, and proportionally to the Difference of the Work one Suit of fine Cloth, shall sell for ten Times the Price of a coarse Suit, containing an equal Quantity of Wool.

The Price of any Thing intrinsically takes in the Quantity of Land with Regard to the Goodness of the Land, and the Quantity of the Labor with Regard to the Dearness of the Labor.

A Pound of Flax wrought into Bruxels Lace, according to the Computation of the different Parts of Labor it requires, will employ the Labor of one Person for near fourteen Years; and so the Quantity of Lace made out of a Pound of Flax, sells at a Price, which not only pays the Maintenance of a Woman for fourteen Years, or of fourteen Women for one Year, but also to yield a Profit to the Merchant or Undertaker.

The Steel-spring, which regulates an *English* Watch, sells at a Price, that makes the Proportion of the Value of the Steel to the Workmanship as 1 to 1, 538, 460.

On the other Hand, the Apples of a Tree require so little Labor that their Price seems to be proportioned almost to the Land that enters into their Production.

The Price of a Bucket of Water at the River is Nothing ; but a Bucket of Water sells in the Street for one Penny, which seems to be the Measure of the Labor of the Water-Carrier.

From these Examples and Explanations, I believe, it will appear, that the Price of any Thing intrinsically is the Measure of the Land and Labor that enters into its Production. But it may happen that Things which have such an intrinsic Value, may not sell accordingly, with Regard to the Fashions and Humours of Men. For Example : if a Gentleman cuts Canals and erects Terraces in his Garden, the Price of them will be intrinsically proportionable to the Land and Labor they require, and they will really cost the Gentleman in that Proportion ; nevertheless it may happen nobody else will give him one Quarter part of that Value for them.

Land, which produces all Commodities and Goods must necessarily maintain those who give these Goods and Commodities their Form by Labor ; and the Labor itself, may be estimated by the Quantity of Land required to maintain those who labor, as appears from what has been urged.

The more Labor is employed in a Suit of Cloaths, the dearer it sells, and the richer it is

is esteemed, A Knife and Fork that is nicely wrought, takes up more Labor, is dearer and esteemed richer, *cæteris paribus*.

It is true that whether the Inhabitants wear fine or coarse Cloth if equally lasting; and eat or drink, and are lodged nicely or coarsely, it is in one Respect much the same Thing: since coarse and fine Food and Cloathing are equally consumed; but, in the general Notion, the State that consumes fine Cloathing is esteemed richer than that which consumes coarse, &c.

But when the additional Labor of 25 Persons we will suppose, produces permanent Wealth, as Gold, Copper, &c. to serve for a *Corps de Reserve*; Whether by exchanging their Labor with Foreigners for these Metals, or digging them out of the Ground; the State is not only esteemed richer, but is in every Respect so: and more particularly if the Labouring in Gold or Silver, for which, on any Emergency, the State may have, even from the Enemy, any Thing it wants.

Thus the more Labor there is in a State, the richer it is esteemed; and if that Labor be well applied, the richer will it be in Reality, and the more powerful.

For the Point which seems to determine the comparative Strength and Riches of Nations is the *Corps de Reserve* they have; as Magazines of all Things necessary for the Use of Man, exceeding the Yearly Consumption to answer in bad Years and Wars; or for as much

much as Gold and Silver, answer all these Things, the Quantity of Gold and Silver, seems to determine the comparative Wealth and Power of States, for these are permanent and lasting Riches.

It is adviseable to encourage all Sorts of Work and Labor in a State, since a State is esteemed the Richer for it; but the Labor which answers best in Case of War and Difficulties is the most to be encouraged.

Diogenes, at the Siege of *Corinth*, fell a rolling his Tub, that he might not be idle, when all others were at Work: I would not recommend that Sort of Labor; but rather than have a Person idle in a State, I would recommend the Working of Toyes or Trinkets, that have a Show of Ornament, tho' little of real Use, rather than Idleness.

If all the Proprietors of Land had but just as much of it as they could oversee, and manage themselves, or as much as Farmers commonly rent and oversee without under Officers to assist them: if the said Proprietors became the Undertakers of such their small Estates they would keep few or no idle Servants, and few Pleasure-Houses; they would live without Luxury, and consequently the Inhabitants of the State would be more numerous and more laborious, This makes it apparent, that a great Inequality in Estates is prejudicial to a State, because of the Luxury and Idleness great Estates commonly bring. And whether a Convent of 50 Monks lives on a large Estate, or a Lord with
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50 Servants and Horses, who do Nothing but attend him; it seems pretty much the same Thing in Time of Peace; but the Lord, indeed, and his Servants and Horses, may be useful in Case of War, and is always an Ornament; whereas the Monks seem to be of no real Use in Peace or War on this Side Heaven.

From what has been said, we apprehend, that we may be capable of ascertaining the Price of Labor from the plain Principles of Nature and Reason; and when such Principles are well considered and established, they may prove the Means of our maintaining that Competitorship against foreign States in the commercial Warfare; which will prevent the Ruin of our Empire: For, when the general Price of Labor soars above its natural Standard, and thereby an artificial Value is superadded to our Produce and Manufacture, beyond that which our Rivals do, we must lose our Dominion in Trade; and our Ruin then cannot be far distant: And this Superaddition of Value to our Commodities arises solely from that *Modus* wherein our Taxes are laid and raised.

Although we have, in the preceding Parts, touched upon this Point occasionally, in the general; yet, as it is one of the essential Foundations, upon which our whole Argument is built; we judge this deserves a distinct Consideration. True it is, this Topic has been handled by many ingenious Gentlemen already, and scarce any Thing
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new may be expected; yet if we put the Matter in something of a new Point of Light, apply it to our Purpose, and exhibit it in Contrast to what we shall submit to the Public; it will serve to corroborate what we have, and shall urge upon this Occasion.

After *Locke* and *Davenant*, the late Sir *Matthew Decker*, Bart. resumed this Subject; than whom few had a better Knowledge of Trade and Commerce; and indeed he has given a masterly Turn to the Subject, from his own Experience in Trade. We, therefore, shall not only, in some Measure, follow his Steps in Miniature, but incorporate such other Matter, as may, perhaps, give no less Weight to his Argument, than what he has urged, will strengthen ours.

The Taxes on our Trade keeping equal Pace with the Encrease of our Debts, they have been from annual, become fixed for two or three Years; afterwards prolonged, and at length *perpetuated*: Within this last Century, our Imagination has been admirably fertile in the Creation of new Taxes, or in the Revival of old ones, under new Shapes and Forms.

Taxes on Consumption have been preferred to other: (1) Because they are the least liable to Evasion: (2) Because the Duty seems light, by the infinite Subdivision of the small Sums whereof it consists: (3) Because it seems unarbitrary, every one fixing the Bounds of his Consumption: (4) Because

cause Foreigners pay a Part of these Duties superadded to our Commodities.

These Reasons look specious: Yet such Taxes are unjust, as being unequal, because with Regard to the very Necessaries of Life, the Poor and the Rich pay the same.

The Charges in the Levy and Collection of these Taxes greatly reduce their Produce, though the Weight on the People is thereby encreased; and thereby the Consumption diminished, which obliges us to the lowering the Duty.

Augmenting Taxes on our Consumption, has not brought our Workmen to the Sobriety or Frugality of a *Frenchman*, or to the Thriftiness of a *Dutchman*: And when our Workmen cannot raise the Price of their Labor and Workmanship to the Degree they would, they have Recourse to the Parish or Robbery.

Taxes on Consumption necessarily raising the Price of Commodities, by superadding an artificial Value to them, besides their natural one, which is derived only from the Price of Labor and Workmanship, as has been shewn; if such Taxes continue to encrease, that Portion of them that Foreigners are supposed to pay, by the Purchase of our Commodities, will proportionably diminish, from the Diminution of our Exports.

Before the Commencement of the present War, there were glaring Proofs of the excessive Rise of the Price of our Products and Manu-

Manufactures. The one was, the Excess of the Price of the Sugars beyond that of other Nations, Quality for Quality. This was caused by the excessive Price of the Commodities we export in Barter for them, so much beyond the Price of these sent by *France* and other Nations to their Colonies. Though, at the particular Time we are speaking of, the Price of Sugars was dearer at *London* from forty to seventy *per Cent.* yet the Case in general is, that all our Plantation-Commodities come considerably dearer to us, at all Times, than those of the *French* and other Nations do to them who have Plantations in *America*; because the Commodities of their Mother-countries are sent proportionally cheaper to their respective Colonies and Plantations. Does not this give Occasion to our Plantation-subjects to carry on an illicit Trade that may, in the End, prove destructive of that Intercourse of Commerce, which ought inviolably to subsist between *Great-Britain* and her Colonies? May not this prove the insensible and invincible Means of rendering our Colonies indifferent to the *British* Dominions, when they can carry on their Trade with *France* to so much greater Advantage, than they can with their Parent-country? Is not this making *Great-Britain* an Oppressor, instead of that tender Nurse, and Protectress that she ought to be of her Infant-colonies and Plantations? However beneficial some may imagine that commercial Communica-

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tiou has been to this Nation, that is carried on, in Time of Peace, between our northern Colonies and the *French* Sugar Island, it appears to be a dangerous Indulgence, on the Consideration only of the greater Cheapness of the Commodities of *Old France* than those of *Old England*; for this is an irresistible Temptation to our Colonies, under other specious Pretensions, to take in Barter for their Lumber, &c. what is very detrimental to the Trade of their Mother-kingdom: And 'till their Mother-kingdom shall be capable of bartering with her Colonies much cheaper than they can now, by Reason of those Tax-incumbrances on our whole Trade, our Colonies will begin to think the Yoke of the Parent too heavy to be born by her Children; and especially so, if we advance in the Encrease, instead of the Diminution of our public Debts and Taxes.

Here then opens to our View a very melancholy Scene of Danger; which has, perhaps, been little thought of, if at all: but certainly this merits the most serious and deliberate Consideration of the great Representative Power of the Nation, if our *American* Commerce shall be deemed worth Preservation.

Another Proof, that shows our Revenue not to be duely regulated for the Benefit of our Commerce, is, the Bounty we grant on the Exportation of certain Articles of our Commerce, to enable our Merchants to support

port a Competition with Foreigners in the Markets abroad : a wise Remedy doubtless, and very helpful to our Trade, and necessary to be extended to many more Branches, than it is, in Proportion as the Industry of other Nations is extended in the Advancement of Rival-Manufactures : Yet this does not effectually answer the End proposed ; for *First*. The Charges of the first Collection of the Duty, and those of Repayment are a Loss to the Nation. *Secondly*. Nor can such Bounty be an ample Equivalent to compensate Trade, for the Taxes upon Consumptions in general ; because such Taxes upon Consumption, and raw Materials, wherewith many of our Manufactures are wrought up, are more than doubled in the Price of our Merchandises, by the Augmentations which the Taxes make, by being paid and repaid, by the various Hands, through which such bountied-Merchandises pass, before it arrives at the Consumers : And, by the Augmentations which this encreased Sum adds to the Price of the raw Materials, to the Price of the Workmanship, to the Expence of the Workmen and Merchants in their own proper Consumptions, and to the Profit of the Merchant ; the Merchandise must be proportionably enhanced, because all the Additions must come out of the Price of the Merchandise, that has undergone, and comprehends all these various Augmentations,

Sir *Matthew Decker*, to convey his Meaning the more intelligibly, takes for Example, the

Tax upon Leather, by which he finds the Price of Shoes is charged with twelve Augmentations, which the Leather has paid; passing successively from the Hands of the Grazier, through those of the Butcher, Tanner, and his Workmen, the Leather-cutter, Shoemaker, and his Workmen, &c. Here are already seven proportional Augmentations of Dearness for the Shoes which themselves use, an Expence which every one of them must regain on the Leather itself: Then there is the Augmentation of the Tax itself, and four Augmentations in Proportion to the Profit which must be made by the Butcher, the Tanner, the Cutter, and the Shoemaker, out of the Price thus swelled of the Leather.

A like Tax will operate the same Effect on the Manufactures of Candles, Soap, Beer, &c.

But these Graziers, Tanners, Shoemakers, &c. all consume for their own Use, Candles, Beer, Soap, and other the necessary Commodities that are taxed,

Here then are again taxed twelve respective Augmentations on the Price of Shoes, from every one of these Articles.

In like Manner all do, who contribute to the Fabric and Commerce of Cloth, or any other Branch of our Woolen Manufacturies: for Example; from the Shepherd to the wholesale Merchant, all use Shoes; and every one of them must charge the Augmentation of the Price of them upon the Wool, and upon the

the numberless Operations it must undergo before it is made into Cloth, &c. Thus the Augmentations of the Tax upon Leather, and of all, and any other Tax on the Consumption of Necessaries, will be repeated, *ad infinitum*, till all these Sums are ultimately paid in a Lump by the last Consumer. It will not then be hard to believe, that before coming to him, the Tax will have been more than doubled: especially, if it is observed, that the Tax is by every one of those who pay it, and receive it again upon the Merchandize, encreased at least the Interest of the Advance he has made; reckoning from the first, who pays only the naked Taxes thereon.

If we add to all this, the Sum of the Customs and Excise Duties thus doubled, the Sum of the other Taxes, as the Land-Tax, the Poor's-Rate, &c. it will be found, that the Sum-Total of these Taxes is at least 31 *per Cent.* of the annual Expence of the whole People of *England*. Now, where is the Nation with which we can enter into a Competition of Commerce upon equal Terms? And what Matter is the 1 or 2 *per Cent.* Advantage we boast over some of our Rivals in the Interest of Money, towards restoring the Equality between them and us?

But if we encrease our national Debts by the present War, to the Degree we did in the last, of 30 Millions; is not this likely to encumber our whole Trade with a Million a

Year of Taxes more ; Will it then be possible any longer to maintain any Degree of commercial Competition with our Rivals ? And if the Pursuit of the old System must be attended with such Consequences, at the End of a ten or twelve Years of War, or less, what must the Event be of another such War only, every Man must dread, who has at all considered it. And this our Enemies well know, if *we* are not thoroughly apprized of it ; and therefore, if they can but be instrumental to augment our public Debts and Taxes, they are sensible this will obtain them that commercial Dominion which they aim at : and if once they effectually gain that, they are too sensible they cannot fail of obtaining whatever else they may have in View.

All Authors agree, that low Customs are one of the Causes of the great Trade of *Holland*. If so, high Customs cause little Trade ; which is comparatively our Case now. If the lower the Customs the greater the Trade, no Customs or Free-ports must carry Trade to its utmost Height ; which Case might be ours. If low Customs have such a good Effect in *Holland*, which hath the most natural Disadvantages of any Country ; a Free-Port must have the greatest and best Effect in *Britain*, whose natural Advantages are not inferior to those of any Country in *Europe*.

High Customs, such as are ours, prevent our Country's being an universal Storehouse for all Merchandizes as *Holland* is. Because our Duties being so great an additional Disbursement to the first Cost of the Goods, no Merchant will let so much of his Capital lie dead for Duties here, when he can have it all circulate in Commodities in other Countries; nor can such Goods be re-exported, because the Officer's Fees in and out, which always remain; and the Interest of Money lying dead for Duties paid (tho' mostly drawn back, as observed) are so great a Charge, the natural Interest of Money being higher with us than in *Holland*, that the Goods cannot come near so cheap from us to any foreign Market, as from a Free-Port, where nothing is paid in or out: Wherefore such Customs prevent our Country's having the best Choice of Goods at the cheapest Price, to tempt our Customers. Also,

The great Duties on *India* Goods discourage Foreigners from buying at our Sales, who make, on extraordinary Charge of Commission on that advanced Price, and are forced to lie some Months out of their Money for the Draw-backs: besides, our strict Rules of declaring Goods at the *Custom-house*, make public to every one each Transaction of Trade, and thereby prevent shipping such Goods for foreign Ports, as are there prohibited; which deprives us of several beneficial Branches of Trade that are carried on

from *Holland*, or Free-ports, to the great Advantage of Foreigners.

Such Customs prevent the Encrease of our Navigation, by enhancing the Expences of building and navigating our Ships. Boards, Hemp, Flax, Sail-Cloth, and Iron, paying Duties; those Materials must be dear, and several Necessaries of Life paying some Customs, and Excise, the Ship-builders Labor must be dear; and also all other Provision and Stores put on board the Ships.

The *English* Sailor paying, in his own Family's Necessaries, Customs and Excises, must have, and hath higher Wages than most other Countries: So that a *British* Vessel built and rigged with dear Materials, by dear Labor, supplied with dear Stores, and navigated by Sailors at dear Wages, must have dear Freights, bring in all foreign Necessaries and Materials for Manufacture dear, and carry out all our Products and Manufactures dear to foreign Markets, much to the Disadvantage of their Sales.

This shews the Reason, why we have made so little Progress in rivalling the *Dutch*, the *Hamburgers*, &c. in the *Greenland* Trade, the Navigation of the *Baltick*, or the *Herring Fishery*; which being Trades carried on for small Profits, our dear Navigation has, and will greatly obstruct our making that Advance therein, which we might, were our public Revenue otherwise constituted than it is.

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By not having an universal Storehouse, our Ships, like empty Houses, lie by idle in our Harbours, waiting Months for Freights, the Interest of the Money they cost, eating out their Profits ; or else are obliged to lose their Time, and be at great Expences in going from one Port to another, to endeavour to obtain a Freight.

Such Duties prevent the Encrease of our Sailors, the true Strength of the Nation. This is the Consequence of what has been said ; for no Trade breeds so many and so good Sailors, as the Free-port and carrying-Trades, the Employment being the greatest, and the Experience the largest, as the Voyages are the most various and extensive ; for it is no less than the Trade of the whole World.

These Things are not only destructive of our Riches, but also of our Security, it being difficult in Time of War to man our Navy, even at a great Expence ; which occasions that unnatural Custom of Pressing, and puts a free-born *British* Sailor on the Footing of a *Turkish* Slave.

Our Custom-Duties lessen the trading Stocks of our Merchants, by keeping a great Part of them idle, to pay the Duties on the Goods they import ; which is, in Effect, making them not only advance their Money for the Service of the State, but likewise run the Risk in the Credit they give of ever being reimbursed. This is diverting a Stream
of

of Riches that should water Trade; for when our Merchants are short of Cash, and they have both Customs and Manufacturers to pay, so much Money is required for the former, that Nothing is left for the latter. This causes a Circulation of Disappointments, seldom known in *Holland* on that Account: And the *Dutch* Merchants can carry on the same Trade with much less Stock than ours, sell cheaper, extend their Commerce farther, and of Course give better Encouragement to their working People; whereby they cause them to be more industrious than ours.

Those Customs encourage and force the Consumption of foreign Superfluities. For the dearer they are, the more are they esteemed by our People of Taste; 'tis the Expence that make the Elegancy; therefore Duties, especially high ones, only further their Sale. Mr. *Locke* says, “ It being Vanity, not Use, that
 “ makes the expensive Fashions of your
 “ People, the Emulation is, who shall have
 “ the finest, that is, the dearest Things, not
 “ the most convenient or useful? How
 “ many Things do we value and buy, be-
 “ cause they come at dear Rates from *Ja-*
 “ *pan* and *China*; which if they were our
 “ own Manufacture or Product to be had
 “ common, and for little Money, would be
 “ contemned and neglected? Have not se-
 “ veral of our Commodities, offered to Sale
 “ at reasonable Rates, been despised, and
 “ the very same eagerly bought, and bragged
 “ of

“ of when sold for *French*, at a double
 “ Price? You must not, therefore, think
 “ that the Raising their Price will lessen the
 “ Vent of fashionable foreign Commodities
 “ amongst you, so long as Men have any
 “ Way to purchase them, but rather encrease
 “ it.”

Besides the encouraging, our Customs force the Consumption here of foreign Superfluities that are imported, though the Duties be mostly drawn back on some Articles: yet the Interest of the Money lying dead for Duties, and Fees in and out, hinder in some Degree, their Re-exportation, and in many Articles, the Duties are only, in Part, drawn back: so that what remains is such an additional Load as prevents such Goods being saleable at any other Market, and their Consumption is forced here.

It is the excessive Consumption among us, not the general Dealings in foreign Superfluities, that should be discouraged: And this is best done by somehow taxing the Consumers, letting the Goods as Objects of Traffic, remain free.

Nor is it less certain that our high Customs encourage Smuggling: For where the avoiding such make the Profit great, no Risk can prevent Mens attempting it: this prejudices the fair Trader, and too often tempts him to turn Smuggler, Besides, it being chiefly the Articles of Luxury that are smuggled, as Brandy, Tea, French-Wine, Laces, Silks, &c. it spreads their Consumption among the
 lower

lower Class of People; who are tempted to imitate, at less Expence, the Luxuries of their Superiors: And what adds greatly to this Evil is, that the same Smugglers, who bring us these foreign Superfluities, carry away vast Quantities of our raw Wool, (which they obtain at a cheap Rate for their smuggled Commodities) to the unspeakable Prejudice of our own Manufacturers, and the Nation in general.

These high Duties ruin our Manufactures in another Light, more especially our Woollen. For they prevent the bartering away our Manufactures for foreign Goods, not only for our own Consumption, but also for Exportation; which might and would enlarge the Vent of our Goods ten Times more than at present; for, if a Merchant now exports woollen Goods, and would barter them for Wines, the Duties on them would amount to more than the Cost of the Woollen Goods; so that he must have a double Capital Stock for such an Adventure, or let it quite alone; whereby the Sales of great Quantities of Woollen Goods are lost to the Nation.

Customs taking away so great a Part of our Merchant's Stocks, they are thereby deprived of driving that great Trade, and purchasing those Quantities of Woollen Goods they would otherwise do. Besides, our Merchants Risk in Trade being greater than in *Holland*, and their Losses heavier by Reason of our Customs, our Bankruptcies are more frequent: This sensibly

fibly affects our Manufacturers, who are generally considerable Creditors.

Customs on Ashes, Bay-Salt, Cotton, Copper, Coals, Drugs, foreign Soap, Flax, Fruit, Furs, Hemp, Iron, Leather, Linnen, Oil, Paper, Rice, Tobacco, Tallow, Threads, Tape, Silk and Sugar, being Necessaries of Life, or Materials of Manufacture, must necessarily make all our Commodities dear; and that not only to our own People, but to Foreigners likewise; (though our Workmen should have no Excise to pay) and such Discouragements give Opportunities to Foreigners to send their Manufactures cheaper to foreign Markets, and smuggle them in Defiance of all Laws into our own Country, to the Ruin of our Manufacturers; for all the above Customs are as much Taxes on our Woollen Manufacture, as if they were laid on the Wool itself, or more; for the Workman must raise the Money on the Woollen Goods he makes to pay the Duties of what he uses of the above Article, with the Augmentations before taken Notice of, in all the Hands through which they pass before they come to him.

Thus, we ourselves ruin our own Manufactures, and Foreigners could not rival the People of so fruitful a Country as *Britain*, if we did not furnish them with the Means, by our high Taxes and Restraints, that are always prejudicial to Trade, tho' designed to amend it; nor do they ever effect the Thing intended, tho' fortified with the most rigorous penal Laws; of which

which Mr. *Locke* gives an Instance in his Considerations. “ It is Death in *Spain*, says he, “ to export Money ; and yet they who furnish all the World with Gold and Silver, “ have least of it among themselves ; Trade “ fetches it away from that lazy and indigent “ People, notwithstanding all their artificial “ and forced Contrivances to keep it there ; “ it follows Trade against the Rigor of their “ Laws, and their Want of foreign Commodities makes it openly carried away at “ Noon-day.”

It is Felony in *England* to export Wool, and yet they who furnish all the World with Wool, have least of the Manufacturing of it ; the smuggling Trade fetches it away from that Excised and Custom-loaded People, notwithstanding all their artificial and forced Contrivances to keep it there : It follows the smuggling-Trade, and that follows high Customs against the Rigor of their Laws, and their Want of taking off the Taxes on their Manufactures, makes it openly be carried away at Noon-day.

Britain having no Mines of Gold or Silver, has no other Means of acquiring or preserving Treasure, but by foreign Trade. As Custom house Duties confine our Trade to mere Importation for our own Necessaries or Vanities, and at the same Time ruin our Manufactures ; what we want in Exports to balance the Imports must be paid in Specie, making the Balance of Trade every Year more and more against us ; for as we raise the Prices of
our

our Goods so high by Taxes that Foreigners cannot afford to purchase them; and yet we continue to import their Superfluities; which we now chiefly do, and in Time must entirely pay for with our Gold and Silver: and our high Duties encouraging Smugglers, who have seldom a settled Habitation, or any Stock of our Manufactures by them, they carry out vast Quantities of Specie to purchase their Cargoes: such large Draughts of Specie make our Mints lye idle, we seeing but little new coined Gold, and hardly any Silver; Our hard Money will disappear, and grow scarcer and scarcer every Year; our Trade will decline, and our People must starve.

Sir *Matthew Decker*, from a very rational Deduction, shews, that the general Amount of all our Taxes, and Part of their Consequences, before the last War, was 15,289,375*l*.

He computes our People at eight Millions, and their Expence at 8*l*. per Head, which make our total Expences annually 64,000,000*l*.: out of which the People pay for the Taxes and their Consequences, as above, 15,289,375*l*.; which being deducted, their Expence, if untaxed, would be only 48,710,695*l*. And, 15,289,375*l*. charged on 48,710,695*l*. is a Tax, as we before observed, of 31 per Cent. on the whole Expence of the People, which must add a prodigious artificial Value to our Goods, consequently render them

them less saleable, and gradually ruin our Trade.

If it be asked, whether Foreigners, for what Goods they take of us, do not pay on that Consumption a great Portion of our Taxes? It is admitted they do: But if that was originally intended and expected to continue the same, as at the first laying on of our Taxes, it will be the strongest Argument against them; for as our Taxes on Necessaries are proved to be so burthensome and extensive, by raising the Prices of our Goods, Foreigners take less of them yearly; and when the Demand is reduced, the People will have less Work, find less Money to receive, and yet have their Taxes proportionally encreased on them as they lose their Trade; for as the Government abates neither Expences or Taxes; and if one Method of taxing fails, another is tried; what Foreigners cease to pay towards our Taxes, we must ourselves; or, in other Words, the less Trade and Money we have, the more Taxes we shall have to pay; and the more our Taxes are, the less and less Trade and Money, we know, we must expect. Is not this like adding to a Horse's Burthen, and diminishing his Meat? And can we wonder, if he sinks under his Load? Perhaps Figures may explain this clearer, by stating a similar Account through thirty Years.

Suppose, that in the Year 1710, all our Taxes and Part of their Consequence, were
as

as they were before the late War, *viz.* 15, 289,375*l.* that Foreigners paid then $\frac{1}{7}$ of them, by their Purchase of our Commodities, and even our own People the other $\frac{6}{7}$; that Foreigners going to cheaper Markets since, have ceased taking Goods from us yearly in Proportion to 1 *per Cent.* only on their former $\frac{1}{7}$ Part of our Taxes, and their Consequences, the Account every five Years will stand thus:

Anno	Foreigners paid of our Taxes, &c.	Our own People paid.
1710—	2,184,196 <i>l.</i> —	13,105,179 <i>l.</i>
1715—	2,074,987 <i>l.</i> —	13,214,388 <i>l.</i>
1720—	1,965,778 <i>l.</i> —	13,323,597 <i>l.</i>
1725—	1,856,569 <i>l.</i> —	13,432,806 <i>l.</i>
1730—	1,747,360 <i>l.</i> —	13,542,015 <i>l.</i>
1735—	1,638,151 <i>l.</i> —	13,651,224 <i>l.</i>
1740—	1,528,942 <i>l.</i> —	13,760,433 <i>l.</i>

Hereby it plainly appears, in what manner our Taxes have prejudiced the national whole Trade, till the Year 1740, and burthened our own People, who, according to the preceding Account, had 655,254*l.* more to pay in the Year 1740, than they had in the Year 1710; and yet had $\frac{3}{10}$ less of Trade wherewith to pay the same.

Since the Year 1740, the Nation, by the last War, has become saddled with an additional public Debt of above THIRTY-MILLIONS, and the additional Taxes thereby occasioned do not amount to less than One

N

Million

Million *per Annum* more ; and yet our Trade has not encreased since that Period ; nor is it ever likely to encrease in Proportion as our Taxes have done, and must do, if we go on Borrowing and Funding : So that the less Trade we have, the more Taxes we pay ourselves, and the less Proportion thereof do Foreigners pay to ease us, by the Declension in the Purchase of our Commodities.

And if the present War should, according to the old System, cost us no more than 30 Millions, will not such an incurred Debt add a fresh Burthen to the Taxes on our Trade of a Million *per Annum* more ? And must not the Effect hereof entail still such further Incumbrances upon our Trade, as will occasion so great a Decline therein, that there will be little Probability of our being able longer to support a Competition with Foreigners ? Unless either the whole national Debt shall be annihilated, and all the Taxes laid upon our Trade in Consequence thereof be annihilated also. Or, before this Extremity is arrived at, perhaps, the Interest of the public Creditors will be reduced at the End of the War to 2 *per Cent.* ; and it may be proposed, that the One *per Cent.* saved shall be applied to take off 1,100,000 *per Annum* of our Taxes, instead of being applied, as all Reduction hitherto have been, to pay Interest for additional Debts.

But this Reduction of the Interest of the supposed encreased Debt of 110 Millions to

2 per Cent. at the End of the present War, will perhaps, disappoint our sanguin Expectations in two essential Respects : the one of which is, that the lopping off *1 per Cent.* of the whole spending-Money of the Annuitants, will so decrease our Trade at home, as to cause a proportionable Decrease in the Produce of the Customs and the Excises, and all other Taxes ; and when foreign Nations experience, that we shall not be able to afford to purchase the same Quantities of their Commodities, as we have heretofore done, they will in Return purchase the less of ours ; whereby the taking off Taxes to the Amount of the *1 per Cent.* on the whole Debt, will not invite Foreigners to increase in their Purchases of us, because we shall be obliged to buy less of their Merchandizes, upon such a further Reduction of our Interest : And if these measures are not likely to add to the Augmentation of the general Ballance of Trade, we shall not have it in our Power to make good those Deficiencies in the Excises and Customs, &c. that will follow upon that Reduction taking Place, however inclinable the Parliament may be to supply them.

The other Reason is, that, as the Necessity of a Reduction, on such Motives, so low as that of *2 per Cent.* will indicate the declining Situation of our Affairs ; and as our foreign Creditors will be induced to think of other Ways of applying their Money, than keeping it in our Funds at so low a Rate of Interest ; they will

draw their Money out of our Funds, and place a Part thereof into foreign Funds, where they can have a greater Interest; and lend out the other Part to their own Merchants and Traders, at an Interest worth their while to hazard their Money upon personal Security: So that an Attempt to reduce Interest to such a Degree, will certainly defeat itself, or unspeakably prejudice, if not absolutely ruin, the public Credit.

Two of our greatest Authors foresaw, at the laying on of our numerous Excises, Customs, &c. that these unhappy Consequences must and would necessarily follow, and their Arguments are a full Proof of what has been advanced.

Mr. *Locke*, in his *Considerations*, says,
 “ That for raising three Millions on Com-
 “ modities, and bringing so much into the
 “ Exchequer, there must go a great deal
 “ more than three Millions out of the Sub-
 “ jects Pockets; for a Tax of that Nature
 “ cannot be levied by Officers to watch
 “ every little Rivulet of Trade without a
 “ great Charge, especially at first Trial; but
 “ supposing no more Charges in raising it
 “ than of a *Land-Tax*, and that there are
 “ only three Millions to be paid, 'tis evident
 “ that to do this out of Commodities, must
 “ to the Consumers be raised $\frac{1}{4}$ in their
 “ Price; so that every Thing to him that
 “ uses it must be a Quarter dearer. Let us
 “ see now who, at the Long-run, must pay
 “ the

“ the Quarter, and where it will light ; ’tis
 “ plain the Merchant and Broker neither
 “ will nor can ; for if he pays a Quarter
 “ more for Commodities than he did, he
 “ will sell them at a Price proportionally
 “ raised ; the poor Labourer and Handicrafts-
 “ man cannot, for he just lives from Hand
 “ to Mouth already, and all his Food,
 “ Clothing, and Utensils, costing a Quarter
 “ more than they did before, either his
 “ Wages must rise with the Price of Things
 “ to make him live, or else not being able to
 “ maintain himself and Family by his Labor,
 “ he comes to the Parish.”

He afterwards proves, that in the Home Consumption the whole Burthen falls on Land at last.

Dr. *Davenant*, in his *Essays on Trade*, Vol. III.

pag. 30, asserts, “ that as to MANUFAC-

“ TURES, high Excises in Time of Peace are

“ utterly destructive to that principal Part of

“ *England's* Wealth ; for, if Malt, Coals,

“ Salt, Leather, and other Things bear a

“ great Price, the Wages of Servants, Work-

“ men, and Artificers, will consequently

“ rise, for the Income must bear some Pro-

“ portion to the Expence ; and, if such as

“ set the Poor to Work find Wages for LA-

“ BOR, or MANUFACTURES advance upon

“ them, they must rise in the Price of their

“ Commodities, or they cannot live ; all

“ which would signify little, if nothing but

“ our own Dealings among one another were

“ thereby affected, but it has a Consequence
 “ far more pernicious in Relation to our For-
 “ EIGN TRADE; for it is the Exportation of
 “ our own Product that must make *England*
 “ rich.”

And in *Page 31*. “ But the Consequence,
 “ says the Doctor, of such Duties in Time of
 “ Peace, will fall most heavily upon our
 “ Woollen Manufactures, of which more
 “ have Value from the Workmanship than
 “ the Materials; and if the Price of this
 “ Workmanship be enhanced, it will in a
 “ short Course of Time put a Necessity upon
 “ those we deal with, of setting up Manu-
 “ factures of their own, such as they can, or
 “ of buying Goods of the like Kind and
 “ Use from Nations that can afford them
 “ cheaper.”

In the Course of the Wars we have been engaged in with *France*, Nothing has more hurt our Affairs, than an Opinion, which we are too apt to entertain, that the War could not last long; which we have been brought into, by the Vanity natural to our Nation, of overrating our own Strength, and undervaluing that of our Enemies.

If we in *England* can put our Affairs into such a Posture, as to be able to hold out in our Expence longer than *France*, we shall be in a Condition to give the Peace; but if otherwise, we must be contented to receive it. For War is quite changed from what it was in the Days of our Ancestors; when, in a hasty Expedition,

pedition, and a pitched Field, the Matter was decided by Courage: but now the whole Art of War is reduced to *Money*; and that Prince, who can best find Money to feed, cloathe and pays his Forces, not he that has the most valiant Troops, is surest of Success and Conquest.

So that the present Business *England* is engaged in, will depend upon the *raising the Money* to carry on the War without running the Nation further into Debt; for so sure as we do, so certain will it be, that we cannot longer have it in our Power to maintain that Competition in Trade; by which alone we can prosper, or even subsist as an independent Nation.

The heavy Burthen of our Taxes on Trade has been the great Cause that our Rivals have supplanted us at foreign Markets in most of the essential Branches of our Commerce. This not only first encouraged *France* to vye with us in the Woollen Manufactory, but has raised a Manufacturing Spirit also in *Germany*, and *Switzerland*, which has not only spread itself into *Poland*, *Prussia*, *Denmark*, *Sweden*, and *Russia*, but into *Italy* and even *Spain* itself, where they have been so long reproached for their Indolence and Inactivity in Manufactures: And not only so, but *Spain*, if we are rightly informed, is about to carry on an active Commerce, by Means of their own Shipping; which will prove a Nursery for Seamen, and save them the Freights, which they now pay to

to such Nations who carry them their Commodities in their own Bottoms.

What can be the Reason and Motive to these Rivalships in every Part of *Europe*, but that our People, being loaded with heavy Duties on the several Materials necessary to the Woollen and other Manufacture, cannot work so cheap? If, in Consequence of this, Manufactures are supported when set up in foreign Countries, ours at home, must suffer more and more every Day in Proportion. By these Means, Numbers of Families will be reduced to starve; and this, by the same Consequence, will lessen the *Funds*, provided for paying the Interest of the *public Debts*; the Burthen of which must then be thrown upon Land, or the public Creditors lose their Estates; and even the Landed-Estates will suffer, by every Diminution of our Manufactures; for the less People get, the less they will have to spend, and the Product of Land must sink in its Value for Want of Consumption.

We have seen in the Beginning of this Letter, what is the natural Price of Labor, and what an extraordinary Superaddition, our *artificial Wealth*, and our numerous Taxes have made thereto, and that the Loss of our Trade and Navigation must at length inevitably ensue, if we continue the present Taxes; but if we persist still in augmenting the public Debts; as our Taxes must augment in the like Proportion, can such Measures fail to hasten our Ruin?

Is it possible, that *Britons* can thus expose themselves to such a Nation as *France*, that is immoderately bent upon enlarging her Traffic; that is courting Commerce, with the heartiest Application, and warmest Addresses, that were ever yet made in a Kingdom, and whose Navigation is prodigiously encreased: or can *Britons* thus expose themselves to any Potentate, who is convinced by Experience that the *Ballance of Trade*, wherever it centers, must secure the *Balance of Power*, and whose unbounded Ambition when thus supported, shall tempt him to contend for universal Empire?

LETTER

 LETTER VIII.

How far the Price of Things may have arisen from the Quantity of Gold and Silver ; and how far from the Encrease of the Public Debts and Taxes.

THERE being some who are disinclined to ascribe the advanced Price in our Manufactures to the Encrease of the public Debts, and Taxes consequent thereon, it may be of Use to consider this Matter in another View.

As to the Necessaries of Life, it will be admitted that many of them are greatly advanced in their Price since former Times, even since the Days of *Charles the Second* ; but we have seen in the foregoing Letter, that such additional Price is, in a great Measure, to be attributed to the modern Duties of Excise and Customs, &c. Such of those Things which are the direct and immediate Produce of Land, and which are exempt from those Duties, it is not true, that their Price is generally enhanced ; and if it were true, the necessary Consequence of such Advance would be, that the Lands, which produce them would yield a better annual Rent ;
and

and yet this is not generally the Case, unless the Lands have received some Improvements.

If by former Times we mean those of two or three Hundred Years ago, every one, who has looked into Things of this Nature, knows, that in the Time of *Henry the Fourth*, or about three Hundred Years ago, a Pound of Silver Money in Tale was an actual effective Pound of Silver, wanting a few Shillings, and allowing a small Matter for Allay: a Solid or Shilling, or what was so denominated in Accounts, was a twentieth Part of a Pound, and a Penny a twelfth Part of a Shilling.

From hence, without Doubt, was introduced the Method of reckoning by Pounds, Shillings, and Pence; meaning thereby, such Quantities of Silver: and we still continue to make our Accounts by Pounds, Shillings and Pence; though it is now merely a Fiction; for a Pound in Money, as now called, does certainly contain no more than a third Part of of the antient Pound, which was a Pound in Weight as well as in Tale. It is known likewise, that 15 Pounds of Silver, whether in Coin or in Bullion, they being both the same or near it, were equal to one Pound Weight in Gold: And a Pound of Silver in Weight being now cut into 3 *l.* 2, or 62 *Shillings*, fifteen such Pounds makes 46 *l.* 10 in Silver Money in Tale; and a Pound of Gold is now cut into 44 Guineas and One half, which make in Gold Money in Tale 46 *l.* 14, 6, each

each Guinea reckoned at 1 *l.* 1 *s.* so that Gold and Silver in our Days bears very near the Proportion to one another as they did in former Days.

How the State of the Silver Coin stood about 200 Years ago, or in the Time of *Henry VIII.* is not so easy to fix, without distinguishing the Times. However, it may be sufficient here to say in general, that in the Beginning of his Reign, a Pound of Silver made 2 *l.* 5 *s.* in Tale, and at the latter End, 7 *l.* 4 *s.* so great was the Debasement of the Coin then by the Mixture or Allay : And yet once, in the Time of his Son and Successor *Edward VI.* this Coin was made much worse, a Pound of fine Silver making 14 *l.* 8 *s.* in Tale.

What was the Interest of Money, or of Silver and Gold, of which it consisted, or the Price given for it in Loan, two or three hundred Years ago, I have not been able to fix with any Certainty. Thus far, however, we may safely go, and that, perhaps, may be sufficient for our Purpose, that about two hundred Years ago, it was, at least, as high as 10 *per Cent. per Ann.* there being an Act of Parliament made at the latter End of the Reign of *Henry VIII.* that it should not exceed that Rate ; so that it is a fair Conjecture, that it had been before that Time higher, and in the Time of *Henry IV.* possibly as high as 15 *per Cent.* And we know that

that the legal Interest at present is at 5 *per Cent.*

From the different States of the Silver Coin, which generally govern that of the Gold Coin, from the different Rates of Interest in any Periods, and in the present Period of Time, these Deductions may be made: that when a Pound of Money in Tale, was an effective Pound of Silver in Weight, and the Interest of Money was at 10 *per Cent.* if we compare the Price of Commodities in *England* now, with the Price of them at those Times, the Price now should be in the Proportion of 6 to 1; and if the Price now should be in the Proportion of 6 to 1; and if the Interest of Money was at 15 *per Cent.* and the like Comparison were made, the Proportion now should be as 9 to 1.

Our Notion of this Matter is, that the Price of Things at one Time will bear that Proportion to the Price of them at another Time, which the effective Silver in the nominal Pound at one Time, bears to the effective Silver in the nominal Pound at another Time, and the Interest of such Pounds on Loan, at the different given Times, Computation being made upon both those Heads.

Whence we infer, if in the Times of *Henry VIII.* a Pound of Silver was cut into 40 or 45 s. and now into 60 or 62, that the Price of any Commodity, which then was two, must now be three Pounds, on the Account

count of that Difference only ; and if the Interest of Money was then 10 *per Cent.* which is now only 5, the Price, on that Account, must be farther doubled, and in all be 6*l.* that is, the present Price must be three Times as much as in that Reign.

In like manner, if in the Times of *Henry VI.* a Pound of Silver was cut into 30, and now into 62 Shillings, from thence only the Price of Things now, must be double the Price of them then ; and if the Interest of Money then was at 15 *per Cent.* that Difference from the Interest now will make an Addition of a treble Price, and the Whole be as 6 to 1 : So that in the Time of *Henry IV.* when a Pound of Money in Tale, was a Pound of Silver in Weight, and the Interest was 15 *per Cent.* which is treble the Value, and treble the Price of each now, we must treble the Price on each Account, and the Price now will be as 9 to 1.

A familiar Instance will explain this. A Farmer or Merchant, in the Times when a Pound of Money in Tale, was an effective Pound of Silver in Weight, and the Price of it on Loan was 10 *per Cent.* is possessed of a Parcel of Sheep, Oxen, Wool, Corn, or other Necessaries of Life, to the Value of an 100 *l.* at the Market Price ; when he sells them at that Rate, will receive an 100 *l.* in Silver in Weight, as well as in Tale, or in Gold proportionably. A Farmer or Merchant in those Times, therefore, must have
300 *l.*

300 *l.* in Money for a like Parcel of Goods, or else he will not have the same Quantity of Silver or Gold in Weight, though the Goods sold are in Quantity and Quality the same ; that is to say, the present Owner must have three times the Price in Money as now sold, as the ancient Owner had, for the same Things. That this is the Fact in the Instance of Gold, as a Commodity, is evident ; for a Pound in Gold in *Henry IV.* Time, was sold for 15 *l.* or thereabouts, in Money or Tale, and now it sells for 45 *l.* and something over, in the like Money in Tale ; that is, at three Times the Price.

To pass on to the Rate of Interest now and formerly. If these Merchants have not present Occasion for these several Sums, in the Way of Trade and Business, or are desirous to let them out at Interest : The Merchants of old Times, on the Loan of his 100 *l.* at the End of the Year, will receive 10 *l.* in Silver, in Weight as well as in Tale, supposing Interest to have been 10 *per Cent* ; but the Merchant of these Times, for the Interest of his 300 *l.* will have no more than 15 *l.* in Tale, which is equal only to 5 *l.* in Weight : Wherefore, that the one and the other may have equal Advantage for the same Parcel of Goods, the modern Merchant must sell his Goods at 600 *l.* ; for no less Sum than that will yield him 10 *l.* in Silver in Weight for Interest, by the End of the Year ; that is, he must sell them at six
Times

Times the Price: or otherwise these two Persons, at the End of such Year, will not be in equal Circumstances, though they were so at the Beginning, when they were possessed of their Goods.

If these Merchants should invest their Money in Lands of Inheritance, instead of putting it out at Interest, the Case will still come out the same. When Money is at 10 *per Cent.* the Price of Estates in Fee-simple is ten Years Value: so that a 100 *l.* in old Times, would have purchased an Estate of 10 *l. per Ann.* and a Rent of 10 *l. per Ann.* was a Rent of so many Pound Weight of Silver, or near it, and of Gold in Proportion.

If a Man were now to purchase an Estate of equal Goodness, he must pay for it 300 *l.* even though Interest were supposed to be the same now as formerly, and there were no Advance in the Year's Purchase; for no Rent less than 30 *per Ann.* will produce 10 Pounds in Silver Weight, or proportionably in Gold. And when we take into the Account the Difference of Interest, it is plain, that the Fall of Interest to one half, makes a Rise of Land in the Purchase to a double Price: and therefore, now legal Interest is no more than 5 *l. per Cent.* he must, and does pay 600 *l.* for an Estate of 30 *l. per Ann.*; that is, for an Estate of equal Goodness, and which shall yield an equal Quantity of real Silver and Gold, which might have been
bought

bought 300 Years ago for 100 *l.* he must now pay just six Times as much.

Or, take the Matter in this Light. The Sum of an 100 *l.* in former Ages, if laid out in Lands, or let out at Interest, would, in a Year's Time, produce to the Owner 10 Pound Weight of Silver, or a proportionable Quantity of Gold: The Sum of 200 *l.* now, if laid out in Lands, or let out to Interest, would in a Year's Time, produce to the Owner 10 Pounds in Money, as now counted: but 10 Pounds in Money, as formerly counted, had three Times as much Silver or Gold in it, as 10 Pounds in Money, as now counted: therefore, to produce as much Silver or Gold, as Money is now counted, must be laid out in Land, or put out to Interest; that is, six Times the Money must now be employed to produce the same Quantity of Silver or Gold, as was produced formerly by 100 *l.* only. The Consequence hereof is, that the Necessaries and Conveniencies of Life, which are the Things out of which Money is to arise, when they come to Market, must now be sold at six Times the Price, or six Times the Pounds, Shillings and Pence, which they were formerly sold at; or the very same Things will not answer the same Purposes of Life now, which they would have done three hundred Years ago.

It will be needless to repeat here this Reasoning, and shew that when Money has been

at 15 *per Cent.* as we may suppose heretofore, the Price of Goods between those Times and these should be in the Proportion of 9 to 1. It may suffice to say in the general, that it will hold good in that Instance, and in any other which may be supposed: So that wherever the Quantity of real Silver in a nominal Pound, and the current Interest of Money can be known and determined, there the Price of Things may be known and determined likewise. Our Notion here is, that the real and intrinsic Value of the absolute Necessaries of Life, such as Food and Raiment, were always, and always will be, much one and the same, except where an accidental Plenty or Scarcity makes a temporary Variation; but if we compute the Value of those Necessaries by a third Thing, as a common Measure between them, the *Price, or nominal Value so measured, must vary as such Measure itself varies.*

If Silver be made that Medium, as for many Ages it has been in these Parts of the World; and if in former Times a real Pound of Silver was called a Pound of Money, a twentieth Part of a Pound was called a Shilling, and a twelfth Part of a Shilling a Penny; if in Times subsequent, the Measure itself be varied, and a third Part of a Pound of Silver be denominated a Pound, and Shillings and Pence in the like Proportion, the Price, or nominal Value, of the Necessaries of Life will and must vary with it.

A Quarter of Wheat or Malt, a Pound of Beef, or a Yard of Cloth, are now of the same real Value as heretofore ; for they will go as far towards the Support of human Life now as they did five hundred or a thousand Years ago, and no farther ; but their Price, or nominal Value, as measured by the *current Coin* of the Kingdom, must vary as the Coin itself varies : And this we must admit to be the Case in Silver itself, or we must be forced to say, that one third Part of a Pound of Silver (supposing no more than one third Part of a Pound of Silver to be contained in the present nominal Pound of Money) is of equal Value with a whole Pound of Silver. For if we consider Silver, not as a Measure of Traffic only, but a Necessary or Convenience of Life, and as a merchandisable Commodity, as we certainly may and do ; one Pound of Silver is of the same Value as another, and of the same Value at one Time as another, greater or less Plenty excepted ; but the Price or nominal Value was formerly one Pound only, but now we see it is three Pounds and above Weight in Silver, as a Measure : And we may rightly say, that it ceases to be one and the same Measure, Sign, or Representation of the Value of Commodities, *when it ceases to be one and the same Thing in its Weight and Value.*

If this Point shall appear unexceptionable, we may plainly discern the Reason why

O 2 Money

Money now is not at the same Value as it was two or three hundred Years ago; *viz.* Because the Silver of which it consists in any given Sum in *Tale* is now only a Moiety, or a third Part of the Quantity, which was formerly in the like Sum in *Tale*; and it being a Convenience of Life, and a saleable Commodity, the real Quantity of Silver in the Money, is the true Measure of its Value.

But, besides this Decrease in the Value of Money arising from the Variation in the Specie, we find another in the annual Interest, or annual Premium for it in Regard to Government Securities. This, we may be sure, has proceeded from another Cause; and has arisen, from the great Encrease of the moveable and easily transferrable Estates of the public Creditors in this Kingdom, and which have been so greatly enlarged by the *public Funds*; and not from the *Encrease* of Gold and Silver in the Nations, either in Coin or Bullion, any otherwise than as they constitute a Part of such moveable and transferrable Estates.

Some think the Interest of Money in the Funds, being lower than the legal Interest, has been of great Benefit to Land, Trade, and the public Credit. Of what Benefit it has been to the two latter has been shewn in the Course of this Epistle; and that it has as little tended to reduce the general Price of our Commodities, as it has to the permanent
Sup-

Support of the public Credit. If it has tended to compell our Merchants to carry on other foreign Trade for less Profit; yet as this has had no Effect to stem that Torrent of Competitorship of our foreign Underfellers, it seems to have answered no other End than to force our Traders to do more Business for less Profit to themselves as well as to the Nation; or to employ a large Capital where a less was more gainful.

That the Lowness of Interest, especially when obtained in the Manner that those Reductions of the public Creditors have been, can prove of no Emolument to the Landholder, is not less apparent; for if our Trader's Gain is less, it will be difficult to shew how the landed Interest can gain more. The trite Argument, that low Interest raises the Price of Lands, and therefore benefits the Landholder, has been long since shewn to be fallacious by Mr. *Locke*. It would be needless to repeat the Argument here, might it not be thought a Chasm in our general Chain of Reasoning: I shall only touch the Matter with all Brevity, that the Reader may not lose Sight of any Thing that may serve to elucidate the Point in Hand.

When the Land-holder has transformed himself into the Monied-Man, and he finds that a large Sum at a lower Interest, is really of no more Advantage to him, than a smaller Sum at a greater Interest, where will arise his Benefit? If Lands will sell for

twenty Years Purchase, when Interest is at 5 *per Cent.* can it be supposed, was Interest reduced to 1 *per Cent.* or $\frac{1}{2}$ *per Cent.* that the Price of Land would rise to one hundred, or two hundred Year's Purchase?

However the Value of Lands might rise upon the *natural* Reduction of Interest, the Encrease of Hard-Money, and the high Price of Commodities, without the Multiplication of Taxes to occasion it, and without the Reduction of their Consumption; does it follow, that Lands will rise at all from the *unnatural* Reduction of all these Particulars? Unless it can be proved, that diminishing the Consumption, will make the Farmer sell more of the Produce of his Lands, and forcing down the Interest of Money, by artful or compulsive Measures, will produce greater Plenty of Money; and that lowering the Price of our Goods from such Causes, will enable us to supplant our Rivals in Trade, and regain what we have lost: unless these Points can be demonstrated, and that we have these extraordinary Advantages, by the Reductions that have taken Place, Land must be of less Worth, and the Land-holder experience a *real* Loss in Lieu of his *imaginary* Gain.

Provided Paper-money should become so cheap as to yield but 1, or $\frac{1}{2}$ *per Cent.* Interest, will not (according to this thread-bare Argument) all Sorts of Materials necessary for Land-Improvements, rise in Proportion? So that any Improvement of a Land-Estate,

Estate, would cost five or ten Times as much as when Money was at 5 *per Cent*. And if, in Conformity to the Scheme of farther Reductions, the Land-holder must reduce the Price of his Commodities, as the Expence of his Produce encreased, will this be any Encouragement to the Culture and Melioration of Land?

To such Land-Proprietors, indeed, who have contracted Debts, the lowering of Interest, by any Measures, seems to be some Advantage; but is not this Advantage exactly ballanced in the public Accounts, by an equal Loss to the Mortgagees? If one fourth Part of the usual Profits of the personal Estates, lent upon Mortgages, be deducted from the Whole of their ordinary, annual Expence, must not this occasion a considerable Diminution, in the Consumption and Value of the Mortgager's Commodities? And will not the Public lose as much, or more, in the Revenues arising from the Consumption of Commodities amongst us, as may be saved by the Reduction of Interest? May not, at length, the Proprietors of Land be obliged to furnish from their own Revenue, those *Supplies* for the Service of the Government, which have hitherto been furnished by the general Expence?

Suppose this Expedient of the Reduction of Interest, as it has been practised, would really help the Land-holder the more easily

to get rid of his Debts, (which does not appear to be the Case, he losing on the one Hand, what he gained on the other) would such politic Projects encourage him to Industry, and the Improvement of his Land? May not disburthening him of his Debts, by such Measures, rather render him supine and indolent, than industrious? The easier some Men pay their Debts, the easier they contract fresh; and, therefore, farther Reductions may be a good Expedient to run the Land-holder farther into Debt, but seem to have little Tendency to encourage him to improve his Estate.

That this fashionable Doctrine of plundering the public Creditors, under Pretence of easing the Land-holder, is a Mistake in our Politics, hence farther appears. I will suppose myself to have lent the public a Sum of Money, when Interest was at 6 *per Cent.* which brought me an annual Interest of 500*l.* and now I am reduced to 3 *per Cent.* and receive but 250 *l.* a Year, instead of 500 *l.* and the other 250 *l.* we will suppose, is intended to pay my Principal. In this Case, it must be allowed, that I must spend 250 *l.* a Year less, or be ruined, by breaking into my Capital: If so, I can take but one half of what I could have done before of the Butcher, Baker, Brewer, Clothier; and all those who take of the Farmer the Produce of his Land, could do no more: If so, the Farmer cannot possibly sell the same Quantity

tity of his Produce as before, consequently his Profit, in this Case, cannot be so much upon the lesser, as it would have been upon a greater Quantity; whereby he becomes incapable of paying the same Rent to his Landlord.

But Money and Goods must always meet, otherwise Dealings of all Kinds must cease; and this is the Reason why Markets rise and fall. A short Instance will illustrate my Meaning. Suppose that two Bushels of Corn are brought to Market to be sold, and there come 10 s. in Money to buy Corn, it will there sell for five Shillings a Bushel; but, if there come but five Shillings to Market, Corn must sell for half a Crown *per* Bushel, or the Farmer carry Home his Corn, and the other his Money. But this Cessation of Dealing, cannot be of Continuance; for the Farmer will soon find himself under a Necessity of complying, when he wants those Necessaries of Life his Farm will not afford him, nor can be had without Money; or when his Landlord's pressing Occasions will not admit of longer Forbearance of Rent.

Experience convinces, that the Reductions of the Interest of the public Creditors hitherto made, have greatly affected Land: and, if they should be carry'd farther, the Landholder will still the more sensibly feel them, and we may repent of our Policy.

'Tis true, that this lessening the circulating Interest-Money of the Stock-Proprietors, will reduce the Price of Commodities
to

to the Disadvantage of the Land-holder ; for, according to the Consumption of all Goods, and the Occasion there is for them, the Price will rise. When Money is wanting, Men consume less ; they are better Economists, and make every Thing last longer, which lessens the Consumption of the native Commodities, and makes the Price of them to fall ; and, if the Price of our native Commodities fall from such Causes, the Rents of Land will sink ; for the Tenants cannot pay the same Rents, when the Corn and Wool, and other Commodities, which are the Produce of Land, fall to one half the Value they were.

But altho' this Cause of sinking the Price of our native Productions, has been felt by our Landholders, and such like farther Reductions will make them more sensible thereof ; yet this has not been productive of lowering the Price of our Manufactures at foreign Markets ; because, as we have reduced the Interest, and thereby hurt the landed as well as the Monied-men, our Taxes on our Trade have kept Pace with those Reductions : and therefore, altho' these two great Classes of the Community have greatly suffered, yet the Nation has not been proportionably benefited : So that, our past Measures, considered in whatever Light they may, do not seem to have had a Tendency so naturally and effectually to have reduced the Price of our Manufactures in general, as to have

have enabled us to check that Competition in Trade which *France* has long maintained against us, from the greater Cheapness of their Commodities in general: and if our Competitors, from such Causes, shall multiply in *Europe*, as they really do, we must lose the commercial Prize, and others will gain it.

LETTER

L E T T E R IX.

Of the Encrease and Decrease of real Money in a State, and of the Price of Commodities ; with a Comparison between France and England in Relation to the latter, more minutely, considered.

LET us further consider, according to the Principles we have hitherto reasoned on, the Land-Estate of a Country, where the general Circulation, is carried on by 2000 Ounces of Silver, for Example ; and that this Money passes through several Hands, and always returns into those of the various Dealers, or Undertakers of Business, whom we suppose the Proprietors thereof.

Let us likewise suppose these Undertakers have received 2000 Ounces more for a Present from *Americans*, so as that each Individual has double the Quantity of Money he had before, and that the Quantity of Money in all becomes 4000 Ounces of Silver.

Each Dealer will endeavour to enlarge and augment the Quantity of his Business : so the Farmer's Commodities will grow dearer in the Market-Altercations, by the greater Demand for them : but, this will not immediately double

double the Price of Things, because some of the Farmers will, at first, be satisfied with a greater Price than usual, but in Time the Price will double in the Altercations; each Undertaker will desire to live better than he did before, since he has got his additional Sum, and he will consume in his Family more Wine and Meat than usual; therefore Wine and Meat will grow proportionably dearer than Bread; and the Farmer will endeavour to have more of these Kinds the next Season, since they yield in Proportion a better Price than Corn; and consequently, the Corn will become scarcer, and grow dearer also.

This Encrease of the Consumption of the Produce of Land, which is on the Footing now supposed to be introduced, cannot maintain all the Inhabitants, and will make it necessary for some of them to seek their Livelihood elsewhere. These will be chiefly turned away by the Land-Proprietor, who, having but 6000 *Oz. per Ann.* for his Estate, cannot maintain his Family, as before, since all Commodities are grown dearer. The Labourers and Journeymen remaining, not being able to subsist upon their usual Wages, must have an Augmentation, as well as the remaining Servants of the Proprietor: And, in all the Changes this new Quantity of Money produces, the Farmers seem to be the only Gainers, and the Land-Proprietors the only Losers.

The

The Undertakers, who buy their Commodities and Materials dearer, will be for turning the Loss upon the Consumers : but, as they are themselves Consumers with Respect to one another, they will find the Expences in their Families encrease beyond the additional Consumption of Meat, Wine, &c.

And, when the Money introduced into Barter shall gradually have doubled the Price of every Thing, they will be obliged to retrench the said additional Consumption, since their double Quantity of Money carries on but the same domestic Undertakings their single Quantity did before ; otherwise they will turn Bankrupts, and be ruined ; and others, who have saved Money will set up in their Place.

The Land-Proprietor, at the Expiration of his Lease, will demand 12000 Oz. for his Rent, instead of 6000 ; since the Price of the Farmer's Commodities is doubled ; and, if he returns to his former Manner of living, he will call back his Servants, whom he had sent away, or have others in their Stead ; and the new Undertakers will live upon the same Footing of Consumption as the first. The Farmers will have the same Profits out of the Lands that the Farmers had at first, and all the Dispositions of this Estate, will turn nearly to its primitive Condition, with this Difference only ; that the Farmers, who saved Money are richer, and the Undertakers, who ruined themselves, are forced to turn Journey-
neymen

neymen to others, who are set up in their Room, and that 4000 Ounces of Silver circulates instead of 2000 Ounces.

These Changes, or something like them, commonly happen in a State, when a sudden Quantity of Money is introduced into the general Barter: but, because Money most commonly encreases but slowly and gradually, Commodities rise in their Value only slowly and gradually also.

Let us again suppose there are Silver Mines on this Estate; that an Undertaker farms them from the Proprietor, or from the Farmers; and that the Veins are so rich he shall quickly get out of them, the additional Quantity of Silver supposed on our Hypothesis.

This new Quantity of Money will occasion much the same Variation in the Price of Commodities, as we have before observed, but quicker. The Undertaker, or Mine-Adventurer, will encrease his Expence, and give great Encouragement to the Miners and others he employs. The Facility wherewith he gets Money, will make him generous, and liberal. The Douceurs, which he gives to those he employs, will encourage them also to spend more than usual; and this will enhance the Price of Commodities: so that which Way soever these 2000 Ounces of Silver come into Barter, they will raise the Price of Things: The circulating Money will be 4000 Ounces instead of 2000, and the Price of Commodities will grow double.

It

It may be worth while to observe here, that we may distinguish several Channels and Walks of Circulation at Market. The Corn or Bread-Market is proportioned to all the Inhabitants in general, since the meanest Workman must eat Bread as well as the greatest Lord. The Wine-Market corresponds to a smaller Number of Inhabitants, but yet is considerable, since not only the Proprietors of Land and Money, Pensioners and Officers, but likewise several middling Undertakers, Tradesmen, and Workmen, drink more or less Wine. The Butchers, or Meat-Market, is much the same. The wild-Fowl-Market, and that of Rarities and Delicacies, correspond to a smaller Number of Inhabitants, as Lords. wealthy Proprietors and others.

So that, if the additional Money, which is brought into a State is, at first, all in the Hands of the wealthy Sort, the Price of wild Fowl may very well rise, and continue high, without influencing the Price of Bread; and the Price of Wine and Meat may rise long before Bread grows dearer: but it will, at the Long-Run, affect the Price of Bread also.

If we suppose that ten Persons encrease the Expences of their Families on the Estate we before mentioned, and that they raise the Price of Wine, Meat, &c. in the Market-Alterations, without affecting that of Bread; the Farmer will have another Year more Cattle and Wine, and consequently less Corn, and Corn will then grow also dearer.

There

There is generally a Stock of all Commodities in a Nation exceeding the yearly Consumption, which answers the sudden and extraordinary Consumption; and, as that wastes, the Commodities grow dearer, and the Dearness again, if it continues, makes several Families diminish their Consumption, till Things return to their primitive State as to the Consumption. But the Dearness of the Commodities continues, since the Quantity of Money in Barter corresponds to it, and a double Quantity of Money in the Hands of the Undertakers, when the Price of Things is doubled, has but the same Effect, the single Quantity had before.

If the additional Quantity of Money belongs to Money-Lenders, it will diminish Interest, and at the same Time encrease the Undertakings; which consequently will enhance the Price of Commodities, by an additional Demand. The Money-Lenders will encrease their Expence and Consumption, and the additional Undertakers will do the like; the Demand for Workmen, in the several Undertakings will raise the Price of their Wages; the Price of Things will keep up in Barter, since the Quantity of Money continues to answer the advanced Price, though several of the Undertakers should break.

But if an additional *Quantity of Credit*, arising either from Government Securities to public Creditors, or from Banks, or Bank-

ing, or other private *Paper-Credit*, should add to the Acceleration of the Circulation, and Bar-
ters by Evaluation, as has been elsewhere ob-
served, and make the 2000 Ounces of Silver
answer the before-mentioned Circulation as
4000 Ounces; it will have pretty much the
same Effect as the 2000 Ounces Encrease of
real Money.

It will occasion an additional Number of
Undertakers, who will encrease the Price of
Commodities, which will grow dearer in the
Market-Altercations. These will enhance
the Consumption &c. But, when some of them
come to break, their Example will stagnate
Circulation, and the Ready-money only will
carry the Negotiations on as before; and
consequently Money will grow scarcer, and
Commodities will grow cheaper, and the Dif-
ficulties in Circulation will make the Under-
takers sell cheaper than they bought, and se-
veral of them will fail and diminish their Con-
sumption, &c: So that a sudden Augmenta-
tion of general Credit, may, for some Time
answer the same Ends and Purposes as the
sudden Encrease of the Quantity of Money:
and if this Quantity of Credit continues its
Stability, and the People have Confidence
therein, whereby it becomes introduced into
the general Circulation and Barter, it will
constantly have the same Effect as real Mo-
ney in keeping up the Price of Commo-
dities.

To apply this to the present Occasion : If the Paper-Circulation of the State is carried too great Lengths, by Reason of the great public Debts, or by the Means of public and private Banking, or other personal Paper-Securities, in our trafficable Dealings ; such a Quantity of this Kind of Credit will, in Appearance, have all the Effects of real Money ; it will have the external Aspect of solid Riches and permanent Treasure, and will raise the Price of Labor and Commodities, the same as if these were the Substitutes and Representatives of solid Wealth : Whereas no one can be weak enough to suppose, that the public Debts can be looked upon as so much public Treasure, or real Money.

If *England* has mortgaged the public Revenue for 400 Million of Ounces of Silver, and the Stockholders buy or sell Stocks ; the Payments are generally made in Bank Notes ; and there is no circulating Money required to the constant buying and selling of Stocks, but the Ten Millions of Ounces, we will suppose, appropriated out of the public Securities wherewith to pay the half yearly Interest : and even the Bulk of that Money being levied, in Effect, out of the three Land-Proprietors Rents of the Nation, by Taxes and Duties, there is no additional Sum of Ready-money required for the circulating of the Interest of the Stocks.

If any Person who sells clearly out of the Stocks, throws his Money, which he withdraws out of the Bank, into minute Pay-

ments, for the Building of Houses, or carrying on any other Undertaking; he that has purchased the Stock must gather out of minute Payments the like Sum; but of those who constantly buy and sell Stocks, there are but few who do not job, and by far the greatest Number subsists on the Interest of the Funds; And the whole Stockjobbing Concerns are carried on mostly by Payments in Bank, and require no Ready-money, but for the Interest: so that all these Transactions do not, in the common Course, affect the Circulation of Money in the Nation, all the Circulating-money being constantly running in the Channels of minute Payments; except the Sums that remain in the Hands of provident People, or in the Hands of the Bank and the Bankers to answer their Calls. Whence it appears, that these mighty bustling Negotiations, which make such a pompous Parade of Riches, are merely carried on by Paper-Credit, there not being above one Fifth Part solid Cash in the Nation to answer to the public principal Debts.

And the more these public Debts encrease upon us, the more universal will our Stock-Dealings appear; but no Man can be so infatuated as to think, that these Debts are the Representation of an Encrease of real Treasure; the Folly of which has been effectually shown before. Certain it is that this Babel of Paper-Credit must have its Fall, when it grows to a cer-
tain

tain Altitude beyond which it cannot rise ; and to that Height we think it is arrived already.

The ingenious Mr. *Hume* seems to entertain a more favourable Opinion of our Debts than he ought.

“ Public Securities, says this ingenious
 “ Gentleman, are with us become a Kind of
 “ Money, and pass as readily at the current
 “ Price as Gold and Silver. Wherever any
 “ profitable Undertaking offers itself, how-
 “ ever expensive, there are never wanting
 “ Hands enough to embrace it ; nor needs a
 “ Trader, who has Sums in the *public Stocks*,
 “ fear to launch out into extensive Trade ;
 “ since he is possessed of Funds, which will
 “ answer the most sudden Demand that
 “ can be made upon him.

“ No Merchant thinks it necessary to keep
 “ by him any considerable Cash. Bank-
 “ Stock, or India-Bonds, especially the lat-
 “ ter, serve to all the same Purposes ; because
 “ he can dispose of them, or pledge them to
 “ a Banker, in a Quarter of an Hour ; and
 “ at the same Time they are not idle, even
 “ when in his Scrutore, but bring him in a
 “ constant Revenue.

“ In short, our national Debts furnish Mer-
 “ chants with a Species of Money, that is con-
 “ tinually multiplying in their Hands, and
 “ produce sure Gain, beside the Profits of
 “ their Commerce. This must enable them
 “ to trade upon less Profit. The small Pro-
 “ fit of the Merchant renders the Commodity

“ cheaper, causes a greater Consumption,
 “ quickens the Labor of the common Peo-
 “ ple, and helps to spread Arts and Industry
 “ through the whole Society.

“ There are also, we may observe, in *Eng-*
 “ *land*, and in all States, that have both Com-
 “ merce and public Debts, a Set of Men
 “ who are half Merchants, half Stock-hol-
 “ ders, and may be supposed willing to trade
 “ for small Profits ; because Commerce is not
 “ their principal or sole Support, and their
 “ Revenues in the Funds are a sure Resource
 “ for themselves and their Families.

“ Were there no Funds, great Merchants
 “ would have no Expedient for realising or
 “ securing any Part of their Profit, but by
 “ making Purchases of Land, and Land has
 “ many Disadvantages in Comparison with
 “ Funds. Requiring more Care and Inspec-
 “ tion, it divides the Time and Attention of
 “ the Merchant ; upon any tempting Offer
 “ or extraordinary Accident in Trade, it is
 “ not so easily converted into Money ; and as
 “ it attracts too much, both by the many
 “ natural Pleasures it affords, and the Autho-
 “ rity it gives, it soon converts the Citizen
 “ into the Country Gentleman.

“ More Men, therefore, with large Stocks
 “ and Incomes, may naturally be supposed
 “ to continue in Trade, where there are
 “ public Debts : And this, it must be own-
 “ ed, is of some Advantage to Commerce,
 “ by

“ by diminishing its Profit, promoting Cir-
 “ culation and encouraging Industry *.

“ But in Opposition to these two favour-
 “ able Circumstances, perhaps of no very
 “ great Importance, weigh the many Disad-
 “ vantages that attend our public Debts,
 “ in the whole interior Oeconomy of the
 “ State: You will find no Comparison be-
 “ twixt the Ill and the Good, that result
 “ from them.

“ *First*, It is certain, that national Debts
 “ cause a mighty Confluence of People and
 “ Riches to the Capital, by the great Sums
 “ which are levied in the Provinces to pay
 “ the Interest of those Debts; and perhaps,
 “ too by the Advantages in Trade above-
 “ mentioned, which they give the Merchants
 “ in the Capital above the Rest of the King-
 “ dom. The Question is, whether in our
 “ Case, it be for the public Interest, that so
 “ many Privileges should be conferred on
 “ *London*, which has already arrived at such
 “ an enormous Size, and seems still encreas-
 “ ing? Some Men are apprehensive of the
 “ Consequences. For my Part, I cannot

* “ On this Head, I shall observe, without interrupting
 “ the Thread of the Argument, that the Multiplicity of our
 “ public Debts serves rather to sink the Interest, and that the
 “ more the Government borrows, the cheaper may they ex-
 “ pect to borrow; Contrary to first Appearance, and contrary
 “ to common Opinion. The Profits of Trade have an In-
 “ fluence on Interest” — But these Things I have before suf-
 “ ficiently considered.

“ forbear thinking, that though the Head
 “ is undoubtedly too big for the Body, yet
 “ that great City is so happily situated, that its
 “ excessive Bulk causes less Inconvenience,
 “ than even a smaller Capital to a greater
 “ Kingdom. There is more Difference be-
 “ twixt the Prices of all Provisions in *Paris*
 “ and *Languedoc*, than betwixt those in *Lon-*
 “ *don* and *Yorkshire*.

“ Secondly, Public Stocks, being a Kind
 “ of public Credit, have all the Disadvan-
 “ tages attending that Species of Money.
 “ They banish Gold and Silver from the
 “ most considerable Commerce of the State,
 “ reduce them to common Circulation, and
 “ by that Means render *all Provisions and*
 “ *Labor dearer than otherwise they would be.*

“ Thirdly, The TAXES, which are levied
 “ to pay the Interest of these Debts, *are a*
 “ *Check upon Industry, heighten the Price of*
 “ *Labor, and are an Oppression on the poorer*
 “ *Sort.*

“ Fourthly, As Foreigners possess a Share
 “ of our national Funds, they render the
 “ Public in a Manner tributary to them, and
 “ may in Time occasion the Transport of
 “ our People, and our Industry.

“ Fifthly, The greatest Part of public
 “ Stocks, being always in the Hands of idle
 “ People, who live on their Revenue, our
 “ Funds give great Encouragement to a
 “ useless and inactive Life.

“ But,

“ But, though the Injury that arises to
 “ Commerce and Industry from our public
 “ Funds, will appear, upon ballancing the
 “ Whole, very considerable, it is trivial, in
 “ Comparifon of the Prejudice that results
 “ to the State, confidered as a Body Politic;
 “ which muft fupport itfelf in the Society
 “ of Nations, and have various Tranfactions
 “ with other States, in Wars and Negocia-
 “ tions. *The ill there is pure and unmixt,*
 “ *without any favourable Circumftance to atone*
 “ *for it. And 'tis an Ill too, of a Nature the*
 “ *higheft and moft important.*”

Thus far Mr. *Hume*. One of the greateft
 Evils we find, according to this learned Gentle-
 man, that attends our public Debts, is moft
 certainly the Expence, which the Taxes occa-
 fioned thereby, fuperadd to our Commodities,
 and the unfpeakable Injury the Nation hereby
 fuftains, in Regard to its commercial Concerns
 with other States: But to refume former Confi-
 derations in our own Chain of Reasoning.

Let us now examine how Things find
 their Proportion in a State, when the Price
 of Commodities riles, either by a real ad-
 ditional Quantity of Money introduced into
 Barter, or by the Scarcity of Commodities
 and bad Years.

When there happens a great Demand for
 any Kind of Commodities, feveral Families
 will confume lefs than ufual, by Reason
 of their Dearnefs: A Man, who common-
 ly eats three Pounds of Bread a Day, will
 fubfift

subsist if he has but two Pounds; and a State, which maintains 1,000,000 of Inhabitants, will, with little Difficulty, and without any sensible Hardship, maintain 1,100,000, and even 1,500,000 with Difficulty and Famine: but Things will afterwards find their Proportion themselves in Number, to the Means they find to subsist on, according to the Manner of living of the Place.

In this Point of View, we have not considered foreign Trade; but, by a Commerce with Foreigners, a State may maintain a greater Number of Inhabitants, than the native Land can maintain. For Example:

The Inhabitants of *Provence* may buy Wool of the *Spaniards*, and pay the Value of it with about a quarter Part of the same Wool manufactured; and export the other three Quarters of it manufactured to *Barbary*, and bring Home in Exchange for it, more Corn than will answer the Maintenance of all the Workmen, Undertakers, Exporters, and Importers, concerned in this whole Commerce.

The little Island of *St. Dennis* near *Paris*, contains three Parishes, the Business of these Inhabitants is mostly tanning of Leather: The Island produces nothing for their Subsistence: they sell their Labor in Exchange for the Produce of the Lands of the Continent, which maintains them: their tanned Leather is wholly consumed at their Doors at [*Paris.*] If it were to be transported, and

and consumed in *Italy*, it would scarce maintain them, because of the Expence of the remote Carriage.

But the *Dutch* find Means, by the Cheapness of their Navigation, to exchange their Labor with remoter Parts, where the Produce thereof is not voluminous : Their Manufacture of Linnen, their Bleaching, their Herring and Whale Fishery, answer the Charge, and so does their sawed-Timber and Shipping to some Places ; for their Saw-Mills, one with another, save the Labor of 25 Persons.

The Cheapness of Commodities will force a Vent. This is the Case of many of our Rivals ; they will force the Sale of their Merchandises, while those of *England*, by Reason of their greater Dearness, lie rotting in Warehouses for Want of foreign Purchasers. *France* being our greatest Rival, we shall consider, from what Causes, we are not capable of maintaining a Competition with them in Trade ; and then the Necessity of lowering our Taxes, in Order to lessen the Price of our Commodities to Foreigners, will further appear.

National Turns of Mind have great Effects on the Interest of Commerce. As Vanity is the general Character of a *Frenchman*, so it conduces to the Interest of a manufacturing People, when it luxuriates in Dress, Equipage and Furniture. Profusion, Drunkenness and Debauchery are the faulty Exuberance of *English* Easiness and Spirit ; the latter

ter shortens the Time of Labor, and hinders the Perfection of it. One half of the Lives of the *English* common People is lost to the Public; and the other must be paid for so much the dearer, which doubles the Injury to the State. Those who are absolutely idle do not prejudice the Public so much as those who work but half their Time; since there being the greater Number, fix the Price of Labor, and the other have nothing to do with it.

The Passion for Decency and Dress in a *Frenchman* cannot be gratified till a Sum is accumulated, and therefore the Desire itself continues to produce Labor much longer than the Love of Liquor, which may be repeated or indulged as Wages are received. He that lays out his Earnings in Dress and decent Furniture, has a permanent Reward ever in Sight, to make him pleased with his past Labor, encourage his future Industry, and excite the Emulation of his Neighbour; while the *Englishman*, who exhausts in an Evening the Industry of a Week, annihilates the Reward of his Labor, and deadens his Vigor from the Loss of his Health, and the next Day's Dissatisfaction. The *Englishman's* Vice calls for few Hands; at most the Ale-seller, Distiller, Farmer and Malster; the *Frenchman's* Indulgence finds Employment to infinite Numbers, and those of the most valuable and industrious Members of Society, the Clothier, the Weaver, the Sempstress, Wool-

Woolcomber, Joiner, and the other numberless Trades depending on Dress and Household Furniture,

Temperance in Food, the general Companion of Neatness, is another national Virtue of the *French*. A cheap and moderate Diet, which our People would call hard Fare, is what they prefer: yet with this frugal Living, there is more Work, and better performed in a Day by the same Number of Hands there, than in *England*: This is notorious in the Paper-Manufacture in *Picardy*, where they fare hardest. We ourselves must acknowledge they work as well in the North of *England* as in the West or South, though the Diet is far more coarse and sparing. Every Man copies from the next above him in Circumstances, and so up to the Originals; not an Extravagance of the Country, but is derived from Town. These Things call aloud for a Reform among the working People in particular of this Nation, as their Vices, more than those of the Great, perhaps, may tend to impoverish the Nation.

The Advantage that *France* has over *England*, arising from the Superiority of their Number of People, is what we are never likely to encounter; and this greater Plenty of their own People makes Labor, in general, on this Account also, cheaper than with us, and adds proportionally to the Cheapness of their Commodities. *France* being bounded on the East by *Germany*, *Switzerland* and *Savoy*,

Savoy, has made its Advantage of the Neighbourhood of those Countries, abounding as they do with Men: She has invited those Foreigners, without Employment at home, to settle in her Manufactories, as well as her Armies. A well judged Policy: the Money she pays foreign Troops being, in a great Measure, expended within the Kingdom; but she would be a Gainer, even were that Money to go out of it. The Soldier whom she pays, spares her the taking off a Labourer, a Mechanic or a Manufacturer; and the Labor of such produces more to the State than she pays to the Soldier. Likewise the foreign Artists, whom she admits into her Manufactures, continue to keep Workmanship at a low Rate, and promote an Emulation favourable to the Advancement of their Commerce. It is computed that there are not much less than ten thousand *Swiss* and *Germans* employed in the Town of *Lyons*. Thus *France* has, in a great Degree, replaced those Inhabitants, which *England*, and other Protestant Countries have got from her.

By these Means the *French* have long outdone us in the Price of Labor, and in the Price of those Commodities wherein they emulate us throughout the World: “ Their common People, says the *British Merchant*, live upon Roots, Cabbage, and other Herbage; four of their large Provinces subsist entirely upon Chestnuts; and the best of them eat Bread made of Barley, Millet,
Turkey

Turkey and black Corn ; so that the Wages are small in Comparison with ours.

But of late Years their Crown-pieces being made of the same Value as ours, and raised from sixty to one hundred Sols ; and the Manufacturers, Servants, Soldiers, Day-Labourers, and other working People, earning no more Sols or Pence by the Day than they did formerly, the Price of Labor is thereby so much lessened, that one may affirm for Truth, they have generally their Work done for half the Price we pay for ours. For tho' Provisions be as dear at *Paris* as they are at *London*, 'tis certain, that in most of their Provinces they are very cheap ; and that they buy Beef and Mutton for half the Price we pay for them here.

But the Price of Meat and Wheat doth little concern the poor *French* Manufacturers ; as they generally drink nothing but Water, and at best a Sort of Liquor they call *Beuverage*, (which is Water passed through the Husks of Grapes after the Wine is drawn off) they save a great deal upon that Account ; for 'tis well known, that our People spend half of their Money in Drink.

The Army is a notorious Instance, how cheap the *French* can live ; it enables their King to maintain 300,000 Men with the same Money we maintain 112500 ; their Pay being five Sols a Day, (which is exactly three

three Pence *English*) and our Soldiers Pay is eight Pence *.

However, they subsist upon that small Allowance; and if there be the same Disproportion between our Manufacturers and theirs, as there is betwixt our Soldiers and their Soldiers, as to Pay, 'tis plain, that the Work in *France* is done for little more than a third Part of what it is done for in *England*; and I am confident, that it is so in most Part of their Manufactures, of which I could give many Instances if it was needful: but let these two following, at present, suffice.

At *Lyons*, which next to *Paris*, is the best City in *France*, they pay nine Sols an Ell for making of Lustrings, which is little more than five Pence *English* Money; and the Price paid here for making Lustring is twelve Pence *per* Ell.

In the Paper-Manufacture, abundance of People are employed for sorting Rags in the Mills, who earn in *France* but two Sols a Day, which is less than five Farthings of our Money; and the Price paid here for such Work is four Pence a Day.

The *French* working thus cheap, 'tis no Wonder if they can afford their Manufactures at lower Rates than their Neighbours.

* It is here proper to observe, that when the *British* Merchant was wrote, the *French* Crown, which is now worth six Livres Tournois, was then worth but 100 Sols, or five Livres Tournois, of the same Weight and Standard. We may at present compute the current Money of *England*, very near upon the Footing of double that of *France*; and the Pound Sterling at about 23 Livres Tournois.

But to leave no Room for Doubt in a Matter of so great Importance, several Merchants have brought over from *France*, Patterns of their Woollen Goods, with the Prices they are sold at; and it appears that in general they are, Goodness for Goodness, cheaper than ours. Their Cloth made of *Spanish* Wool, which is brought to great Perfection, is sold in the Shops for sixteen to seventeen Livres the Ell, (which is a Yard, a Quarter, and an Inch) and as a *French* Livre is exactly worth one of our Shillings, they sell the Ell there as cheap as we sell here the Yard, which is 25 *per Cent.* Difference."

The Facility of Carriage in *France*, for their natural Productions and Manufactures to the Sea, is an Object of no little Importance to a Kingdom of so great an Extent. The *Seine*, the *Loire*, the *Garonne*, the *Rhone*, with the other navigable Rivers that run into these principal ones, are an Advantage owing to Nature. Their Industry has added to these, navigable Canals, admirable for the Immensity of the Work, and for the Profits their Commerce from thence derives. Such is the Canal of *Languedoc*, by means whereof a commodious Communication is established between *Bordeaux* and *Marseilles*, between the Ocean and the *Mediterranean*: such the Canal of *Orleans* and *Briare*, between the Countries watered with the *Seine* and the *Loire*; not to mention numerous

Q

other

other Canals, and navigable Rivers, contrived by Art to render Carriage cheap : nor are their high Roads less commodiously cut out from the like Motives.

Their Inland Carriage is near sixty *per Cent.* cheaper in *France* than *England* ; Goods passing as far as from *London* to *Edinburgh*, for five Shillings the long Hundred. This, in coarse Woollen and Linen Goods, has a considerable Influence on the Price of those Manufactures.

From the People in *France*, being at least two Thirds more in Number than those in *England*, they can as little want Sailors to carry on their intended Commerce, as Land-Men, for their Arts and Manufactures, and Support of their military Force.

Whoever has perused, with any Attention the Marine Ordinances, Arrets, and Royal Edicts of this Nation, from the Year 1681, to the present Time, cannot but admire the profound Wisdom therein manifested, for the Regulation as well of their mercantile Navigation and Commerce, as that of their Royal Navies. With respect to the former, no Measures can scarce be more wisely calculated to multiply their Brood of Seamen, to obtain them at a cheap Rate, and to keep the Price of Freights considerably lower than ours ; which does not a little contribute, together with their other Advantages, both natural and political, to enable them to under-sell this Nation, at all foreign Markets.

Nor

Nor does the Policy, in Relation to their Artisans and Manufacturers, less deserve Notice, as it proves highly conducive to the Advancement of all the commercial Arts, and to render the Labor of their Artists in general, not less cheap than exquisite in Point of Workmanship. Without entering into a Detail of Particulars, I shall only observe in general, that no Measures can be better consulted to rouse and stimulate an Emulation among their own Mechanics and Manufacturers, to excel those of all the Globe. To which End, none are ever admitted to the Honor, as it is esteemed among them, of the Freedom of any of the Companies of Arts and Trades, without having first performed a Master-piece of Workmanship; wherein they give an unquestionable Proof their Ingenuity and Dexterity, in their respective mechanical and manufactural Arts, as well as of their good Conduct and Behaviour, even from the Stages of their Apprenticeship, as well as Journeymanship, to that of a Master. And to prevent any Collusion or Corruption upon these Occasions, all the Jurats concerned in these Companies are forbidden, at such Times, to accept or receive from the Candidates any Presents, or any other Fees, but such as are appointed by the Statutes, from whatever Pretence and Colour it might be, under the Penalty of a Fine, which cannot be less than an hundred Livres. The Candidate al-

so is prohibited from giving any sort of Feast or Treat, upon Pain of having his Reception into the Company superseded, and declared absolutely void. By this Means, none are admitted but Persons of real Merit in their peculiar Professions ; and such as are well qualified, to bring up their Successors with all desirable Advantages to the State ; whereby the Race of ingenious and reputable Artists becomes transmitted to Posterity, and the Improvements they daily make of their several Branches of Arts and Trades, demonstrate the public Utility of a Policy, so exquisitely planned, to vye with all States and Empires, in the Productions of Arts, and the raising of Genii for their Propagation.

Nor do the more polite and refined Arts, which they so much cultivate, tend less to the Propagation of their commercial System, than those we have intimated. From which conjoint Measures it is, that *France* has drawn into their Nation, the best Artists of every Country, and as it were, enchanted the whole World, with a Species of Madness, to adopt their Taste and Fashions ; whereby they introduce their lucrative Arts and Manufactures into all foreign States and Empires. By these their superlative Arts of political Magic, have they not extended the Empire of their Modes over the Universe ? Do they not hereby insensibly steal their Manufactures into every Country, on the Face of the Globe, and make their Taste and

and Fashions in all Things, the Standard of good Sense, Agreeableness, and Politeness?

That their Fabricks may stand in Need of no recommendatory Introduction; have they not infused and forced their very Language into every Court of *Europe*, and make even their ecclesiastic Missionaries, subservient to the Extension and Propagation of their Arts and their Manufactures, wherever they are sent? This Nation has made the refined Arts, their Politesse, and their Turn for the Invention of new Modes and Fashions, all subservient to the silent and imperceptible Advancement of their commercial Interests: and those Arts they think will prove the most secure, as being the least suspected, of obtaining that Degree of Dominion and Empire, which they aim at. Instead of our countenancing those secret Modes of Conquest, do we not ourselves adopt their Fashions, according to their Changes and Succession, and cherish that very Policy, which strikes at the Ruin of this Nation, as an independent Empire?

These Things considered, as cooperating with the Cheapness of the Commodities of this rival Nation, cannot fail to transfer to them that commercial Dominion, which it is the Duty, as well as the Interest and Glory, of this Kingdom to maintain against them: I say, the Duty, because the Security of the Liberties and the Felicity of all *Europe* de-

pend upon the *British* Power; and that wholly depends upon the Preservation of our Commerce and Navigation. But if we shall not be able to vend our Commodities, as exquisite for their Quality and their Cheapness, as theirs are, in Vain do we continue our Trade, unless the more expeditiously to undoe ourselves; for we must in Time be Losers instead of Gainers in all our Traffic with other Nations. Such is the Attachment of the *English* to her own Customs, and to her beaten Tract of Policy, that she too much despises the Study and Culture of that refined System which would prove the more recommendatory to her Fabrics in general: her Language is unknown and unstudied, for not only Want of being wisely propagated in other Nations, but for Want of proper Motives and Inducements to attract Foreigners here for their Education, as *France* does into her Dominions: and instead of enconraging the constant Invention of pleasing Modes and Fashions, which might fall in with the Taste of the World, we plod on in the old Road, and adopt those of *France* instead thereof. And that too, after she has first satiated the foreign Markets, whereby our Traders and the Nation also often become Losers instead of Gainers; for we are in our mechanical and manufactural Modes and Fashions, as in our Politicks, generally too late in the Day: And this for Want of proper public Encouragement being constantly given to breed up a Succession of the best Artists and Designers.

Nor

Nor is *France* the only commercial Competitor we have to deal with, though she is the most dangerous. Her Example has animated the less respectable States to attempt a Rivalship with us; and from the Success of the Measures taken by *France*, they have wisely pursued the same: For, before States establish Fabricks for Sale to other Nations, they will first endeavour to serve themselves with what they were before obliged to take from others. This will bring their Hands in, and they know it is their Interest to be contented with such Fabricks as they are capable of making in their own Country, 'till they shall be able to vie with those Nations, who have long been their Predecessors therein. That these Beginners may the sooner overtake us in many of our Manufactures, they likewise do, as *France* has done, and daily does; they give encouraging Invitations to all first Rate Artists to come and settle amongst them. This has of late Years been the Practice of several Parts of *Germany*, of *Switzerland*, of *Poland*, of *Sweden*, of *Denmark* and of *Austria*; and such is the present Practice of several States in *Italy*; and at length, this manufacturing Impulse, this Spirit of Commerce has been embraced by *Spain* itself, and renders our Trade with that Nation less and less beneficial.

These are but Infant-Trading-States, in Comparison to ours; and so indeed is *France* itself in Point of Time: But altho' we had

the Start of them for near two Centuries, yet do we not find that they now tread upon our Heals, and are likely to trip us up? Nor will it be easy, perhaps, when we are down, ever to rise again. Certain it is that such is the Load of Taxes, which our Trade at present bears, that it staggers under the Weight; and if we continue to add to them, by incurring of further public Debts, how will it be possible to stand longer upon our Legs?

LETTER

L E T T E R X.

Of Rivalship in Trade ; and more particularly with Relation to that which subsists between Great Britain and France ; with its Application to the subject Matter of this Work.

BEFORE we enter into a Detail of the several Means by which a Body politic may grow rich and maintain itself in the greatest Degree of Strength it is susceptible of, by Trade ; it is proper to be acquainted with what is the most active Principle of useful Commerce : I mean Rivalship. All other Principles may be ranked under this : they emanate from it, and without it would have no Vigour. It is the Life and Spirit of Industry ; for which Reason it would be dangerous to check it : but as every Kind of Industry is not equally useful and necessary, so Emulation or Rivalship may be encouraged more or less in Proportion. This Difference is not an Exception ; if it be thought such, it is the only one that the Application of this Principle will admit of.

Rivalship consists in the Number of Competitors for Preference.

Hope of Advantage, of some Kind or other, is undoubtedly the Source of Rivalship ; its Preservation depends on the real Utility that is found in aspiring at preference ; and its general Effect is to multiply the Objects of Preference.

We will examine Rivalship, at present, only in it's Relation to political Commerce, both in its Nature and Effects. It is either domestic or foreign.

Foreign Rivalship in the Trade of a Nation, consists in being able to sell abroad as much of the Productions of our Country's Lands and Industry as other Nations do ; and in employing as many more as they, with the Money of Foreigners ; that is to say, in respective Proportion to the Populoufness, Capitals, Extent and Fruitfulness of each other's Lands. The Strength of the Nation which does not encourage that Rivalship in the Degrees of Proportion just mentioned, must infallibly be relatively inferior to the Strength of others ; because it's Inhabitants are less employed, less rich, less happy, consequently less numerous relatively, and in short less able in Proportion to assist the State. The Balance of Trade, I cannot too often repeat it, is in Fact the Balance of Power.

This foreign Rivalship is not to be obtained by Force ; It is the Fruit of the Efforts of Industry to suit the Taste of the Consumer, and even to anticipate and spirit up that Taste.

Home

Home Rivalship is of two Kinds : the one between the Commodities of the Nation's own produce, and foreign Commodities of the same Nature, or for the same Use : that Rivalship ought in general to be proscribed, because it deprives the People of the Means of subsisting. Some Cases do admit of Exceptions in Favour of foreign Rivalship, as we shall observe in its proper Place : but when the Legislator thinks fit to banish this home Rivalship between Commodities of the natural Growth of the Country and foreign Commodities ; they who help to promote and encourage it, either by selling or buying, are really guilty towards Society, of encreasing or keeping up the Number of Poor, which are a Burthen to it.

The other Kind of home Rivalship, is Emulation in Work between the Subjects : it consists in each of them being allowed to employ himself, in what he thinks most lucrative, or what is most pleasing to him, provided that Employment be useful to Society. It is the chief Basis of Freedom in Trade ; and alone contributes more than any other Means to procure a Nation that foreign Rivalship by which she grows rich and powerful. The Reason is obvious. Every Man is naturally inclined (I ought not perhaps to say he unfortunately makes it his Business) to seek his own Ease : and that Ease, the Reward of his Labor, when attained, makes his Business pleasing and agreeable to him :
So

So that when no inward Defect in the Government of a State cramps and prevents Industry, it will open itself a Way. The more numerous it's Productions are, the cheaper they will be, *and that Cheapness will obtain the Preference at foreign Markets :*

In Proportion to the Money brought into a State by this Method, and to the greater Number of Means whereby the People is enabled to subsist, the Number or Rivalship of Consumers encreases, and the Commodities require being represented by a larger Sum : this Encrease of the Price of each Thing is real, and the first Effect of the Progress of Industry ; but a happy Concatenation of new Rivalships, moderates and keeps it within proper Bounds. The Commodities in Request become more plentiful every Day ; and that Plenty moderates a Part of their encreased Price ; the other Part is insensibly divided among all that are concerned in working, manufacturing, or trading in them, and taken out of their Profits : That Diminution of Profit is again compensated by the Fall of the Interest of Money : for the Number of Borrowers not being equal to that of Lenders, Money loses of it's Price by unanimous Agreement, like any other Kind of Merchandise.

This Fall of Interest is, as we see, the Effect of a great Trade : on which I cannot help observing, that in Order to know whether a Country, which has no Mines of it's own,

own, carries on as great a Trade as another in Proportion to it's respective Advantages for Trade, it is sufficient to compare the natural Value of the Interest of Money in each of them; for it is certain, that if there be not an equal Rivalship in the Interest of Money, there can be no Equality of foreign Rivalship in the Sale of it's Productions and it's Navigation.

When a continual Encrease of the Trade of a State is perceived by these manifest Symptoms, all it's Parts act and communicate an equal Motion to each other: it then enjoys all the Strength and Vigor it is susceptible of.

Great Luxury is inseparable from such a Situation; it extends to every Class of People, because they are all happy: but that Luxury which, is the Effect of the public Ease, and proceeds from an Encrease of Labor, need never be feared; foreign Rivalship is sure to prevent it's rising to too great a Height, which would otherwise soon put a fatal Stop to such Prosperity. Industry then opens new Fields wherein to display itself, by perfecting it's Methods and Works; Oeconomy of Time and Strength helps to encrease the Number of Men; Want is the Mother of Arts, Rivalship promotes them, and Artists, by growing rich, become more learned and experienced.

Such are the prodigious Effects of these Principles of Trade.

Evident

Evident as the Consequences of this Principle are, yet Interest will, perhaps, dare to appeal to the Tribunal of Sophistry. Rivalship, some will say, lessens the Profits of the Merchant and great Manufactures, by the Means it affords petty Manufacturers and Workmen to extend their Business and encrease their Profits: or take in Partners unacquainted with Trade. The former will relinquish a Profession in which they no longer find the usual Allurement of Gain; whilst the latter, unable to support the Trade of the Nation, will let it fall into the Hands of Foreigners, and perish with it.

But can they who thus object, be so blinded by Self-Interest, as not to conceive, that the united Strength of two ordinary Men is equivalent to that of one Man as strong a gain as each of them? The Salary of one is divided between two; that is the only Difference. The Business is equally done. Let the Legislator but take Notice in such Cases; the first Thing he hears will be the Complaints and Murmurs of a few, which will soon be silenced by the joyous Acclamations of an infinite Multitude, whose Happiness he secures. It is a general Rule that no Man leaves his Trade so long as the Profits he makes by it bear a Proportion to the natural Price of the Interest of Money; that Interest must necessarily grow lower as the general Ease of a Nation encreases; that general Ease cannot proceed from any Thing but Trade, and Trade cannot

not encrease but by Rivalship of Men, Capitals and Commodities.

A shallow Policy may see too in another Light the Objections some interested Men will always be ready to make against Rivalship in Trade ; and may pretend to manage an Empire as a Farmer does the trifling Concerns of his Grounds, and under Pretence of settling a Balance between Provinces, restrict the Labor of one to favour another. But before such a Scheme be put in Execution, it would be proper to make foreign Consumers enter into an Engagement to help to keep up the Dearness of a Commodity, that being the necessary Consequence of all Restraint on Labor. Rival Nations in the same Branch should likewise engage, that neither their Industry, nor Desire of Gain, shall be encreased by the Dearness of the Commodity.

To be serious, the true Equilibrium between the Provinces of a State is, for each of them to enjoy, in an equal Degree, it's peculiar Conveniencies and Advantages for Trade.

The Provinces, whose Commodities have farther to go to Market of Course, pays it's Labourers less Wages ; that is a natural Compensation : And if Duties, or the Nature and Weight of Imposts, do not occasion some farther Difference in the Value of Labor, the Effect will be absolutely the same as to Price : The Degree of Intelligence, or Industry, is what the Consumer will be influenced

enced by. Such will the Principle of Emulation be.

In our last Letter, it has been observed, in Part, what natural and political Benefits and Advantages *France* has beyond *England*, whereby she has already so greatly outstripped us in her Rivalship, and is likely still more and more so to do, unless we take proper preventive Measures against it. I shall further pursue the Point in other Lights, that we may effectually discern what Measures *France* has taken to promote and encourage, a Spirit of Rivalship, more particularly in Opposition to the Trading - Interests of *Great Britain*.

Every one will readily allow that the Kingdom of *France* in *Europe* is very happily situated for Commerce and Navigation, and that it is inferior to none, in that Respect, *Great Britain* alone excepted.

So fruitful is the Soil, and so happy the Climate of *France*, that almost the Produce of all Quarters of the World may be raised there: Hence they have the *Materials* of many *Fabricks* at home, which *England* is obliged to purchase and import; as the best of Silk, Flax equal to that of *Egypt*; and it is said Cotton too, in some Quantities, but as they cultivate this in their *American* Islands, they do not concern themselves with it in *Europe*.

This populous and extended Empire subsisted itself, till near the middle of the last Century

Century by an *Inland Trade* : Such has been the Industry, Wisdom and Policy of that Nation, that *England* must have been contented with a small Share of the Trade of the World, if their *Colbert* and *Lewis* had been Cotemporaries with *Henry VIII.*

Their ill Policy in religious Matters gave us some Advantage, and returned us in the *Silk* what they were beginning to take from us in the *Woollen.* The Progress of *France* is astonishing, for tho' they began it not to any Purpose till near One Hundred and Fifty Years after us, yet they soon came up with us, and have so nearly kept our Pace for almost this last Century, that they have given us, from Time to Time, as many Improvements as they have received.

If they adopted our *Draps de Londres*, *Sayes*, *Bayes*, *Serges*, we derive from them our *Alopes*, *Duroys*, *Serges de Nismes*, and a Thousand Varieties of flighter Texture. This rapid Advance can only be attributed to the superior Encouragement their Manufactures have received in their Rise and Progress, from the noble Munificence of their Princes, and the Genius and Liberality of their Statesmen : Whilst our rising Trades were always left to settle themselves, and the Undertakers met with neither Honour nor Bounty ; nay, nor even the least public Notice, from the Death of Queen *Elizabeth* to the last happy Revolution ; and what has been done since, has not enabled us to maintain that Rivalship

R

against

against *France* in foreign Countries. that we could wish for.

Under the Government of the first Line of *French* Kings, who reigned from the Year 418 down to 751, it is not known what the State of Trade was; these Princes regarding only Conquest, were more attentive to Arms than to enrich the State by Commerce.

Charles the Great, the second Prince of the second Line, desirous of having Commerce flourish, created an Office of *King of the Merchants*, with an Authority of Superintendancy over all that Denomination; whose Jurisdiction was exercised, by Deputies in every considerable Province and City.

The *Great Chamberlain*, an Officer of the Crown, and who had already the Jurisdiction over all *Arts and Manufactories*, was appointed instead of the King of the Merchants, by *Francis* the First in 1544. This Father of Arts and Letters was the First of the Kings of *France*, that projected the carrying on Trade in *France*, by distant Voyages into the remote Parts of the World.

In 1545, the Employment of *Great Chamberlain* of *France* was vacant by the Death of *Charles*, Duke of *Orleans*; and his Father *Francis* the First, annihilated the Office, and revived that of *King of the Merchants*; which continued, 'till *Henry* the Great put an End to it, in 1587, and took upon himself the Charge of Commerce, and was so zealous therein that he set up the Fabric
of

of Tapestry at the *Gobelins*, another of Gilt Leather Hangings, the Mills of *Estampe* to split Iron, a Manufacture of Gold and Silver Stuffs in the Royal Palace itself; those of Gawse, and of Glass in Imitation of those of *Venice*, and several other useful and important Manufactories.

This Prince also formed a Council of Commerce, constituted of Ministers out of several Tribunals, wherein was debated and decided every Thing relating to Trade.

In 1607, he appointed a new Officer of *Master-Visitor*, and *Reformer-General*, to inspect all the Manufactories, which then made up the principal Branches of Commerce.

In 1664, when the Taxes of *France* were about to be reduced, we find in one of their Edicts of that Time the following: “ But
 “ finding that these Abatements of Taxes,
 “ would only lessen the present Miseries, and
 “ give our People the Opportunity to live
 “ with more Ease, but did not tend to bring
 “ in Wealth from abroad, and that *Trade*
 “ alone is capable of bringing this to pass:
 “ for this Purpose we have, therefore, from
 “ the Beginning applied to the proper Means
 “ to support and encourage, and encrease the
 “ same, and to give all possible Care to our
 “ Subjects therein: And, in Order, there-
 “ unto, have caused a general Inquisition
 “ to be made into all the Tolls raised upon
 “ all the Rivers in our Kingdom, which any

“ Way hinder the Commerce, or the trans-
 “ porting Goods and Merchandises from
 “ Place to Place ; and, having inquired into
 “ all the Pretences made for the raising and
 “ levying the said Tolls, we have suppressed
 “ so many of them, that the Navigation of
 “ our Rivers is thereby made extraordinary
 “ easy.

“ We have also established in all our Pro-
 “ vinces Officers to examine the Dues of all
 “ our Communities or Corporations ; upon
 “ which we have made such Regulations as
 “ would reduce the same for the present,
 “ and afterwards entirely discharge them :
 “ And, in the mean Time, we have given a
 “ general *Liberty of Trade* to all People,
 “ which they have been deprived of, by the
 “ Violences aforesaid.

“ After this, we have endeavoured to
 “ cause all our Bridges, Cause-ways, Moles,
 “ Banks, Piers, and public Buildings to be
 “ repaired ; the bad Condition whereof have
 “ been a great Hindrance to Trade, and to
 “ the carrying of Merchandise from Place
 “ to Place. Also we have powerfully esta-
 “ blished the Safety and Liberty of the High-
 “ ways, &c.

“ After having done every Thing to restore
 “ Trade *within* the Kingdom, we have ap-
 “ plied the greatest of our Care for the en-
 “ couraging of Navigation and Commerce
 “ also *without*, as the only Means to enrich
 “ our Subjects. To this End, having found
 “ that

“ that Foreigners had made themselves, Ma-
 “ sters of all the Trade by Sea, nay, even
 “ of all the Coasting Trade from Port to
 “ Port, of our Kingdom; and yet the small
 “ Number of our Ships, which remained in
 “ the Possession of our Subjects, were every
 “ Day taken just at our own Doors, as well
 “ in the *Levant Seas*, as in the *Western Oce-*
 “ *an*; we have established the Imposition of
 “ 50 Sols *per Ton* on the Freight of all for-
 “ eign Ships, at the same Time discharging
 “ those of our Subjects; encouraging them
 “ thereby to build and fit out sufficient Num-
 “ bers of Ships for their Coasting Trade. At
 “ the same Time we have put to Sea so con-
 “ siderable a Fleet, both of Ships and Gal-
 “ lies, as should oblige the Coasters of *Bar-*
 “ *bary* to keep their Ports and Places of
 “ Retreat, &c.

“ At the same Time, we have secured
 “ the Navigation of our Subjects against
 “ all other Pirates, by allowing them Con-
 “ voys of our Men of War. We have for-
 “ tified and augmented the *French Colonies*
 “ settled in *Canada*, and the Islands of *Ame-*
 “ *rica* *, by having sent our Ships thither,
 “ making them acknowledge our Authority,
 “ by settling of Courts of Justice amongst
 “ them. We have also laid the Foundation

* This was the first Establishment of the *French Colonies* in *America*.

“ for the Settlement of our *East-India* and
 “ *West-India* Companies, which are now set
 “ up in our Kingdom, to our entire Satis-
 “ faction.

“ But tho’ all these great Things are very
 “ much to our Satisfaction, yet the said Love
 “ we have for our People, as it is every Day
 “ stirring us up to look forward what may
 “ be farther done, to the Encrease of their
 “ Happiness; we have resolved to erect a
 “ COUNCIL OF TRADE, to meet in our Pre-
 “ sence, and to employ to that End, one of
 “ the Council of the *Finances*, which, for
 “ that Purpose we shall dissolve: in which
 “ *Council of Trade* shall be considered all the
 “ *Means possible*, for the Encrease and En-
 “ couragement of *Trade*, both within and
 “ without our Kingdom, and also of our
 “ Manufactures; which having been hap-
 “ pily performed in the first Day of their
 “ Meeting, we have made known to all our
 “ Companies, as well sovereign as inferior,
 “ to all Governors of Provinces, and their
 “ Intendants, how tender a Regard we have
 “ to the Prosperity of the said Commerce,
 “ with Orders to them to employ all the
 “ Authority which we have committed to
 “ them, *for the Protection of the Merchants,*
 “ *and to do Justice to them, even with Pre-*
 “ *ference to others, that they may not be injured*
 “ *or cheated, or any Way discouraged in their*
 “ *Business.* And we have by circular Letters,
 “ *invited the Merchants to address themselves*
 “ *directly*

“ *directly to us, upon all Occasions; and to de-*
 “ *pute some of their Body near our Person, to*
 “ *present to us their Memorials and Petitions;*
 “ *and, in Case of Difficulty, we have appoint-*
 “ *ed a Person to receive all their Petitions, and*
 “ *solicit for them at our Expence: And we*
 “ *have ordained there shall always be a*
 “ *House appointed for that Purpose. We*
 “ *have also resolved to employ a Million of*
 “ *Livres yearly for the settling of Manu-*
 “ *factures, and the Encrease of Navigation.*
 “ *But, as the most effectual Means for the*
 “ *restoring of Trade, is the lessening and re-*
 “ *gulating the DUTIES upon Goods and*
 “ *Merchandises, coming in, and going out of*
 “ *the Kingdom, we have appointed our*
 “ *trusty and well beloved the *Sieur Colbert*,*
 “ *Counsellor in our Royal Council, and In-*
 “ *tendant in our Finances, &c.”*

The Council of Commerce was an admirable
 Establishment for the Benefit of Trade, and
 has been productive of unspeakable Advantages
 to *France*. This Council consisted of some of
 the principal Officers of State and others (as the
 Comptroller-General of the Finances, the Se-
 cretary of State, and other particular Counsel-
 lors of State) who communicate what passes at
 this Council, to the Royal Council, as Occasion
 may require. The Council of Commerce,
 consists also of twelve of the principal Mer-
 chants of the Kingdom, or such who have
 been long experienced in Trade: of this
 Number, two are of the Town of *Paris*,

and each of the other ten, are of the Towns of *Rouen, Bourdeaux, Lyons, Marseilles, Rochelle, Nants, St. Malo, Lisle, Bayonne, and Dunkirk*; and they are elected annually by the Corporation and Magistrates of the several Towns, and the Trading-Merchants, in each of the said Towns, and every one of these Towns has a distinct CHAMBER OF COMMERCE †, within itself; which hears Representations concerning Abuses and Difficulties in Trade, and also Complaints relating to Impositions in Trade, made by the Governors, and other public Officers in the *French Plantations*, which are represented by them to their respective Deputies aforesaid, in Order to be laid properly before the Royal Council.

These Chambers meet twice a Week in one of the Rooms of the Town-House, in Order to confer together on the most proper Measures requisite to be taken, to make not only the Trade of their own Town flourish, but to encrease both the inland and foreign Trade of the whole Kingdom; to which End, they receive all Informations and Proposals useful to any Branch of Traffic what-

† The Establishment of a Royal Council at *Paris*, in the Year 1700, occasioned the setting up of *Chambers of Commerce* in the other chief Towns of the Kingdom, in the Year 1701. These Chambers of Commerce were instituted with an Intent to communicate to the respective Persons who attend the Royal Council, whatever they judged essential to the Interest of Trade and Navigation.

soever; of all which they keep a Register, and of their Resolutions thereupon: of which they send Extracts every three Months, to their Deputies of the Royal Council, or in his Absence, directly to the Royal Council itself, on any Emergency.

These are most excellent Institutions, and have been productive of very great Prosperity to the whole Trade and Navigation of *France*: and such like Establishments, properly conducted, would certainly prove of inestimable Advantage to the Commerce of these Kingdoms, and contribute with other Measures, to enable us the better to support such a Rivalship against *France*, as will save our whole Trade from that Destruction, wherewith it is threatened.

With all the Advantages of Situation, Extent of Land, Water-Carriage, and Number of People, *France* has laboured under two Difficulties, which rendered it next to impossible for her to produce any considerable staple Manufactures, unless these Difficulties could be effectually surmounted. These were the Want of a Competency of Wool of a good Staple, and of Silk, the two fundamental Articles in the general Manufactures of *Europe*; which the *French* were ambitious to fall into, but for want of these Productions in ample Quantity, suffered the Discouragement many Years. They, however, fell into the Silk Manufacture to a great Degree, encouraged by the *Italians*,
when

when the *French* were Masters of the *Milaneſe*, in the Reign of *Francis I.* and though they bought their Silks in *Italy* and *Turkey*, as they do ſtill occasionally in ſmall Quantities ; yet all the ſouthern Parts of *France* were employed in the Manufacture of Silk, and ſpread it into *Champaigne*, and even into *Paris* itſelf.

But at length the *French* conquered the Difficulty. They planted the white Mulberries in *Languedoc*, and Part of *Provence* ; and nourishing the Worms with unſpeakable Industry, and greatly encouraged by the Court, in the Reign of *Lewis XIV.* they, after many Years ſpent in fruitleſs Experiments, brought the Matter to Perfection, produced the Silk in Quantities, which is now become a natural Production of *France*. But it hath not yet proved the ſame in *France*, with Regard to the Produce of Wool of an equal Quality with that of *England* or *Ireland* ; tho' it ſeems, there are ſome of their philoſophic People, attempting to mend the Breed of Sheep there : and what may be the Conſequence of Art added to Nature, with the Aid of the Royal Purſe, no one can peremptorily ſay.

Yet the Diſadvantage by Nature hath not diſcouraged this enterprizing Nation, from attempting the Woollen Manufacture in every Branch. They determined to have our *English* and *Irish* Wool. This was the Policy of their great *Colbert*, to whom we owe the pernicious Trade of Owling. After obtaining

ing his End, he was not long before he established Woollen Manufacturies of every Kind in *France*, *Façon, d' Angleterre*; and the *French* King soon saw all his Subjects cloathed, however indifferently, at first, with these Manufactures of their own Country, who but a few Years before, bought their Cloth from *England*.—Thus *England* lost the supplying of *France* with this capital Fabric.

This commercial Minister of State to accomplish his great Design, decoyed by Rewards and Honours, *English* and other foreign Artists into every Part of *France*, where it was most eligible to establish the various Sorts of Manufactures; and the *French* were so apt to learn, and so dextrous and chearful in teaching each other, that, in a few Years, they could do without *English* Instructors.

The *French* becoming thus able to furnish their own People, cloath their Nobility and Gentry, and even the King himself (for he would wear nothing that was not the *Manufacture of his own Subjects*) they not only, in a few Years, excluded the *English* Woollen Manufacture by a Law, but began to rival the *English* in all the foreign Markets of *Europe*; as in *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *Italy*, and also in *Asia* and *Africa*, as well as in *Turkey* and *Barbary*.

From a short Specimen of the Methods taken by that Court to raise their Woollen Manufactures, we may judge of the rest. In 1665, *Lewis XIV.* settled Mr. *Joseph Van Robay*,

Robay, a foreign Protestant at *Abeville* in *Picardy* and by Letters Patent granted to him and his Workmen the free Exercise of their Religion, and several other very considerable Privileges, which their Families enjoy to this Day. This Clothier fixed the Manufacture of all Sorts of *Spanish* Cloth in that City, and the King lent him by Agreement 2000 Livres for every Loom he set up, untill he had forty Looms at Work; so that he received 80,000 Livres. At last it was found, he had so well established the Manufacture, that by Degrees the Payment of the whole was remitted.

Again, that Monarch, by an Arret of the 19th of *October*, 1688, granted to *Noel de Varannes* divers Immunities, to encourage him to carry on the Manufacture of *Drap de Londres* (or Cloth made in Imitation of what is sent from *London* to *Turkey*) in the Province of *Languedoc*.

And afterwards that Province was obliged to furnish the *Sieur Magi*, and his Partner with 30,000 Livres, to carry on the same Manufacture of *Drap de Londres* at *Clermont* and *Sete*; and they having voluntarily engaged themselves to transport two thousand Pieces of that Cloth to the *Levant*, by an *Arret* of the 2d of *October*, 1692, they are permitted to carry the Goods they import from thence at *Marseilles*, by Transires from *Lyons*, into all Parts of that Kingdom (that is, without paying the Duties of particular Provinces.)

Nevertheless

Nevertheless upon this exprefs Condition, that they export annually 2000 *Drapes de Londres* to the *Levant*.

In 1670, the *Levant* Company were established in *France*, and the King both at that Time, and afterwards, granted them many Privileges; and though it was some Time before their Trade flourished, yet they have for many Years supplanted us in that once estimable Branch of Trade to this Kingdom.

By these and other proper Methods, their Trade in general, and their Woollen Manufactures in particular, have been established in *France*; and that they are brought to a very great Perfection, we know by too dear bought Experience.

By Measures of this Kind, they have settled a surprising Number of Manufactories, and mechanical Arts; which will be too tedious to enumerate: I will only observe, that they have struck Medals, to commemorate most of the remarkable *Æra*, from whence the Advancement of many Branches of their Trade commenced, as well as some of their politic Institutions, tending likewise to the Extention of their Commerce in general.

The Establishment of a Number of *new Manufactories* in *France*, and the *old ones* being brought to their Perfection, make the Establishment of the first Medal. This was in 1664, a Year remarkable, as observed, for the great Number of commercial Enterprises

prizes, which took Place from that Æra; and which were continued during the Administration of *Colbert*, whose Memory will ever be revered in this Kingdom.

Upon *the Medal* there is a *Minerva*, who has by her a Spindle, a Shuttle, Bottoms of Wool, and a Piece of Tapestry: The Legend, *Minerva Locupletatrix*, signifying the Arts Re-established MDCLXIV.

The Subject of the second *Medal* is the Re-establishment of Navigation, which had been a long while neglected in *France*: But the Grand Monarch, applying to their Re-animation, rendered his Kingdom as powerful by Sea as Land, and as flourishing by its Commerce as by its Arms.

This *Medal* is of the Year 1665. It represents a Ship in full Sail: The Words of the Legend are, *Navigatio instaurata*, signifying *Navigation re-established*: The Exergum shews the Date.

The *French East-India Company*, established in the Year 1664, and which took Possession of the Island of *Madagascar* in 1665, gave Occasion to the third *Medal*.

This Colony, in Manner of the ancient Medals, is designed by one of those bunch-backed Oxen which are in great Plenty in the Island: It stands nigh to an Ebony Tree, which is very common in that Country. The Legend is, *Colonia Madagascarea*, signifying the Colony of *Madagascar*: The Exergum denotes the Date, M.DC.LXV.

The

The Union of the two Seas, so commodious and beneficial to the domestic and foreign Commerce of *France*, is represented in the fourth Medal, struck in the Year 1667.

Neptune armed with his Trident, with which he strikes the Earth, seems to complete this important Enterprize: The Gushing out of the Water, which pours forth, by the Strength of the Blow he has given, and which spreads itself to the right and left, indicates the Ocean and the *Mediterranean*, which the Canal unites. It has, for Legend, JUNCTA MARIA, which signifies the joining of the Seas: The Exergum has, FOSSA A GARUMNA AD PORTUM SETRUM: A CANAL EXTENDED FROM THE GARONNE TO THE PORT OF SETE. M.DC.LXVII.

The fifth Medal was struck in the Year 1680, in Order to preserve the Remembrance of the several Classes of the Marine.

These Classes, at the first Establishment thereof, were Three, each consisting of 20,000 Sailors, one of which was to serve on Board their Men of War, the other on Board their Merchantmen, and the other to rest one Year in three. These Classes were soon after augmented to five, making only 60,000 Seamen.

The Medal represents a Sailor by the Sea-Side, leaning upon a broken Pillar; he holds in his Hand a Rudder, covered with a Flower-de-luce: The Legend has these Words, BELLO ET COMMERCIO, signifying
By

BY WAR AND BY PEACE. The Exergum has, SEXAGINTA MILLIA NAUTARUM CONSCRIPTA. M.DC.LXXX. SIXTY THOUSAND SEAMEN INROLLED at that Time.

The sixth and last Medal is on Occasion of the Establishment of the *Council of Commerce*. It represents *Justice*, and near her stands *Mercury*, the God of Commerce; who with one Hand holds his Caduce, and with the other a Purse. The Words are, SEX VIRI COMMERCII REGUNDIS; signifying SIX COMMISSARIES PROPOSED FOR THE REGULATION OF COMMERCE.

I have not been able to learn whether the *French* have struck any Medals since the Year, 1700, respecting the Advancement of their Trade, but I am inclined to believe the War that soon ensued gave a temporary Damp to this Spirit. However, whether they have or not, I am convinced that this is an *Æra*, that does not less merit their Commemoration than any that has been intimated. For, from this Period they may date the Rise of their *African* Trade, as well as that of their Sugar Colonies; which are not of the least Importance to that Kingdom.

By an authentic Memorial, from the Deputies of the Council of Trade presented to the Royal Council in the Year 1701; we find that the *French* then did not employ above 100 Sail of Shipping in those Trades, and we, at that Time, employed 500: but such has been

been the Encrease of the *French* Trade in those Branches, since this Time, till the present War that they have employed between 700 and 800 Sail; but our Trade is far from augmenting, in those Branches, in Proportion as theirs has done.

Before they rivalled us so much in these Trades, we had a considerable Share in the Supply of *France* with Sugars; but since they have throve so much herein, we have not only lost the Supplying of them, but they have supplanted us in the Sugar-Trade at most of the foreign Markets in *Europe*: And with Regard to the Trade of *Africa* they have absolutely supplanted us in the whole Trade of the *Gum-Coast*, from *Cape Blanco* to the River *Senegal*, which is a Sea Coast Trade of near 500 Miles in Extent. This together with the Union of their former *African Company*, with their present *East India Company*, has not only rendered them our most dangerous Competitors in *Africa*, but in *Asia* also; their *East-India Company* never till the last War, having been able to make any Head against ours in the Manner they did: And that the *French* are daily growing in this Part of the World is not questioned by any one.

From the Peace of *Utrecht*, likewise, have they not, by the Means of *Cape Breton*, and the Privileges they have usurped on our *Newfoundland Trade*, so considerably encreased in their Fisheries, as to rival us therein at all the Markets in *Europe*? And has not their

extraordinary Progress in their *African* Trade, together with that of their Sugar Colonies, and their *Cape-Breton*, and *Newfoundland* Fisheries, as also that of the *East-Indies*, afforded them such Nurseries for Seamen, as to enable them to rival us in our whole naval Power? And if the Court of *England* had not taken those wise Measures, which she did, by making Reprisals on their Commerce without a Declaration of War, and thereby taken so many Thousand Seamen out of the *French* Scale of Power, we might have more sensibly felt the Weight of their maritime Strength than we have done: But we do not find that they stand in Need of Sailors more than we do; And certain it is, that such is their Management, that they preserve them better in Health than we do.

It surprised us greatly in the last War to experience that the Trade of the *French* Sugar Islands, and that of their *North-American* Colonies, should prove so considerable as it did: but all Surprise upon this Occasion must cease, when we consider the Wisdom of those Measures, which the *French* have taken to promote the Prosperity of those lucrative Branches of their Commerce.

It would divert the Reader too much from the Point I am at present engaged on, to do Justice to those Regulations: nor is it necessary, since they may be referred to in my Dictionary. It may, however, be some Satisfaction to observe here:

That

1. That these Regulations are grounded on the Representations of the Deputies of Commerce before taken Notice of, made from Time to Time, to the *Royal Council of State*; That those Deputies are Persons well skilled and experienced in Commerce, take due Pains to inform themselves in those Branches of Trade, concerning which they lay their Sentiments before the *Royal Council*.

2. That those Laws and Regulations, in general, are extremely minute, and appear to be derived from a very exact and circumstantial State of the Commerce, as carried on by the Merchants and Traders; which indicates that the Legislators in all Countries cannot be too fully and particularly informed of the various Methods and Arts, made Use of by Traders in the Prosecution of their respective Branches, the better to enable them so to adapt and conform their Laws to the Nature of peculiar Branches, that the national Prosperity cannot fail of being thereby promoted.

3. That the Fines and Penalties inflicted on Traders for violating those Laws, are very rigorous and severe; and that the *French Nation* are no less strict in the Execution of those Laws, than they are circumstantial and deliberate in the enacting them.

4. That the Laws of Trade in *France* should seem, suitable to the Nature of the Constitution of their Government, to be wisely accommodated to preserve the whole Trade of

their Island and other Colonies solely to themselves : in Order to render them absolutely subservient to the Prosperity of their Mother-Kingdom — And that, to this End, we find them, by their Laws, extremely vigilant to prevent all contraband Trade from being carried on with foreign Nations in their Colonies, they judging such Trade highly detrimental to the Interest of their Colonies, as well as of the Kingdom of *France* in general.

5. That, since the Laws of *France* are so well calculated to prevent such illicit Trade, we may presume that, whenever this Nation permits, or winks at such Trade with their *American Colonies*, they are certain to be *Gainers* by it ; otherwise we may reasonably believe that they soon would put a Stop thereto ; as the due Execution of their Laws could not fail of being effectual to that Purpose.

6. That as the *French* connive at, countenance and encourage, in Time of Peace, a Trade being carried on between the *British Northern Colonies* and the *French Sugar-Islands in America*, it is to be feared that the *French* are too sensible of the Advantages arising from that Trade ; or they would as little admit of that in particular as any other : And, if that proves a gainful Trade to the *French*, does it not become the Wisdom of *Great Britain* so thoroughly to examine into this Commerce with the *French Colonies*, as to determine whether a Commerce beneficial
to

to *France* can be so, in its Consequences to *Great Britain*? And whether such Commerce does not contribute to enable the *French* the better to rival us in their Sugar Colony Trade?

7. That the *French* take all proper Care to promote a Trade between *Canada*, or *New France*, and their own Island Colonies; and that it should not seem to appear bad Policy in *Great Britain* to promote, as much as the Nature of the Case will admit of, the Commerce of our *North American Colonies* with our own *Sugar Islands*, rather than permit them to carry on any Trade with the *French Sugar-Islands*.

8. The Number of Prices that were taken from the *French* in the last War, and the frequent Arrivals of their numerous Fleets from their Colonies to *Old France*, have roused and opened the Eyes of many that would not be convinced of the Greatness of the *French* Trade before: And, since our Indolence is, at length, awakened, our Security now alarmed, and every Breast seems to be filled with those Passions, which are inkindled by the Love of our Country, not only from this Instance, but also from numberless other Proofs that the *French* have of late Years gained very great Advantages over us in Trade: Since this is the Fact; it certainly becomes us to think of every Measure that can contribute to enable us to stem the Torrent of their commercial Rivalship.

Since the Establishment of the Chambers of Commerce in *France*, their Deputies thereby commissioned, and that also of the Royal Council of Trade, the *French* have encreased in their Traffic to a Degree almost beyond our Belief. They have extended their Trade to the *Levant*, to *Africa*, to the *North*, to *North-America*, and the *South-Seas*, as well as to the *East* and *West-Indies*. In their *West-India* Islands they at present produce more than double the Value in Sugar, Indigo, Ginger, and Cotton, which is now made by the *English*, who, before that Time abundantly exceeded the *French* in this important Branch.

It is computed that, before the Year 1720, there were no more then 30 Sail of Ships annually employed in the *American* Trade from *Bourdeaux*, but since there has been 300 Sail employed annually in that Trade from that City alone.

In the Article of Sugar only, they have, within that Time, encreased, from the Quantity of about * 30,000 *English* Hogsheads per Annum, to 120,000, or thereabouts; of which near Two Thirds have been shipped to *Holland*, *Hamburgh*, *Spain*, and other foreign Markets; and the *English* have encreased from about 45,000 to no more than

* A Hogthead of Sugar, including Freight, and other Charges home, may be computed, on an Average at 12 l. to 18 l. per Hogshead, according to the Plenty or Scarcity.

70,000 Hogsheads, within that Time ; of which they have sent but little of late Years to foreign Markets, although they had formerly the best Share of that Trade, and even supplied *France*, as observed, with the greatest Part of her Sugars.

This Encrease of the Importation of Sugar into *Europe* from *America*, by the *French* and *English*, is owing to the great Encrease of the general Consumption in *Europe*, and the Declension of the *Portuguese* Sugar Trade. The *French* likewise have engrossed the Indigo-Trade from the *English*, and have surprisingly advanced in their Fisheries, and their Beaver, and other Fur-Trade in *North-America*, since their Settlement of *Cape Breton* : and it is from their last mentioned Trades, and their Fisheries, that they find a Vent for most of their Melasses and Rum that the *English* * do not take off their Hands.

The Superiority they have gained over us in the *Fur-Trade* is considerable. It is computed they import into *France* from *Canada* only, to the Value of † 135,000 *l. Sterl. per Annum* in Beaver and other Furs, including

* The Consequence of this unpolitic Practice of the *English*, we have elsewhere taken Notice of.

	In Beaver	In Deer skins	In Furs	Total
† The <i>French</i> import from <i>Canada</i>	75,000	20,000	40,000	135,000 <i>l.</i>
The <i>English</i> import from <i>North-America</i>	37,000	25,000	28,000	90,000 <i>l.</i>

L, 112,000 | 45,000 | 68,000 | 225,000

Deer-skins; and the *English*, from all our *Northern Colonies*, not above 90,000 *l. Sterl.*

So tender are the *French* of this Branch of Trade, and so sensible of the Advantages that arise from the Manufactory of those *American* Commodities, that no one can re-export Beaver from *France* unmanufactured, under the severest Penalties. When these Goods are manufactured, they exceed the Value upon Importation, in some Cases, ten-fold, and have greatly advanced this Branch of their Commerce, they having the greatest Share in the Supply of *Europe* and *Spanish-America* with the Article of Hats. In the late War there was a *French* Ship taken, bound from *France* to the *Spanish-West-Indies*, wherein was a Quantity of white Beaver, and other Hats, which were sold in *London*, and were so much superior in Quality to any Thing of the like Sort, that our Manufacturers were surpris'd at it, as they were much beyond what they could have imagined.

The great Advantage gained by the *French* from such an extraordinary Encrease of their Trade, is apparent from the great Sums they draw annually from other Countries, in Return for their *American* Products, as well as for their Cambrics, Tea, Brandy, Wine, and other their numberless Manufactures, wherein they daily encrease.

This is the Source of Treasure, whereby they maintain such powerful Armies,
and

and afford such plentiful Subsidies and Pensions to several Powers in *Europe*, when subservient to their Views and Interests: It is from hence they are enabled to raise their Royal Navies, and nourish and maintain Seamen to man them.

The *French*, for the Encouragement of their *American* Isles and Colonies, have, since the Year 1628, laid little or no Duties on the Importation of their Sugar, or any other of the *American* Products, however pressing the Exigencies of the Government might have been since then,

They pay but $3 \frac{1}{2}$ *per Cent.* on a low Valuation, which reduces it to about 2 *per Cent.* on the Importation of their Sugar into *France*, besides an inland Duty of three Livres, or about 2 s. 8 d. Sterling *per* hundred Weight; yet, not only Sugars, but other Effects of the *African* Company, are exempted from half the Imposts payable at the Custom-House, and from all local Duties on what is imported or exported by them. The *French* Planters pay but one *per Cent.* on the Exportation of their Plantation Products from their Islands, whilst our Planters of *Barbadoes* and the *Leeward* Islands, long paid $4 \frac{1}{2}$ *per Cent.* on their Exports.

The *French* King has many Years since allowed his Subjects that trade to *Africa*, a Bounty of ten Livres, or about nineteen Shillings Sterling a Head for every Negroe,
and

and as much for every Ounce of Gold Dust, which they carry from the Coast of *Guinea*.

Although the *French* King's Edicts, and Arrets, or Laws, are as strict as our Acts of Parliament, in Regard to the Prohibition of Foreigners from trading in their Islands and other Colonies in *America*; yet, such is their Policy, that their great Officers have discretionary Power to dispence with those Laws, where it shall appear for the Benefit of their Colonies, and without Prejudice to the Trade and Navigation of *France* *. Whence it is they are permitted to exchange their surplus Rum and Malasses, with the *English*, for Cash, Horses, Shipping, Timber, and other Plantation Necessaries.

From other interesting Motives, they permit also a considerable Traffic to be carried on between the *French* Islands and the *Spanish* Islands of *Magueretta*, *Trinidado*, *Porto Rico*, and other *Spanish* Ports in *America*, whereby the *French* receive from the *Spaniards* Money, Horses, Mules, Cocoa, Cochineal, Tobacco, and other *American* Products, in Return for *French* Manufactures and Negroes; but this Trade from the *British* Colonies to those of *Spain*, is looked upon by the latter as a contraband Trade, and is severely restrained, while that of *France* is connived at, and privately encou-

* The Consequence of this dispensing Power to us, has been set in its proper Light in the preceeding Part of these Papers.

raged by the Court of *Spain*: And yet some People will still flatter themselves with the great Cordiality and Friendship of that Nation towards ours.

The *French* King grants Lands in his Plantations *gratis* to poor industrious People, sent thither from *France*, and gives them other Encouragements to go over and settle there: He likewise lends Money to his *American* Subjects, in Cases of Hurricanes, or other unavoidable Misfortunes.

For the further Encouragement of their Trade, they check exorbitant Fees, extravagant Port-Charges and Extortions in their Officers; and they discountenance high Interest and usurious Oppressions, and take the greatest Care that none of their Planter's Estates are broke up by hasty Creditors: In a Word, they neglect scarce any Measures that have a Tendency to the Advantage of all Parties interested, as well as to the general Prosperity of their Colonies, in Conjunction with that of their Mother-nation.

The Fortifications in the *French* Sugar Islands, are erected and maintained at the King's Expence; which, in the *English* Islands, is chiefly done at that of the Inhabitants. They pay Wages to Marines that are taken on Board their private Ships, which Ships are at the Expence of Victuals only for such Marines; and they observe the most prudent Regulations, with Regard to their Marine in general; they punish Defaulters with

with Severity, and do not neglect to reward the meritorious.

They coin small Pieces of Silver in *France*, for the particular Uses of their Sugar Colonies, and send them there to pay off their Governors, and other public Officers, and to ease their Trade : On the other Hand, the *British* Sugar Planters raise Money to pay, not only their own Governors, and other public Officers, but also the Governors of *Bermuda*, and the *Bahama Islands* in *America*, as well as the Governor of the Island of *Jersey* in *Europe*.

The *French* do not think their Laws ought to remain unalterable, according to the Maxim of the *Medes* and *Persians*, for they at all Times readily change their Laws, when they experience the Exigencies of Commerce require it. We have a recent and remarkable Instance of this during the last War ; they permitted *Dutch* Ships to load Sugars, and other Commodities, at their *West-India Islands*, and carry them directly to *Holland*, or any other Part of *Europe*.

By this Measure, the *French* encouraged their Colonies in Time of War, by easy Insurances and low Freights, besides getting early with their Plantation-Produce to foreign Markets. And true it is, that let who will be Ministers in *France*, they have seemed one and all successively, to have set their Hearts upon wisely regulating their Commerce, according to Circumstances of Things, and to turn
every

every Article thereof to the national Emolument: nay, there appears to have been an Emulation amongst their ablest Ministers, to strive who should be the most instrumental to advance the Prosperity of their Trade, and the Glory of their Monarchy: and could this Nation be but once so happy as to see our ablest Ministers struggling and contending, who should do the most Service to their Country in the like Respects, how happy might they make these Kingdoms; how greatly would they add to the Ease and the Glory of their Sovereign; and what eternal Honour would they do to themselves, and entail on their Posterity? And who would grudge such Ministers ample Rewards and Honours for such their Services?

As a leading Step to the Glory of such a Minister; let us view him making the utmost Efforts, to raise the Supplies *within the Year*, and those in such a Manner, as shall prove the most agreeable to the Voice of all wise and honest Men: let him convince the Legislature of the Necessity, of the indispensable Necessity thereof; and the Wisdom of our illustrious Representative Body, will easily fall upon the proper Measures to accomplish this great Work. Could any Thing thunder-strike our Enemies more, than to convince them, that so zealous were the People in their Country's Cause, that they were resolved not to run the Nation a Shilling more in Debt, nor add another perpetuated

tuated Tax to encumber their Trade—That on the contrary, the Government was determined to deal, as it were, for *Ready-Money*; that they would raise the *Supplies Monthly*, and pay their *Creditors Quarterly*; that by Virtue hereof, they would make such an Alliance between the *Exchequer* and the *Bank*, as should uphold the *Public Credit* upon a Rock, not to be shaken by any Event of War, nor even from an Invasion itself: And was this the Case, we might have Reason to treat our Enemies with Contempt, and bid them Defiance. And when our Affairs were brought to this desirable State at Home, what could hinder our Fleets from acting vigorously and effectually Abroad? Could we not then have it in our Power so to distress the Commerce and Navigation of our ever restless Enemy, as to disable them in future Times, from maintaining that lucrative Competition with us in Trade, they have too long done? And if this is not effectually done, these Kingdoms will ever be in Danger of Ruin; for no sooner shall a Peace be made with a perfidious Enemy, but he will instantly prepare again for War. But as the Affairs of our *Trade*, and our *Finances*, are at present circumstanced, a Peace is far more dangerous than a War; for upon the Continuance of a Peace, our Trade must be ruined and undone, if that continues to be loaded with our Tax-Incumbrances, which we have seen in Variety of Lights, put it
our

out of our Power to support that commercial Competition against *France*, and others, that alone can save the Nation. And if we do not give up the System of encreasing our Taxes on Trade, as we shall encrease the public Debt, our Ruin must not only be inevitable, but near at Hand.

LETTER

L E T T E R XI.

*Further Observations on Rivalship in Trade;
with Regard to France and other Nations.*

IN the former Letter, we have taken a short View of some of the masterly Strokes of the *French* Policy, to raise their Trade and Navigation upon the Ruin of ours; and every impartial Man must discern the wide Difference there is between the *French* and the *British* System of commercial Policy; that the one is calculated, by the utmost Stretch of Wisdom and Sagacity, to raise the Commerce of our principal Competitor to its utmost Pitch of Splendor, and that the other is calculated to sink and depress the *British* Trade to its primitive Nothingness.

If *France* encreases her public Debts, she can debase her Coin; she can raise or fall it as she pleases, and can amuse and deceive her own People as well as Foreigners, in Order by such crafty Arts, to lighten her Burthen: if *France* becomes over-loaded with Debts and Taxes, she can again contrive a *Mississippi* Chimera, that, with a Dash of a Pen or a Sponge, will restore her from the most abject State of Poverty, to that of Wealth and Splendor: and when such like

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Politics shall fail them, what hinders but she may dragoon her Subjects out of every Shilling of their Property, to support their grand Monarque?

But, with what Grace can a *free Empire* play such State-Tricks? Can *England*, that values herself upon her inviolable Faith, who glories in upholding her public Credit, with an un sullied Dignity; shall *Britannia* follow the detestable Example of the *Gallic Faith*, and deceive and ruin those who have put Confidence in her Honour? If then she runs in Debt with a View one Day justly to discharge such Debts; and to pay the Annuity contracted for, till the Principal shall be reimbursed; with what Justice and Equity can She presume to run so far in Debt, that she can never be able to pay, either the Interest or the Principal? To save her Honour, is it not more eligible to stop short before She runs so deeply in Debt, that she cannot extricate herself, than to spin the Thread of her Credit so fine, that it must inevitably break? Should She even miscarry in the Attempt, to prevent the farther Encrease of her public Debts, would it not prove more to her Glory, than never to try her Strength; nor ever be able to judge from Experience, whether she could or could not succeed in such her laudable Intentions?

When the Nation was convinced of the Rectitude and Necessity of the Measure, and of the national Glory as well as Benefit and

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Advantage that must attend it, why should any wise and able Minister be dismayed, and imagine that the Voice of the Kingdom would not eccho to the Justice of his Resolution? Why should he apprehend, that any Mouth would open in the Senate, in Opposition to such his upright Intentions? But if such a strange Phænomenon should chance to make its Appearance, may not a Minister be convinced, that such may for ever after shew their Teeth, but they can never be able to bite? If we may ever hope for Unanimity among our Representatives, can any Thing be more likely to obtain it? And what could a Minister desire more to forward and promote his Patriot-Designs, than the Voice of all *within* as well as *without* Doors?

That a Ministry may not be intimidated from making this glorious Stand in their Country's Cause, I shall continue to urge the Necessity of it, by considering the Danger our Trade is in, from the further Measures taken by *France* and other States, to oust and dispossess us of those Branches of Trade, which alone can sustain our commercial Power.

We have already given some Idea of the trading Policy of our most dangerous Competitor; and could wish there was no Occasion to say more on the same Topic: but the Field is capacious.

As Things are now constituted amongst the trading World, those Countries which
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subsist on their natural Productions, and by bartering them against those of other Countries, make no Figure as a Trading People. The *Indians* in *North America*, as well as the *Negroes* in *Africa*, are Instances thereof.

Were the *Chinese*, and the other *Eastern* Countries, deprived of their mechanical and manufactural Artists, they would, probably, degenerate into the like savage Dispositions with the wild *Africans*, or the *American-Indians*: this we may presume, would also prove the Case amongst the *Europeans*. For, as these Arts are the Basis of all Commerce, and Commerce has so greatly civilized the human Race, this Class of People may be said to have some Share in the Merit. Nothing can be more obvious, than that the Commerce and Navigation of trading States, depend on the daily Improvements made by their Artificers, and Manufacturers. Wherefore, it is of the last Consequence to the Interest of such a State, that they be not only bred up in the best Manner, amongst themselves, according to proper State-Regulations, but that their Workmanship should be liable to the constant public Inspection; and that Rewards be dispensed, and Punishments inflicted as well upon those, as upon other Occasions; for if a trading Nation loses its mechanical and manufactural Artists, or those degenerate in their Workmanship, such Nation is sure to lose its Trade,

France, convinced of the high Utility and Importance of those Classes of People, has taken profound and exquisite Measures to preserve the Spirit of Ingenuity among those Subjects, not only by inspiring them with an Emulation amongst each other in the same Branches, but by exciting in them an Ambition to excell those of all other Nations: and particularly in these two following Essentials, (1.) In the Exquifiteness of the Workmanship; and (2.) In the Cheapness of the Commodity. Emulation among their Artists and Workmen within their own Country, is the best Preparatory to enable them to vye with Foreigners. To this End, let us see what is the Policy of *France*; it being worth observing and imitating. For the State has taken all Artists under their Care and Regulation, even from the Apprentice to the Journeyman, and from him to the Master-Workman. Not only are the Genii and Strength of Youth properly consulted, with Regard to the respective Businesses to which they are placed out, but the Abilities and Conduct of Masters, are duely considered, that the Talents of Youth may not be misapplied, and thereby the State deprived of their Service to the best Advantage that Nature seems to have intended them.

In their Apprenticeship, their Servitude is a longer or a shorter Time, according to the Business to which they are placed out; and, after the Expiration of the Time of their Appren-

Apprenticeship, they are not permitted to pass directly, from a State of Subjection and Servitude, to that of Self-mastership: No; they are obliged to go through the Medium of Journeyman-ship, the better to fit and prepare them for Masters. Is not this exquisite Policy? Can any Thing have a more natural Tendency to the Ruin of young People, than their leaping from one Extreme to the other; as that from a State of Servitude and Dependency, to the other of Mastership and Independency, is? But when Artisans and Manufacturers are compelled by the Laws and Regulations enacted for that Purpose, to go through the State of Journeyman-ship; is not such a one more likely to make the better Master, as well with Respect to Skill in his Employment, as to his general Conduct and Behaviour? For his being, as he encreases in Years, some reasonable Time in a Condition above the Degree of an Apprentice, and yet in a State of Manhood, subservient to the Controul and Direction of a Master, qualifies him still the better, not only for the practical Part of his Occupation, but for the prudential Exercise of that Mastership he is about to enter into. Is not a Person so regularly bred, likely to bring up others more to the Advantage of the State, than if such-like Regulations had no Place, as is our Case in *England*? Is not this Policy more likely to train up a Race of skilful, ingenious, and industrious

Artists and Manufacturers, than the contrary Measures? Can we admire to see the Effects of such wise Measures; and that they are really productive of a Succession of the ablest Mechanics, Artificers and Manufacturers, who bring immense Treasures into a commercial State?

Similar Practices also take Place, with Relation to Tradesmen and Merchants: but I have elsewhere hinted at the wise Measures taken with Respect to their Admission of the former, to the Freedom of the Companies of Arts and Trades, or into that of the principal Companies, and how circumspect they are to admit none, but such who are unexceptionable: and that not only with Respect to the Point of Ability in their several Employments, but with Regard also to their Conduct in the three Stages, through which they must have passed; *viz.* that of an Apprentice, a Journeyman, and some Time in the Degree of a Master. See the Royal Ordinances of *France*, particularly that for the Month of *March* 1673.

The Royal Ordonnances, and Arrets of several Parliaments of *France*, in Regard to the Regulation of their Traders, distinguish between the Wholesale and Retail Dealers, and are wisely adapted to both, according to their respective Situations: so extremely minute are those Regulations, that they descend even to prescribe the Methods whereby they are obliged to keep their Accounts:

And

And this is done for good Reasons. (1.) Because the State of their Affairs may be well known, and the Progress they make in Trade fairly appear. (2.) To the End, that if they fail, there may be no Deception, whether it happened by unavoidable Misfortunes, or otherwise. Or, (3.) Whether there is any Thing fraudulent in their Bankruptcy: And when a Bankruptcy does ensue, they are very rigorous: Let it proceed from what Cause it may, the Bankrupt is excluded from being elected Mayor, Sheriff, Consul, or in any other public Capacity of any Distinction or Honour. These have happy Effects; and prove extraordinary Checks and Restraints against Failure, and indeed, any Misconduct in their Traders.

These, together with the Regulations of their Companies of Arts and Trades, shew how greatly, they think, the Prosperity of their Commerce depends upon the private good Conduct of their Traders of every Denomination: And certain it is, that too much Care cannot be taken by a State, of those useful Bodies of the Community.

Nor are they less particular, with Respect to the Regulation of Partnerships in Trade, whose Articles of Agreement are to be executed in the Presence of legal Notaries, and authenticated by Register in the Consular Office. Instead of treating Trade and Traders with Indignity, the State encourages Persons of Distinction and Honour, even the

Prime of their Noblesse, to be anonymously interested in the Wholesale and Mercantile Commerce with Traders of distinguished Skill and Integrity : nor shall it, according to the Royal Ordonnances, any Way derogate from their Gentility or Nobility. Sanction of this Kind, given to practical Trade, has been attended with good Consequences ; for hereby the Trader of Judgment, Address and Honour, will never want a Capital to carry on his Traffic ; and while Monied-Men, and Persons of Distinction, are content to run some Risk, with a View to their commercial Dividends, usurious Practices are greatly prevented.

That their Traders may labour under the less Difficulty and Discouragement in their private Affairs, and be the more at Ease and Tranquillity, to promote their own, as well as the public Prosperity, they have instituted *Court-Merchants*, for the short and unexpensive Decision, in a summary Way, of any Disputes which may arise in the Course of their trafficable Negotiations.

To give the *English* Reader the proper Idea of this Establishment, a Sketch of a genuine Edict for the Purpose may not be improper. That established by *Henry II.* King of *France*, concerning the *Court-Merchant* of the City of *Rouen*, runs as follows, viz.

“ And, for the greater Ease and Advantage of the Merchants of our City of *Rouen*,
“ and

“ and being desirous to gratify them in every
 “ Thing, as far as possible, that they may
 “ not be distracted, and drawn off from their
 “ Business and Affairs, by being obliged to
 “ give their Attendance at fundry Courts of
 “ Judicature, by Reason of Suits and Pleas oc-
 “ casioned by Litigations and Differences
 “ arising amongst them in their Traffic:
 “ Our Will and Pleasure is, that the Mer-
 “ chants of the said Town of *Rouen*, as well
 “ Natives as Foreigners, frequenting the said
 “ Place, shall every Year cause a Society of
 “ Merchants to meet in the Lodge of the
 “ Exchange, at what Time they think fit;
 “ out of which Society of Merchants they
 “ shall chuse three Officers, *viz.* One *Prior*
 “ and two *Consuls*, who shall remain in Au-
 “ thority one Year; at the End of which new
 “ ones shall be chosen by the Plurality of
 “ Voices: which Election and Nomination
 “ being fully ended, the said *Prior* and *Con-*
 “ *suls* shall have present Power in them to
 “ take Knowledge of, and to give Judgment
 “ between all Men, of what Estate, Quali-
 “ ty, or Condition soever they be, of all
 “ Suits, Controversies, and Differences touch-
 “ ing Matters of MERCHANDIZING, or buy-
 “ ing and selling, in Manner as the Conser-
 “ vator of the Fair at *Lyons*, and the *Prior*
 “ and *Consuls* at *Thoulouse* do, as well for Obli-
 “ gations, Bills of Debt, Receipts, Blanks,
 “ signed Bills of Exchange, Securities, Affo-
 “ ciations, and Partnerships of Merchants,
 either

“ either general or particular ; Also of Affu-
 “ rances, Accompts, Transports and Con-
 “ tracts for Matters aforesaid, or any Thing
 “ belonging thereunto ; with all full Power,
 “ and according to the Manner, Judgments,
 “ and Condemnations of the said Conserva-
 “ tor of *Lyons*, and *Prior* and *Consuls* of
 “ *Tboulouse*, &c. &c. Prohibiting all our Judges
 “ to take Cognizance of any Matter or Plea
 “ thereunto belonging ; which Command
 “ shall be noticed unto them, and unto all
 “ Persons to whom it shall appertain, by the
 “ first of our Officers or Sergeants that shall
 “ be required so to do, whom we enjoin to
 “ perform the same accordingly, to the In-
 “ tent that the EXTRAVAGANT CHARGE
 “ AND EXPENCE that Merchants might
 “ otherwise be put to in prosecuting their
 “ Affairs before other Judges may be, by
 “ that Means, entirely avoided, &c. And in
 “ Regard to the Process in Writing, there
 “ shall another Record be made, to the End
 “ that appeals may be ended in the SAME
 “ DAY, to avoid the PROLONGING OF
 “ SUITS, to the RUINING and CONSUMING
 “ OF THE MERCHANTS,”

The Domestic Consular Institutions in
France are of the same Nature, and answer
 good Purposes to the Trading Interest : (1)
 As they also prevent tedious Litigations at Law
 between Traders ; and (2) as they bring the
Consular-Courts familiarly acquainted with the
 practical Affairs of *Commerce*, which renders
 their

their Decision easy to the Court, and no way Vexatious or expenfive to the Subject. For, as their Determinations are all recorded in their Courts, from Time to Time; when any Point occurs that may not have been determined by their Predecessors, or which may be a new Case, they have, from an Index of References, immediate Recourse to Cases, as similar as they can find, and form a Judgment therefrom, in the Manner that our Courts of Law make their Decisions, from consulting a Similitude of Cases of their learned Predecessors, and weighing them consistently with the fundamental Principles of Law.

But these Consular-Courts, and *Courts-Merchants*, being restrained merely to Matters of Trade, they become more skilful, judicious, and expert, in this one Species of Cases, than any Court could possibly be, wherein they undertake the Decision of Cases of every Kind.

Nor is this the only good national End that this domestic Institution answers to *France*; For this Court is a Kind of practical Seminary for the bringing up Persons for the Exercise of the Consular Jurisdictions in foreign Nations, with which *France* carries on their Commerce: And from amongst this Body, or from the Deputies of Commerce, (as taken Notice of in a former Letter) who make their Reports and present their Memorials to the Royal Council, their foreign Consuls are generally chosen. And as the Affairs of their Trade in foreign

foreign States and Empires are left to the Care of those Consuls, they think they cannot be too well qualified previously in Matters of Trade, before they are chosen for an Office of such Consequence: And indeed Persons cannot be presumed to acquit themselves with Honour and Credit in that Capacity abroad, unless they have been some how trained to it at home; for the Exercise of the foreign Consular Authority, is frequently in the Nature of a Judicial Power, when any Contests happen between the Subjects of one State and those of another in Relation to Affairs of Commerce: And by the prudent and wise Interposition of a judicious Consul, great Broils, and Heartburnings, have been happily reconciled; which might otherwise have terminated in Wars.

The *French* foreign Consuls thus trained up at home to the Knowledge of Trade, if they are Persons of Discernment are never at a Loss to discover whatever Difficulties and Discouragement the Trade of *France* may labour under in those foreign Countries where they reside, and what Advantages they can take therein of *England*, or any other Nation. Consuls of Judgment and Sagacity, who do not keep at such a Distance from practical Traders, as an Ambassador, have greater Opportunities of knowing the commercial Grievances of a State, and of pointing out the Means of their Redress, than One who represents his Sovereign in a superior Capacity: And it is not uncommon in *France* for this Station

tion to prove the preparatory Step towards that of a Resident, or an Ambassador. Certain it is, that from these and such other like Measures taken in *France* to make their People well acquainted with Trade, in Order to lay Things before the Royal Council, by the Address of their foreign and domestic Consuls, they have obtained very beneficial Treaties of Commerce with foreign Power; and are seldom over-reached therein by others. Nor can we admire at this; since we find that those in whom the Court confides for the Management of the Interest of their Trade, are so well informed of the Subject.

If this Nation takes such Care to have wise Heads to conduct their commercial Affairs, and gives likewise due Encouragements to have dextrous Hands to propagate their Arts and Manufactures, all Surprise at their Success must cease; for such Causes cannot fail to have those Effects that must prove dangerous to those States, who neglect and condemn the like Policy.

Their Measures, with Respect to their more common Arts, we have already touched on; but as our own Nation cannot be too well apprised of what so nearly concerns her Interest, I shall further observe; That Manufactures of moderate Expence and quick Growth may safely be left to private Adventurers, and run the common Chance for Success; the *finer Arts* will never flourish but under *public* Protection and *noble* Patronage;

Patronage ; no Encouragements in the Hands of private Persons are adequate Rewards to the Merit of Genius : All that was great and noble has been produced by Honour and Reward, by the Countenance of Princes, the Favour and kind Influence of *Great Men*. A noble Profusion of *Honour and Bounty* raised the *Gobelins* to its present Height, the united Influence of these too being generally sufficient, to call forth whatever human Industry can attain to.

This House was the Residence of two Brothers, who first brought to *Paris* the Secret of dyeing a curious *Scarlet*, and failed in setting it on Foot. Their Buildings went under the contemptuous Name of, The Folly of the *Gobelins* for many Years, till the Opprobrium was taken off by a Royal Edict, and the Name changed by public Authority to the more honourable one of the Royal Mansion of the *Gobelins*. The *Scarlet Colour* was ordered to be called after the Name of the Inventors, and the little River *Brevie*, which runs by the Building received the same Distinction. These, in Appearance, were trifling Matters, but will be sensibly felt by the Man of Genius. The same Year the House was purchased by the King ; and intitled the *Royal Manufactory of the Crown Furniture* ; and Provision was made by a *Royal Charter*, to render the Place a *perpetual School and Seminary* of the curious Arts,

Here

Here Monsieur *Colbert* collected together from all Parts of the World the most able Masters and Designers, as well as inferior *Artists* in the fine Manufactures. *Salaries* were appointed for the *Directors*, and *Pensions* for Life for the Workmen; these were Tapestry-weavers, Engravers in Etching and Metzotintoes; Goldsmiths, Jewellers, Carvers, and Workers in Ebony, &c. In this Place was wrought all the magnificent Furniture for fourteen royal Palaces, which has since been deservedly the Admiration of the World. Particular Care was taken, that no Part should be furnished elsewhere, much less from abroad. All honorary Presents to foreign Princes and Noblemen abroad, and to the Ornaments of Temples and public Buildings at home, were made in their best Performances, instead of Jewels or Money. Many of the *superior Artists* invited from foreign Countries, were made *noble*, and various of them have divers honorary *Privileges* and *royal Pensions*.

Besides these, there are three other Academies in *Paris* for the *polite Arts*, with various *Privileges*, *Honours* and *Pensions* to the Members, forming the governing Part of each Society. The *Academy of Painting and Sculpture*; that of *Architecture*, and the *military* one, of late Foundation. Precedents inviting our Attention and Imitation, if the latter may not be said to command it. The two former, and the Academy of Sciences are

are copied in *Spain*, and have all liberal Endowments.

In *England* the Stream of public Favour and Liberality has turned wholly to the Advance of *Sciences*; we have few or no Institutions in Favour of *Arts*, no Place of Residence but for Speculation. The Royal Society are indebted to the Public, only for their Name. And what has been the Effects of the *French* Academies for the Advancement of the polite Arts in *France*? Have not they tended to the extraordinary Improvement of divers of their capital Fabricks? And is it not from them, together with the Ingenuity and Dexterity of their practical Artists, that their eternal Variety and Succession of new Modes and Fashions are derived, which fall so much in with the Taste of the whole World? So helpful to the commercial Arts are their academical Establishments, that they not only contribute to the continual Improvement of the *old* Fabricks, but to the Invention of *new*, both in the manufactural and the mechanical Way.

The lower Branches of Manufacture, wherein the Price is paid chiefly to Labor, contribute most to the Encrease of labouring Hands. The Trades of *Refinement* are not comparable to these for the Numbers they employ. The former seem to be full, as far as our own or foreign Markets, can, at present, receive our Goods. The Arts of Elegance are next, in which we are an Age behind our Neighbours;

bours : What these may want in Merit, as to Encrease of Numbers, they make up in that of Wealth ; the Price of *Art* rising above that of *Labor*, in Proportion as Genius is a scarcer Commodity than Strength.

An Encrease of Wealth may attend a Decrease of Numbers and real Strength, for which Reason, the Ballance of Money is less to be regarded. The Exports of our Nation may at present exceed a Million in the lower Branches of Bays, Serges, Druggets, and Flannels ; and this may employ a *Million of Hands*. In a Course of Years, we will suppose, by Improvement in the refined Arts, this Trade to be changed for that of *wrought Work, Tapestry, Painting, Statuary, &c.* in which our Exports might amount to two Millions ; for which a *thousand Hands* full employed might be more than sufficient. Here we see it possible that our Wealth may be annually encreased a *Million*, whilst our real Strength is decreased in the Proportion of a *Thousand* to *One*. Yet there is nothing incompatible in the Arts of *Ingenuity*, and those of *Labor* ; and all the *plainer* Trades may be retained notwithstanding the *higher Arts* are introduced ; in which Case we should be both a richer and a greater People.

By these Principles of Policy *France* is actuated : Her daily Advancement in the *refined Arts* does not impair those of her *plainer* : On the contrary, the Propagation of the former contribute to the Sale of the latter ; for

U

when

when Nations entertain a favourable Opinion of the one, they are prejudiced in Behalf of the other.

The Cultivation of the more refined Arts in *France* gives an universal Turn of Delicacy, Politeness and Refinement throughout the whole Nation. The Court of *France* is the most splendid of any in *Europe*. The most opulent Exterior reigns in her capital Towns and Cities: The useful as well as the agreeable Arts, the Sciences, and even Wit, have their particular Schools and Academies: The excessive Taste of the *French* for Dress, and their Passion for enjoying Life with Ostentation, improves and sets off these Advantages, and presents to Foreigners a Sight, which seduces, while it dazzles them.

All Nations owe to *France* at least the Tribute of Curiosity, which is not always restrained to that Sentiment. To say nothing of the Money they spend there, which is very considerable; a great Advantage *France* hereby receives, is, that each Traveller, returning to his own Country, carries away with him some *French* Affection, Taste or Fashion. Even we ourselves, whom our national Pride and Rivalship have the most preserved from the *French* Infection, dress out in *French* Cloaths, and *French* Stuffs, even on public and Birth-days: We prefer the Wines of *France*, and keep *French* Cooks.

To

To propagate this Seducement, the Court of *Versailles* affects the Magnificence of making Presents to foreign Nations of the finest Master-pieces of Work from the principal Manufactures of the Kingdom: By which Means it is that their Manufactures have introduced themselves with such Success into other Countries, forcing the Barriers, which high Customs, or Prohibitions oppose in vain to them. Thus it is also, that an Excess of Luxury, ruinous to other States, is become, as to *France*, a Sort of Necessity, towards preserving to it that Superiority of which it is in Possession, in Point of Fashions; and which supports its Manufactures.

After this Sketch of the domestic Policy of this Nation, as it has a Tendency to the Advancement of their Trade and Commerce; it may contribute to give us some further Idea of the Sagacity and Address of this State, by considering in what Manner they have brought about and effected their commercial Connections with the neighbouring Nations. To which End I shall first take Notice of their Management of the *Dutch*, in Order to render them the more subservient and the more conducive to the Promotion of their trading System.

Tho' no Address and Artifice have been wanting in the Court of *France* to stir up Jealousies and even Heart-burnings, between *England* and *Holland*, with Respect to their Competition in Matters of Commerce; yet

we are far from allowing, that the Trade of the two States engages them in such a Rivalship with each other as is pretended by the Enemies of both ; for the Trade of the *Dutch* is chiefly founded upon their carrying Merchandises cheaper to foreign Markets than any other Nation in the World : The hard and penurious Way of living they are inured to, enables them to perform the longest Voyages with much less Consumption and Expence than other Nations : By which Means they have long been the common Carriers of the Product of other Countries, having little of their own, unless what arises from their Settlements in the Indies. The *British* Trade, on the contrary, consists almost entirely in vending and dispersing the Product and Manufactures of our own Country, while our Freights, from the Reason given in the Course of these Papers, must necessarily be dearer than those of any other Nation.

The essential Branch, therefore, of the *Dutch* Commerce, very little interferes with ours ; nor if they were to lay it down to morrow, would any Share of it, as our Affairs are at present circumstanced, in Regard to the Weight of our Taxes, devolve to *Great Britain* ; but to the *French*, the *Danes*, the *Swedes*, the *Hamburgers*, and the other *Hanse-Towns*, who all both can, and actually do, sail much cheaper than we can afford ; and 'till our Taxes are reduced, instead of being encreased, we shall never have any Share

in the carrying Trades of the World; although they would prove such a Nursery for our Seamen, that, we could never stand in Need of Sailors far more than sufficient to man a Royal Navy capable of facing any Enemy, without being under the disagreeable Necessity of forcing Men into the Service. And were the *Dutch* at this Time to lose their Plantations in the *Indies*, are they not likely to fall into the Hands of *France*? *France*, therefore, is the most formidable Rival to both Nations.

France well knowing that the *Dutch* have been always zealous to improve every Occasion that offered in Favour of their Commerce, has wisely fell in with their Way of thinking. The Interest that *France* had with the States in the Year 1678 to disunite her from her Allies was founded upon this Principle: And this determined the King of *France* to grant the Republic a Renewal of old Treaties, and even to indulge her so far as to explain them as she pleased.

After having said in the Sixth Article of that Treaty, that the Subjects on either Side should enjoy a full and entire Liberty of Commerce in *Europe*, in all the Bounds of each others Dominions, the *Dutch* added to the former ones what we find in the Seventh Article: This Article was of so much Importance and Advantage to them, that they again extended it in the Treaty of Commerce made at *Utrecht*, April 11th 1713. The particu-

lar Regard the *Dutch* shew to this Article, may convince us, that they held the Rest of the Treaty for almost Nothing, provided the *French* put in Execution that Article, which was so favourable to the Interest of their Commerce : For this Article they made no Scruple to withdraw from their Allies at *Nimeguen*, and to be the first who signed the *Treaty of Ryswick*.

By the Means of this Article the *Dutch* long enjoyed the Fertility of *France*, and all the Advantages of the *French* Subjects themselves. Besides the Advantages which this Article procured them, they took from the King even the Liberty of granting any particular Favor to his own Subjects, unless, at the same Time, he gratified the *Dutch* Merchants with the like : And by the Ninth Article, the *French* gave the *Dutch* great Advantage in the *Levant Trade*. This Article, afterwards included in the Treaty of *Utrecht*, was limited to 25 Years, and consequently expired *April 11, 1738*.

And to allure the *Dutch* into all the Measures of *France*, they have, from Time to Time, given them to understand that they would renew this Treaty, or make some other Treaty of Commerce more beneficial to the *Dutch* than that provided they followed the Dictates of their Court. By these Means, *France* has too long amused the States to act what Part she has pleased.

The Seventh Article of the above-mentioned Treaty of Commerce between *France* and *Holland*, concluded at *Nimeguen* in 1678, says, “*That the Subjects on both Sides shall pay no other Duties in one another’s Dominions than the Natives do **.” Nor has this Article, perhaps, proved of less Advantage to *France* than it has to *Holland*, it having encouraged the latter to enter the *French* Ports, purchase their Commodities wholly for the *Dutch* Account, or for the Company Account of both *Dutch* and *French*, according to the mercantile Practice, and to carry them, in their cheap Way, to foreign Markets. Hereby the Exports of the *French* Produce, and also their Manufactures, have been greatly extended by the *Dutch* in most Parts of the World; which might not have been the Case, if this *Treaty* had not taken Place; notwithstanding the Pretensions of *France*, that it has proved more to the Benefit of *Holland* than themselves. But this is a *Fineffe* only to enhance the Me-

* There is a separate Article in this Treaty, as follows : viz. “The Equality to be observed in Relation to the Subjects of each Nation as to Duties &c. according to the 7th Article of this Treaty, shall not derogate from the Imposition of 50 Sols *per Ton* imposed in *France* upon the Ships of Strangers; but the Subjects of the States shall pay the same as well as other Strangers; but it shall be only once in each Voyage; and the said Ships, if laden with Salt, shall pay but half the 50 Sols. The States may lay the like Imposition on Strangers Ships, but must not exceed it.” But the *Dutch* Shipping were afterwards exempt in *France* from the Duty of 50 Sols *per Ton*.

rits of the Treaty to the *Dutch*, while they have reaped the greatest Benefit by it : But neither could have reaped the Advantage they have done by it, provided the Cheapness of the *French* Commodities and the Cheapness of *Dutch* Freights, and the other Advantages given to the *Dutch* by the Treaty, had not mutually conspired thereunto.

We cannot better judge of the Benefits, which *France* has received from thus drawing foreign Shipping in general into their Ports, than from the Sentiments of the Deputies of Commerce in their Memorial to the Royal Council in 1701 *.

“ The Point, say the Deputies, we ought
 “ to have the most in View in *France*, is to
 “ draw thither foreign Shipping to take off
 “ our superfluous Commodities ; it must be
 “ remembered that all the Provinces are
 “ overstocked with them ; that they are our
 “ Mines of Gold and Silver ; we formerly
 “ vended of them to the Value of above 50
 “ Millions yearly ; the People cannot subsist,
 “ nor support the Charge of the Government
 “ without this Vent ; it is by this Means alone
 “ that we render other States our *Debtors*.
 “ The State will be exhausted when due At-

* See MEMOIRE sur la Suppression du Droit de Fret de 50s. par Tonneau sur les Marchandises du Nord ; les Avantages & Adresses des HOLLANDOIS pour s'emparer entierement du Commerce de FRANCE.

“ tention is not had thereto ; we shall always
 “ want, as long as we do not create Compe-
 “ titors to the *Dutch*, in our Commerce.
 “ Nothing is of so much Importance : That
 “ Nation ruins us *.

“ The Views we might have in continuing
 “ the levying of the Duty of 50 Sols *per Ton*,
 “ namely to engage the King's Subjects to
 “ carry the Merchandise of the Kingdom to
 “ foreign Countries in our own Shipping, in
 “ Order to sell them there for our Account,
 “ and to establish our Navigation by Laws
 “ and Maxims like those of the *English*, do
 “ not suit us for several Reasons.

“ 1. The Product of *France* is different
 “ from that of *England* ; that Nation is not
 “ loaded with those corruptible and perish-
 “ able Kind of Goods, that should put them
 “ to the Necessity, like us, of having For-
 “ eigners among them to take them off their
 “ Hands. The Nature of our Commodities
 “ requires, for their being well disposed of,
 “ that they should be bought by Foreigners,
 “ before they are exported out of the King-
 “ dom. This Condition must oblige us to

* From the Cheapness of the *Dutch* Freights, and the Uni-
 versality of their commercial Correspondence, they did in some
 Measure prevent the Competition of other Shipping in the
French Ports ; which probably might have raised the Price of
French Commodities, provided the Duty of 50 Sols *per Ton*, on
 Freights had been taken off ; tho' some of the more skilful and
 experienced Judges of Trade were of a contrary Opinion, as
 might be shewn if needful.

“ Managements which otherwise we might
 “ avoid.

“ 2. Nothing is so ruinous to the King’s
 “ Subjects, as the sending Goods on their Ac-
 “ count to foreign Countries; where the
 “ House-keepers ordinarily drink Beer only,
 “ and taking but small Quantities of Wine;
 “ the Sale of it is not to all Sorts of Persons
 “ indifferently. We are constrained, when
 “ we carry any to them, to pass through the
 “ Hands of certain Dealers in Wine, who
 “ have an Understanding with one another
 “ like our Brokers of *Paris*; which they
 “ keep up the more easily, by causing the
 “ Goods we send them to be sold by public
 “ Auction. These Goods are consumed by
 “ Charges, or corrupt, and very often perish
 “ in the Ware-houses; so that it almost al-
 “ ways happens, that we got no Return for
 “ them; Nay, it is good Luck if we do not
 “ owe them something by the Accounts we
 “ receive from them. Hence proceed the
 “ frequent Bankruptcies we have in *France*.
 “ We shall ever be in this fatal Situation, till
 “ we draw Foreigners to our Country, and
 “ till they send to our Ports to take these Goods
 “ on their own Account *. This will be done

* Does not this shew that the *French* have experienced it to be more for their Advantage that Foreigners should come to their own Ports and purchase their perishable Commodities for their own Account, than to send them to foreign Markets in their own Shipping, tho’ they lost the Benefit of the Freight?

“ when

“ when we shall have restored our antient
 “ good Intelligence with Foreigners. Now,
 “ in our present Condition, the *Dutch* be-
 “ ing those who do us most Mischief, be-
 “ cause they are the sole Masters of our Com-
 “ merce, it is of Importance to free ourselves
 “ from their Tyranny, by creating as soon as
 “ may be Competitors to them, by suppress-
 “ ing this Duty of 50 Sols *per Ton*.

“ 3. The Liberty, which we cannot take
 “ from Foreigners, of making Use of their
 “ own Shipping to fetch our Commodities,
 “ whether for themselves as for us; and the
 “ inimitable Oeconomy of their Navigation
 “ suppresseth ours, with the indispensable
 “ Necessity of consuming the Superfluity of
 “ our Goods in their Countries, joined to
 “ other Inconveniences above intimated, will
 “ ever place Foreigners out of all Competi-
 “ tion from the King's Subjects, as to the
 “ Navigation in the *Ocean*, and the Trade of
 “ those Goods; they will gain both by the
 “ one and the other, while we shall lose con-
 “ siderably. It is absolutely our Interest not
 “ to make them jealous and uneasy in these
 “ Cases, since in vending our Goods, they
 “ work for us. We have therefore seen 4 or
 “ 5000 foreign Ships at a Time come into the
 “ Kingdom to take them off; the Privation
 “ of Trade with the *English*, and the Duty
 “ of 50 Sols *per Ton*, have interrupted this
 “ great Commerce.”

From

From hence we may judge, that considerable mutually Advantages have been obtained by this Encouragement given to the *Dutch*; whom *France* has made subservient to the Promotion of her Trade in all Parts of the Globe; to which the *Dutch* have chearfully consented: And such like Baits will always be caught at by those trading People.

Holland has long been an *Entreport* for the Merchandizes of *France*; which has proved of unspeakable Benefit to both Nations; the Voyages from the *North*, from *Dantzick*, or *Copenhagen*, &c. to many of the Ports of *France*, are too long for a Ship to go and come certainly in one Season, considering the Ice, and the long Nights; and this State has been an important *Entreport* for the Trade of *Marseilles* in particular.

How *France* has cultivated her Trade with *Spain*, may be judged by the Encouragement the latter has long given to the Commerce of the *French Colonies*, with those of *Spain*, tho' they strictly prohibit ours, as has been before sufficiently noticed: And with Relation to the Commerce of *Spain* from *Europe* to *America*, it is well enough known how numerous the *French* mercantile Houses at *Cadiz* are, in Comparison to those of *England*; whereas, where there was one *French* House of Trade formerly at *Cadiz*, and other of the chief trading Ports of *Spain*, there were

were ten *English*. Whatever Arts may have been practised by the *Spaniards* to prevent Umbrage to this Nation; yet it is well known, whose Merchandizes are most favoured in the Register-Ships, and who have the largest Returns in the Galleons and Flota: But what is it that a greater Cheapness of Commodities, and Refinedness of Workmanship, joined to *French* Policy, will not effect, were there no other prevailing Inducements?

To what a Pitch the *French* have wormed themselves into the *Portugal* Trade, is not less deserving our Observation. There is scarce an Article in that Commerce wherein they have not interfered with us more or less. By Means of their Manufacture of black Druggets alone, they had not stripped us of less than 200,000 *l.* Sterling *per Ann.* in our Woollen Manufactory, before the late Catastrophe in that Kingdom. Nor can any one be surpris'd at this, who has ever seen the Exquifiteness of their Workmanship, and their Dying in that new Manufacture, and know the cheap Rate at which they are sold in *Portugal*. I have some Patterns now by me, sent me at my Request, from an eminent *English* Merchant at *Lisbon*; which I have showed to several Manufacturers in that Way; who declare, that they can never afford to sell so good a Manufacture so cheap as the *French* do, till their Taxes are reduced.

If

If we turn our Eyes upon *Italy*, we shall hardly find a State there, where the *French* are not daily supplanting us; and what a Progress they have made in the *Levant-Trade*, is too well known to need Animadversion. And what is this to be ascribed to, but the greater Cheapness of their Fabricks when compared to ours, Quality for Quality; and to the Subtilty and Craftiness, in accommodating their Goods, as well in Colour and Workmanship as Price, to the *Turkish* Taste? When a *Turk* can purchase for himself and his Attendants, two Suits of *French* Apparel that hits his Goût, in the Year, for the Price of one that is *English*, can we wonder which should obtain the Preference?

The Progress of their Trade in *America* we have before observed; and how extraordinarily the greater Cheapness of those Productions have contributed to the Promotion of their whole *European* Commerce: And to what a Degree their *East-India* and *African* Trades in particular have advanced their whole Trade and Navigation, is too notorious to require more than has been occasionally said thereon, in the Course of these Letters.

If *France* had not been too premature in breaking with us; if they had preserved the Pacification but for one twenty Years longer, they need not have had Recourse to War, to have subdued the *British* Empire: had they only silently persevered in their commercial System,

System, they might by that Means only, without disturbing the Tranquillity of *Europe*, have insensibly brought the haughty Islanders, as they have christened us, under their Yoke. But, perhaps, they might judge the Scheme they have adopted, to be rather more expeditious, or more secure; for, say they, if we should not happen to conquer by Dint of Sword now, we shall take a large Step towards it, if we can but compell the Enemy to run as many Millions more in Debt, as they did the last War, and thereby add *a Million a Year more of Taxes upon their Trade*: If we can do that, say the *French*, we shall afterwards be prepared to bring about the Ruin of the *English* by *Trade*, tho' we should be once more disappointed by the Sword.

In this Manner will a *French* Monarch and his Ministers reason; but certain it is, that a *British* Monarch, with his wise and faithful Ministers, will be able to counterplot those Designs against our Liberties and our Commerce; if they shall resolve to try the Sense of the Parliament and the Nation, in Regard to raising the Supplies *within the Year*; for if *That* shall be resolved on, can any Thing more effectually disappoint the Views of our Enemies? Can any Measures have a happier Tendency to render us respectable abroad, and strengthen us with potent Allies, than to convince the whole World, that we are, at length, determined
to

L E T T E R XII.

How the Encrease of the public Debts, and consequently of the public Taxes will affect the Landed Interest.

IT will hardly be suspected to be an under Computation to reckon the Landed-Rental of *England* at — 20,000,000 *l.*

The Exports and Freights at 8,000,000

The Expence of the People of *England*, as most reckon them at 8 Millions, at 8 *l.* per Head 64,000,000

The general Amount of Taxes, and Part of their Consequences, as represented in the former Part, according to Sir *Matthew Decker* is, - - - 15,289,375

If our Exports and Freights make $\frac{1}{8}$ of the Expences of the People, they must be computed to pay $\frac{1}{8}$ of the last Article, which makes - - - 1,911,171

Which being deducted, the Remainder of our Tax-Incumbances, is what falls on Land, viz. - - - 13,378,204

Mr. *Locke*, in his *Considerations, &c.* treating of Taxes and Commodities, says, X “ It

“ It is in Vain, in a Country whose great
 “ Fund is Land, to hope to lay the public
 “ Charge of the Government on any Thing
 “ else; there at last it will terminate. The
 “ Merchant (do what you can) will not bear
 “ it, the Labourer cannot, and therefore
 “ the Land-holder must.”

If foreign Trade will pay but $\frac{1}{8}$ Part of our Taxes, our own Landed-interest must pay the remaining $\frac{7}{8}$; which amounting to 13,378,204 *l.* and falling on a Rental of 20,000,000 *l.* is above thirteen Shillings in the Pound Tax upon all the Lands of *England*: so that our Land, with the present Taxes, at twenty Shillings *per* Acre, or without the present Taxes at seven Shillings *per* Acre, are equal; and thus Land is reduced by our Taxes.

But if the landed Interest bore only 10 *s.* in the Pound of all the Taxes upon their Rental of twenty Million, that would be paying ten Millions of our general Tax Incumbrances out of the 15,289,375 *l.* and the Remainder of the People might be said to pay the remaining 5,289,375 *l.* Yet this Burthen considered, perhaps, in the lowest Light it can, falls very heavy upon the landed Interest.

If Mr. *Locke's* Observation, that all Taxes in general ultimately terminating upon landed, should be exceptionable, as some think it; yet it is obvious, that the landed Interest bears a considerable greater Proportion thereof, than all other Parts of the Nation do together: And
 if

if our Taxes laid directly upon Trade, or in any other intermediate Shape, do (by Virtue of the Augmentation of our public Debts, encrease by the present War to the Degree they did encrease in the last War) arise to a Million *per Annum*, together, without the Addition of all the various Augmentations that necessarily attend such a primitive Taxation, this *Million per Annum*, as has been shewn in the former Part of this Work, will be *doubled* upon our general Trade; And if we add two Millions a Year more to the preceding 15,289,375 *l.* the Sum total will be 17,289,375 *l.*

If likewise, according to the Case stated, our Exports and Freights make $\frac{1}{8}$ Part of the Expences of the People, they must be computed to pay $\frac{1}{8}$ Part of the last Article of 17,289,375 *l.* which is 2,161,171 *l.* This Sum being deducted, the remaining $\frac{7}{8}$ of our Tax-incumbrances, which will be 15,197 *l.* falling upon a Rental of 20,000,000 *l.* amounts to seventeen Shillings in the Pound: And, provided we should suppose this to be reduced to fifteen Shillings in the Pound, the Landed-interest will be stripped of three Quarters of their annual Rental, and must be obliged to subsist themselves and Families only upon the other Quarter.

Besides, if our public Debts encrease in the Proportion represented in the first Letter, or in a much less Degree, we find, that such will, in few Years, be the Doom of the Land-holder, that his Lands must sink in the

Rental and Purchase, by Reason of the Height of our Taxes; and what must exaggerate the Grievance, will be, that the less valuable his Estate shall grow, the more he will have to pay, the heavier will his Tax-burthen be.

Rather than Things should come to such Extremity with the Land-holder and the Nation, it may be submitted to Consideration: Whether it will not be eligible on the Part of the Landed-interest, and, indeed, more to their Advantage in particular, to acquiesce to an equal Land-tax? There is no Tax more unequal than that laid upon Land; and why this Inequality should subsist, I believe, no Reason of Weight can be assigned. The Arguments urged against Smuggling, may, with no less Reason, be urged in Favour of a Review and a new Assessment of the Land-tax. May it not be said, that an Estate paying but *half the Tax* in one Place, which an Estate of the *same Rent* pays in another, is an unreasonable Partiality, and ought to be remedied? May not the Landed-man, who is taxed to the *Full* of his Estate, be compared to the fair Trader, who deserves all the Care of the Government; and the under-taxed to the *Smuggler*, who defrauds the Public of its just Dues? And if there are any Abuses in the Collection of the Land-tax, ought they not also to be remedied? If the Commissioners of the Land-tax, as is said, in all Counties, ease themselves, and lay dis-

disproportioned Burthens on their Neighbours, should not such Grievance be redressed likewise ?

It may be said, that a State of War is the most unseasonable Time to think of an Affair of this Kind ; it being necessary that the Land-tax should be first absolutely taken off, before a Review, and a new Assessment should be thought of : To this it may be replied, that Nothing can prove a more justifiable Plea, in Favour of such an Attempt, even in Time of War, when it proceeds from a Motive to raise the Supplies within the Year ; which must, in its Consequences, prove more beneficial to the Landed, than to the Trading or Monied-interest, from what has been before observed.

If by as exact an Equilization of the Land-Tax as can be made, four Shillings in the Pound should produce not above a Million *per Ann.* more than it does, this, upon our *Ready-money*, or *Short-credit System* of dealing by the Government, will make more than a quarter Part of the whole Supplies we may stand in Need of ; and will the better prepare the Way towards raising the Remainder. For when the Trading and Monied-interests, and other Classes of the People, found the Landed-interest so ready to contribute their Proportion, and that in a Shape so just, and so equitable, they could, with an ill Grace, complain of an additional Tax upon themselves ; when it was intended for a Purpose

so highly interesting and honourable to the whole Kingdom.

In Order to prevent all Objection to this Design on the Part of the Land-holders, it is submitted: Whether, in Consideration of their Acquiescence to such an Equilization of the Land-tax, they should not be exempted from any Kind of further Taxation, that should be requisite to raise the Supplies within the Year? But if they should not chuse to submit to the one, they could have no reasonable Pretence to be excused from the other.

The candid and ingenuous Reader will please to observe, that the great Point aimed at, throughout these Papers, is the Advancement and Prosperity of our *foreign Trade*; and it is not possible, that this should take Place, and the Land-holder not participate of the national Blessing thereby intended; and in Consequence thereof obtain that Ease hereafter, which he can never expect, unless he will either concur in a new Assessment, or to an additional Taxation in some other *Modus*. Here the Land-holder has the Alternative; and which ever of the two shall be embraced, he will please to consider, that it is only a *temporary* Tax, laid on annually, at his own Option, till there shall be no further Occasion for its Continuance: I mean, that if the Landed-interest shall in either one Shape or the other, contribute their Proportion, to raise the Supplies within the Year, it may, in its Consequences,
be

be made to turn out so much to their Benefit and Advantage, as to free them for *ever after* from every Degree of a Land-tax : And certainly a *perpetual Easement* will be reckoned an *adequate Equivalent* to a *temporary Burthen*, and that to continue a few Years only : And this I am willing to believe may be made appear.

The Merchant, the Tradesman, and the Manufacturer, are not so deeply concerned in the Interest of Trade, as the Landholder, tho' his particular Interest seems more remote. The former are not fixed to a Country ; their Effects are moveable, vendible in many Parts of the World : If they are oppressed in one Country, they can soon fly to another, where greater Freedom and Prosperity invite.

The Landholder, on the other Hand, hath an immoveable Property, valuable only to some few of his Neighbours or Country-men ; the Produce of which, if Trade carries not off, nor brings in People to consume, but, by its Decay, drives the Consumers out of the Kingdom, his Tenants must decay, break, and his Land become untenanted : He may, indeed, sell at one Price or another : but when the Bulk of his Neighbours are in as bad a Situation as himself, and all Rents declining, will not the Value of untenanted Farms and empty Houses be very low ?

If the Traders should be the first pinched, they will have the first Warning to avoid the Calamity, which coming the more gradually

upon the Landholders, they will be the longer lulled in a deceitful Security. Who then is the most concerned in Point of Interest with Regard to Trade? Is he whose Property consists in Moveables, who hath the first Warning, and the greatest Choice of Purchasers in foreign Countries; or he whose Property is immoveable, who feels not the Danger, till it is far advanced, hath the least Choice of Purchasers, and those too declining ones, like himself?

LETTER

L E T T E R XIII.

The Practicability of Raising the Supplies within the Year, with the Sketch or Outlines of a Scheme for that Purpose.

From what has been urged throughout this Tract, considered connectedly in all its divers Lights, I am willing to flatter myself, that the *Reasonableness* and *Necessity* of raising the Supplies *some how* within the Year, has been made appear. It remains, therefore, now to enter upon the *Practicability* of the Matter; for if it should be found impracticable; if it should be judged that the Nation is incapable of bearing, during the Time of a War, such an additional Burthen, as must be necessary, it cannot be expected that the Design should be carried into Execution. Great Variety of Schemes may be easily formed upon this Occasion; but previously hereto, it was requisite to establish, beyond Dispute, the Reasonableness and Necessity of any. Till something better is thought of, I shall, with all humble Submission, pray Leave to propose the Outlines of a Scheme that seem to bid fair to answer the End proposed; which is chearfully submitted to the Amendment

ment and Alteration of such, who are better acquainted with those Affairs.

Antecedent to which, it may not be amiss to observe :

1. That this additional Burthen requisite to be laid upon the Nation to answer the Purpose hereby intended, must be considered only as a *temporary* Burthen, to be continued no longer, than during the Time of War ; and that it will absolutely free and exempt the Nation from all *perpetuated* Taxes that must be imposed, to pay Interest-money only for what shall be borrowed during the Continuance of the War, if we shall not be found capable of raising the Supplies within the Year.

2. That it is proposed to raise the Sum necessary every *Month* upon the Public, and to pay all the *Contractors* and *Dealers*, &c. with the Government every *Quarter* ; in Order that the Money as soon as possible, may return again into the general Channel of *public Circulation*, and thereby prevent any Stagnation in our Commerce, and other Negotiations.

3. That the Consequence of such a speedy Return of the Money into the general Circulation will create a greater Plenty of Money in Circulation, than the Payment of Interest *half-yearly* of Money borrowed ; and that therefore Commodities, in general, will come cheaper to all Purchasers, and thereby the better enable them to contribute, as shall be

be proposed, towards raising the Supplies *monthly*.

4. That the Savings made by the Contributors in their Consumption, by Reason of the greater Cheapness of Commodities, that will ensue, will go a great Way in Discharge of the whole additional Incumbrance necessary to be laid upon them; and therefore, however burthensome it may, at the first View, appear; yet it will be next to insensible, and at the Year's End People will not find their Expence so greatly encreased as it will be by *Taxes* to be perpetuated upon them for the *Monies borrowed*. For, as has been shewn in the foregoing Part, such Taxes, however laid upon Commodities or otherwise, in the common Way of Management, are *doubled* in their Expence to the Nation: So that although the Government raise *Four Millions* at the Interest of *3 per Cent.*, that Tax to the Nation, amounts to *6 per Cent.* as has been demonstrated in these Papers, by the Augmentations that are necessarily made upon the People thereby: So that by raising of *Four Millions* without any Tax being levied to pay Interest for the same, the Nation will be saddled with *240,000l. per Annum* in that Respect only.

5. That the Government being capable of paying all Contractors and Dealers every *Three Months* (which is esteemed in the Way of Trade as good as *Ready-money*) will be able to save in the laying out of *Four Millions*, at least

least 20 *per Cent.*; but to avoid all Exaggeration, if they save by such Management no more than 10 *per Cent.* in their Purchases, this will prove a further *Saving* of 400,000 *l. per Annum.*

6. That the Methods of raising the Supplies by *Borrowing* and *Funding*, have always been attended with a great Expence to the Nation, those who being the *Undertakers* upon such Occasions ever making great Advantages of the public Necessity: And, if those Advantages were to be computed, we should find that they have amounted to a round Sum upon a Loan of *Three Millions per Annum.* But if we shall be capable of raising the Supplies *within the Year*, we shall prevent every national Disadvantage of this Kind; and *Two Millions* may be made to go as far in the public Expence in Time of War, as *Three Millions* have been made to do by the usual Way of *borrowing*: And if we add to these *Saving-Considerations*, the Benefit that our Commerce may receive by the Prevention of *additional Taxes to Perpetuity*, I believe no partial Person will think I have over-rated the *Savings* from what has been observed. So that if the Landed Interest should be prevailed on, from the Motives that were urged in the last Letter; and indeed from all other urged throughout these Papers, to acquiesce in a new Review and Assessment of the Land-Tax, and thereby 4 *Shillings* in a Pound shall produce a *Million* more than it at present does, there

there may require only *Two Millions* more to be raised *within the Year*; but if *Four Millions* should be necessary, a *Quarter Part* thereof being raised by a *new Land-Tax*, would facilitate raising of the Remainder.

And here I would observe, that the Inequality of the Land-Tax not only requires being remedied, but the Slowness of it's levying, which puts the Nation to the Expence of borrowing, upon that Tax, and paying Interest for what we ought to pay none at all: This taken into Consideration might add to the *general Savings* proposed.

7. As the Benefit of Taxes to the Public results only from the nett Income, and the Evil to Individuals extend not only to the gross Produce, but to every other Expence and Loss incident and consequential, that Tax is most beneficial to the Public, and least injurious to the Subject, which produces a large Sum through a *cheap Collection*; and which is exempt from every other eventual Charge.

To use a familiar Instance: He who attends to his own Affairs, lives upon his own Land, employs but one Steward, at a small Salary, to receive his Rents, and buys at the first Hand, may, from a small compact Estate, thus conducted, spend and save more than the Lord of an immense Rental, widely dispersed, gathered by many Hands profusely paid; he living at a Distance, and purchasing what he consumes from the fourth or fifth Dealer. That a Land-Tax is attended
with

with the least Expence of any other whatsoever, that does not produce any Thing near the nett Sum annually, is Matter of Fact.

Whatever Kind or Kinds of Taxes shall be thought eligible for raising the Supplies *within the Year*, should be collected at the *cheapest Rate* possible : Nay, it should, and may be done *without any Expence* whatever to the Nation ; it being collectible by the Persons already employed in the public Revenue. Or, if they had three Pence in the Pound upon proper Security, or $1\frac{1}{4}$ *per Cent.*, for the Collection of it, this should be the utmost.

It being proposed, likewise to be collected *Monthly*; the Sum of *Three Millions per Annum* will make 250,000 *l. per Month*; and this should be duely and punctually remitted *monthly* to the *Exchequer*; so that the Government would thereby be enabled to pay their Contractors 750,000 *per Quarter*; if also the present Manner of collecting the Land-Tax was expedited, the Income of the new Tax Money, might be made to contribute to the *Saving* of a Part of the Interest we pay for anticipating the Produce of the Land-and-Malt-Taxes.

8. The Consideration of the different Taxes, which constitute the Revenue of the State, and of the Inconveniencies of each, will naturally lead a Friend to his Country, to the Desire of the Means of taxing all the Articles which could, and ought to be made contribute, in the justest, easiest, equallest Manner

Manner, to the public Charge ; that is to say, of taxing every Subject, in Proportion to the Advantage he derives from Society : Infomuch, that, with Respect to him who has no Property, so far from depriving him of the Hopes of acquiring any, the Influence of the Taxes should be no more than a gentle Spur to his Industry, and that it should fall reasonably, and not arbitrarily upon those, who have some Property, in Proportion to the real and personal Estates they enjoy.

Wherefore, it should seem, that a free Tax, bearing solely upon the different Articles of Luxury and Consumption, (these of absolute Necessity excepted) is the least exceptionable. This is what Sir *Matthew Decker* seems to have formed in a Recapitulation, of divers Article of Luxury ; as the Use of Coaches, Chairs, Horses, Plate, Jewels, Diamonds, &c. but this Scheme having been already Piece-meal'd, something else may be thought of : And from this Scheme of Sir *Matthew's*, or that upon Houses, might probably be derived, as good as any that can be suggested, whereby to raise the Supplies needful for the War within the Year : But as this is so well known and understood, I shall not dwell upon it.

9. I am not unapprised of the Disagreeableness of a general Poll-Tax, in a free, or any other State. Certain I am, that it will be always best to avoid this Tax in *Great-Britain* ;

Britain; because it is so contrary to the Sense of the People; and that is Reason sufficient for me to condemn it. However, it does not follow from hence, but that Something of a personal Tax upon proper Classes of the People, may be very eligible, and no Way disagreeable to the Persons so taxed, when they are assured, that it is imposed only for a *Time*, and upon the most pressing Emergencies of the State: In such a Case of extreme Necessity, (as I take the present to be) a Person may venture to presume to offer the Sketch of a Scheme, carrying with it some Degree of personal Taxation, though very far from being any Thing in general: Nor will it fall upon any but those whom we may reasonably believe, can bear it without labouring under any great Difficulty.

If any Thing of a personal Tax should be thought eligible, I shall only draw the *Out-Lines* thereof, exhibiting the various Classes of Persons that may be thought proper to be the Objects of such a Kind of Taxation, leaving the respective Sums to be filled up by others.

I will not take upon me to answer for the Exactitude of the Numbers; but till something more correct can be obtained, the following Numbers are submitted.

1. Temporal

1. Temporal Lords	-	250
2. Spiritual Lords	-	26
3. Baronets, Knights and Esqrs;		4,500
4. Gentlemen	—	14,000
5. Persons in great Offices	-	6,000
6. Ditto in lesser Offices	-	9,000
7. Eminent Merchants, and Traders by Sea ; and some monied Persons and Bankers	—	3,000
8. Lesser Ditto	—	12,000
9. Law and its superior Dependants		15,000
10. Eminent Clergymen	-	2,000
11. Lesser Ditto	—	12,000
12. Freeholders of better Sort		30,000
13. Ditto Lesser	—	125,000
14. Farmers	-	180,000
15. Persons in liberal Arts, and Physicians, Surgeons Apotheries, Chymists, and Quacks		30,000
16. Shop-keepers and Tradesmen		100,000
17. Artisans and Handicrafts		80,000
18. Naval Officers, Captains of <i>Indiamen</i> , and of the principal Merchant's Ships		10,000
19. Military Officers	-	7,000
		639,776

REMARKS.

I believe no one will think that the Numbers are over-rated.

In Regard to the two first Classes, *viz.* of Temporal and Spiritual Lords, as their Numbers

bers are very small, I humbly apprehend that they should be left entirely to their Choice, to serve the Public on such Emergencies, in a Way the most agreeable to themselves; they having ever given Testimony of their Zeal, to serve the Interest of their Country in the best Manner, in Cases of Necessity.

The 5th Class, *viz.* That of Persons in great Offices, will admit of a Subdivision, of all Deputies, and Clerks under them, who may be thought as proper Objects of some Degree of Taxation, as their superior Employers: And those Persons, who are of the 6th Class, have also their Clerks and Dependants, which together will make a pretty numerous Body, and an easy personal Tax, will be no Burthen to them.

The 7th Class, likewise, will admit of a Subdivision, with Respect to the following Particulars. (1.) In Relation to their Apprentices, who are generally young Persons of good Fortune, and a personal Tax upon them as such, will not be felt. (2.) Their Clerks too, will make still a more considerable Number. (3.) And their Merchandizing and Ship-Brokers, and their under Agents of every Kind, will still encrease the Number of their Dependants, who can hardly be thought to escape some small Degree of Taxation, while their Masters, I am persuaded, will chearfully submit, on their Part, to what is so essential to the Prosperity of their Commerce. (4.) Captains, and Mates
of

of Merchantmen. These also will make an Addition to the Produce; nor scruple to contribute something in this Shape, in Order the more effectually to enable us to give the *French* an hearty Drubbing; and humble them, if possible, for ever after.

The 8th Class have also their Subordinates, who cannot expect to remain unnoticed upon so meritorious an Occasion. Under these will fall all Warehouse-men, and Wholesale Dealers, Factors and Agents of every Class, concerned in such-like Affairs, &c.

The 9th Class will be divided as follows: viz. (1.) Into Gentlemen of the long Robe, or Chamber-Council, as well with Regard to Law and Equity, as Civilians. (2.) Solicitors, Attornies and Proctors. (3.) All their Clerks and Dependants, which respect their several Professions.

The 15th Class, viz. Persons in liberal Arts may take in several Branches. (1.) As Physicians, Men-midwives, Surgeons, Apothecaries, Chymists, Empericks. (2.) The Apprentices of all these, except of the two first Orders, who have none. These will make a tolerable Corps; and I dare say, will chearfully submit to a reasonable Burthen for the Interest and Honour of a Nation, where they are more liberally recompensed for their Skill, than in any other Country in the World.

The 16th Class having their Clerks and Journeymen, they should not be exempt from a small Tax.

The Reason for comprehending all the Clerks and Dependants of these several preceeding Classes is, that they may, in some Degree, contribute to ease the Burthen of their Superiors, and those on whom they so nearly depend for their Support and Maintenance.

If there should be Occasion to multiply the Classes, they may be farther extended. As (1.) To all Mayors, Sheriffs, Aldermen, and Magistrates, as such. (2.) To all Students at the Universities suitable to their Ranks. And if all this should not render the Tax light and easy to the whole, there may be an Act to oblige all public Places of Diversions whatsoever, as Plays, Masquerades, Operas, *Ranelagh*, *Vaux-Hall*, and all other Places of any Kind of public Diversion, to issue Tickets ; which Tickets should be stamped with ——— Stamp, under certain Penalties in Default thereof.

If all this should not prove sufficient to make the Tax set as light as could be wished, every Measure should be taken against the succeeding Year to prevent *Smuggling* ; more especially, that so notoriously carried on at the *Isle of Man* ; and which, if effected, may afford an additional Encrease to various Branches of the Revenue, that will not amount to less, perhaps, than 200,000 *l.* per Ann. and at the same Time, prevent this *Petty France*, bringing in a great Revenue to our Enemies.

With

With these, and every other Aid and Assistance that may be thought of, such a personal Tax, as is proposed to be laid, cannot, at this Conjunction, and to answer so good a Purpose, be thought a Grievance: But if it should not be judged adviseable to raise the whole of the Supplies *within the Year*, can we not first try whether one half thereof cannot be raised within that Time. If requisite, we may encrease the same the next Year, or make such Changes and Alterations therein, as Experience shall point out to be indispensably necessary: This may certainly be done without any Hazard. But as the Produce of such a Kind of Tax, as has been suggested, would be known in a *Month or two*, by being raised as proposed; if the *Supplies* were attempted to be raised this Way, at the very Beginning of the Session, there would be Time to make Alterations therein, without any Hazard of Disappointment; which having more fully considered in the former Part of this Work, I shall not here repeat.

I could sincerely wish, that those Classes may be omitted, which affect our naval and military Officers, they daily hazarding their Lives, in Time of War, for the public Service. I would by all Means likewise have the Clergy in general exempted, there not being many Prizes in the Lottery of Divinity to the Number of Blanks. However, I thought proper to take Notice of these Classes, lest some

should think it might betray a Glimmering of Partiality, which I would studiously avoid.

If it should be needful to supply those Deficiencies, a Tax upon *Saddle Horses*, and divers other Particulars, perhaps, might be thought of, that would not much affect those who should be the Objects of such Sort of Taxation.

The Number of Persons that would come within this Taxation, will not exceed one Million; and those reckoned, at an Average, of 3 *l.* each *per Ann.* will raise *Three Millions*, which levied *Monthly*, would be only 5 *s.* *per Month*. If even *Four Millions* should be required, it would make but 6 *s.* 8 *d.* *per Month*, on an Average of 4 *l.* *per Ann.* each, upon the supposed Million of Persons. But, according to the Scheme of public Oeconomy proposed, *Three Millions* will go farther than *Four Millions* will, by *borrowing* and *fund- ing*; and therefore, if the War was to continue ten Years, from the Time of Commencement of such Taxation, it would not cost the People, one with the other, above 30 *l.* each, in that Course of Years. If it be considered also, that during this whole Time, they will be exempt from all *additional Taxations*, during the whole ten Years, and at the End thereof, not be saddled with any *new perpetuated Taxes* upon our Trade, or otherwise; this will greatly alleviate the Burthen, and
reduce

reduce that 30*l.* in the whole ten Years, perhaps, next to Nothing. Nay, it may be a Question; Whether the Persons taxed, will not be Gainers rather than Sufferers at the End of the ten Years, with Respect to their Payments; when it is considered, that every Tax is *doubled* in its Burthen, according to the old System before shewn; and yet the Nation left incumber'd with encreased Debts?

Nor, according to what has been urged, need the highest Subject in the Kingdom, be rated at above 20*l.* *per Ann.* or 1*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* *per Menssem*; nor should the lowest proposed to be taxed, be less than 40*s.* *per Ann.* or 3*s.* 4*d.* *per Month*, upon the System of this Personal Tax *only*.

And if every Parish was obliged to remit their Money, *monthly* to the *Exchequer*, it might save even the Expence of Collection; for on such an extraordinary Occasion, we cannot be too parsimonious.

Nor do I apprehend there would be any great Difficulty in *Classing*, or in *Rating* the People, according to their Distinctions, nor any in the levying the Tax monthly.

But if a new Review and Assessment of the Land-Tax should take Place the succeeding Year, which would at least raise a *Million* more than it does, one third Part of this personal Tax might be reduced: And by the whole returning *Quarterly* into the Channels of Circulation, there seems Reason

to believe, that the People themselves, who shall be taxed, will be less sensibly affected, than they would be by the yearly Entail of *perpetuated new Taxes*, by the Encrease of the public Debts.

If a general Tax upon *Houses* should be thought rather more eligible, whereby to raise the Supplies *within the Year*, we shall next consider this Point.

The Number of Houses in *England*, according to the strictest Enquiry, is reckoned to amount to 1,200,000; and suppose 100,000 of them to be uninhabited, it would not be reasonable that they should be taxed, whilst they remained so. Let it be farther supposed, that 500,000 of these Houses are inhabited by the lowest and poorest Sort of People; from these we should expect no Advantage to the Scheme, that their Labor might not be enhanced, and the Goods thereby produced, raised in their Price.

After these Deductions, there will remain 600,000 Houses in *England*. If to these we add about 250,000 Houses in *Scotland*, and 150,000 in *Wales*, the whole will make one Million of Houses; whereon to raise three Millions; which will make the Tax on that Number, one with another, to be at the Rate of 3*l.* per House.

But if we were to make the Computation upon the Rental, we cannot compute it higher, at an Average, than 20*l.* per Ann. each;

each ; which will make the Total to be 20 Millions *per Ann.* and to raise 3 Millions thereon, the Rate must be 3 s. in the Pound, supposing none of these Deductions to be made in *Scotland* and *Wales*, as we have done in Regard to *England* : If we suppose that the Deduction of the Number made in *England* may be sufficient to answer for those that ought to be deducted upon the whole, and the Rental should be overated, then the Rate must be encreased : and if the Rate should be made *Four Shillings* in the Pound, the Rental must be *Fifteen Millions* to give the *Three Millions* annually required. But if such a Rate should be thought too high, as it certainly would, let it be considered, whether, by the conjunctive Aid of a *House-Tax* on the Rental, and a *Personal-Tax* only on certain Classes of People this will not more equally answer the Purpose.

Suppose then that a *Million and a Half* shall be raised upon the *House-Rental* at 2 s. in the Pound, reckoning the Rental as before at *Fifteen Millions*, and another *Million and a Half* shall be raised upon certain Classes of Persons, amounting to a *Million* in Number ; this will be only 30 *Shillings* to be paid by each yearly, take them one with the other, which is no more than Half a Crown *per Month*.

It is, therefore, humbly submitted, whether, from the proper Application of these two Methods

thods of Taxation, the Supplies cannot be lightly raised *within the Year*, and without any Expence, or at most that only of *Three Pence* in the Pound; these two Taxes being collectible at the same Time: and when the People know, that they must pay *within the Month*, the Collectors will have the less Trouble.

But if a Scheme of this Kind should not be acceptable, it is not to be doubted but the Wisdom of the great Representative of the Nation will think of a better, when once they shall be convinced of the Necessity, of the absolute and indispensable Necessity there is to raise the Supplies *within the Year*: And this is the chief Point that I have laboured throughout this Tract.

Let whatever Scheme be pitched upon, it will not be the least Recommendation, that a Part thereof may be made instrumental, after the War, to reduce the Public Debts, in a few Years, to such a Degree, that the whole national Taxes may set so light and easy on our Trade, as to be little Incumbrance to it: Whereby our Commodities in general will be so lowered at foreign Markets, that we shall not only retrieve those Branches we have lost, but extend our Trade into many new Branches, as the Public Debts shall from Time to Time, be discharged; which will furnish Employment for the Capital as paid off.

And

And if it shall please God to let me see those Days, I may possibly endeavour to shew in what Manner many Millions more than are, may be gradually thrown into Trade; and this Nation, rendered as happy and prosperous as the Nature of Things will admit; and the whole Protestant Interest invincible secured.

LETTER

LETTER XIV.

The Effects of a quick Circulation between Money and Commodities further considered: upon which Principle depend the Ease and Practicability of Raising the Supplies within the Year.

THE Government and the Persons, who deal with them for naval and military Stores, &c. shall be considered, as we have in some Measure done heretofore, in the Light of Traders; the Government as Purchasers of the requisite Commodities whereof they stand in Need; the Traders as Sellers; and the Supplies to be raised, as the Trading-Stock of the Government. Wherefore, all the Benefits that may accrue to a Trading-State, from Traders carrying on their commercial Negotiations in general, by *Ready-money, or Short-Credit Dealings*, may be presumed likewise to arise to the Government in Proportion to the Extent of its Dealings upon the same Principles.

Money is a collective Name, under which Custom comprehends all Kinds of conventional Riches.

It is essentially necessary to distinguish in the nicest Manner the Principles we are going to

to lay down ; because, tho' very simple in themselves, their Consequences may be less so ; and to keep our Ideas within the Bounds of each of the Circles, we shall consider them distinctly.

It is evident, as we have before observed, throughout this Tract, that the Introduction of Money into Commerce has not any Ways altered the Nature of that Commerce. It still consists in an Exchange of Commodities for Commodities ; or, in the Absence of those which are wanted, for Money, which is the Representation of them.

The Repetition of that Exchange is called Circulation.

Money being only the Sign of Commodities, the Word *Circulation*, by which their Exchange is expressed, ought to be applied to the Commodities, and not to the Money : for the Function of the Sign depends absolutely on the Existence of the Thing it is intended to represent.

Accordingly Money is attracted by Commodities, and has a representative Value so far only as the Possession of it is always attended with a Certainty of being able to exchange it for Commodities. The Inhabitants of *Potosi* would be in a most deplorable Condition amidst all their vast Heaps of Silver, and must starve, if they were debarred for one Week exchanging them for Food.

It

It is, therefore, a mistaken Notion to think Money in itself the Principle of Circulation, as we shall endeavour to shew.

First let us distinguish two Sorts of Circulations of Money ; the one natural, the other composite.

In Order to form a just Idea of that natural Circulation, it is proper to consider Societies abstractedly ; and to consider what Function Money can perform in them in Proportion to it's Mass.

Let us suppose two Countries able to subsist of themselves, without foreign Connections, equally populous, and possessed of an equal Number of the same Commodities : that the Mass of Commodities in the one be represented by 100 Pounds of any Metal whatever, and that of the other by 200 Pounds of the same Metal : what will be worth an Ounce in one will cost two Ounces in the other.

The Inhabitants of both Countries will be equally happy, as to the Use they are able to make of their Commodities within themselves. The only Difference will consist in the Bulk of the Sign, and the Ease with which it may be transported, but it's Function will be performed equally.

Two very important Truths will be easily conceived from this Hypothesis.

I. Wherever unanimous Consent has established one Quantity to be the Sign or Representation of another Quantity ; if the Quantity representing be encreased, whilst the Quantity

tity represented remains the same ; the Bulk of the Sign will encrease, but it's Function will not be multiplied.

2^{dly}. The important Point for the Facility of Exchanges does not consist in the greater or less Bulk of the Signs ; but in the Assurance which the Proprietors of Money and Commodities have to be able to exchange them whenever they please in their several Divisions, on the Footing established by Custom, in Proportion to their reciprocal Masses.

The Operation of Circulation is, therefore, nothing more than a reiterated Exchange of Commodities for Money, and of Money for Commodities. The Convenience of Trade is it's Origin ; and the continual and reciprocal Need, in which Men stand of each other, is it's Motive.

It's Duration depends on an entire Confidence in the Facility of continuing to make Exchanges on the Footing established by Custom ; in Proportion to the reciprocal Masses.

Let us, therefore, define the natural Circulation of Money,

The continual Presence in Trade of the Portion of Money, which each Portion of Commodities has been used to fetch, in Proportion to their reciprocal Masses.

The Effect of this natural Circulation is to establish between Money and Commodities a perfect Rivalship, by which they are incessantly divided among all the Inhabitants of a Country ; from that constant Division it follows,

lows, that none want to borrow but every Man is busied in some Occupation or other, or is a Proprietor of Land.

So long as Nothing interrupts that exact Equilibrium, Men will be happy and Society will flourish, whether the Bulk of the Signs be great or small.

It is not my Business here to follow the Condition of that Society: What I intend to prove is, in what the natural Function of Money, as a Sign, consists: And wherever that natural Order now subsists, Money is not the Measure of Commodities, but on the contrary, the Quantity of Commodities is the Measure of the Bulk of the Sign.

As Commodities are subject to great Inequalities in Point of Goodness, as they are spoiled and destroyed more easily than Metals; as the latter may be more easily concealed, in Case of any foreign Invasion or domestic Trouble, as they are more conveniently carried to another Country, in Case that in which we live ceases to please: in short, as all Men are not equally inclined to consume the same Quantity of Commodities, it may happen that some Proprietors of Money hoard up the superfluous Quantities, which they have more than what they want *.

* If by Raising the Supplies *within the Year*, a great Part of the hoarded Money be drawn into Circulation, it would be of more Benefit to the Nation, than to continue motionless and inactive.

As those Hoards encrease, there will be a greater Chasm in the Mass of Money, whereby the Mass of Commodities used to be compensated: A Part of those Commodities being deprived of its usual Exchange, the Balance will incline in Favour of Money.

The Proprietors of Money will then want to measure with it such Commodities as are most common, such as keep least well, and of which the Exchange is least convenient: Money will no longer perform its Office of Representative; the Loss which the Commodities measured by the Money must sustain, will bear down the Equilibrium of Ballance in its Favour; the Confusion will be great in Proportion to the Sum locked up.

The Money taken out of Trade passing no longer through the Channels where it was used to go, Numbers of Men will be forced to suspend, or diminish their usual Purchases.

In Order to bring that Money back into Trade, those who are in great Want of it will offer a Profit to its Proprietors to part with it for a Time. That Profit will be proportioned to the Borrower's Want, the Advantage the Money may be of to him, and the Risk run by him that lends it.

That Example will induce many others to procure themselves a like Advantage by their Savings; an Advantage by so much the more pleasing as it indulges Idleness. In a Nation where Work is thought a Shame, that

Custom will find many Abettors ; and the Money which used to circulate there, will be oftener locked up, than among People who respect and esteem such as do work. The Abuse of that Custom being extreamly easy, the same Spirit which shall have countenanced it at first will carry that Abuse to such a Height that the Legislator will be obliged to put a Stop to it. In short, whenever it is easy to make a Profit by, or receive an Interest for the Loan of Money, it is plain that every Man willing to employ his in any Undertaking whatever, will immediately reckon, among the Charges of that Undertaking, what his Money would have produced him by putting it out to Use.

Such to me seems to have been the Origin of Usury, or of Interest of Money. Several Consequences ensue from what we have just said.

1st, The natural Circulation is interrupted in Proportion as the Money, which did circulate in Trade, is drawn out of it.

2^{dly}, The more Reasons there are for distrusting a State, the more Money will be locked up.

3^{dly}, If Men find they can make a Profit by drawing their Money out of Trade, the Quantity drawn out will be proportioned to the Greatness of that Profit *.

* Must not the encreasing our public Debts, draw more and more Money out of Trade?

4^{thly},

4thly, The less natural the Circulation is, the less People are able to consume; and the Power or Faculty of consuming will be less equally divided.

5thly, The less the Industrious are able to consume, the less the Power or Faculty of consuming is distributed equally; and the more it is easy to hoard up Money, the more will Money be scarce in Trade.

6thly, The more Money goes out of Trade, the more Distrust arises.

7thly, The more Money is scarce in Trade, the more it deviates from its Function as a Sign, in Order to become the Measure of Commodities.

8thly, The only Way to make Money return back into Trade, is to allot it an Interest relative to its natural Function as a Sign and its usurped Quality as a Measure.

9thly, All Interest allotted to Money is a Diminution of the Value of Commodities.

10thly, Whenever any one shall have heaped up a Sum of Money with a Design to put it out at Interest, the natural Circulation will have diminished successively, until that Sum re-appears in Trade. It is, therefore, evident, that Commerce is the only Way of growing rich and useful to the State. Now Commerce comprehends the Culture of the Lands, ingenious Labor, and Navigation.

11thly, The more Money shall have deviated from its natural Function as a Sign, the higher the Interest of it will be.

12thly, From the Interest of Money's being higher in one Country than another, we may conclude, that the Circulation of it has deviated more there from the natural Order; that the Class of Workmen enjoys a less Degree of Ease, and that there are more Poor. But we cannot hence conclude, that the Mass of Signs is intrinsically less considerable.

13thly, It is evident, that the Interest of Money in a State cannot be properly and usefully reduced, but by bringing the Circulation nearer to its natural Order.

14thly, In short, wherever Money receives an Interest, it ought to be considered in two Lights at once. As a Sign, it will be attracted by the Commodities; as a Measure, it will give them a different Value, according as it appears or disappears in Trade; Consequently, Money and Commodities will attract each other reciprocally.

We will, therefore, define the composite Circulation, an unequal Competition or Rivalship of the Commodities and their Signs, in Favour of their Signs.

Let us now bring those Societies nearer together, and pursue the Effects of the Diminution, or Increase of the Mass of Signs by the Ballance of the Exchanges made by those Societies with each other.

If that Money, which we suppose taken out of Trade, in Order to be restored to it by usurious Means, chances to have passed into a foreign

foreign Country there to remain for ever ; it is plain, that the Portion of Commodities thereby deprived of its usual Equivalent, will likewise be for ever lost to Commerce ; for the Number of Buyers would in such Case be irretrievably diminished.

The Men who were supported by working in those Commodities would be forced to beg or seek Employment in other Countries. The Absence of those Men, so expatriated, would form a new Chasm in the Consumption of Commodities ; the Populoufness of the Country would diminish by Degrees, until the Scarceness of Commodities put them again on a Level with the Quantity of the Signs circulating in Trade.

Consequently, if the Bulk of the Signs or the Price of Commodities be in itself indifferent towards establishing a mutual Assurance of their Exchange, between the Proprietors of the Money, and those of the Commodities, in Proportion to their reciprocal Masses ; it is on the other Hand highly necessary that the Mass of the Signs on which this Proportion and the Assurance of such Exchange are founded, should never diminish.

We may, therefore, lay it down as a Rule, that the Condition of a Nation is much worse, when the Money that did circulate in its Trade is taken out of it, than if that Money had never circulated in it.

Having thus shewn the Effects of the Diminution of the Mass of Money in the Circulation of a State, let us endeavour to find what are the Effects of its Encrease.

By Encrease of the Mass of Money we do not understand the Return into Trade of that Part, which was taken out of it through Distrust or Cupidity. The Return of that Part is precarious; it never re-appears with any Degree of Stability, and always on such Conditions as are a harsh Warning to such as make Use of it; it is likewise attended with a Diminution of the Value of Commodities according to our ninth Consequence. That Money was before due to Trade, which now owes it: It restores, indeed, the Means of Occupation to the People, but it is by sharing the Fruits of their Labor, and by limiting their Subsistence.

What we here speak of, is, therefore, a new Mass of Money, the Entrance of which into the Circulation of a State is not precarious: There are but two Ways of procuring it, either from the Mines, or by foreign Trade.

The Money arising from the Possession of Mines may not be thrown into the Commerce of a State for many Reasons. It is in the Hands of but a small Number of Men; so that even though they were to enlarge their Expences in Proportion to their Abilities, the Competition or Rivalship of Money will have encreased in Favour of a few Commodities

modities only. The Consumption of such Things as are most necessary in Life, is not encreased by the Riches of one Man; so that the Circulation of this new Money will begin with the least useful Commodities, and from them proceed slowly to other more important ones.

The Class of Men employed in working in useful and necessary Commodities, is however that which ought to be strengthened most, because that is the Class which supports all the Rest.

The Money that comes in Exchange for superfluous Commodities, is necessarily distributed among the Proprietors of those Commodities, by the Merchants who are the Nation's Stewards. Those Proprietors are, either rich Men, who, working with the Assistance of others, are forced to employ a Part of the Value received to pay Wages; or poor, who are forced to expend almost the Whole of what they receive to be able to live comfortably. Foreign Trade embraces every Kind of Commodity, and every Class of People.

We shall, therefore, lay it down as a Maxim, that Circulation will be encreased more certainly and more speedily in a Nation, by an advantageous Balance of it's Trade with Foreigners, than by the Possession of Mines.

And accordingly, it is only of the Encrease of the Mass of Money by foreign Trade that we intend to speak.

Wherever Money has ceased to be a bare Sign attracted by Commodities, it is become in Part the Measures of them ; And as such attracts them reciprocally. Wherefore every Augmentation of the Mass of Money, perceptible in the Circulation of it, begins with multiplying it's Function as a Sign, before it encreases it's Bulk as such ; that is to say, the new Money, before it raises the Price of Commodities, will bring a greater Number of them into Trade than what there was before. But at last this Bulk of the Sign will be encreased in composite Proportion to the old and new Masses, either of Commodities or of their Signs.

In the mean Time, it is plain that this new Mass of Money will necessarily have awakened a Spirit of Industry where it first passes. Let us endeavour to discern it's general Progress.

All Rivalship of Money which happens in Trade by Favour of a Commodity, encourages those who are able to furnish that Commodity to bring it into Trade, in Order to profit by the favourable Circumstance. It cannot fail to be so, if no inward Defect in the State, prevents it: for if the Country has not a sufficient Number of Hands to encrease the Rivalship of the Commodity, Strangers will come and settle there, if properly received and made easy in their Circumstances.

This new Rivalship of the Commodity so favoured, restores a Kind of Equilibrium between

tween that and Money; which is to say, that the Augmentation of the Signs destined to be exchanged for that Commodity, is distributed among a greater Number of Men or of Commodities: the Function of the Sign is multiplied.

However, the Bulk of the Sign generally encreases so much as is necessary to keep up the Spirits of the Workmen: for their Ambition regulates itself, and sooner or later limits the Rivalship of the Commodity, in Proportion to the Profit it yields.

The Workmen employed in forming or manufacturing that Commodity, finding an Encrease of the Sign, will establish among themselves a new Rivalship in Favour of the Commodities which they want to consume. Happily, the Signs made Use of in the new Consumptions, will in their Turn have the same Effect on other Men. The Benefit resulting therefrom will be repeated, till it has reached every Class of Men useful to the State; that is to say, such who are occupied.

If we suppose that the Mass of Money introduced in Favour of that Commodity at one or more Times, has been perceptibly divided among all the other Commodities by Circulation, two Effects will result therefrom.

1st, Each Kind of Commodity having appropriated to itself a Portion of the new Mass of Signs, the Expence of the Workmen to whose Labor that Profit shall have been owing, will be encreased, and their Profit lessened.

ed. This Diminution of Profits is very different from that which proceeds from the Diminution of the Mass of Signs. In the first, the Workman is encouraged by the Sight of a great Number of Buyers ; in the Second, he is drove to despair by not seeing any. The first sharpens his Genius ; the latter gives him a Dislike to Work.

2dly, By an exact Distribution of the new Mass of Money, it's Continuance in Trade is more certain ; the Motives for Distrust which might chance to be in the State, vanish ; the Proprietors of the old Mass spread it about more freely : Circulation is brought nearer to it's natural Order : There are fewer Borrowers, and Money loses of it's Price.

The Interest paid to Money being a Diminution of the Value of Commodities according to our Ninth Consequence ; the Diminution of that Interest encreases their Value : Consequently they then yield a greater Profit by being brought into Trade. In Fact, there is not any one of it's Branches to which *the natural, not the forced Reduction of Interest does not give a new Life.*

Every Sort of Land is fit for some Production or other : but if the Sale of those Productions does not yield a Profit equal to what the Interest of the Money employed in cultivating it would have produced, that Culture will be neglected or abandoned. Whence it follows, that the lower the *natural Interest*

est of Money is in a Country, the more it's Lands are reputed fertile.

The same Reasoning ought to take Place in the Establishment of Manufactories either for Navigation, Fishery, or the Planting of Colonies. The loss the Interest of the Disbursements requisite in such Enterprize is high, the more lucrative they are reputed to be.

By there being fewer Borrowers in a State and a greater proportional Profit in Trade, the Number of Merchants is encreased. The Mass of Money augments; the Consumptions are multiplied; the Bulk of Signs encreases: the Profits then diminish; And by a constant Gradation, Industry becomes more active: The Interest of Money falls, whereby the Proportion of Advantages is restored; and Circulation becomes more natural.

Let us now extend our Views, and run over the immense Field of an Infinity of Means combined together, to attract the Money of foreign Nations by Trade. But let us suppose at first, one only in each Province of a State: What Rapidity of Circulation? What a Source of Cupidity will it not be to Artists and Workmen of every Kind? Their Emulation is no longer confined to each particular Class, when many have seen, and are sensible of the Gain that may be made: The Warmth and Confidence become general. The Ease and Convenience with which some live, is a Spur to others to strive

strive to do so too, and their joint Endeavours are the Seal of public Prosperity.

From what has been just said of the Augmentation of the Mass of Money by foreign Trade, several Consequences ensue.

1st, The Augmentation of the Mass of Money in Circulation, cannot be said to be sensible, but so far as it encreases the Consumption of necessary Commodities, or promotes a Convenience useful towards the Preservation of Mankind; that is to say, the Ease of the People.

2^{dly}, It is not so much a great Sum of Money brought at once into a State, that promotes and animates Circulation, as the gradual and continual bringing in of that Money, to be distributed among the People.

3^{dly}, Circulation is brought nearer to its natural Order, in Proportion as the foreign Money is more equally distributed among the People.

4^{thly}, The Diminution of the Number of Borrowers, or of the natural Interest of Money, being a Consequence of the *Celerity and Activity of Circulation*, becomes more natural; and the Celerity of Circulation, or of public Ease, not being itself a necessary Consequence of the bringing in a large Sum of Money at once into the State, so much as it is that of the continual Encrease of such Money distributed among the People; we cannot but conclude, *that the Interest of Money will not naturally decrease, whenever the*

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Consumptions of the People do not encrease *. That if the Consumptions were to encrease, the Interest of Money would naturally decrease, without Regard to the Multitude of its Mass, but in composite Proportion to the Number of Lenders and Borrowers. That the sudden Multiplication of *artificial Riches*, or *Paper-Money*, is a violent and ineffectual Remedy, when a more natural Method can be taken.

5thly, So long as the Interest of Money keeps high in a Country, whose foreign Trade is advantageous, it is a sure Sign that the Circulation is not free there. I speak of a State in general; for some Circumstances might chance to bring such a Quantity of Money into one Place, as would, by its being over plenty, force a *Fall of Interest*: But that *very Fall* would often indicate a *Stoppage of Circulation*, in the other Parts of the Body politic.

6thly, So long as the Circulation is obstructed in a State, one may venture to assert, that it does not carry on so great a Commerce as it might do.

* Hence it appears, that all Reductions of the Interest of Money of the public Creditors, which have tended to diminish the *Spending-Money* of the Nation, have been *unnatural*, unless they had ultimately, as designed originally, tended to have reduced the *Price* of our Commodities, in the like Proportion, and thereby not have diminished the Consumption. And this would have been the Consequence, if the *Savings* had been sacredly applied to the Payment of the *old Debts* incurred before 1716, as has been shewn.

7thly, Every Circulation that does not result from *foreign Trade*, is slow and unequal, unless it is become absolutely natural.

8thly, The Bulk of Signs being encreased in Proportion to their Mass in Trade; if that Money was to go out of Trade some Time after, the Commodities would be forced to diminish their Price or Mass, at the same Time that the Interest of Money would rise; because the Scarcity of Money would encrease the Motives of Distrust in the State.

9thly, As every Thing would have encreased in a certain Degree of Proportion, thro' the Influence of *Traffic*; and as no Man chuses to be the first that lessens his Profit; the Commodities the most necessary in Life, would keep up their Price. The Earnings of the common People being little more than sufficient to purchase those Necessaries, the Produce of Labor must of course remain dear, in Order to continue to maintain the Workmen; it would therefore be the Mass of Labor that would first diminish; until the Diminution of Populoufness, and of Consumptions should lower the Prices. During that Interval, Commodities being dear, and the Interest of Money high, the foreign Trade would decline, and the Body-politic be in a dangerous Crisis.

10thly, If a new Mass of Money brought into a State, did not enter into Trade, it is plain, that the State would thereby be richer, relatively to other States; but the Circulation

tion would be neither encreased nor lessen'd thereby.

11^{thly}, Fortunes made by Trade, having in general necessarily encreased or preserved *Circulation*, their inequality cannot have affected the Equilibrium between the several Classes of the People.

12^{thly}, If Fortunes made by foreign Trade are taken out of it, there will be a Chasm in the *Circulation* of those Parts, where that Money used to be spread. But if Trade be esteemed and protected, *such Fortunes will remain in it.*

13^{thly}, If those Fortunes go, not only out of Trade, but likewise out of the *Home Circulation*; the Loss of them will be felt by all Classes of People in general, as being a Diminution of the Mass of Money. That cannot happen, when there are no quicker, easier, or surer Ways of gaining than by Trade.

14^{thly}, The more different Objects a foreign Trade embraces, the quicker will its Influence on *Circulation* be.

15^{thly}, The nearer the Objects embraced by foreign Trade draw towards the first Necessities common to all Men, the better will be the Equilibrium established by *Circulation* between all the Classes of the People: And consequently the sooner will the Ease make the Interest of Money naturally fall †.

† If ever the Necessities of the State, should prevail upon our public Creditors to consent to reduce the Interest of their Money below 3 *per Cent.* the Measures here proposed, are most likely to obtain their Acquiescence therein.

16^{thly}, If the usual Introduction of a new Mass of Money into the State, by the Sale of its superfluous Commodities, should stop suddenly ; its Effect would be absolutely the same as that of a Diminution of the Mass ; that it is, which makes War so fatal to Trade. Whence it follows, that the Nation which carries on her Trade best with the Help of her *maritime Force*, is least incommoded by War. It must, however, be observed, that Artists and other Workmen do not forsake a Country on Account of War, so easily as if the sudden Interruption of Trade proceeded from any other Cause. For Hope still sustains them, and the other warring Parties likewise, find a Chasm in their Circulation.

17^{thly}, Since foreign Trade enlivens all the Members of the Body-politic, by the Impulse with which it promotes Circulation, it ought to be the chief Care of Society in general, and of every Individual, who would be thought a useful Member of Society.

That foreign Trade, the Establishment of which requires so much Care, will not support itself, if other Nations have not likewise a real *Interest* in preserving it. *That Interest can be no other than the cheaper Price of Commodities.*

We have seen, that a Part of every new Mass of Money brought into Trade, commonly encreases the Bulk of the Signs.

That Bulk, in itself indifferent to him that receives it, so long as it does not procure him

a greater Degree of Convenience, is by no Means indifferent to the Foreigner, who purchases the Commodities. For if he receives them in another Country in Exchange for Signs of a less Bulk, it is there that he will make his Purchases. The Countries who are Buyers, will likewise endeavour to do without a Commodity, tho' the only one of its Kind, if it be not absolutely necessary, when the Bulk of its Sign becomes too great, compared with the Mass of Signs which they possess.

It should, therefore, seem that foreign Trade, the Object of which is to attract continually *fresh Supplies of Money*, would be working its own Ruin, in Proportion to the Progress it makes that Way; and consequently, that the State would be deprived of the Advantage resulting from *Circulation*.

If in Reality, the Mass of Signs was encreased in a State, to such a Degree, as to render all Commodities too dear for Foreigners, all Trade with them would be reduced to Exchanges; or if that State was able to subsist of itself, it would have no foreign Trade. Circulation would no longer encrease, nor would it be weakened, because the Introduction of Money would cease, by a Series of imperceptible Gradations. The Country would contain as many Men as it could support and employ of itself; its Riches in wrought Plate, Diamonds, and other scarce and valuable Effects, would surpass

infinitely its *numeral Riches* ; not to speak of the Value of other more common Pieces of Furniture. Its Inhabitants, tho' destitute of all foreign Trade, would be very happy, so long as their Number should not exceed the Proportion of its Lands. In short, the Legislator's End would be answered, because the Society governed by him would be vested with all the Strength of which it is susceptible.

Men have not yet deserved from Heaven so great a Blessing as such a profound Peace, and so constant a Series of Prosperity. The dreadful Scourges which continually hang over their Heads, warn them from Time to Time, by falling on them, not to set their Hearts too much on perishable Objects.

What is a Chastisement for the Sins of Men, delivers Commerce from a Superabundance of *numeral Riches*.

Tho' the Period to which we have conducted a Body politic, cannot morally be attained, yet we will follow this Hypothesis a Moment longer ; not with a chimerical Design to penetrate into inaccessible Parts, but in Order to collect useful Truths by the Way.

The Country we are speaking of, before its Commerce with Foreigners, can have been totally interrupted, will have disputed for many Ages, the Right of attracting their Money.

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That is always advantageous to a Society, that has foreign Interests with other Societies, even tho' it should be of no Ease to it at Home. Money is a general Sign received by the unanimous Consent of all civilized Nations. Not content with its Function of Sign, it is become the Measure of Commodities; and what is more, Men have made it the Measure of their Actions. The Nation that possesses most of it, is therefore Mistress over those who know not how to reduce it to what to them is its just Value. That Knowledge seems now to be quite abandoned in *Europe*, and given up to a small Number of Men, whom others would think ridiculous, if they did not take Care to conceal themselves. The Encrease of the Mass of Signs, animates Industry, and encreases Population; it is of Moment to deprive Rivals of the Means of becoming powerful, because we gain a relative Force thereby.

It would be impossible to say, in what Space of Time the Bulk of the Signs might encrease in a State to such a Degree as to interrupt its foreign Trade. But a general and natural Way is known to prolong the Introduction of foreign Metals into a Nation.

The Diminution of the Number of Borrowers, and of the natural Interest of Money, proceeds from a well distributed Encrease of the Signs in a State. That Diminution is the Source of a more easy

Profit on Commodities ; of a sure Means of obtaining the Preference in one's Sales ; and, in short, of a greater Rivalship of the Commodities of Workmen and Merchants. To attempt to calculate the Effects of Emulation or Rivalship, would be trying to measure the Extent of the human Genius, or calculate all the Efforts it is capable of. From the smaller Number of Borrowers, and the Lowness of the Interest of Money, two farther great Advantages result.

We have seen, that the Proprietors of superfluous Commodities sold Abroad, first pay out of the Metals which they receive in Exchange, what is due for Wages to the Workmen employed in those Commodities. A considerable Portion of those Metals still remains in their Hands : And if they have not just then Occasion for a sufficient Number of Commodities to employ the Whole of their Metals, they cause a Part of them to be wrought, or converted into precious Stones, and other Things of such known Scarcity, as to be all the World over equivalent to a great Bulk of Metals.

The Circulation does not for that Reason diminish, according to the tenth Consequence, on the Encrease of the Mass of Money. When that Custom is the Effect of a Superabundance of Metal in the general Circulation, it is a very great Proof of the public Prosperity. It plainly suspends the Encrease of the Bulk of Signs without any Diminution

tion of Strength to the Body politic. We are speaking of a Country, where the Encrease of private Fortunes is owing to Trade, and the Greatness of the general Circulation. For if there be other Ways of collecting great Heaps of Metals, and a Part of them be converted to that Use, it is plain, that the Circulation will diminish by so much as those Heaps amount to; that all the Consequences which ensue from the Principles we have laid down, concerning the Diminution of the Mass of Money, will be as much felt, as if that Money had passed into other Nations; unless it be instantly replaced by a new equivalent Introduction of more; but in that Case, the People will not have been enriched.

The third Advantage arising from the natural Lowness of the Interest of Money, gives one Nation a great Superiority over another.

In Proportion as Money superabounds in the Hands of the Proprietors of Commodities, no Borrowers offering, they transmit that Part which they do not intend to employ in Trade, to Countries where Money is the Measure of Commodities. They lend it to the State, or to Merchants at a high Interest, which comes round annually into the Circulation of the Nation that lends, and deprives the other of the Benefit of Circulation. The Workmen of the State that borrows, are no longer any more than Slaves
al-

allowed to work some Days in the Year to earn themselves a scanty Subsistence : All the rest belongs to their Masters ; and the Tribute is exactly rigorously, whether they have subsisted well or ill. The Nation that borrows is *in the general* in that Crisis of which our eighth and ninth Consequences of the Augmentation of the Mass of Money, shew the Reason.

After a Revolution of some Years, the principal Sum borrowed, is in Fact gone in Payment of the Arrears, tho' the Whole of it be still due, and the Creditor has yet remaining an infallible Means of subverting the *Circulation of the State indebted, by drawing out his Capital suddenly* *. In short, if a little Regard be but paid to the Profit made in Exchanges, by a Nation to which others are indebted, one must be thoroughly convinced of the *Advantage of lending one's Money to Foreigners*.

Divers natural Causes may retard the Preference of Money in Trade, even when the Circulation is free ; besides, the Carriage of it is tedious and expensive. Men have found out a Way to represent it by two Sorts of Signs.

The one are momentary, being only simple Promises in Writing to produce such a Sum, in such a Place, at such a Time.

* Does it not follow, that the more we encrease our Public Debts, the more we put ourselves in the Power of Foreigners to ruin us of a sudden. If *France* possesses *Holland*, may they not oblige the *Dutch* to draw all their Money out of our Funds?

These Promises pass from one to another, in Payment either of Commodities or of Money itself, until the Time stipulated be expired.

By the second Sort of Signs of Money is understood Obligations as permanent as Money itself, and which circulate in public as Money.

These momentary Promises, and these permanent Obligations, bear no other Resemblance to each other, than in their being both Qualities of Signs ; and as such, neither the one nor the other have any Value, but so far as the Money exists, or is supposed to exist.

But they are different in both their Nature and Effect.

Those of the first Sort are forced to be balanced at the limited Time, by the Money which they represent ; wherefore the Quantity of them in a State is always in Proportion to the respective Distribution of the Mass of Money.

Their Effect is to keep up or repeat the Rivalship of Monies with Commodities, in Proportion to the respective Distribution of the Mass of Money, This Proposition is self-evident, if we do but consider, that we see most Notes of Hand and Bills of Exchange when Money is common, and least when it is most scarce.

The permanent Signs are divided into two Classes : Some may be annulled whenever the Proprietor of them pleases; others cannot cease
to

to exist but so far only as he by whom they were proposed to others to be acknowledged for Signs, consents to suppress and annul them.

The Effect of these permanent Signs, is to keep up the Rivalship of Money with Commodities, not in Proportion to its real Mass, but in Proportion to the Quantity of Signs added to the real Mass of the Money. The World has seen them twice usurp the Quality of the Measure of Money, doubtless in Order, that no Kind of Extravagance* should be wanting in the Annals of Mankind.

So long as these Signs, whatever they may be, perform their natural Function freely, the State is in a very happy Condition within : Because Commodities are exchanged as freely for the Signs of Money, as for Money itself ; but with the two Differences of which we have taken Notice.

The momentary Signs do nothing more than repeat the Rivalship of the real Mass of Money with Commodities

The permanent Signs multiply in the Opinion of Men the Mass of Money. Whence it follows, that, that multiplied Mass has, at the Instant of its Multiplication, *the same Effect that every new Introduction of Money into Trade has* : Consequently, that the Circula-

* Alluding to the *Mississippi* and *South-Sea* Years.

tion distributes among the People a greater Quantity of the Signs of Commodities, than there was before ; that the Bulk of the Signs encreases ; and that the Number of Borrowers diminishes.

*If that Multiplication be immense and sudden, it is plain, that Commodities cannot be multiplied in the same Proportion *.*

If it was not followed by an annual Introduction of some Kind or other of new Signs, the Effect of that Suspension would not be so much felt as if one had no other Currency but Specie ; it might even happen, that the real Mass of Money should be diminished without being perceived, on Account of the Superabundance of the Signs. *But the Interest of Money would remain the same, unless forcibly reduced, by which neither Trade nor Agriculture can be Gainers.*

In short, it is highly proper to observe, that this Multiplication does not enrich a State otherwise than in the Opinion of such of its Subjects as have a Confidence in the Signs multiplied ; and that those Signs are of no Use whatever in the *foreign Connections* of the Society that possesses them,

It is evident, that those Signs, of whatever Nature they may be, are an Exertion of *another's Power*, and are, therefore, properly a

* This must be considered to be the Case, with Regard to our national Debts, and the Consequence must follow, as represented.

Part of *Credit*, which has its several Branches, and is in itself so important a Concern, that we have treated of it in various Lights already. But it must always be remembered, that the Principles of the *Circulation of Money* must necessarily be the *Principles of Credit*, which is only the *Image of the other*.

From the Principles that the very Nature of Things has furnished us with a Demonstration of, we may deduce three Maxims which ought to be considered as the Analysis of all the rest, and which admit of no Exception.

1st, Whatever hurts Trade, either Home, or Foreign, exhausts the *Sources of Circulation*.

2^{dly}, All Diminution of Security, in a State, suspends the Effects of Trade; that is to say, of *Circulation*, and destroys Trade itself.

3^{dly}, The less the Rivalship of the Signs existing, is proportioned in each Part of a State to that of the Commodities; that is to say, the less *quick and active Circulation* is, the more *Poor* there will be in that State: and consequently the more quick and active the Circulation, as proposed by the *Manner* of raising the Supplies within the Year, the less *Poor*, and the more Wealth and Prosperity we must enjoy.

These general Sentiments of an ingenious and impartial Foreigner agreeing with the Tenor of this Tract, I have thought proper to add them in the Conclusion.

P O S T-

P O S T S C R I P T.

THE Reader is desired to remark, that in *Letter XIII.* which contains a Sketch of Schemes for raising the Supplies within the Year, the Numbers of the several Classes of the People therein set forth, relate to *England* only, those in *Scotland* and *Wales*, being omitted, not being able to ascertain them so correctly; which if taken into Consideration, would lessen the *Personal Tax*, in Proportion to such a Number of People, when that shall be ascertained. But if in the Scheme proposed, *Two Millions* of Persons should be Taxed, in *England*, *Scotland*, and *Wales*, instead of the *One Million* therein mentioned, this would not be above *one Quarter Part* of the *whole* People; and the other *Three Quarters*, who were the least able to bear the same, being free from the Tax, this would prove no Incumbrance to Trade, nor be thought any Hardship upon those who should bear it, because it would prove a very trifling Tax upon double the Number of Persons, when it is considered in Conjunction with that upon the Rental of *Houses*, together with the other additional Particulars suggested in that Letter; all which might contribute to lessen the public Burthen.

F I N I S.

tion diffidence among the People a greater
 Quantity of the Signs of Commodities than
 there was before; that the Bulk of the Signs
 increased; and that the Number of Buyers

was diminished.

It is that Multiplication of Signs and Buyers
 which is the Cause of the Increase of the
 Quantity of the Signs of Commodities.

It is also followed by an annual Influx
 of new Signs and Buyers of new Signs.

The Effect of this Influx is that the
 Quantity of the Signs of Commodities is
 increased.

Without being observed by the
 Signs of Commodities.

Suppose that the Quantity of the
 Signs of Commodities is increased.

In this case the Quantity of the
 Signs of Commodities is increased.

But the Quantity of the Signs of
 Commodities is not increased.

It is not increased by the
 Signs of Commodities.

It is not increased by the
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It is not increased by the
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It is not increased by the
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Postlethwayt, Malachy,

Great-Britain's True System ...

London 1757

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